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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses the history of the Victorian women‘s domestic violence services 
movement from 1974 through to a period of significant change in 2005. Whilst services 
provided accommodation to women and children in crisis, the refuge movement of the 1970s 
made explicit the link between what became known as domestic violence and the need for 
refuge. In a climate of international and national activism, and as a result of resolute advocacy 
and creative political campaigning, members of the movement made public what had 
otherwise been considered a private issue, and identified the ‗intolerable circumstances‘ 
facing women in their intimate relationships as a reason for large numbers of women and 
children seeking emergency accommodation. Despite the tremendous gains made by the 
domestic violence services movement in both service development and social policy 
concerning domestic violence, there has been no comprehensive study of any state-based 
refuge movements in Australia. The primary aim of the thesis is, therefore, to document and 
historicise the refuge movement in Victoria in its social and political context. In doing so, it 
will contribute to the task of recording the movement‘s unequivocally political nature.  
 
One of the principal objectives of this dissertation is to investigate the ideologies and actions 
of the women involved and make evident the influence of feminism and the contributions of 
community sector women‘s organisations to service delivery, social policy and legislation 
concerning domestic violence. In doing so, the thesis also considers the ways that diverse 
organisations have worked together to achieve social change. As a result of the domestic 
violence services movement‘s political activism and advocacy, domestic violence is now 
widely and publicly denounced, and this project is significant because it documents the 
strategies that were adopted in order to achieve this goal.  
 
The thesis also investigates the relationship between the movement and external institutions. 
In particular, it considers the movement‘s shifting, and at times productive as well as 
problematic, relationship with state institutions. By extension, it undertakes to critically 
analyse the historical development of public policy as well as the current policy and 
organisational context relating to the domestic and family violence service sector.  
 
This dissertation then, illuminates how the refuge movement in Victoria emerged, how 
members organised and worked towards achieving their goals, made sense of their 
experiences and dealt with the obstacles they encountered whilst undertaking action to create 
change for women. It also acknowledges that the history of the refuge movement is not a 
  2 
seamless one of ‗feminist‘ success and ideas but rather a story of complex relationships, 
ideologies, identities and power struggles. However, the project will seek to acknowledge the 
diversity, ingenuity and resourcefulness of the activists and community-sector women‘s 
organisations that made it happen. 
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Introduction 
When you think about all of the women, and some men, that have been tilling the 
ground in this area for decades … it‘s so shocking to think that the issue of bashed and 
raped women isn‘t enough to make people realise that something has to be done.1 
 
When the Victorian women‘s refuge movement2 emerged in 1974, activists were profoundly 
shocked at the extent of violence they uncovered. Employing resolute advocacy and creative 
political campaigning, movement members soon made public what had previously been 
considered a private issue and identified the ‗intolerable circumstances‘ facing large numbers 
of women and children seeking emergency accommodation.
3
 The movement was central to 
problematising and politicising what became known as domestic violence by the late 1970s.
4
 
The first refuges established in the 1970s operated as communal households, and those 
identified with radical feminist politics operated under collective structures where violence 
against women was conceptualised within the feminist understanding of all forms of women‘s 
oppression—gender inequality. Whilst services that provided accommodation to women and 
children in crisis had certainly existed for a long time, the refuge movement of the 1970s 
made explicit the link between domestic violence and the need for refuge. However, as former 
refuge worker and Victorian Labor Party Minister, Kay Setches, contends above, members of 
                                               
1
 Kay Setches, interviewed by Jacqui Theobald, 2 April 2009. 
2
 Typically, in Australia, the ‗women‘s refuge movement‘ is now talked about in terms of  domestic and family 
violence services (rather than ‗refuges‘ or ‗shelters‘ as they are known in some Australian states) reflecting the 
much greater diversity in service models and programs now available. I will employ the phrase ‗Victorian 
women‘s refuge movement‘ when referring to earlier periods, and, at other times, ‗domestic violence services 
movement‘, to better reflect the current sector. 
3
 What became known as domestic violence was also of concern to earlier feminist activists, but their responses 
were different, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 2. 
4
 Whilst domestic violence has been referred to in the past as ‗cruelty‘ or ‗wife bashing‘, the Australian women‘s 
refuge movement adopted the phrase ‗domestic violence‘ to describe intimate partner violence from the late 
1970s. Throughout this thesis, I primarily use ‗domestic violence‘, and accord it the same definition, because it 
remains the preferred terminology of Victorian domestic violence services. More recently in Victoria, the term 
‗family violence‘ has become the preferred terminology of the state government to acknowledge that violence 
may also be perpetrated by other family and community members, in particular, in relation to Indigenous 
women. At times, I use ‗family violence‘ interchangeably with ‗domestic violence‘, where it is appropriate to do 
so. The thesis also acknowledges the socially constructed nature of domestic violence, and recognises the 
problem as located on a continuum of mistreatment stemming from inequality between women and men. The 
uncritical adoption of family violence in preference to domestic violence in comparison to the broader term 
‗violence against women‘ has been critiqued by some because it de-genders the nature of the violence. See, for 
example, Helen MacDonald, What’s in a Name: Definitions and Domestic Violence, Discussion Paper No. 1, 
Domestic Violence Incest Resource Centre, Melbourne 1998; Wendy Weeks and Kate Gilmore, ‗How Violence 
Against Women Became an Issue on the National Policy Agenda‘, in Tony Dalton, Mary Draper, Wendy Weeks, 
and John Wiseman (eds), Making Social Policy in Australia: An Introduction, Allen & Unwin, Sydney 1996, pp. 
141–153; Carol Lee Bacchi, Women, Policy and Politics: The Construction of Policy Problems, Sage, London 
1999; Adrian Howe, Sex, Violence and Crime: Foucault and the ‘Man’ Question, Routledge-Canvendish, 
London 2008; Suellen Murray and Anastasia Powell, ‗―What‘s the Problem?‖: Australian Public Policy 
Constructions of Domestic and Family Violence‘, Violence Against Women, vol. 15, no. 5, 2009, pp. 532–552. 
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the movement soon realised that exposing the problem was not, in and of itself, enough. 
Consequently, they have continued to demand that the government and wider community take 
responsibility for tackling the problem. As a result, outreach and other specialist women‘s 
domestic violence services have gradually developed, and organisations have become 
increasingly responsive to the diverse requirements and subjectivities of women. Moreover, 
since the 1980s, Australian federal, state and territory governments have continually pursued 
policy in this area, and, over the years, they have formed taskforce investigations, created 
domestic violence units within police forces, and established other government inquiries. In 
particular, Victoria in recent years has attempted a concerted whole-of-government response 
to domestic violence, involving collaboration that includes the courts and the police. 
 
Despite the tremendous gains made by the domestic violence services movement in both 
service development and social policy, there has been no comprehensive study of any state-
based refuge movements in Australia. This dissertation thus partially fills this gap by 
documenting and contextualising the history of the refuge movement in Victoria. In doing so, 
it emphasises the unequivocally political nature of women‘s activism and achievements in this 
area. The research that informed this thesis was conducted with the assistance of Domestic 
Violence Victoria (DV Vic), the peak advocacy body on women‘s domestic violence services 
for the state of Victoria.
5
 
 
Recognition, documentation and analysis of the domestic violence services movement is 
important because the legitimacy of feminists organisations has been challenged by 
conservative governments. At times federal and state government policy has worked to 
undermine the equality of women.
6
 As political scientist Marian Sawer notes, from 2004 until 
2010, national Labor Party leaders campaigned without so much as a reference to women, 
and, despite policy initiatives designed to tackle violence against women, they lacked ‗a 
coherent plan for addressing gender inequality‘.7 However, the release of the Labor 
government‘s National Plan to Reduce Violence Against Women and their Children in 2011,8 
combined with the newly elected Gillard-led Labor government‘s Equality for Women policy 
                                               
5
 This PhD project forms part of an Australian Research Council linkage grant, and was funded as an industry-
based scholarship. The industry partner is DV Vic. A project reference group, comprising representatives from 
DV Vic, other member organisations, and RMIT University, has overseen the research. 
6
 Anne Summers, The End of Equality: Work, Babies and Women’s Choices in 21st Century Australia, Random 
House, Sydney 2003. 
7
 Marian Sawer, ‗Presence and the Price: Women and the 2007 Australian Federal Election‘, Australian Feminist 
Studies, vol. 23, no. 56, 2008, pp. 263–269, p. 269.  
8
 Council of Australian Governments, National Plan to Reduce Violence against Women and their Children, 
Commonwealth Government, Canberra 2011. See also, National Council to Reduce Violence Against Women 
and Children, Time For Action: The National Council’s Plan for Australia to Reduce Violence against Women 
and their Children, 2009–21, Commonwealth Government, Canberra 2009. 
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framework in 2010,
9
 has signalled improvements. Nevertheless, it remains critical that the 
work undertaken by women‘s services, alongside the challenges they face in an uncertain and 
shifting political and institutional context, are made known. 
 
This thesis is significant because violence against women continues at disturbingly high levels 
and is the leading cause of death, disability and disease among women aged between fifteen 
and 44.
10
 The extent and severity of domestic violence have been revealed in reports such as 
Women’s Safety Australia (1996), which documented that one in five women report 
experiencing violence at some time during their adult lives.
11
 A decade later, 40 per cent of 
Australian women reported at least one incident of physical or sexual violence since the age 
of fifteen, with most perpetrated by a current or former partner or family member.
12
 
 
In this dissertation, I analyse the shifting trajectory of the Victorian domestic violence 
services movement and document the unremitting efforts of activists over a thirty-year period 
to have the problem redressed. I make evident the influence of feminism and the contributions 
of women‘s organisations to service delivery, social policy and legislation concerning 
domestic violence in Victoria. I also make apparent the influence of external forces, including 
state institutions, on the shifting aims and activities of the movement. In doing so, this thesis 
also considers the ways that women‘s organisations have worked together to achieve social 
change.  
 
This dissertation traces the movement primarily from the viewpoint of those who have 
worked in its services from its beginning in 1974 until 2005. It is not intended to provide a 
history of individual domestic and family violence service providers across Victoria but, 
rather, to examine the development of the broader movement that emerged within the context 
of women‘s liberation. Three interdependent themes correspond to the central arguments 
developed. Theme one analyses the ways feminism has shaped the movement‘s ideas and 
aims in response to the issues facing women working in or accessing domestic violence 
services. The second theme considers the shifting internal and external strategies the 
movement employed to exercise influence. And the third theme examines the relationship 
between the movement and external institutions such as ‗the state‘.  
 
                                               
9
 Australian Labor Party, Equality for Women, Election, 2010. 
10
 Victorian Health Promotion Foundation, The Health Cost of Violence: Measuring the Burden of Disease 
Caused by Intimate Partner Violence, VicHealth, Melbourne 2004. 
11
 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Women’s Safety Australia, ABS, Canberra 1996. 
12
 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Personal Safety Survey, ABS, Canberra 2006. 
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The first theme gives particular attention to the impact of feminist theorisations of gender and 
power. It also considers the role activists have played in the discursive construction of 
‗domestic violence‘ as a feminist issue. To date little attention has been paid to the diversity 
of organisations, women and feminisms that comprised the Victorian movement, particularly 
in its early years. Unique to Victoria was a high level of inter-refuge organisation and secrecy 
of refuge locations and both of these features will be examined in this thesis. I seek to 
acknowledge the diversity, ingenuity and resourcefulness of the activists and community-
sector women‘s organisations that made it happen.  
 
The second theme interlocks with the first, and argues that the movement‘s internal and 
external strategies and actions derived from feminist ideas and aims. The shift in emphasis 
over time from radical to liberal feminist tactics and methods is documented and analysed. 
Documentation of the debates and processes this entailed is an important aim of this thesis in 
order to ‗give voice to the movement‘s everyday life in its women‘s organisations and 
services‘.13  
 
The third and final theme considers the relationship between the domestic violence services 
movement and external institutions. In particular, the thesis examines the movement‘s 
shifting, and at times productive as well as problematic, relationship with state institutions. 
The achievements resulting from this association are documented and the challenges 
explored. The strategies the movement adopted to ensure that feminist ideas and ways of 
organising were not compromised by engagement with the state are analysed in detail. I also 
examine the growing influence of liberal feminism on the relationship with state institutions 
from the 1990s onwards. This paralleled the impact of a changing political and institutional 
context as the function of government shifted from funder, service provider and macro-
economic stabiliser in the 1970s and 1980s to contractor, regulator and promoter of economic 
efficiency in the 1990s and 2000s. The thesis thus also briefly analyses the historical 
development of public policy relating to the Victorian domestic and family violence service 
sector. Feminist conceptualisations of domestic violence rest on critical interrogation of 
gendered power structures, and this understanding has shaped both current practice and public 
policy in general. However, this has not gone uncontested, and ongoing challenges confront 
the domestic and family violence sector in Victoria as it navigates an uncertain political and 
economic environment dominated by neo-liberal ideology and managerialism. 
 
                                               
13
 Wendy Weeks, (ed.) Women Working Together: Lessons from Feminist Women’s Services, Melbourne, 
Longman Cheshire 1994, p. 35.     
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Structure of the Thesis 
 
The first chapter provides a conceptual framework and outlines the key theoretical and 
epistemological issues involved in a historical analysis of the domestic violence services 
movement. I discuss the influence of feminist historians on my approach to historical inquiry 
and the task of theorising women‘s pasts. I then contextualise my study within Australian 
feminist history. A review of writings most connected to the key themes of the thesis follows, 
including the historiography of the domestic violence services movement, literature pertaining 
to the role of the state in Australia and the construction of social policy as it has related to 
domestic violence services, and the growing body of literature examining feminist and 
community service organisations. Finally, I outline the methodology adopted to undertake the 
research, including discussion of how evidence was gathered, my conduct of interviews and 
use of archives, and reflection on my position within the research, as both creator and 
interpreter of evidence. 
 
In Chapter 2, I draw on the published writings about feminist activism in Australia and the 
analysis of my interviews with refuge movement activists and former bureaucrats, as well as 
various archival and documentary sources, to outline the social, political and institutional 
context within which refuges emerged in Victoria. Particular attention is paid to the 
significance of the women‘s liberation movement. I contend that the women‘s refuge 
movement should be understood as a new feminist response to previously silenced problems 
of women‘s homelessness and intimate partner violence. Whilst feminists had campaigned on 
these issues in the past, the refuge movement of the 1970s represented an approach to 
supporting women that was radically different from that of existing charitable institutions and 
those approaches that had come before. I explore the range of feminist ideas—socialist, 
radical, liberal and protectionist—informing the movement, in terms of their influence on 
understanding both the problems facing women in refuge, and their broader ideals about 
working with women, and structuring their organisations.  
 
In Chapter 3, I utilise my interview transcripts and archival sources, including meeting 
minutes, to analyse the refuge movement‘s activities throughout the second half of the 1970s. 
Focusing on the movement‘s peak body, the Victorian Women‘s Refuges Group (VWRG), I 
explore members‘ aims and activities as they worked together to politicise the numerous 
issues facing women in refuge and constructed domestic violence as a feminist issue. The 
interdependence between activists‘ political strategies and actions and their feminist ideals is 
demonstrated through the modus operandi of the VWRG and other feminist refuges. I also 
  8 
consider the extent to which co-operation on the one hand, and conflict on the other, 
characterised the group. I then examine the relationship that developed between the refuge 
movement and ‗the state‘, and in particular, the relationship that evolved between key 
bureaucrats within the Department of Community Welfare Services (DCWS) and members of 
the VWRG. Finally, I document the outcomes of this engagement, including the origins of 
government funding for refuges and the strategies adopted by the movement to maintain 
autonomy and avoid ‗state control‘. 
 
Using a wide array of source material, including interview transcripts, documentary sources, 
and published accounts, Chapter 4 continues the examination of the refuge movement‘s 
engagement with state institutions and policy-makers and bureaucrats into the 1980s. I 
analyse the influence of refuge movement activism on the policy processes that led to 
increased funding for domestic violence services and to Victoria‘s first broad-sweeping policy 
initiatives, the contents of which make evident the influence of feminism on the development 
of social programs dealing with domestic violence. I document the funding and programmatic 
arrangements in order to highlight the changing political and institutional context under which 
domestic violence services were operating, as well as their impact on shifting the movement‘s 
aims and objectives. This includes collaboration between movement activists and feminists in 
government to achieve co-ordinated policy and funding responses, particularly in relation to 
the judiciary and the police. In light of the changing political context, the chapter then 
explores the emerging influence of liberal feminism on the movement‘s aims and activities, as 
less radical groups tentatively asserted their influence on internal operations, as well as 
external relationships.
14
 
 
In Chapter 5, I draw upon government policy documents, domestic violence sector 
publications, archival sources, interviews and academic writings to analyse the rapidly 
changing political, institutional and policy context within which domestic violence 
organisations were operating throughout the 1990s. I note that, whilst the issue of domestic 
violence assumed a central place on both Commonwealth and state government agendas, 
other discursive and institutional shifts, including the onset of economic rationalism and 
changing conceptualisations of citizenship and welfare, dramatically changed the nature of the 
movement‘s relationship with government. I document how this confluence of factors 
                                               
14
 Throughout the thesis, I adopt the language of movement activists and categorise ideological differences 
between groups as ‗conservative‘ and ‗radical‘ recognising these terms‘ limitations, and acknowledging 
variations of perspectives within each. Some of these are outline in Chapter 1. Similarly, whilst I refer to the 
growing influence of liberal over radical feminism in the movement my analysis also demonstrates how these 
feminist standpoints changed over time. 
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generated a particularly inhospitable environment for domestic violence services, and analyse 
how, over the course of the decade, they adapted to these changing circumstances. Moreover, 
I argue that from the early 1990s onwards, domestic violence services were increasingly 
challenged from within to provide for women‘s differing requirements and subjectivities. I 
document the sustained efforts and advocacy of marginalised groups of women, who 
responded to these needs and demanded that mainstream services do the same.   
 
During the early 2000s in Victoria, a number of dramatic changes in policy responses to 
domestic violence occurred, culminating in the state government contributing approximately 
$30m in its 2005 budget to tackle the problem. Chapter 6 documents these changes, as well as 
the achievements and challenges for the domestic violence services movement in the lead-up 
to this major announcement. It explores the contradictions embedded within the policy and 
funding environment affecting domestic violence organisations, which, on the one hand, 
reflected the government‘s prioritisation of the problem, and, on the other, failed to rectify the 
acute under-funding while at the same time demanding improvements in efficiency and 
quality of service provision. Furthermore, the chapter examines the movement‘s purposeful 
collaboration with a range of government and non-government institutions and makes evident 
its influence in achieving a number of cross-government policy and funding commitments. 
These achievements were enhanced by a culture of partnership promoted by a new state Labor 
government. 
 
In the final chapter, I draw together the themes of the thesis and discuss the achievements of, 
and future challenges for, domestic violence services. Of significance is that their relationship 
with the state bears little resemblance to that of the 1970s and early 1980s; indeed, the locus 
of power has indelibly shifted. This presents ongoing challenges for the movement, with 
governments continuing to exert rigid control over the planning and operation of all 
community services organisations. For a movement so uniquely founded on a critique of 
patriarchal power and the promotion of women as experts on their own lives, this adjustment 
has proved difficult and left many questioning how the voices of women and children 
experiencing violence are to be heard, and the goals of dislodging institutionalised power 
achieved.  
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Chapter 1: Concepts and Questions 
The dissertation falls under the umbrella of Australian feminist history and uses a 
theoretically eclectic approach. As gender historian Laura Lee Downs has noted, we now live 
in a ‗theoretically heterodox era‘.1 This chapter outlines the key theoretical and 
epistemological issues surrounding the process of history writing as they relate to this thesis. 
It then discusses the bodies of literature relevant to the thesis topic and its key themes. I 
contextualise the research project within Australian feminist history and then review writings 
related to the domestic violence services movement. Subsequently, I examine literature and 
theory pertaining to the role of the state in Australia and the construction of social policy in 
connection with domestic violence services and feminist and community service organisations 
more broadly. Of particular interest are theories relating to organisational conflict and the 
impact of neo-liberal ideology on domestic violence services. Finally, I discuss the 
methodology adopted for the dissertation, which has included extensive oral history 
interviews and archival research.  
 
Investigating the origins and evolution of the women‘s domestic violence services movement 
reminds us of the historical continuum of violence stemming from women‘s unequal position 
in society.
2
 To understand the present, we need knowledge of the past. In particular, it is 
important to know what mattered to women in the past and how women achieved change 
because dominant versions of Australian history are androcentric. Only when this skewed 
understanding has been redressed can we develop new ways of thinking and acting. 
Theorising History  
 
The thesis is particularly informed by feminist theory, including elements of radical, liberal, 
socialist and post-structuralist feminism. Amongst other things, these feminisms theorise the 
nature of gender, power, knowledge, and discourse, and the way they contribute to women‘s 
unequal position in Western society.
3
 Feminist perspectives on gender and power inform my 
understanding of why and how domestic violence exists, as well as why and how political 
activity in response to domestic violence grew. Specifically, feminist conceptualisations of 
                                               
1
 Laura Lee Downs, Writing Gender History, Hodder Arnold, London 2004, p. 100. 
2
 See Mary Maynard, ‗Violence Towards Women‘, in Diane Richardson and Victoria Robinson (eds), 
Introducing Women’s Studies: Feminist Theory and Practice, Hampshire, Macmillan 1993; Liz Kelly, ‗It‘s 
Everywhere: Sexual Violence as a Continuum‘, in Stevi Jackson and Sue Scott (eds), Feminist and Sexuality: A 
Reader, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1996, pp. 191–206. 
3
 See for example, Rosemary Tong, Feminist Thought: A More Comprehensive Introduction, Routledge, London 
1998; Betsy Wearing, Gender: The Pain and Pleasure of Difference, Longman, Melbourne 1996; Barbara Caine 
and Rosemary Pringle, Transitions: New Australian Feminisms, Allen & Unwin, Sydney 1995. 
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domestic violence rest on a critical interrogation of gendered power differences relating to the 
respective positions of men and women in society.  
 
There is no doubt that an epistemological divide exists amongst historians when it comes to 
the state of theory, and it has been argued that the discipline ‗is yet to take a quantum leap 
forward to embrace a new epistemological paradigm‘.4 This divide centres on the nature of 
historical knowledge and whether it is possible to claim, as the historian or the knower, 
techniques and methods that permit direct, objective access to reality.
5
  Post-structuralist 
theorisations regarding the centrality of language to the creation of historical meaning have 
certainly challenged history ‗as traditionally conceived‘, and  ‗raised doubts about the 
discovery of truth and the foundation of knowledge‘. 6 
 
Amongst others, feminist historians have been at the forefront of reconstituting historical 
discourse, arguing for a reflexive approach and challenging foundationalist epistemologies. 
As feminist historian Jill Matthews noted some twenty years ago, ‗there is no Truth, there is 
no Real, and, most importantly for historians, there is no What Really Happened. Rather there 
are many truths, many realities, and many versions of what happened‘.7 It is this perspective 
that informs my understanding of the nature of history writing and the task of how to theorise 
women‘s pasts. In particular, my own epistemological position is that historical knowledge 
consists of narratives that represent the past. As historians, we make history by telling stories, 
which are thus a product of the present and shaped by who we are. History is therefore 
subjective and consists of things in the past that are also in the present. As products of the 
present, we cannot sit outside of this process; thus, the narrative I am constructing in this 
dissertation is informed by my own subject position, a point to which I will return later in this 
chapter when discussing my role in the making of this history. 
 
Through historicising women‘s ‗experiences‘ by placing them in their social and political 
context, my aim is, in part, to reveal the way that change came about in a material sense. A 
‗materialist‘ explanation of history draws upon historical ‗evidence‘ produced by—and in the 
case of this study—in collaboration with ‗real‘ women. But these women are also sentient 
                                               
4
 Penelope J. Corfield, ‗The State of History‘, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 36, no.1, 2001, pp. 153–
161, p. 161. 
5
 Anna Yeatman, ‗Post-Modern Epistemological Politics and Social Science‘, in Kathleen Lennon and Margaret 
Whitford (ed.), Knowing the Difference: Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology, Routledge, New York 2004, pp. 
187–203, p. 189. 
6
 Robert Berkhofer, Beyond the Great Story: History as Text and Discourse, Harvard University Press, London 
1995, p. 2. 
7
 Jill Matthews, ‗Learning to See with Peripheral Vision‘, in Joy Damousi and Bain Attwood (eds), Feminist 
Histories, History Institute Victoria, Melbourne 1991, p. 8.               
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beings who represent their own subjectivity through discourse. In other words, this thesis is 
informed by the perception that material and discursive realms cannot be entirely separated, 
but are instead ‗mutually constitutive‘.8 Because human ‗experiences‘ are mediated, there is 
no single historical ‗truth‘ and all knowledge is interpretative. Post-structuralist feminists, in 
particular, have challenged the tendency of historians to adopt historical categories such as 
‗experience‘ without qualification. Feminist historian Joan Scott, for example, famously 
rejected the notion that historians can appeal to ‗experience as uncontestable evidence‘ or a 
‗foundation on which analysis is based‘9—insisting instead it constitutes a ‗linguistic event‘ 
that ‗doesn‘t happen outside of existing meanings‘.10 The proposition that women‘s 
experiences constitute mere ‗linguistic event[s]‘ subsequently raised considerable objections 
from feminist historians who considered the implications of post-structuralism ‗politically 
paralysing‘ for women‘s historical agency.11 Whilst the polarisation between language and 
social experience that emerged from this debate has lessened to some extent in recent years, 
there is no turning back from the proposition that historians cannot capture experience in the 
form of unmediated truth, or, as feminist historian Sue Morgan argues, uncritically ‗read off‘ 
women‘s ‗historical identity‘ as some ‗self-evident social experience‘.12 However, this thesis 
is premised on the notion that experience, despite its partiality, is not, as Scott conceded, 
‗something we can do without‘, because it ‗serves as a way of talking about what happened, 
of establishing difference and similarity, of claiming knowledge that is unassailable‘.13 The 
category of experience is particularly important for the writing of feminist history because it 
allows for challenges to be made to the ‗truth‘ of the androcentric historical record and 
dominant narratives. 
 
Attention must also be given to discourses that organise experience. This thesis is thereby 
informed by the proposal that ‗multiple discourses of gender, class … and race‘ give 
‗meaning to women‘s experiential reality‘.14 It does not hold, though, that there is no ‗reality‘ 
for women outside language but, rather, that ‗the meanings of the material world are produced 
                                               
8
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no. 3, 2009, pp. 381–407, p. 387. 
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 Scott, ‗Experience‘, p. 793. 
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 See Joan Hoff, ‗Gender as a Postmodern Category of Paralysis‘, Women’s History Review, vol. 3, no. 2, 1994, 
pp. 9–23. 
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 Morgan, p. 385. 
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within discourse‘.15 Moreover, discourses are not always stable or coherent, and ‗competing 
meanings are part of broader relations of power‘.16 This dissertation is thus further premised 
on the notion that, despite the importance of discourse in ‗effecting truth‘ regarding women‘s 
lived historical experiences, subjects also possess a degree of agency. Subjectivity is, 
therefore, a lived process, as philosopher Sonia Kruks contends, which is ‗taken up by the 
subject, be it in modes of complicity, of resistance, or both‘.17 Without a concept of agency, 
historians are hard pressed to theorise historical causation. As Laura Downs asks: ‗if history 
only happens on a discursive plane … how does change actually occur?‘18 Some years earlier, 
feminist historian Kathleen Canning similarly questioned how ‗discourses [can] figure as 
anything but fixed hegemonic systems without the interventions of agents who render them 
contingent and permeable?‘19 Both historians reject the notion that historical subjects are 
devoid of agency, which, as Downs contends, enables transformation: 
whatever the dogma of patriarchal discourse may prescribe, things are always more 
complicated in real life. Indeed the subordinate might go so far as to seize hold of 
those same identities that position some (men) as possessors of power and use them to 
constitute their own identities and thereby challenge the dominant discourses.
20
  
 
This thesis is therefore concerned to document, in Canning‘s terms, ‗the material 
consequences and ideological effects not only of discourses that become hegemonic but also 
of those that were contested and transformed‘.21 Indeed, it was women as subjects, but also as 
agents, who were active in setting up women‘s refuges and opening doors to the streams of 
women and children who entered them. This lived socio-political reality was the space where 
activists began to challenge dominant discourses relating to violence against women, 
revealing that ‗real men and women do not always or literally fulfil the terms of either their 
society‘s prescriptions or of our analytic categories‘.22 The domestic violence services 
movement has indisputably been characterised by resistance in terms of its relations to 
external hegemonic institutions and discourses, but also within its own ranks. Externally, this 
movement produced one of the most sustained challenges to the gender order thus far, 
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namely, that domestic violence should be seen as the result of unequal power relations 
experienced discursively and institutionally between men and women. 
 
Whilst materially grounded interpretations of history can provide insights into how change 
occurs, it is also necessary, as I have suggested, to consider the role of language and discourse 
in constructing social experience, as it is language that inscribes reality. In this sense, I am 
arguing that the domestic violence services movement needs to be understood as constituted 
not simply by ‗a set of unmediated or self-evident experiences but by particular discourses of 
gender, class or race‘.23 Post-structuralist theory is useful for such an analysis as it reveals the 
subjective and socially constructed nature of social categories, and can allow for a critique of 
the politics embedded in such categories as feminism and domestic violence. Feminist history, 
then, can be used as a process of critical inquiry that seeks to challenge ‗ways of thinking that 
legitimate themselves as natural‘.24   
 
This leads to an acknowledgement that my research has a political impetus, motivated by the 
call of feminist historians to write history in a way that seeks to politicise contemporary 
issues. Evidence of the power of the domestic violence services movement as a force for 
change in Australian history is a reminder to future and present historians that, as Joan Scott 
implores, history can and should be used not only as a tool for the ‗production of knowledge‘ 
but as means to ‗disrupt the certainties of the present and so open a way to imagine a new 
future‘.25  
Literature Review 
Feminist History  
 
This thesis is informed by a commitment to feminist historical enquiry. It is therefore 
necessary to contextualise the dissertation within the project of feminist history. Here I outline 
its trajectory in Australia, and make evident how the thesis is located within its shifting 
objectives and evolving theoretical orientations. These theoretical shifts are reflected in the 
first and second thesis themes concerning the influence of feminism on the movement‘s 
changing ideas, aims, and activities. 
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Women experience inequality in society and are underrepresented in our histories, particularly 
in their contribution to political and social change. Prior to the early 1970s, the academic 
study of history was mainly undertaken by men in universities, who wrote about public life 
and politics. The historical experience of women was largely omitted from these histories 
with the result that women‘s voices were silenced. As a result, ‗generations of Australian 
women had studied history without learning anything about women in the past‘.26 However, 
we are reminded by historian Marilyn Lake that women were in fact writing history in 
multiple genres, but the failure to acknowledge that this constituted ‗real‘ history meant they 
were not publicly heard and accepted.
27
 Not until the 1970s were women increasingly 
appointed in significant numbers to academic positions in university history departments—
primarily as a result of the women‘s movement.28  
 
Thirty years of feminist historical research has resulted in many challenges to Australian 
historiography, not the least of which has been the writing of women back into history.
29
 
Feminist historians have been successful in bringing women‘s history in from the margins, 
and this project seeks to contribute to this process. Early feminist historians interrogated the 
invisibility of women in history as well as the authority of white male historians, who 
represented their histories as universal and others as specialist, sectional and narrow. These 
pioneer women scholars sought, as historian Ann Curthoys has argued, to ‗shake history by 
the shoulders till it gave them answers to the questions of why women were still second class 
citizens, with lower pay, subject to violence and an all too apparent cultural devaluation‘.30 
Feminist historians thus undertook to redress the historical silencing of women‘s experiences, 
arguing that women not only needed to be restored to history but that history needed to be 
restored to women; and they were intent on the process of ‗creating … knowledge of 
ourselves‘.31 
 
The women‘s liberation movement provided ‗an important platform for the expansion of 
feminist historical scholarship‘,32 and activists pursued ‗a radical feminist history … that 
attempt[ed] to understand any given situation from the point of view of the most oppressed 
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group concerned‘.33 Early women‘s liberationist texts concentrated on documenting women‘s 
contribution to the national story and focused their critique on the emphasis of Australia‘s 
national history on men‘s achievements.34 Moreover, as Lake points out, their critique was 
aimed at bringing about a ‗women friendly state that subsidised childcare, women‘s health 
centres, and refuges; provided support for victims of rape and incest; and legislated against 
sex and race discrimination and sexual harassment‘.35 Central to their politics was their ‗unity 
of theory and practice‘,36 and their writings were significant because many emphasised the 
oppression and victimisation that women experienced. Feminist historian Jill Matthews has 
argued that one effect of this emphasis was that women were acknowledged not so much for 
what they had done as for their status as ‗passive victims, acted upon, rarely acting 
themselves‘.37 These texts were also later critiqued for their ‗fleeting attention to race, and to 
questions of Indigenous dispossession‘.38 
 
Feminist history soon emerged as a distinct field among women‘s liberation writings. It 
moved beyond writing about women as objects of history and underwent significant 
theoretical shifts. What had been previously labelled ‗women‘s history‘ became ‗feminist‘ or 
‗gender history‘. The category of gender, for example, assumed a central place as a category 
of analysis and informed a newly emerging feminist discourse relating to the identity and 
position of women, and increasingly men, in society.
39
 This shift reflected a critique of 
women‘s history as unreflexive in its use of historical categories, and argued for an approach 
that considered the shifting nature of the relations between men and women and reflected the 
endemic inequality these relations embodied. Feminist history, then, problematised and 
recognised ‗gender relations as a major power dynamic within history‘.40  
 
Coinciding with these theoretical shifts regarding the nature of history, feminist historians 
sought to interpret the historical experience of women and to cast them not only as victims of 
sexism and patriarchy, but also as active historical agents intent on shaping their own 
history.
41
 Historiography began to focus on issues of importance to women such as women 
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and work, the family, welfare and philanthropic activities.
42
 As part of this shift, scholarship 
also began to emphasise women‘s political mobilisation within a national frame.43  
 
At the same time, there was a move away from celebrating universality, in order to work 
through the implications of differences among women‘s experiences. This shift was also 
reflected within the domestic violence services movement throughout the 1990s. As Matthews 
recounts: 
[W]orkers against middle-class women, lesbians against straights, women of non-
English speaking background against Anglos, Koories against whites, disabled against 
sound, Muslim women against Christian, postcolonial women against settler 
imperialists. There was an urgent demand for recognition on the part of each of the 
groups identified … had been historically oppressed, excluded, ignored.44 
 
For many feminist historians, the ‗notion of difference began to overtake that of opposition‘.45 
And feminism more broadly, it has been argued, embraced ‗a politics of difference and 
diversity‘.46 This coincided with the onset of the ‗linguistic turn‘, as discussed above, which 
emphasised the role of language and discourse in constructing social experience. At the same 
time, feminism itself became a subject of critical inquiry in two central ways. First, a major 
theoretical and political concern of feminist scholarship at this time was ‗to recognise the 
existence of many different feminisms‘, alongside the way that categories like ‗ethnicity, 
socioeconomic position, religion and sexuality differentiate and divide women‘.47 Writers of 
colour challenged white scholars to accept that: 
[F]eminism can never be an encompassing political home for all women, not just 
because different groups of women have different and sometimes conflicting interests, 
but, more radically, because for many groups of ―other‖ women other interests, other 
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identifications are sometimes more important and politically pressing than, or even 
incompatible with, those related to their being women.
48
 
 
Second, feminist historians became increasingly concerned to document the history of 
feminist activism. Whilst a number of studies by historians and social scientists relating to the 
history of Australian feminism had been written from the 1980s onwards,
49
 it was not until the 
1990s that the first book-length studies emerged.
50
 In particular, Lake, who had previously 
highlighted the dearth of historical scholarship relating to the political activity of Australian 
women, contended that ‗women‘s history, has, for the most part, been social history‘, where, 
in some instances, ‗political activity is subsumed under and reconceptualised as social 
struggle‘.51 Concerned as she was to document the history of feminism as a political 
movement, Lake called on scholars to undertake ‗historical work on the detail of [feminist] 
campaigns‘, much of which, she argued, ‗remain[ed] to be done‘.52 It is the political work of 
feminists within the domestic violence services movement that this thesis emphasises, an area 
that has thus far been under-researched. In undertaking this task, the thesis makes evident the 
multiplicity of feminisms, experiences, and identities that characterised the movement. 
 
By the 2000s, feminist historians were taking time to celebrate their achievements,
53
 and 
question the future direction of their endeavours.
54
 Historian Katie Holmes, for example, 
argued that an ongoing challenge for feminist history was to prevent women from 
‗disappearing as historical subjects‘.55 It was, therefore, incumbent on the discipline, she 
contended, to insist ‗that feminist history matters—for its potential to be inclusive, 
subversive, critical, alternative‘.56 Another feminist historian, Susan Magarey, saw the decade 
as a period when feminist historians continued to flourish, producing a range of social and 
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cultural histories that gave attention to politics and gender relations, some of which were 
marked by theoretical innovations relating to white race privilege.
57
 Lake, too, posited an 
optimistic outlook on the state of Australian feminist history, suggesting it had been 
‗revitalised‘ in recent years ‗through its recognition of and engagement with a transnational 
past‘.58 She contended, however, that ‗activists and historians‘ needed to bear in mind that it 
is ‗primarily within the domain of the nation-state that policies can be influenced and political 
change effected‘.59 This is true in a negative as well as a positive sense, in that it is within our 
nation-state and its many jurisdictions that hostile neo-liberal and conservative policies have 
profoundly impacted on the work of the domestic violence services movement over the past 
fifteen years dismantling many of the achievements of the women‘s movement more 
broadly.
60
 Moreover, as Curthoys contends, during this time, ‗feminism as a political 
movement seemed to have lost its force‘, and other issues such as ‗human rights‘ came to be 
considered more ‗urgent‘.61 Indeed, the recognition of women‘s rights as human rights, 
assumed a central focus in Beijing at the world conference for women in 1995. Yet, there 
remains an urgent need for feminist scholarship that seeks to examine the impact of, and 
resistance to, these discursive and material shifts as they affect women‘s services. Indeed, as 
Curthoys suggests, it is timely ‗to bring feminist concerns back into central focus‘.62 
Historiography and the Domestic Violence Services Movement  
 
While the history of feminism in Australia has been broadly documented, detailed accounts of 
feminist responses to particular issues, including domestic violence, remain to be written.
63
 In 
writing this history, therefore, my aim in part is to fill a gap in the historiography of feminist 
political activism in Australia. Although there is now a substantial literature relating to 
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domestic violence in Australia, there has been no major state-based historical analysis of the 
women‘s refuge movement, despite its key contribution to the development of social policy 
and services. In examining the historical and other literature that does exist in relation to the 
domestic violence services movement in Australia, I explore the shifting interpretations that 
have generally paralleled the development of feminist history writing. These range from those 
seeking to ‗write women back into history‘ to more sophisticated analyses that have sought to 
highlight the role of language in shaping and changing the way problems are conceptualised. 
Finally, I note the areas where this dissertation contributes to this body of literature. 
 
It is over 35 years since the first domestic violence refuges were established, and a recent 
upsurge of writing aims to document the movement‘s origins, including those of its 
constituent organisations.
64
 These writings have generally been locally resourced and written 
by non-academic feminist activists—many of whom continue to be involved with domestic 
violence services and/or the women‘s movement. These activist accounts emphasise the 
struggles and triumphs the authors experienced and reflect the tradition of community-based 
advocacy and research that has characterised the movement. The accounts of the writers—like 
those of feminist historians—reflects a desire to ensure that younger generations of women 
have access to the stories and knowledge of their predecessors. 
 
Documentation of the history of refuges occurred from its earliest days and was mostly begun 
by women affiliated with feminist refuges.
65
 Consistent with early women‘s liberationist 
texts, they emphasised women‘s oppression and sought to challenge androcentric accounts of 
history. They aimed to give voice to the ‗experiences‘ of women, and to provide testament to 
the political agendas, goals, motivations, challenges and aspirations of feminist activism. 
They were emblematic of a movement that stressed women‘s agency in making history as 
well as recording historical knowledge. 
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The Women‘s Liberation Halfway House Collective (WLHWH) was the first feminist refuge 
in Melbourne, and published their Herstory in 1976.
66
 Consistent with other feminist literature 
of the time, it attributed the need for refuges to the ‗exploitative, sexist, racist, class base of 
this society‘.67 It was WLHWH‘s intention to ‗make the problems we encounter public 
knowledge; to make the government and uninformed public feel responsible for the sufferings 
of women‘.68 Similarly, out of Sydney‘s Marrickville refuge, a collection of documents 
argued ‗women were experiencing their common oppression in a patriarchal society‘.69 Both 
texts encapsulated the aims of early feminist historians to redress the absence of women as 
subjects in a largely androcentric tradition of history writing. The agenda of Herstory is clear 
in its opening paragraph: ‗recording history to date has been the story of great men and great 
events … it has accurately reflected the patriarchal and class nature of our society‘.70  In 
seeking to provide a ‗feminist perspective on the past‘, they also reiterated a stated aim of 
Vivien Johnson‘s The Last Resort: to ‗let women speak for themselves‘ and allow for the 
‗immediacy of the spoken word‘.71  
 
By the 1980s, reports and other studies sought to evaluate the work of women‘s refuges.72 
Whilst debate ensued about the extent of their achievements,
73
 refuges were still generally 
represented as places where women could assert independence and control over their lives,
74
 
and feminists in state governments began arguing the case for their expansion.
75
 In Victoria, 
refuges were held to be ‗safe homes‘ and ‗secure‘ places where women could expect to 
receive a ‗service of high standard‘ in an environment of ‗relative peace‘.76  It was also argued 
that the ‗great diversity within the Victorian women‘s refuge movement‘ had contributed to 
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its ‗richness, creativity and energy‘.77 These narratives constructed women‘s refuges, and the 
movement, as inclusive and empowering for residents and activists alike, though, as we shall 
see, ‗other‘ women began to challenge this dominant narrative from the 1990s. 
 
Early accounts of the refuge movement simplistically interpreted its beginnings as a response 
to the pre-existing problem of ‗domestic violence‘.78 But as historian Linda Gordon has 
argued, ‗the modern history of family violence is not the story of changing responses to a 
constant problem but, in large part, of redefinition of the problem itself‘.79 This thesis argues 
that, from its beginnings in the mid-1970s to the end of the decade, the advocacy work of the 
Victorian refuge movement was directed to a broad range of issues affecting the lives of 
women in refuge. The problem of what became known as ‗domestic violence‘ was but one of 
their many concerns. It is one of the purposes of this project to analyse the way that the refuge 
movement came to prioritise ‗domestic violence‘ and construct it as a feminist issue. 
 
In line with feminist historiography, women‘s refuge movement studies of the 1990s began to 
reinterpret the historical experience of women in terms of agency.
80
 These writings also 
emphasised the movement‘s achievements in making domestic violence a political and public 
issue, the centrality of radical feminism to refuge activists‘ work and the ability of women to 
work together. In their study of refuges as a social movement, sociologists Heather McGregor 
and Andrew Hopkins have argued that the grassroots character of the refuge movement was 
the driving factor in its ability to achieve social change.
81
 They further contend that the refuge 
movement‘s twin goals were providing housing and publicly promoting the elimination of 
violence, and ‗much of the history and experience of the refuge movement is best understood 
in terms of the interplay between these purposes‘.82 The emphasis of my research is less on 
how movement activists achieved social change than it is on how they responded to and made 
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sense of the problems facing women in their services and the outcomes of their responses. 
This opens up the possibility for a multitude of narratives and encourages a consideration of 
the diversity of the women and ideologies that constituted the movement. 
 
In the Victorian context, Liz Orr has highlighted the leading role of radical women in the 
refuge movement. She judges the movement an unmitigated success and ‗the driving force in 
making family violence a public concern‘.83 Similarly, sociologist Gisela Kaplan, who briefly 
discusses the women‘s refuge movement in her history of the women‘s movement, considered 
it the ‗most effective grass-roots feminist organisation in Australia‘.84  
 
Whilst these studies have emphasised women‘s agency and documented the movement‘s 
achievements, they have failed to interrogate difference and discourse as they relate to the 
construction of categories such as ‗domestic violence‘ and the experiences of the women that 
made up the movement. We are reminded by Laura Downs, however, that whilst such 
critiques appear ‗incredibly obvious from the vantage point of the early twenty-first century‘, 
it is important to remember that in the 1970s and 1980s ‗the desire for an uncomplicated 
sisterhood was so strong, that it made it quite difficult for mainstream (i.e. white middle-
class) feminists to really hear the voices of feminists of colour‘.85  
 
From the late 1990s onwards, accounts of the refuge movement have, like feminist 
scholarship generally, given greater attention to these factors. Counter-narratives by migrant, 
refugee and Aboriginal women have highlighted the centrality of whiteness to the refuge 
movement. In particular, they have argued that, in part because of racism, many women did 
not experience refuges as ‗safe homes‘, or, in the case of activists, that the movement was less 
than inclusive.
86
 The concept of ‗home‘ in relation to domestic violence has been 
deconstructed by feminist scholar Anannya Bhattacharjee, who highlighted the multiple 
significations it elicited from poor immigrant women who participated in her study, including 
those relating to their extended communities and nations of origin.
87
 Criminologist Adrian 
Howe has argued that a narrow definition of home reveals the ‗limitations of a Western 
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feminist analysis that assumes public space is one of recourse from injuries endured in 
―private‖‘.88  
 
Historian Adele Murdolo critiques dominant histories of the refuge movement, arguing that 
the ‗complex issues raised by race, class, and ethnic divisions are consequently written out‘.89 
Endeavouring to correct such omissions, she constructs a compelling counter-narrative, which 
places the activism of migrant and refugee women at its centre and highlights the 
‗complexities and difficulties of feminist activism‘.90 Marilyn Lake, who briefly considered 
the development of refuges within the context of the women‘s liberation movement, also 
highlighted the role of migrant women in the refuge movement and their misgivings about 
particular cultural assumptions.
91
 
 
Stressing some of the complexities of feminist ideas, historian Suellen Murray, in a brief 
history of the ‗Nardine‘ refuge in Perth during the 1970s, highlighted the universalising 
assumptions underpinning ‗radical feminism‘, including deterministic notions of masculinity 
and a belief that commonalities between women overrode differences.
92
 Radical feminism has 
thus been extensively critiqued for its propensity to universalise white western women‘s 
experiences. As Historian Laura Downs has argued, ‗for poor women and women of colour, 
the forms of masculine domination that they encountered at home were not always the most 
problematic forms of discrimination and inequality that marked their lives‘.93  
 
In More than Refuge—Murray places the refuge movement in its social and political context 
and highlights the social change agenda of feminist refuges, alongside their role in politicising 
and making public the issue of domestic violence in the context of radical feminism. 
Furthermore, Murray charts the changing responses to domestic violence over time and how 
dominant discourses relating to gender, the family and feminist theory shaped the way 
domestic violence was constructed as a social problem.
94
  
 
Others scholars have also drawn attention to the role of discourse in the constitution of 
domestic violence as a social problem. Janet Ramsay has shown how refuge feminists in 
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NSW initiated a ‗social constructionist framing‘ of domestic violence,95 while historian Ann 
Genovese examined the genealogy of domestic violence, highlighting feminism‘s role in ‗the 
construction of a discourse‘ on the subject.96 For her part, criminologist Adrian Howe has 
highlighted the challenges facing feminists once this was achieved and, in particular, the 
acceptance of ‗domestic violence‘ as a discourse at policy level. Howe contends, for example, 
that the gender-neutrality of the term has worked to conceal ‗the profoundly sexed asymmetry 
of interpersonal violence‘.97 
 
This dissertation builds on this existing historiography by documenting continuity and change 
in the efforts of domestic violence activists over a 30-year period. In doing so, it explores how 
the movement in Victoria emerged and how members organised, worked towards achieving 
their goals, made sense of their experiences and dealt with the obstacles they encountered 
while undertaking action to create change for women. I demonstrate the centrality of 
discourse to the movement‘s ideas and actions and, in particular, its influence on the way the 
movement made sense of, and responded to, issues facing women in their services. The result 
is not a seamless story of ‗feminist‘ success, but rather one of complex relationships, 
ideologies, identities and power struggles. History can rarely tell simple stories. However, it 
can reveal courage, ingenuity and fortitude, whilst also acknowledging diverse experiences 
including failures and successes. 
Domestic Violence Services, ‘the State’ and Social Policy 
 
Historian Ann Curthoys has noted how much of the literature on the Australian women‘s 
movement ‗concentrates on one outstanding feature of Australian feminism: its close 
relationship with the government as a means of achieving its ends‘.98 A close relationship 
with ‗the state‘ has certainly characterised the domestic violence services movement and 
constitutes a central theme of this thesis. In this section, I outline how the state is 
conceptualised in this dissertation, and survey literature relating to the often fraught 
engagement of feminist organisations, including women‘s refuges, with government. I also 
canvas literature examining the role of social policy in relation to domestic violence, before 
explaining the specific contribution of this dissertation to these bodies of scholarship. 
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Sociologists Rosemary Pringle and Sophie Watson have noted that feminists have ‗shared a 
view of the state as, to a greater or lesser extent, a coherent unity‘,99 and have suggested that 
instead it should be conceptualised as ‗a set of arenas‘ whereby ‗women‘s interests are 
constructed rather than pre-given‘.100 More recently, Carol Bacchi has argued against seeing 
‗the state as a body operating either for or against claimant groups‘.101 Instead, she contends 
that governmentality literature, inspired by the work of Michel Foucault, provides an 
alternative conceptualisation of the state as ‗always intervening‘ to produce citizens as self-
regulating subjects.
102
 Bacchi argues that the ‗dominant framing of the state‘, as identifying 
and responding to social problems needs to be re-evaluated; rather ‗the state together with 
non-state actors, in particular professions, produces understandings of problems that have 
particular effects‘.103 
 
Central to this analysis are relations of power, which Foucault contends ‗necessarily extend 
beyond the limits of the state‘ despite the ‗omnipotence of its apparatuses‘, because it operates 
as ‗superstructural in relationship to whole series of power networks‘.104 Conceptualising 
power, according to Howe, has been revolutionised by Foucault, who transformed it from 
being ‗understood as held by one group over another‘ to that which produces ‗effects of truth 
through discourses‘.105 Foucault also contends that ‗there are no relations of power, without 
resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the 
point where relations of power are exercised‘.106 
 
This dissertation works within a conceptualisation of the state that recognises it as comprising 
an always intervening ‗complex set of interrelated but distinct institutions, relations, 
hierarchies, discourses and practices, interests and players‘.107 I pay particular attention to the 
role of those formal arms of the state, such as bureaucracies, police and the judiciary, that 
have obviously fashioned the work of domestic violence organisations. However, my analysis 
also recognises subtler processes that seek to regulate the individuals with whom they work. I 
also consider the roles of individuals who have both constituted and contested state 
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institutions and practices. Finally, I acknowledge that the state engages with others in 
‗discursive battles over meaning‘,108 and should be recognised, in Claire Reinelt‘s words, as 
‗a site of active contestation over the construction of gender inequalities and power‘.109 
 
Analysis of this relationship with the state revolves around two questions. How were gains 
achieved over time, and what factors have been critical in effecting such outcomes? In 
relation to the refuge movement, a number of studies have highlighted its successes in gaining 
funding for domestic violence services.
110
 Social work academics Kate Gilmore and Wendy 
Weeks, for example, have emphasised that ‗activity inside government was kept moving by a 
refuge movement, which saw itself as involved in political action‘.111 Others have highlighted 
the role of feminists within government bureaucracies as crucial in securing funding and 
facilitating communication between community organisations such as women‘s refuges and 
the government.
112
 Existing literature also highlights the role feminists have played in 
securing the place of violence against women on the policy agenda, as well as ensuring that a 
feminist perspective underpins the development of government policies.
113
  
 
Conversely, other writers tend to contrast the work of community activists with that of 
femocrats, suggesting that once the former had achieved the job of exposing the issue, the 
baton was then passed to feminists within the bureaucracy, who undertook to ‗convince the 
governments to develop policies to address the problem‘.114 Whilst there is no doubt that this 
occurred to some degree, it paints an overly simplistic picture. Working within a theorisation 
of the state that recognises bureaucrats‘ engagement with non-state actors produce particular 
understandings of problems, this dissertation instead emphasises the activists‘ dynamic, long-
lasting and reciprocal relationships with state actors, a nexus that produced new ways of 
defining and responding to the policy problem of domestic violence. I thus examine in some 
detail the nature of the relationships between the domestic violence services movement and 
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state bureaucrats, building on Murray‘s conclusion in relation to women‘s refuges in Western 
Australia that, ‗the patriarchal state was neither monolithic nor undifferentiated. The 
relationship between refuges and bureaucrats was variable: at times and in certain places, 
difficult; at others, productive‘.115  
 
Debate has also centred on circumstances that have allowed government-funded feminist 
organisations to survive. Weeks and Gilmore have argued, for example, that in the case of 
women‘s refuges, this was enabled by the ‗coming to power in the 1980s of state and federal 
Labor governments with explicit commitments to equality and social justice‘.116 However, 
sociologist Roselyn Melville contends that liberal social democratic governments cannot 
guarantee the survival of feminist organisations, and identifies other crucial factors such as 
‗the level of political activism within feminist services, the degree of state autonomy and its 
capacity to deliver social goals and the peculiar nature of Australian federalism and 
constitutional politics‘.117 Political scientist Louise Chappell has also emphasised the 
significance of Australian federalism for Australian feminists‘ progress in relation to domestic 
violence policy.
118
  
 
Researcher and former refuge worker Ludo McFerran has highlighted the importance of 
electoral pressure in influencing the decision of governments to fund feminist services such as 
refuges. In particular, she has documented how the federal Labor government‘s decision to 
fund a national women‘s refuge program in 1975 as a direct consequence of overwhelming 
support from women voters.
119
 Adopting a similar argument, more recently, political scientist 
Marian Sawer has contended that this can also work in reverse, and that because of changes in 
the broader women‘s movement, ‗governments have found they can abolish agencies without 
widespread community protest and the fear of electoral backlash‘.120 
 
In a comparison of Australian and Canadian women‘s movements, Chappell suggests 
Australian feminists‘ reliance on the Australian Labor Party (ALP) to provide ‗positive 
opportunity structures‘ to advance their claims has made them ‗vulnerable to the state in a 
way that their Canadian counterparts are not‘—the latter having focused on the legal and 
constitutional arms of the state.
 121
 However, in this thesis, I demonstrate Victoria‘s domestic 
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violence services movement has also looked to the state‘s legal apparatus to advance its aims, 
and has made important progress through engagement with the judiciary and the police, thus 
placing broader pressure on the state bureaucracy to increase funding for services. 
 
A further theme in the literature concerns the implications for feminist organisations of 
entering into funding and contractual arrangements with governments.
122
 Services have been 
required to adopt governance structures and administrative reporting requirements held by 
some to be in conflict with their feminist philosophies and collective structures.
123
 In 
particular, the issue of whether alternative institutions can maintain their autonomy if they 
receive money from structures they are seeking to change
 
was and still is, to some extent, an 
issue of contention amongst feminist service providers.
124
 McFerran, for example, believes 
that the attainment of funding security in the early 1980s turned refuges into ‗part of the 
welfare furniture‘.125 This thesis adopts a different perspective, challenging the view that 
domestic violence services gave up on being feminist or resisting government directives. 
Accepting that there are no relations of power without resistances, this thesis demonstrates 
that whilst services were indeed forced to vary their methods and tactics in response to 
government coercion, they simultaneously found opportunities to resist and, over time, began 
to work more cooperatively with each other and with external organisations to survive. 
Indeed, as Reinelt suggests, while involvement with state institutions has political risks, it can 
also ‗create political opportunities for transforming institutional practices and furthering a 
feminist agenda‘.126 Certainly, feminist services organisations continue to play an important 
role for Victorian women, though their work has to some extent been compromised by 
managerialism and economic rationalism.
127
 
 
A growing body of literature seeks to unpack the way domestic violence is presented in public 
policy,
128
 and how it ‗has been named and renamed as a social problem‘.129 When refuges 
began, they were responding to what Murray calls an ‗almost invisible issue‘.130  Domestic 
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violence did not exist as a named social issue, let-alone as part of public policy. It was the 
refuge movement that initiated a process of constructing ‗domestic violence‘ as a feminist 
issue, identifying it ‗and other forms of violence against women as manifestations of women‘s 
oppression in a male-dominated society‘.131 As a result of the ensuing campaigns and the 
work of feminist bureaucrats, Australia had by 1994 adopted more policy initiatives in 
relation to domestic violence than any other democratic government except Canada.
132
  
 
Murray and Powell have canvassed the varying ways that domestic violence has been named 
and framed, highlighting how the ‗ongoing contestation over gendered or ungendered 
problematisations continues to influence policy approaches‘.133 Generally, public policy in 
Victoria has considered domestic violence as a gendered issue, although ‗at times, under 
certain governments, public policy has been more or less gendered‘.134 For example, Chappell 
argues that domestic violence related policies: 
developed in states with Liberal Coalition governments reflect the pervasive influence 
of a conservative discourse that is reflected in the emphasis on family and perpetrator 
projects. By contrast in states with ALP governments … the focus has been quite 
different … a degree of commitment to feminist approaches to domestic violence 
continues.
135
  
 
Weeks and Gilmore have highlighted the particular risks for domestic violence policy 
development of ‗being co-opted by the law and order lobby‘—an approach that ‗feeds into an 
individualising of both victim and perpetrator, thus deflecting emphasis away from gendered 
power relations as the central issue‘.136 Adrian Howe also warns against feminist social justice 
campaigns being subsumed under a law and order focus.
137
  
 
Concerns were raised about the national Howard Coalition government and its policy 
initiatives towards, and analyses of, domestic violence. Partnerships Against Domestic 
Violence (PADV) was introduced in 1997 and ran for three terms until 2005. The policy has 
been widely critiqued for its embedded discursive elements, which were intended to ‗negate 
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the feminist roots of domestic violence policy as a women‘s issue‘.138 Furthermore, it has 
been criticised for promoting a ‗pro-family‘ agenda, which ‗marginalises women and children 
experiencing domestic violence‘.139 As Murray has pointed out, PADV formed ‗a major part 
of the Government‘s strategy for strengthening families‘.140 A harmful consequence of this 
‗family harmony‘ discourse is that it places the ‗responsibility for ―managing‖ violence upon 
women‘.141 Social work academic Ruth Phillips has argued that this runs the risk of ‗undoing 
the potential to challenge gendered forms of violence [and] the practical knowledge that has 
developed as a result of women‘s activism in policy governance‘.142 Chappell argues, 
however, that PADV was ‗unable to unilaterally impose its views on the states … [and] … no 
single discourse on domestic violence has prevailed‘.143   
 
This dissertation contributes to this literature by focussing on Victorian and Commonwealth 
government policy and programs and analyses of domestic violence since the late 1970s, 
tracking the impact of feminism on social policy definitions and framings that identified 
gender as the principal causative agent. It explores the highly contested and political nature of 
the policy development process in relation to domestic violence, highlights the incongruities 
that have often emerged between agreed-upon problem definitions and objectives and the 
failure to match them with appropriate funding and policy design. As Murray has noted:  
The naming of domestic violence as gendered violence has not yet ensured that the 
wider dimensions of violence against women are addressed. There continues to be a 
gap between rhetoric and reality, and addressing gender inequality is an integral part 
of the process if we really want to prevent domestic violence.
144
 
Feminist Organisations  
 
This section focusses on literature relevant to my second thesis theme—the movement‘s 
internal and external strategies and actions. The diversity of ideology and organisations in the 
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early years of the second wave women‘s movement has begun to be documented.145 More 
recently, the effects of this diversity on feminist women‘s services, including domestic 
violence organisations has been recognised. So too has the fact that they have worked together 
despite considerable external pressure
146
 from the impact of managerialist and economic 
rationalist–inspired government policies.147 A significant body of literature considers the 
impact of these discursive and institutional shifts in relation to the Australian women‘s 
movement.
148
 
 
Political scientist Verity Burgmann has noted that, in the early years, ‗the distinction between 
the women‘s liberation movement and the Women‘s Electoral Lobby was between those who 
believed revolution was needed for women to achieve equality and those who insisted 
substantial reform would be sufficient‘.149 Katy Reade observes that the relationship between 
these women‘s organisations in the 1970s was highly fractious to the point where any ‗useful 
similarities were often overlooked or downplayed‘.150 However, most women‘s organisations 
also perceived the necessity for a united front, public differences being defined as ‗threatening 
to the supposed solidarity of ―sisters‖‘.151  
 
The refuge movement reflected these divisions incorporating organisations of differing 
ideological persuasions. Unlike other coalitions in the women‘s movement, not all 
organisations that made up the refuge movement were feminist. Radical feminist refuges, for 
example, were often in conflict both with ideologically different organisations providing 
refuges such as religious groups, as well as with their government funding bodies, which they 
saw as a threat to their autonomy. My research has examined the degree to which the 
Victorian refuge movement can be characterised by conflict and/or unity, and the strategies 
the movement adopted over time to deal with these challenges. Divisions in the domestic 
violence services movement have continued and one of the aims of this project has been 
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examine how diverse organisations, including feminist refuges, worked together to achieve 
change. This also contributes to our understanding of the way activists who were marginalised 
within the mainstream movement initiated programs to meet their different needs. As Reade 
has argued in relation to the broader women‘s movement, organisational conflict need not 
necessarily result in negative outcomes: 
Criticism is ultimately a constructive rather than a destructive political act, involving a 
metamorphosis of the overall politics of the women‘s movement from one which 
assumes homogeneity of all women‘s experience of oppression at the hands of a 
common enemy to one which acknowledges, in a positive way, the existences of 
difference.
152
 
  
The refuge movement is illustrative of how some social movements have metamorphised and 
contributed to complex community service delivery.
153
 Whilst the ideas of women‘s liberation 
continue to inform a wide range of autonomous women‘s organisations, women‘s liberation 
no longer exists as a social movement.
154
 By the 1980s, it had fractured, and radical and 
socialist feminists could no longer cooperate politically to the extent that was necessary to 
sustain the movement. The impact of this split is evident within the Victorian refuge 
movement and this thesis explores how members dealt with a new degree of disunity. 
 
In more recent years and, in particular, from the late 1980s onwards, major changes have 
taken place in the nature of state welfare provision. Governments have increasingly 
transferred welfare provision to the non-government sector and pursued policies of privatising 
an increasing number of essential community services. Various forms of competitive 
tendering and other market-style funding mechanisms have replaced previous funding 
agreements for domestic violence services. This shift has taken place in an institutional 
environment dominated by managerialist and economic rationalist ideologies that privilege 
efficiency and effectiveness, resulting in increased competition amongst services and the 
dismantling of some of the wider social welfare infrastructure.  
 
Some studies have considered the negative effects of these changes on the provision of 
domestic violence services, revealing that those who ‗used feminist working practices were 
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those most likely to suffer feelings of being constantly under threat‘.155 In an examination of 
four NSW women‘s refuges, Melville argues that the effect of economic rationalist policies 
on refuges has been to increase their vulnerability since they are premised on values of self-
help and community development, seen as ineffectual in the current policy environment.
156
 
More recently, social work academic John McDonald has argued that manageralist ideology 
has tended to ‗depoliticise and clinicalised domestic violence‘.157  
 
This thesis contributes to this body of work by examining the nature and consequences of 
these changes for domestic violence services, which struggled to survive the 1990s in a 
hostile climate characterised by the imposition of countless administrative and programmatic 
changes aimed in part to regulate the work of their organisations.
158
 However, feminist 
organisations have not become complacent in this climate of change. They have attempted to 
organise and resist, as well as to forge creative ways of operating in the ‗competition age‘.159  
Methodology  
 
The study of the origins and development of Victorian domestic violence services draws 
substantially on the perspectives of those who have worked in the services. The analysis is 
presented both chronologically and thematically, and the ‗evidence‘ has been drawn from a 
combination of oral and archival sources, analysed with, ‗a keen materialist and feminist eye 
to context, and also … post-structuralist insights into language‘.160  
 
We make history out of the traces or the remnant materials of the past and arrange them to 
produce historical narratives. Evidence is thus fundamental to history but must be considered 
critically, and as partial, subjective and mediated. In this section, I identify some of the 
distinguishing features of oral narratives compared with documentary sources, emphasising 
that transcripts from interviews are to be understood as constructed texts rather than 
unmediated accounts of women‘s ‗true experiences‘. I will then discuss how evidence was 
gathered for this study, including my conduct of interviews and use of archives. Finally, I will 
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reflect on my position within the research, both in terms of my role in making evidence, 
which I have done by shaping and structuring the interviews and producing transcripts, and in 
writing history based on this and other evidence. 
Oral History  
 
Giving voice to women who have participated in the domestic violence services movement, as 
well as documenting their history as a political movement, is central to the aims of this thesis. 
Indeed, collaboration and engagement with others in the research process, particularly those 
such as women who have been marginalised and omitted from the written record, enhances 
the potential for communities to become more democratic and pluralising. The adoption of 
oral history as a methodological approach is therefore congruent with the research objectives, 
and the interview process has been utilised to gain the perspective and understanding of 
activists about the social and political environment within which they operated, often amidst 
adversity, to create change for women and children experiencing domestic violence. It is for 
this reason that this dissertation engages with oral history. Though it is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation to position memory itself as the object of study, it is necessary to discuss 
some of the particular theoretical and methodological problems relating to oral history—
including the present-centred nature of memory.  
 
Oral sources are inescapably presentist, and there has been significant debate amongst 
historians regarding their suitability as a method of constructing the past and creating 
history.
161 
It has been argued, for example, that oral informants provide unreliable sources of 
historical information because, as public perception and social consciousness alter—what 
Alistair Thomson refers to as ‗public memory‘162—so too does the past they remember.163 In 
addition, gender, class, ethnicity, sexuality and political ideology create significant 
differences in how people remember and tell their lives.
164
 The role of myth has also been 
identified as a central constituent in the memory of human experience.
165
  
 
Oral accounts are unavoidably about the relationship between past and present, resulting in 
what John Murphy has referred to as a ‗revised edition of one‘s life … [where it] … is 
impossible to recall events without the recollection being informed with such pattern and 
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logic as one‘s life now seems to have‘.166 Narrative gives a shape to our memories that they 
did not have at the time and ‗we organise our experience and our memory of human 
happenings mainly in the form of narrative‘.167 Narrative is, therefore, ‗a process of 
retrospective meaning making—the shaping or ordering of past experience‘.168 Where 
appropriate throughout this thesis, consideration is given to the way that participants‘ 
narratives have been fashioned by these processes. 
 
Feminist post-structuralist theories are congruent with the methods of oral history, 
highlighting the subjective nature of the relationship between experience and representation as 
well as the role of discourse in shaping testimony. This should not, however, be taken as a 
denial of the importance of experience. Indeed, we should keep in mind Sangster‘s plea not to 
lose sight of the reality of the lived oppression of women, for post-structuralist theory may 
‗pose the danger of overstating the …―fictionality‖ of oral histories, and the impossibility of 
using them to locate a woman‘s past which is real and knowable‘.169 I am particularly aware 
of this dilemma, and, while attending to the role of subjectivity in relation to women‘s oral 
narratives, I am concerned to ensure that this in no way ‗moves all events to the level of 
discourse, stories and social categories, turning away completely from questions of truth and 
justice‘.170 Though oral sources may not provide us with the ‗factual‘ events of the past, they 
can tell us about the meaning attached to events by those who experienced them. Oral 
historian Alessandro Portelli, for example, argues that oral sources tell us not just ‗what 
people did but what they wanted to do, what they believed they were doing, what they now 
think they did‘.171 In relation to feminist oral history, Sangster contends that, ‗asking why and 
how women explain, rationalise and make sense of their past, offers insight into the social and 
material framework within which they operated … [and] … the perceived choices and cultural 
patterns they faced‘.172 Feminist historians utilising oral sources as a way to learn about the 
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past, therefore, can and should do so to understand ‗how women understood, negotiated, and 
sometimes challenged … dominant ideals‘ and practices. 173   
 
Conducting Interviews 
 
The oral history component of this project involved conducting in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with 55 women, and three men, as well as three focus groups with a total of 
thirteen women. The interviews were conducted in an open-ended manner to facilitate the 
telling of participants‘ stories, and with the additional prospect that those interviewed might 
help ‗shape the research agenda by articulating what is of importance to them‘.174 The 
majority of women interviewed were either current workers and/or former 
activists/volunteers. A large proportion of the women interviewed had worked across several 
domestic violence services and other related organisations in senior roles for more than ten 
years. A small number had done so for more than 30 years. Some had also worked as 
bureaucrats overseeing the administration of domestic violence services. Interviews were also 
conducted with three women and three men whose sole connection with the movement was as 
bureaucrats or members of parliament. These accounts offered a significant counter-narrative 
to ones from those directly involved in the movement, and related to the productive and 
differentiated role of the state—a theme explored in various parts of the thesis. 
 
Focus groups were conducted with the aim of examining particular decades in greater detail, 
and the first two were organised around women‘s experiences of the 1970s and 1980s 
respectively. Three women participated in the first focus group, each representing different 
services. Two of these women were also interviewed individually. The 1980s focus group was 
considerably larger, with nine women attending, several of whom had worked in rural and 
outer suburban organisations. This group was particularly constructive, as people interacted 
with each other, sparking memories and providing competing versions of the past. Finally, a 
focus group was conducted with two women who had worked in services targeting young 
women to ensure that this component of the movement‘s work was captured. 
 
Among the interviewees who participated in both the one-on-one interviews or the focus 
groups, approximately 75 per cent of the organisations that made up the movement in Victoria 
were represented, including those located in rural areas. In an attempt to gain the perspectives 
of women with varying identities and backgrounds, participants were also purposely recruited 
on the basis of their varying political persuasions, ethnicities, ages, sexualities, and physical 
                                               
173
 Sangster, p. 10. 
174
 Sangster, p. 5. 
  38 
abilities. However, there is significant Anglo bias and no Aboriginal women were 
interviewed. The reasons for this will be explained below. 
 
I conducted these interviews and focus groups between November 2007 and May 2009. 
Access to participants was facilitated via a project reference group that included 
representatives from the domestic violence services sector and its peak body, Domestic 
Violence Victoria (DV Vic). The project reference group provided a mechanism for 
identifying and recruiting initial participants, and snowballing was employed to recruit further 
participants. Other forms of organisational communication were also used to contact 
participants, including member meetings and advertisements on DV Vic‘s website. 
 
Following the receipt of ethics approval from the RMIT University Human Resources Ethics 
Committee, I approached participants initially by telephone. If they agreed to be interviewed, 
I followed up the conversation with a letter detailing the nature of the project, as well as a 
copy of the interview schedule and consent form. The conditions outlined included that the 
interview would be recorded (if they agreed for this to occur), transcribed and sent back to the 
participants for checking and amendments. Following the interview, the transcript was sent, 
accompanied by a second letter reiterating these conditions, including an assurance that I 
would not use anything said without approval. Subsequently, after I had completed a final 
draft of the thesis, all interviewees‘ quotations were sent to them for final approval. At this 
point, even where they had already edited their quotations, the majority of participants chose 
to edit or re-edit their quotes, and all but one agreed to be identified. The fact that most people 
wished to make changes to their printed words is congruent with the theoretical position of 
this thesis: that oral narratives are not ‗windows into the past‘, but are instead constructed 
texts.  
 
In undertaking ethical research with a political agenda, I have been guided by the work of 
feminist researchers and historians for whom oral history is a commitment to ‗an activist 
enterprise‘, which might ‗empower people‘ and ‗contribute to social change‘.175 These writers 
recognise that traditional sources have often neglected the lives of women. Oral history, they 
have argued, provides an opportunity to put women‘s voices at the centre of history,176 in this 
instance giving voice to the women who made up the Victorian domestic violence services 
movement. 
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Feminist research has also been characterised by opposition to masculinist hierarchical 
research methods. In keeping with this understanding, I have endeavoured to carry out 
interviews from a position that minimised my role as ‗expert‘ or ‗knower‘, and to conduct 
myself with ‗sensitivity‘ and ‗self-awareness‘.177 However, adopting these approaches to 
interviewing does not eliminate the inherent capacity for exploitation by the researcher of her 
subject.
178
 Indeed, the researcher has considerable power over the final narrative, and is 
therefore party to an ‗asymmetrical exchange‘.179 I have sought to lessen any possible 
negative effects from this dynamic by engaging in dialogue about my analysis and 
conclusions with participants throughout the course of researching and writing the 
dissertation. Thus, whilst I have unquestionably imposed my interpretation of the meaning of 
participants‘ experiences, I have sought to ensure the validity of this account through a range 
of means. First, I have adopted a consultative approach to choosing participants‘ words for 
use in the final thesis, and have provided them with numerous opportunities to edit their final 
narratives and thus maintain a degree of interpretative authority. I have also engaged in an 
ongoing process of discussion and debate via the project reference group regarding my 
analysis and interpretation of evidence. The group has met quarterly over the past four years 
for this purpose and to provide verbal and written feedback on drafts of the dissertation. 
Finally, I have presented parts of the dissertation at wider sector-level forums annually, such 
as the DV Vic Annual General Meeting, in an endeavour to make the research process as 
egalitarian, consultative and accountable as possible.  
Documentary and Archival Sources 
 
The oral history component of this project has been complemented by the utilisation of 
documentary sources. Whilst all historical sources are interpretative and therefore partial and 
limited, the nature of archival written sources—unlike oral sources, which are entirely 
constructed in the present—is such that they are of ‗another time‘. It has been argued that this 
offers conventional historical research, more so than oral history, the potential to explain 
anew historical causation.
180
 In other words, this provides the potential for more ‗objective‘ 
interpretation of how the past constructs the present because archival sources provide a 
disjunction between the past and the present. Accessing a particularly rich body of 
documentary material has, from this perspective, strengthened the ability of this thesis to 
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locate women‘s experiences in a materialist context of social, political, cultural and economic 
relations and imperatives.  
 
First, two Victorian refuges, Brenda House and Kara women‘s refuges, provided me with 
access to their archives on their premises. Wendy Austin played a crucial role both in 
amassing, and enabling access to, the collection at Brenda. These combined archives 
amounted to ten boxes of material, providing me with access to a rich body of meeting 
minutes, including those relating to Victorian Women‘s Refuges and Associated Domestic 
Violence Services (VWRADVS now DV Vic) the movement‘s peak body, during the period 
from 1995 to 2005. They also included other meeting minutes, annual reports, unpublished 
internal documents, evaluations, policy and practice documents, consultant reviews, 
government reports and internal and external correspondence. These materials allowed for a 
detailed reconstruction of the movement‘s activities and advocacy from the early 1990s. Two 
folders of primary source material were also provided to me by DV Vic, which included 
correspondence and meeting minutes relating to the organisation‘s evolution from 
VWRADVS to DV Vic during the first half of the 2000s. 
 
Archives were also accessed from collections housed at the University of Melbourne‘s 
Women‘s Liberation and Lesbian Feminist Archive (MWLA). This rich source of data 
includes records specifically related to women‘s refuges and, in particular, the archives of the 
first Victorian refuge, the Women‘s Liberation Halfway House, which consists of 100 boxes 
of material (from which 30 were examined in detail). This material was relevant not only to 
the refuge‘s own history, but also to the wider refuge movement because WLHWH was 
particularly active and engaged with the women‘s movement, and other campaigns relating to 
housing, until the late 1980s. Other collections examined within this archive include the 
Australian Union of Students (AUS) Women‘s Department papers, Women‘s Liberation 
Centre papers, Lesbian Open House papers, Women‘s Liberation Movement papers, Vig 
Geddes‘ papers, Sue Jackson papers, Jenny Tatchel‘s papers, Frances Ryan‘s papers, and Jan 
Chapman‘s papers. In addition, the Maggie Burrows collection was accessed from the 
University of Melbourne archives separately from the above collection. These collections 
offered voluminous amounts of material that included meeting minutes, campaign letters, 
handwritten notes, letters, posters and fliers, pamphlets, newspaper articles, conference 
proceedings and magazines. A number of participants offered me access to their personal 
documents over and above those held by the University of Melbourne archives; this was 
gratefully accepted. These included Wendy Austin, Vig Geddes, Jean Taylor, Con Smith, 
Chris Sitka, Ulla Svensson, Rose Stone, Judy Johnson, Gwyn Roberts, Judy Line, Natalie 
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Thomas, Janine Berryman, Keran Howe, Lyn Walker, and Sandra Morris. By far the most 
substantial collection was that belonging to Ulla Svensson, whose personal papers included 
copies of ‗Drum‘ Newsletter—the official collective meeting minutes of the WLHWH—from 
1974 to 1988, Victorian Women‘s Refuge Group meeting minutes, newspaper articles, 
newsletters, campaign meeting minutes, books, conference papers, speeches, unpublished 
papers, policy and funding submissions, letters, copies of parliamentary debates and 
government documents, statistical data, and annual reports.
181
 These documents combined 
afforded detailed data to reconstruct the social and political context of the early years of the 
refuge movement in Victoria.  
 
Other primary data examined included women‘s movement journals and newsletters from 
Victoria, New South Wales and the UK, which I scanned for articles, letters and editorials on 
the subject of women‘s refuges and domestic violence. In particular, I examined the Women’s 
Liberation Newsletter (1974-1985), Scarlet Woman (1975-1985), Vashti's Voice (1973-1980), 
Rouge (19791980), Refractory Girl (1975- 1980), Spare Rib (1976-1983), and Woman Speak 
(1978-2005). At the library of the Domestic Violence Resource Centre in Melbourne 
(formerly Domestic Violence and Incest Resource Centre), I also accessed Domestic Violence 
and Incest Resource Centre Quarterly from 1989 to 2008, along with other reports associated 
with women‘s refuges including ministerial taskforce reports and annual reports. This 
material enabled me to examine the way that activists and organisations responded to, and 
conceptualised, various legislative and policy changes over time. Finally, I also reviewed 
Victorian Parliamentary Debates (VPD) for the Legislative Assembly and Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Debates (CPD) for the House of Representatives and the Senate for the 
purpose of investigating how, and by whom, issues relating to women‘s domestic violence 
services were raised, tackled and responded to in parliament. 
The Historian and History 
 
In the context of an explicitly political and feminist research project, it is important that I 
locate and reflect critically on my position as the researcher/author of this history, and also as 
the maker of evidence in the process of conducting and transcribing interviews with the 
participants concerned. My own subject position as a relatively young, able-bodied, English-
speaking, tertiary-level educated, feminist, heterosexual, white, middle-class woman cannot 
be divorced from either of these processes.  
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In my view, oral sources are always the result of a relationship, a common project in which 
the informant and the researcher collaborate. The class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity and 
education of both interviewers and participants all contribute to the outcome of the interview. 
In this sense, as Armitage and Gluck contend, ‗each interviewer will get different partial 
truths, given her or his positionality‘.182  
 
My approach to the interviews was self-consciously non-objective. Often, before the 
interview began, I had spoken at length on the phone with participants about the purpose of 
the project and the ‗conversational‘ style that I intended to adopt. From the outset, participants 
were encouraged to feel at ease and confident that there was no right or wrong answer to the 
questions I was asking. Whilst I did not identify as a member of the researched group, there 
was often the presumption of common values, or, at times, when participants asked directly 
about my own identity and history, I openly talked about them, including the fact that I 
identified as a feminist, was committed to social justice and women‘s rights, and had been a 
social worker with the homeless community in Victoria and South Australia. This also meant 
that there was a shared language, or a ‗sharedness of meaning‘, which enabled an 
understanding of ‗the contextual nature of specific references‘.183 These factors have by and 
large generated positive feelings between the interviewees and myself, as well as dialogues 
that were relatively free-flowing. The effects on the interviews were therefore generally 
constructive and people spoke frankly and honestly. There were also several participants with 
whom I had previously developed professional relationships, which further enhanced this 
dynamic. 
 
On reflection, however, I became aware that I had at times been cautious, as Valerie Yow puts 
it, about ‗ask[ing] some things of narrators for whom I felt affection lest my questions cause 
them discomfort‘.184 On the other hand, I was sometimes intimidated by the experience, 
expertise and knowledge of many interviewees. This was related to the fact that the vast 
majority of participants were at least one generation older than me, and several participants 
had post-graduate qualifications, including at least eight with PhDs, and others had spent the 
bulk of their lives working towards eliminating violence against women. My cautious 
approach was also brought to my attention by Ulla Svensson, who, after editing her transcript, 
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informed me that I should have been more direct in asking about things she was ‗ashamed‘ of 
during her time as a political activist in a Melbourne refuge in the 1970s. She later wrote to 
me about the ‗worst experience‘ she had undergone, which occurred while supporting a 
resident through an arduous court case. In particular, she had not believed the woman‘s claims 
that her husband had been sexually abusing their daughter, and instead assumed the woman to 
be ‗crazy‘. It was revealed, however, at the end of the case that the husband had previously 
been jailed for that very offence. This clearly fractured her relationship with the woman and 
her daughter, and had left her with memories that were ‗hard to even mention‘.185  
 
This ‗private memory‘ provides an example of what was ‗omitted‘ from our interview, in part 
as a consequence of my own ‗positionality‘ as interviewer. However, such omissions may 
also reflect the way that some interviewees‘ private memories can be repressed if they do not 
fit in with public norms or acceptable versions of the past, or with the image the interviewee 
wants not only to project but to inhabit. Moreover, private memory, in this instance, 
contradicts public memories of the refuge movement, which for the most part stressed its 
achievements in challenging the silence surrounding women‘s experiences of violence and 
incest. These public memories have informed dominant accounts/narratives of the refuge 
movement—indeed it was the achievements of the movement that dominated the majority of 
participants‘ narratives and, by extension, the history I have constructed. This suggests a 
circular relationship between public memory and oral history, whereby memory 
reconstruction generates oral history, and the latter ‗reflects and shapes collective or public 
memory‘.186  
 
Furthermore, looking back on the transcripts, it became apparent to me that I was seeking 
particular answers to my questions, and many times I did not receive the answers I expected. 
Below is an edited excerpt from an interview with long-term worker in domestic violence 
services, Vig Geddes, which was the second interview I conducted.
187
 It is clear to me on 
reflection that I had predetermined and romanticised notions about the beginnings of the 
refuge movement that imagined women working together, putting aside their differences, 
forging a sense of unity as a movement, and embracing feminism. However, Vig‘s account 
reveals something quite different. 
Jacqui: How did they manage to work together amongst so much diversity? 
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Vig: Well I think everyone was just really committed to the women, you know, to 
keeping women safe. I think that was really strong. 
Jacqui: So a commitment to making women safe united people of different political 
persuasions? 
Vig: I don‘t think we would‘ve even talked about what we had in common; we 
focused a lot on the differences.  I think that‘s what kept everybody in there … [and] 
… we were not namby-pambying around … I mean there was some heated debates 
and differences and people raising their voices and … the feminist analysis was pretty 
hammered home. 
 
Geddes‘ account reveals how a focus on what divided (not united) women was prevalent from 
her experience, and a feminist analysis of domestic violence was, at times, forcibly imposed. 
Oral testimony can serve to challenge the assumptions of researchers, and thereby dominant 
narratives. And, in part as a result, the history I have constructed does not (re)present an 
idealised view of this feminist past. However, feminism, and its relationship to the domestic 
violence services movement, constitutes a central theme of this thesis, which brings me to 
another example of the way that my own positioning has influenced the construction of oral 
narratives. Specifically, I had assumed that feminist ideology would be fundamental to 
workers engaged in this movement. However, I had not assumed that it would mean the same 
thing to everyone. What became apparent was that, for many women, feminism or feminist 
ideas were not only reflected upon in the interviews in innumerable ways, but played an 
increasingly ambiguous role in the contemporary context. This in turn led me to reflect on 
what might have occurred had I not assumed this structure for their memories. 
  
It is also important to note that, when editing their transcripts, many participants took the 
opportunity to rephrase what they had said. Some women stated that they were self-conscious 
about sounding inarticulate, and others felt the need to qualify comments they had made 
during the interview whilst feeling particularly ‗disarmed‘ and ‗at ease‘. Furthermore, when 
editing transcripts, many participants sought to clarify my interpretation of their words, which 
had taken on a different meaning when transferred to paper from what they had intended to 
convey.  
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The process of writing history is also shaped by the historian, according to ‗his or her own 
ideas, interests, and preoccupations‘.188 In particular, it is important to note that there is much 
missing from the narrative as I have constructed it, particularly the perceptions and 
experiences of women from backgrounds other than those interviewed. In particular, no 
Aboriginal women were interviewed for the project.
189
 This can in part be explained by the 
fact that the project was initiated academically by women from Anglo backgrounds and then 
steered by several key Anglo women who had worked/volunteered in domestic violence 
services over many years.
190
 Whilst a variety of organisations were invited to join the 
reference group so that it could represent the diversity of women comprising the 
sector/movement, immigrant and Aboriginal women chose not to participate at that level. The 
project reference group, including myself as researcher/author, therefore symbolised what 
sociologist Anna Yeatman terms ‗custodians of the established order‘.191 In this sense, the 
project was predisposed from the outset towards an Anglo account of this history, in part 
because these women made themselves and their archives immediately available as resources 
for the project. And, whilst attempts have been made to draw upon documentary sources and 
oral accounts to incorporate the divergent experiences and subjectivities of ‗other‘ women, the 
dissertation inevitably replicates to some extent invisibilities that have been characteristic of 
mainstream Australian feminist history. This can be considered reflective of a domestic 
violence services movement that, like society more broadly, has been dominated by the 
standpoint of Anglo women who have historically possessed a greater proportion of society‘s 
resources, power, and cultural capital than their non-white, non-Anglo counterparts.  
 
The other women who have remained silenced in the writing of this history are the residents 
and/or clients of domestic violence services. For a range of ethical and time-related reasons, 
including my own identity as a social worker with no experience of having been a 
client/resident/consumer of domestic violence services, these women were not invited to 
participate in the project, although, by happenstance, several women interviewed had 
experience as both residents and workers in domestic violence services. These accounts posed 
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a counter-narrative to the dominant one constructed by workers—most significantly in 
questioning that refuges were always a ‗safe‘ place for women.  
 
This thesis is, therefore, not exempt from the omissions and silences that occur when some 
women construct history. In this sense, it is important to acknowledge that, whilst this thesis 
in part aims to render women visible to history, in doing so it automatically makes other 
women and their experiences invisible. However, even if all women were somehow equally 
represented and empowered, the participants‘ narratives in this dissertation could still not be 
considered as collectively ‗true‘, for all sources can conceal, as well as reveal, the past. 
Despite these reservations, it is hoped that the extent and depth of research forming the basis 
of this thesis will enrich and complicate understandings of both the refuge movement and the 
women whose work made its achievements possible. 
  47 
Chapter 2: The Varied Beginnings of the Victorian Refuge 
Movement, 1974–1979 
The women‘s refuge movement is a political movement standing against patriarchal 
attitudes and ideals that provide the foundation and cover for men who bash the 
women they marry … Its purpose is to alter power structures so that women are, and 
are recognized as being, politically, socially and economically equal with men.
1
 
 
This chapter explores the emergence of the Victorian women‘s refuge movement, beginning 
in 1974. It outlines the social, political and institutional context within which refuges emerged 
in Victoria, and particular attention is paid to the significance of the women‘s liberation 
movement. In Victoria, and nationally, radical feminist refuges were central to the foundation 
and development of the refuge movement. For this reason, the ambitions and activities of 
feminist activists from Melbourne‘s women‘s liberation movement who established the first 
women‘s refuge, are examined in some detail. Feminist discourses emanating from the 
women‘s liberation movement informed their ideas and actions in seeking to create societal 
change and institute special rights for women. However, the refuge movement as a whole was 
made up of women from diverse backgrounds, not all of whom identified with feminism, and, 
for this reason, this chapter includes the development of migrant and Aboriginal women‘s 
refuges. 
 
The relationship between feminism and the refuge movement constitutes a key theme of this 
thesis and is explored here in a way that reveals the variety of feminisms in refuges during the 
movement‘s early years. For this reason, the beginnings of several individual refuges are 
examined, though no attempt is made to cover the origins of all refuges.  
 
Refuge activists were informed by a range of feminist ideas—including socialist, radical, 
liberal and protectionist—which are discussed below, both in terms of how they influenced 
understandings of the problems facing women in refuge, and in terms of values that moulded 
the ways they structured their organisations and worked with women. For example, refuges 
affiliated with the women‘s liberation movement, organised collectively and in accordance 
with their radical feminist goals of breaking down power relations. However, as this chapter 
makes evident, achieving ‗sisterhood‘ in this context proved problematic, in part because of 
the diverse identities of the women involved.  
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The Context: ‘A Unique Time in Herstory’
2
 
 
The women‘s refuge movement in Australia emerged within the context of a radically 
changing political, institutional, social and economic environment, both internationally and 
domestically. On the domestic front a climate of opposition to the Vietnam War provided a 
‗focus for people‘s radical political engagement‘.3 Women‘s liberation arose out of the ‗new 
left‘ and anti-Vietnam war movements, and consciousness-raising groups developed in each 
capital city in the early 1970s, following similar developments overseas.
4
  
 
A new Labor government led by Gough Whitlam came to power nationally in 1972, 
influenced by European notions of social democracy, including women‘s equality. The 
Whitlam government committed itself to ‗large-scale spending in the areas of health, housing, 
urban development and education‘.5  One of the major innovations of the government was the 
establishment of a Women‘s Affairs section in the Department of Home Affairs in 1973.6 In 
his speech at the inaugural meeting of the National Advisory Committee for International 
Women‘s Day on 11 September 1974, Gough Whitlam outlined his position in relation to 
women‘s unequal situation in Australian society: ‗We have to attack the social inequalities, 
the hidden and usually unarticulated assumptions which affect women not only in 
employment but in the whole range of their opportunities in life‘.7 
 
Changing social and economic circumstances for women under the Whitlam government 
included reproductive control and expanded means of economic independence. Of particular 
importance in 1973 was legislation that provided income for sole supporting parents and, in 
1975, ‗no fault‘ divorce. All these factors were significant for the development of refuges 
because it meant that women were able to envision their lives in a new context of greater 
‗political, social and economic rights than [their predecessors] of a century before‘.8  
 
At the same time, a context of international activism in relation to violence against women, 
such as the development of a women‘s refuge in London in 1971 and the subsequent 
publication of a book detailing its development in 1974,
9
 provided a significant catalyst for 
the beginning of the movement in Australia and, in particular, the development of Elsie, 
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Australia‘s first feminist refuge, in Sydney the same year.10 The women‘s liberation 
movement was of central significance to the development of women‘s refuges and its 
emergence in Victoria will be explored in detail below. The emergence of refuges also related 
to the development of a new framework for thinking about women‘s homelessness, which 
was also of central concern to feminists at this time. Before examining the way this happened 
in Victoria, it is necessary to situate the new feminist responses within the context of existing 
social policy and programs. 
Domestic Violence, Homelessness and History 
 
In the mid-1970s, the homelessness of women and what came to be known as domestic 
violence, were not issues that were acknowledged or tackled in any coherent way at a 
Commonwealth or state government policy level. Moreover, prior to the 1970s, what became 
known as domestic violence was commonly referred to as cruelty within the context of the 
law, and was one of the grounds by which women could seek divorce.
11
 Whilst legal remedies 
were available, in reality ‗many women would never have taken advantage of these laws 
because of the cost of litigation, fear of retribution, and shame at the failure of their 
marriage‘.12 However, throughout the course of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
cruelty became increasingly unacceptable within marriage and legislation came to reflect 
changing attitudes to violence.
13
 Domestic violence had long been silenced throughout the 
preceding years for a number of reasons relating to the traditional rights of men to discipline 
their wives, the confinement of women to the home and the limitations of legal redress.
14
 
 
It was, however, still not discussed widely and publicly. The ‗new wave‘ of young feminist 
activists, thus knew very little about these issues until the opening of women‘s refuges 
because, as historian Janet Ramsay argues, ‗no political or policy discourse, including that of 
their own political tradition, spoke to them about this widespread violence‘. As a result, many 
felt that they had ‗discovered‘ the issue.15 
 
Problems facing women, including what came to be known as domestic violence, had been of 
concern to feminist activists from the late nineteenth century onwards, and historian Marilyn 
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Lake has documented five overlapping periods of Australian feminism, arguing that they 
‗constitute an organised political movement‘.16 However, until the women‘s liberation 
movement, feminist activism, including that relating to domestic violence, had maintained as 
its cornerstone the moral and caring role of women whose rightful place was seen to be within 
the sphere of the family home. Domestic violence as a specific problem had remained mostly 
hidden in ‗the codes and limited strategies of the temperance movement‘ and philanthropic 
societies, and, as a result, there were ‗few markers to assist the next generation of feminists in 
their identification of domestic violence‘.17 Whilst earlier feminists framed the problem and 
measures to deal with it in ways that were different from their late twentieth century 
successors, they were nonetheless aware of and active in response to such violence. 
 
Women‘s refuges developed within the context of charity-based emergency accommodation 
for women. Religious organisations such as the Salvation Army and the Catholic Church had 
long provided some small-scale accommodation services for homeless women. Women who 
experienced domestic violence most certainly accessed such services. However, this was not 
publicly acknowledged and discussed. Mary Anderson Lodge (MAL) was one such place 
operated by the Salvation Army. It loosely aligned itself with the refuge movement after 1975 
by accepting government funding, although it continued to operate relatively independently 
until more recent years. Catholic organisations such as the Good Shepherd sisters‘ convent in 
Abbotsford and the Missionaries of Charity Women's Shelter in Fitzroy also provided crisis 
accommodation to women, and the latter continues to operate today. But neither was aligned 
with the refuge movement and they generally saw their work as an extension of Christian 
duty, focusing on restoring families and defending women‘s morality. Other non-
denominational organisations such as Hanover Welfare Services identified the problems 
facing women as ‗human distress‘ and argued that it was common to all those experiencing 
homelessness.
18
 None of these groups were in the business of critiquing the social structures 
within which women became homeless. Only after the beginnings of the refuge movement did 
some sections of the community begin publicly to acknowledge, that ‗the battered wife is a 
tremendous and very common problem‘.19 And it was not until the development of feminist 
refuges that women‘s homelessness was publicly and explicitly linked to the issue of 
domestic violence. Feminist refuges argued against the welfare-focused charity model, and 
responded with new ways of interpreting and dealing with the problem of domestic violence. 
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The issue of homeless men dominated public discourse at this time and the main welfare 
services in Melbourne responded with large accommodation facilities. These included ‗The 
Gill‘ run by the Salvation Army, and ‗Ozanam House‘ auspiced by St Vincent De Paul. The 
Commonwealth government played no formal role in the provision of these services until 
‗pressure by people from Victorian homelessness services on both political parties‘20 saw the 
establishment of a working party to investigate ‗the needs of homeless men and women‘ 
following the election of the Whitlam Labor government.
21
 The working party‘s 
recommendations formed the basis of the first Commonwealth legislation providing for 
homeless people passed in December 1974, the Homeless Persons Assistance Act (1974), and 
most of the recommendations were implemented under the national Homeless Persons 
Assistance Program (HPAP) in 1975. Notably, the working party had concluded that ‗women 
were not a significant part of the homeless population‘,22 and argued that the government‘s 
response to the problem should ‗give consideration to not segregating the sexes‘.23 Thus the 
extent of women‘s homelessness and its relationship to domestic violence remained 
unacknowledged.  
Victoria under Hamer 
 
The state of Victoria was also beginning to experience what would be a considerable 
transformation over the course of the decade. The Liberal state government underwent 
massive change in its political focus as a result of the election of Rupert Hamer as premier in 
1972. Hamer was known as a socially progressive small ‗l‘ Liberal, and was elected following 
the resignation of the conservative premier, Henry Bolte, after eighteen years in office. The 
Hamer government placed a high priority on the state‘s provision of social welfare services. 
He also created an environment favourable to the promotion of women‘s issues, and Penny 
Ryan was appointed adviser to the premier in 1975. However, this was short-lived,, as 
conservative forces galvanised to ensure her removal.
24
 At the same time, in the context of 
International Women‘s year, the Whitlam government appointed Elizabeth Reid as its first 
Women‘s Adviser. 25  
 
                                               
20
 Bullen, p. 47. 
21
 Report of the Working Party on Homeless Men and Women to Minister for Social Security, Australian 
Government Publishing  Services, Canberra, June 1973, National Archives of Australia (NAA), A5915/1. 
22
 Report, p. 7. 
23
 Report, p. 29. My emphasis. 
24
 ‗Drum‘, 16 August 1976. 
25
 Sawer and Simms, p. 173. 
  52 
Hamer‘s actions were supplemented by the flow-on effects of the Whitlam government‘s 
progressive social policy initiatives under its Australian Assistance Plan (AAP), which 
radically increased Commonwealth government intervention in health, education, welfare and 
urban planning, as well as promoting the role of local government in social welfare provision. 
The South Australian Labor Party government had implemented similar policies under the 
pioneering premiership of its socially progressive leader, Don Dunstan.
26
 Throughout the 
latter half of the decade, Victoria followed South Australia‘s lead, enacting a range of 
progressive legislative changes including the Equal Opportunity Act in 1978. 
 
Victoria continued to implement Whitlam‘s AAP following his dismissal in 1975 and the 
subsequent election of Malcolm Fraser, who headed a new conservative Liberal–National 
Party Coalition government. The AAP was embodied in the Family and Community Services 
(FACS) program, which came about as a result of a request to the Victorian Consultative 
Committee on Social Development by the then Minister for Social Welfare, Brian Dixon, in 
1976.
27
 David Green was the director of regional services at this time in Victoria‘s 
Department of Community Welfare Services (DCWS) and wrote the basis of the submission 
for continuing the AAP.
28
 According to Green, programs like FACS distinguished Victorian 
social welfare policy because they promoted ‗a continuation of a local planning perspective 
based around the regionalisation of social welfare‘, which was combined with a new emphasis 
on ‗keeping the non-government organisations [and] the local councils in some kind of 
connection around community issues‘.29 However, as Green concedes, even though FACS 
was a pale shadow of the AAP, it was a central reason why ‗Victoria was different‘.30 
 
The Victorian women‘s refuge program, as it came to be called by the department, was 
administered under Green‘s directorship within the new FACS program from the beginning of 
1978. Green, and the soon-to-be appointed co-ordinator of the women‘s refuge program, Rosi 
Lever, were in charge of its administration when the role and provision of social welfare were 
being conceived in new ways, moving from an individually focused response to an increasing 
awareness of structural issues. As Lever recalled, ‗David and I were committed to new service 
priorities that were focusing on more practical approaches rather than what were sometimes 
referred to at the time as ―the triumph of the therapeutic‖. He was ground-breaking in his 
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work‘.31 Finally, the impetus behind the government‘s new approach to social welfare cannot 
be divorced from the movements for social change occurring within the wider community, 
including the women‘s liberation movement, which strove to make public institutions more 
accountable to women. Former refuge activist Kaye Hargreaves recalls: ‗Public services were 
very much sort of like brick walls at the time … you can‘t underestimate how remote and 
unaccountable the public institutions were‘.32  
Women’s Liberation Movement 
 
Women‘s liberation consciousness-raising groups developed in each capital city in Australia 
during the early 1970s following similar developments overseas.
33
 They were a response to 
‗unshakeable sexist assumptions and behaviour of the new left men‘, 34  as well as a reflection 
of international developments on theory and practice that inspired young women in 
Australia.
35
  
                            
The women‘s liberation movement demanded more than equality for women, and its focus 
shifted from demands relating to citizenship to women-centred rights. By the early 1970s, the 
central tenets of women‘s liberation were the rights of women to abortion, free contraception 
and childcare and, by the middle of that decade, it had developed into a movement for social 
change and revolution. In a speech given on International Women‘s Day in 1975, ‗Adriana‘ 
outlined the newly developing ‗radical‘ agenda in Melbourne: 
It is more than just the basic reforms such as repeal of the abortion laws, free child 
minding centres, equal pay with minimum wages for women and no discrimination in 
education and employment opportunities that women‘s liberationists seek; we seek an 
entire dissolution of those structures and those people that place women into a 
particular role in life: that predetermines what the definition of a woman is and what 
her place and function in society will be. To expose the sexist attitudes towards 
women is to engage in the process of demolishing the old attitudes and creating the 
new—this is our struggle of liberation.36 
 
By the early 1970s, no longer satisfied with the goals of citizenship and equality, and ‗armed 
with a university education and the pill‘,37 Australian women began to demand sexual, 
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economic and political freedom as well as equality. Simultaneously, they began to develop 
radically new and different woman-centred identities and lifestyles.  Notably, domestic 
violence was not at first a part of the women‘s liberation movement‘s concerns. 
 
For feminist historians and activists alike, women‘s liberation provided a ‗flourishing 
intellectual environment‘38 and a new framework for interpreting women‘s lived experiences. 
As Lake notes, it was an ‗intensively literary movement‘39 and new modes of feminist 
thinking sought to explain the what, why and how of women‘s inequality. It gave rise to a 
feminist theory and scholarship that emphasised the patriarchal nature of society and, in 
particular, women‘s sexuality. It emphasised notions of ‗woman‘ and ‗sisterhood‘ and 
highlighted women‘s shared oppression under the ‗chains‘ of patriarchy.40 This style of 
feminism became known as ‗radical‘, and feminist refuge activists used it to theorise the 
nature of violence against women. Much feminist thought at this time was also heavily 
influenced by Marxist critiques of capitalism.
41
 Socialist feminism, as it came to be known, 
privileged the capitalist system and class over gender in explaining women‘s oppression and 
focused its critique on the unpaid labour of women. Over time, socialist feminism fell out of 
step with radical feminist agendas partly because it was unable to account for the common 
oppression of women that cut across class lines.
42
  
 
While ‗decades of feminist activism have won women equal rights to participate in social, 
economic and political life in Australia‘, as Murray reminds us, ‗equality has meant 
participating on men‘s terms‘.43 But the women‘s liberation movement has been characterised 
as ‗a historical disjuncture in a centuries old activist tradition‘,44 because at this moment in 
Australian history feminists rejected men‘s terms, along with their forbears‘ commitment to 
maternalist citizenship, and mounted a campaign overtly aimed at bringing about radical 
change. This was partly a consequence of the changing economic circumstances of a new 
generation of women, as Lake has noted.
45
 She has also argued that the transformation in 
women‘s attitude to their sexuality was the most significant dividing line between feminists of 
the late twentieth century and all who went before.
46
 Janet Ramsay, however, stressed the 
centrality of women‘s new-found employment opportunities, which meant that women could 
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now ‗expect to establish autonomous household(s)‘, and could thus ‗reject the institutional 
dominance of marriage in women‘s lives‘.47 The rejection of marriage held particular 
significance for the refuge movement, one of its primary aims being to establish women in 
autonomous households.  
 
The women‘s liberation movement, for all these reasons, was able to destabilise seemingly 
fixed, uncontested and naturally occurring gender roles for women, particularly those relating 
to their sexuality and prescribed roles as wives and mothers. Essentialist ideas about gender 
were undermined in the process. The women‘s liberation movement, then, had begun the 
process of politicising women‘s identities. This had important implications for the 
development of the refuge movement because it enabled refuge activists to reconstruct the 
problems facing women in refuge in new and important ways.  
Women’s Liberation Centre  
 
Following the emergence of the women‘s liberation movement in Melbourne, the first 
Women‘s Liberation Centre (WLC) opened in Little Latrobe Street in March 1972. The centre 
came about in part because ‗it was obvious that the lack of a central place hindered the growth 
of the movement‘.48 Melbourne‘s WLC was more closely connected to working-class 
activism and trade unionism than its Sydney counterpart, and its members were often 
affiliated with the Communist Party.
49
 The Women‘s Action Committee, for example, led by 
prominent Communist Party member and equal wage campaigner Zelda D‘Aprano, played a 
central role in its establishment.
50
 The space provided a central meeting place for the various 
action groups that emerged, and it was also used as a forum for weekly discussion groups and 
for meetings to explore the meaning of women‘s liberation.51 It established a phone contact, 
information and referral services point, as well as a drop-in and support centre for women. It 
allowed for enhanced communication between the various groups and facilitated the 
movement‘s ability to organise and structure more effectively.52  
 
As well as providing a space for members of the women‘s liberation movement to develop 
and coordinate their agendas and activities, the phone contact at the centre improved 
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communication between them and other women more broadly. Very quickly, according to an 
early account of the refuge movement, the precarious nature of many women‘s circumstances 
was revealed through the constant phone calls from ‗women in crisis situations, requesting 
accommodation‘.53 These desperate appeals propelled members of the movement into action 
to alleviate the range of ‗intolerable circumstances‘ such women faced. As former WLHWH 
refuge activist Marie Rowan recalls: 
[W]omen just came to the women‘s centre seeking shelter and different women would 
take them home and that didn‘t work. Partly it was simply a problem that needed 
solving and a problem that had been raised by feminism and/or feminists. The 
women‘s liberation movement was talking about liberating women and women started 
liberating themselves and asking for help.
54
 
 
The need for a halfway house had been recognised by the women‘s liberation movement since 
the foundation of the WLC, and some members had already begun accommodating women in 
their own homes. It was not only accommodation, however, that women were seeking; as Jean 
Taylor recalls, the ‗centre started getting a lot of calls for abortions and about rapes and 
domestic violence‘.55  
 
Lesbians were a central driving force within the women‘s liberation movement and, in 
particular, they provided an important impetus to the feminist refuge movement in Melbourne 
as well as nationally. As early as 1973, the Melbourne Radical Lesbians organised a 
consciousness-raising weekend in Sorrento.
56
 They identified various strategies to overcome 
being ‗invisible in this male oriented world‘,57 and published a paper that canvassed the 
‗establishment of women‘s halfway houses and the opening of our own homes to women 
leaving parents and husbands who have nowhere to go‘.58 Sharon Laura played a central role 
in initiating the Halfway House Group (HHG), and she recalls that it was at the Sorrento 
conference that she raised the ‗issue of the vulnerability of women‘ and the need for ‗a safe 
place‘.59 The role of lesbians in the movement was not without controversy, however, and 
prejudice was commonplace, leaving many feeling ‗alienated, discriminated against, and 
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generally ignored or made to feel invisible by our sisters‘.60 However, the movement 
indisputably owed much to these women who were ‗on the vanguard of many women‘s 
liberation movement actions‘.61  
 
The action group that emerged within the WLC with the aim of providing a half-way house 
for women who needed it was just one in an explosion of women‘s groups. By 1975, the 
WLC was home not only the HHG but also to the Women‘s Abortion Action Coalition, the 
Women‘s Health Collective, Women Against Rape, and the Lesbian Feminists, among many 
others.
62
  
The Halfway House Group 
 
Activists from within the women‘s liberation movement were central in establishing a 
committee to find a way forward for the proposed Halfway House. In April 1974, an initial 
meeting was held at the WLC and, soon after, a co-ordinating committee of eight women was 
elected. Later that month, the ‗halfway house committee‘ was operating out of the WLC to 
‗provide help and accommodation for women if and when they required it‘.63 The close-knit 
group functioned as a collective and met every Monday night to build the financial, practical, 
and physical capacity needed to start a refuge. The HHG‘s central mission was to provide 
women with accommodation and safety from men‘s violence and, as Anne Summers recalls, 
this was also the case in the establishment of Elsie in Sydney: ‗we had to do something 
practical immediately to help women who were homeless or suffering from abuse at the hands 
of men‘.64  
 
The discourse of radical feminism, with its emphasis on challenging patriarchy and women‘s 
oppression, was central in shaping the ideas and actions of the HHG. However, there were 
variations between members in terms of how they became involved. Chris Sitka, for example, 
recalls that she had become radicalised after ‗reading women‘s liberation literature and had 
decided to not follow the stereotype role‘.65 Women‘s liberation theory thus shaped the way 
that radical feminists like Sitka challenged dominant roles and norms for women, and the 
concept of a halfway house was part of this challenge, as were personal decisions like not 
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following prescribed roles for women and dress codes.
66
 From Sitka‘s perspective, women‘s 
liberation from men, and in particular from the institution of the family, constituted the 
group‘s ‗core‘ aim:  
We saw the halfway house as a place for women to come once they decided they 
wanted to leave oppressive men and become independent, politically active women … 
And part of that of course was that men raped and bashed women … but …. for us the 
central core concept was that we provided a political hot house where women could 
come as they left their families … whether they were married or young ... [W]e 
wanted the liberation of women, and it wasn‘t just economic, it was about a spiritual 
liberation.
67
  
 
By contrast, for socialist feminists such as Hargreaves, involvement in the HHG was 
stimulated by concern about the structural inequalities facing women and, in particular, 
women‘s homelessness. In a policy context dominated by men‘s homelessness, she recalled 
feeling compelled to ask: ‗Where are the homeless women? … no-one could really answer 
that question … it was really a gap in the knowledge of our understanding of what was going 
on in society at that time‘.68 It was with this in mind that she attended the first meeting of 
what would become the HHG. However, as Hargreaves discovered, those in attendance were 
primarily concerned to liberate women from oppressive relationships with men: ‗certainly 
accommodation was seen as an important issue but the nature of the relationships that women 
were in was really the driving force‘.69  
 
With a slightly different perspective, founding HHG member Sharon Laura recalled that her 
involvement stemmed from being ‗radicalised‘ by involvement in the ‗anti-war movement‘,70 
and experiences that heightened her awareness of the vulnerability of women:  
I‘d met young women who were in gaol … under exposure to ―moral danger‖. I had a 
very strong sense of the vulnerability of young women [and] because of my family 
background, I had a very strong sense of the abuse that women could suffer, that there 
was no place for women or young girls to go to. Because of all of that, there was a 
sense that there needed to be… [somewhere] … that women could be safe … So I 
suppose there were a lot of personal things that were driving my position.
71
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By contrast, Sitka did not recall whether ‗many of the women in my particular little radical 
group had talked about being bashed by their fathers or their mothers being bashed so it 
probably wasn‘t in our personal experience‘.72 
 
Whether their aims derived from women‘s liberation, homelessness or safety, the women who 
made up the HHG were predominantly young, Anglo and able-bodied. For these women, and 
many others of the women involved in the women‘s liberation movement, gender was a more 
oppressive structure than class or race. They rarely considered how their actions and ideas 
might impact on women from different backgrounds. Indeed, they focused their attention on 
minimising difference and promoting the unity of all women as sharing a common oppression 
under patriarchy.  
 
The issue of women‘s homelessness and subjection to violence was new to them, and like 
much of the rest of society, they were staggered by its extent. As Sitka recounts: ‗I‘m sure I 
didn‘t know how widespread it was. I knew it in theory but not in practice and so probably we 
were a bit overwhelmed about … the extent of the violence‘.73 However, as the collective 
grew, and other women came to work at the refuge, first-hand experiences of ‗unhappy 
marriages or home life situations‘ became more frequent.74 These women had been through 
‗intolerable domestic crises, and knew that there were many other women who were in 
contact with the movement who were going through the same ordeal, and were trapped in 
their situation‘.75 It is clear that the lived experience of violence and abuse by men was a part 
of the experience of many women who became involved in the refuge movement at its 
beginnings. 
   
The HHG was influenced by the development of refuges interstate and overseas. Indeed, Sitka 
had been directly involved in the squatting that preceded the establishment of ‗Elsie‘ in 
Sydney.
76
 In the same year, women had spoken out in Sydney at the Women against a Violent 
Society Conference on International Women‘s Day, again revealing their many stories of 
violence, as well as the grossly inadequate responses of the legal system.
77
 By September in 
Melbourne, a rape crisis centre had opened in Collingwood as a result of the work undertaken 
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by the radical feminist collective, Women Against Rape (WAR).
78
 The centre was operated 
by volunteers and run by the Women‘s Health Collective until December 1975. 79  
 
The emergence of refuges overseas was well known at this time, and their activities were 
receiving publicity in Melbourne.
80
 As Taylor acknowledges, ‗We didn‘t just start it up out of 
nothing. Already, there were refuges in England‘.81 Movements were also developing in other 
parts of the UK, and in the US and Canada.
82
 In the US, for example, ‗shelters‘ were formed 
across the country during the 1970s and early 1980s, and, whilst they had diverse 
organisational beginnings, ‗radical feminist ideology … profoundly influenced their policies 
and practices‘.83 For Canada, Gillian Walker has documented how women in Vancouver, 
‗worked to make women‘s experiences of beating, brutality, and neglect … a matter of public 
and political concern‘.84 Similarly, S. Laurel Weldon has shown that ‗women‘s groups were 
identified as the catalyst for government action‘ in the eight nations most responsive to the 
problem of domestic violence‘.85 
 
There were eleven refuges operating across the country by mid-1975,
86
 and members of the 
HHG knew they ‗were being flooded with women and children seeking shelter‘.87 This meant 
that they were reluctant to squat in order to obtain a house, even though the idea was 
discussed and explored at some length, lest they be ‗swamped with desperate women needing 
help‘.88 Instead, they were determined to be ‗very well organised before we start‘, to avoid 
‗add[ing] to the misery these women have suffered already by our mismanagement‘.89  They 
thus set about the task of recruiting people to fill the house rosters and creating an extensive 
list of women who would be prepared to open their homes to women and children. They 
publicised a central number and began receiving calls well before the refuge was operating.  
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Initially, HHG planned to establish a number of houses but it quickly became apparent that 
the attainment of even one would be more difficult than they foresaw. They petitioned various 
bodies, and hundreds of letters were sent out asking for funds. However, this proved 
unsuccessful and they very quickly began looking to the state for assistance, submitting 
various proposals to government. The group‘s first submission in August 1974 included 
$100,000 for buying a suitable house, and was sent to a number of government departments.
90
 
Simultaneously, the group publicised their activities through women journalists at the Age and 
the Herald and began to receive community support.
91
 It was only after members handed out 
leaflets at a WEL forum, however, that a member offered the use of her house in Kew for 
twelve months, rent free. The committee immediately launched into action and again took a 
meticulous approach to organising before the refuge opened. People were recruited for 
transport and baby-sitting rosters, and a long list of rules was devised for roster women. The 
group developed a manifesto, later renamed the Halfway House principles, in order to ensure 
that the house operated as part of the women‘s liberation movement and was consistent with 
their ‗specific political strategies‘.92 On 23 September 1974, the HHG opened the first 
women‘s refuge in Victoria, the WLHWH, operating entirely on donations and volunteer 
efforts for its first thirteen months.
93
 The house was overwhelmed with demand and in nine 
months they had received ‗over 350 requests and accommodated over 100 in the house‘.94 
They had also resorted to accommodating ‗about two dozen in our own homes‘, and 
approximately one third of the women seeking help were unable to be housed. 
Feminisms and the Refuge Movement: Difference, Equality and 
Protectionism  
 
[O]ne by one from ‘74 … refuges popped up, not connected at all, grew like topsy 
from a whole variety of different perspectives … you can imagine the diversity and 
the disparity of the people that were actually working there.
95
  
 
Refuges would soon become central to the women‘s movement‘s response to the problem of 
domestic violence. In Victoria, and nationally, radical feminist refuges were highly influential 
in both the initiation and the further development of the refuge movement. However, refuges 
in all states were characterised by varied philosophies, and not all shared radical feminist 
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beliefs, particularly in the early years. Some were motivated by religious compassion. Others 
drew on a variety of feminist philosophies, goals and strategies, including those others 
championed by an earlier generation of feminists. The continuity of these past feminist ideas, 
along side the new, characterised the work of the 70s refuge movement in Victoria. 
Women’s Liberation Halfway House  
I think the Halfway House collective was one of the fulcrum‘s from which feminism 
was moving the world.
96
 
WLHWH opened in September 1974. Its objectives were heavily shaped by radical feminist 
philosophy with its emphasis on patriarchy and women‘s oppression, from which all issues 
facing women, including violence, were seen to be derived. Above and beyond its focus on 
liberating women economically and personally, WLHWH activists sought to create societal 
change and were firmly committed to the notion of difference and special rights for women, 
identifying the ‗intolerable situations‘ women faced as ‗an overall social problem‘.97 The 
assessment, and the initial aims and objectives of the HHG were inseparable from the subject 
positions of the women who created them.  
 
In November 1974, the WLHWH sent its first submission for funding to the federal Hospital 
and Health Services Commission and, by February 1975, after much lobbying, they were 
given an interim grant of $14,600. These were federal funds administered through the 
Victorian State Health Department and were designed to cover costs until alternative funding 
was made available through the federal government‘s HPAP. However, administrative hold-
ups prevented them from receiving any of the funds until 28 May 1975. The refuge committee 
quickly learnt that ‗the state government had no precedent for dealing with groups like ours 
and … [we] felt that they viewed us with suspicion, if not downright hostility. The feeling 
was mutual‘.98 This distrust among WLHWH refuge workers was accentuated by the 
department‘s inability to quickly process and distribute interim funds. Ongoing bureaucratic 
bungling seemed to induct lack of care and commitment to the refuge program and resulted in 
the refuges‘ applications for funding being lost on more than one occasion.99 This initial 
engagement with the state government set the scene for a somewhat turbulent future 
relationship. 
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The WLHWH, set a precedent for future feminist refuges in undertaking an approach to 
supporting women and structuring their organisation that was radically different from the 
existing charitable institutions and all of those that had come before. Early on, WLHWH 
refuge was seen to offer ‗a point of contact between the women‘s movement and women in 
acute, desperate and dangerous situations‘.100 Its principal aims were not only to ‗offer 
emergency accommodation and food‘ but to empower the women coming into refuges and 
‗enable them to regain their confidence, re-establish their identities as worthwhile individual 
human beings, and establish new lives in which, in the long term, they can be free and 
independent‘.101   
 
Support was thus based on enabling women to achieve independence in relation to their 
practical needs as well as the potential for developing of new identities as women. The 
emphasis was on empowerment, and their intention was to provide a model of support based 
on self-help principles: ‗We do not think at this stage that we are capable of providing 
permanent homes for women. We can only assist women as they attempt to help 
themselves‘.102  On another level, they also tried to support women to ‗find themselves‘, to 
resist and ‗break out‘ of their traditional roles.103  As Sitka wrote at the time:  
Originally we envisaged the Halfway House as being a place where women who had 
decided to leave their previous situation could find the space and the time to find 
themselves, where they could get the space and time and support with which to more 
confidently shape their new lives.
104
 
 
It is difficult to point to a unified set of aims, with a collective of up to 100 women, and 
different feminisms in operation from the beginning, but it is clear that ‗it wasn‘t enough just 
to run the refuge‘.105 The WLHWH was concerned with changing the structure and nature of 
society so that women could ‗choose to live with or without a man, with or without children, 
with dignity, economic security and independence‘.106 This approach was directly shaped by 
the radical and socialist feminist philosophies of the women‘s liberation movement. As 
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former WLHWH activist Di Otto recalls, ‗[W]e did see ourselves as changing ourselves and 
the world.  And we were very hopeful about being able to do that in a relatively short amount 
of time‘.107 Such change was a central concern of the WLHWH, which aimed to provide 
much more than support and independence for women; they would also promote the right of 
women to live and be different from men. This emphasis was what clearly differentiated the 
work of the WLHWH from that of other women‘s refuges.  
 
As an extension of their radical feminist philosophy, refuge activists rejected traditional forms 
of charitable welfare provision, working in opposition to the professional institutions 
providing charity to women and children such as religious and welfare groups. Otto recalls: 
 [W]e saw ourselves as opposed to the ―welfare‖ state, that we were going to create a 
different kind of assistance, where women were treated as sisters—as equals—and not 
as objects of social work.
108
 
 
They critiqued the role of traditional welfare organisations, as serving to reinforce ‗the role of 
women as ―female‖ i.e. mother, wife, housekeeper, passive, selfless, dependent‘,109 and 
inevitably leading to their ‗continued dependence on intolerable situations‘.110 They would 
instead support women to ‗determine their own lives and recognise their self identity‘.111 This 
rejection of traditional forms of welfare intervention was also embraced by other women‘s 
refuges that emerged soon after the WLHWH and shared their view that the institutional 
context of support services for women was inadequate and a new approach was needed. As 
Hargreaves recollects: 
So a woman … says she was in an intolerable domestic situation … who could she 
turn to?  Doctors, lawyers, priests, psychiatrists, social workers, police … we explored 
all these sort of institutions and avenues and found that they were all just dead ends as 
far as giving the woman some help to get out of the situation.
112
 
 
Violence against women by their husbands, combined with economic insecurity, was the most 
prominent issue facing women residents. But in addition to responding to their very real and 
immediate physical, psychological and emotional needs, the refuge would also aim to ‗show 
that these intolerable situations are widespread, the result of the sort of society we live in‘.113 
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Another important part of their work was to politicise, critique and make public the conditions 
that created the need for refuges. As Di Otto recalls: 
So we saw ourselves as involved in a movement for the liberation of women and we 
saw the violence that women were experiencing in their family situations as something 
that needed to be exposed and become known about.
114
 
 
WLHWH was structured according to a collective model of functioning that encouraged the 
full participation of residents in decision making. This approach was intended to ‗close the 
gap between provider and recipient‘.115 Collectivity was seen as the only ideologically 
consistent form of organising for women‘s liberationists because it was believed to remove 
oppressive hierarchical structures and to foster democratic decision making:  
We work as a collective because hierarchical organisation induces apathy and 
depersonalisation, and robs people of the right to become involved and responsible in 
whatever capacity they choose. We don‘t want to perpetuate the system whereby the 
fate of the many is decided by a few. We want to develop an organisational structure 
which is democratic and non-authoritarian, so that all members of the collective can 
share equal responsibility for its functioning.
116
 
 
The idea of collectivity, as with many other women‘s liberation auspiced organisations, was 
firmly established by the group in 1975 in order to ‗establish ourselves as feminists, as a 
political, not a charitable group‘.117 Western Region Women‘s Refuge followed suit when it 
opened in 1976 by employing only feminist workers.
118
 The refuge was initially funded by the 
Essendon local council under the HPAP. The council had tried to push for a committee of 
management and, as a result, the refuge attempted to cut all ties in defence of its commitment 
to a women-only collective structure.
119
 An extension of this philosophy was the development 
of employment policies that limited workers periods of tenure to twelve months. As former 
WLHWH activist Vig Geddes recalls: ‗[Y]ou normally only had the job for a year, because it 
was seen that this opportunity to be paid for your political work should be shared around‘.120 
 
                                               
114
 Otto interview. 
115
 Smith, p. 29. 
116
 WLHWH, ‗Collectivity‘, workshop paper, circa 1977, Vig Geddes private papers, in possession of Jacqui 
Theobald. 
117
 WLHWH, Herstory, p. 34. 
118
 Women’s Liberation Newsletter, March 1976, p. 6, Frances Ryan papers, box 3, MWLA; Booklet, ‗Western 
Region Women‘s Refuge Group: Aims, Structures and Policies‘, Melbourne, August 1976, Burrows papers, 
UMA. 
119
 Women’s Liberation Newsletter, p. 6. 
120
 Geddes interview. 
  66 
Differences amongst women at the WLHWH (and other women‘s refuges) meant that 
collective processes did not create the seamless sisterhood they had intended. In particular, 
differences in class, race and sexuality between women meant that there were varied 
experiences for those involved. Acknowledging these differences at the time, however, was 
resisted. The propensity of second–wave feminism to adopt a ‗universalisation of white 
middle-class women‘s lives as representatives of the female experience‘,121 has been well 
documented. Radical feminism, in particular, employed its own essentialist notion of 
‗women‘, which meant that different experiences and identities were minimised. As Otto 
reflects:  
It was about combining our energies and combining our resources for the collective 
good really and resisting hierarchies and divisive differences between us. The 
downside of that is that we were then reluctant to acknowledge that there was also 
value in our differences and capabilities and resources and so on.
122
 
 
Problems relating to engagement with residents also emerged for political activists, some of 
whom found it confronting ‗listening to those terrible stories‘ and ‗tried to keep ourselves 
distant‘.123 This also resulted from the fact that many of the women in refuge were ‗working 
class‘.124 On this topic, former WLHWH activist Ulla Svensson remembers: 
There always was that gap …. that we (who attended Monday night collective 
meetings, the political activists) were successful and we had jobs, we earned money, 
we had our own house … we had never been beaten … At that time I don‘t think we 
understood that we were not sisters in the same situation … [but] … I think we 
sincerely tried to relate to the residents as ―sisters‖.125  
 
Moreover, she added, many residents were ‗scared‘ by radical lesbian activities, and this 
generated a further ‗barrier to sisterhood‘.126 Pat Russell was a resident, and later worker, at 
the WLHWH at this time and recalled that collective processes could be intimidating for 
residents, and the divisions between themselves and ‗office workers‘ could operate in such a 
way so as to mirror the relationships they were trying to escape: 
It was very frightening to speak in front of twenty other people that you don‘t really 
know … [W]hen you come into a place, to you, they‘re the bosses. They‘ve taking 
over your husband‘s role virtually … What they say goes more or less … women 
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[that] come in [to refuge] think they‘re in charge, they‘re going to make these rules 
and regulations and that‘s it.127 
 
Furthermore, as Otto remarks, the support needs of residents were not considered with the 
same level of rigour as the collectives desire to enable women to ‗become one of us‘.128 
Similarly, Geddes reflected on the consequences for residents when political work took 
priority: ‗it probably wasn‘t very good for those women in a lot of ways, and we didn‘t really 
reflect on our practice much in terms of what it was like for them‘.129 On this subject, former 
WLHWH activist Irena Davis remarked: ‗I don‘t think they took much time to think about the 
wonders of feminism … I think some came around to it once their life got sorted a bit‘.130 
 
Barriers to ‗sisterhood‘ also stemmed from the policies and practices of WLHWH, and some 
later refuges. Sitka reflected, for example, on the heterosexual focus that refuges developed, 
which made her ‗angry‘ because she perceived them to have evolved from ‗a place where all 
sisters were welcome to be helped by all other sisters‘ to one where access became ‗narrowly 
focused … [on] … heterosexual women abused physically by men … even though lesbians 
were… [a] …large proportion of the group who set it up‘.131 She also expressed her dismay at 
the involvement over time of women in the collective who ‗weren‘t radical feminists‘, who 
she considers to have hijacked their revolutionary agenda by focussing their work on 
‗individuals‘ instead of ‗politics‘.132 However, as Sitka concedes, this exclusion was less 
intentional than a result of a lack of resources and awareness: ‗at that time, we didn‘t really 
have a concept of lesbian domestic violence because we were … so focused on male 
dominance of women‘.133  
 
Women of migrant backgrounds were also discriminated against, and this was formally 
written into policy as is evident in the ‗Doing Roster‘ manual for WLHWH: ‗If the woman 
does not know enough English to communicate, we cannot take her in‘.134 It is also evident 
that ‗racism … was openly acknowledged among migrant women and Aboriginal women‘.135 
Indeed, Rowan recalls that migrant women ‗wouldn‘t feel comfortable coming [to refuge] 
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because they were surrounded by Anglos‘.136 By contrast, Rowan recalled her own experience 
as ‗a fabulous time to be alive and a fabulous time to be a woman‘.137 
 
Murdolo has contended that, within the white women‘s movement, migrant women often 
faced ‗judgements … about their feminism, and the assumption was made that they did not 
measure up to the image of the feminist activist and refuge worker‘.138 This image, Murdolo 
contends ‗was based on an unacknowledged series of white Anglo-feminist core values‘.139 
Such values are implicit in the narrative of activists like Rowan, which reveal that migrant 
women were expected to conform to an ‗Australian‘ way of life upon entry into refuge: 
The women who left ethnic communities … were the women who were able and 
willing to say, ‗I don‘t want to belong to that community … I‘m an Australian, and I 
want to live as an Australian. And I want to bring my children up as Australian‘. And 
we could resettle them in an Anglo community, and help them set up a support 
system. If they were those women who couldn‘t bear to not be in touch with mum and 
sister and Aunty Mary or whoever, that was extremely hard.
140
 
 
Implicit in Rowan‘s narrative is the assumption that migrant women only became real 
‗Australians‘, after they rejected their cultural heritage and adopted an ‗Anglo‘ way of life. 
Similarly, Sitka‘s memories, as outlined above, are shaped by her identity as a white, middle-
class, radical, lesbian feminist. Indeed, her recollection of a utopian sisterhood that was 
subsequently ‗taken over‘ by conservative forces does not reflect the experiences of other 
women for whom class and/or ethnicity shaped their experiences in less positive ways.  
 
Yet how to overcome divides between women was the subject of much debate in the 
WLHWH collective.
141
 And there were successful endeavours to bridge social class 
differences. Svensson recounts, for example, how on her rostered nights at the refuge she 
would arrive ‗with two kits … one was a handyman kit to repair fallen-off door handles and 
kitchen cupboard handles … the other was a contraception kit to show residents how not to 
get pregnant‘.142 This provided Svensson with a successful way of interacting with residents, 
some of whom became more ‗accepting of her than some other politicos‘.143 This acceptance 
also related to the fact that Svensson adopted a non-judgmental approach, and chose not to 
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‗preach‘ at residents when they failed to take up the aspirations of some radical feminist 
collective members.
144
 Other activists sought to minimise differences between themselves and 
residents in other ways. Taylor recounts how, whilst she was working in an inner-city feminist 
refuge: ‗residents came to my house for dinner often‘.145  
 
Breaking down divisions between women, and empowering residents, was achieved in a 
range of other ways. As Otto recounts: 
Some residents were extraordinary and did join the collective and participated like 
anyone else.  Some became paid workers at the refuge—which was our hope really, to 
have former residents as workers, because that was one way to dismantle the welfare 
model of the expert and the needy person—to mix those people up and not accept 
those two categories.
146
 
 
Russell believes that her experience at refuge was just as empowering as it was intimidating, 
and, in particular, the communal focus facilitated a shared consciousness-raising between 
residents: 
[P]eople talked … and you realised that you weren‘t the only one in that situation. 
Because you thought when you went in there [that] ―I must be a bad person I don‘t 
know anybody else who‘s living like that‖.147   
 
Similarly, Rowan believes the communal model created a space where women could share 
their experiences, often for the first time, as an ‗experiment‘, learning from each other: 
I quite liked being on nights because … people would talk … about their lives and 
their feelings and their hopes and their dreams and their fantasies… [W]e weren‘t just 
there providing a service we were providing consciousness raising … the idea that the 
50s model of the woman by herself in a home taking care of herself and her husband 
was challenged very directly … [W]e just created a household where you can talk 
about anything, there is no privatisation of oppression anymore.
148
 
 
As a direct result of their aims to promote the rights of women to live and be different from 
men, WLHWH opened its doors with the stated aim of supporting any woman in need for 
whatever reason. Though violence was certainly a part of their understanding of the 
circumstances facing women, they were also motivated by the fact that ‗women were not 
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always looking for an escape from abusive domestic situations‘ but were often ‗needing 
somewhere to stay for a while, often in desperate circumstances … A significant proportion of 
them were young girls with no-where to go‘.149 Most significantly, WLHWH was committed 
to offering support to all women, regardless of their circumstances, and the criteria for women 
to access the refuge were very broad. They included: ‗intolerable circumstances, including 
financial difficulties and insecurities, fear of an unknown situation, lack of support and 
acceptance from the community … We hope to accommodate any woman who requires 
emergency shelter, whatever the reason‘.150 In its beginnings, then, WLHWH was a response 
to the needs of all ‗desperate women‘. 
 
As well as seeking to expose the issues they were dealing with at the refuge, and in line with 
the objective of social change, the collective mounted a series of political campaigns. They 
initiated action groups in response to the issues women in refuge were dealing with. Some of 
these issues related to income support, the law, children and housing, and they assumed a 
central focus in the refuge movement‘s political activity for well over a decade.151 The lack of 
housing options for women in refuge was publicly exposed by the WLHWH housing action 
group. A campaign was initiated just two months after the refuge was opened and involved 
squatting in a block of nine vacant flats in an inner-city suburb of Melbourne. The squat lasted 
for several years, and during that time, the flats were used as emergency accommodation for 
women exiting the refuge. Their main aim was to publicise the lack of well-located and 
affordable accommodation for women.
152
 Hargreaves, who played a leading role in the 
campaign, recalled their motivation to politicise the vacant housing: 
It was at the time when we realised that women needed housing, they couldn‘t just 
stay at the refuge forever … and we were starting to put demands on the housing 
commission to accommodate women, and we found out there were a lot of vacant flats 
… while women desperately needed homes.  It was just such an obvious contradiction.  
One which we thought we could use politically. So we decided to move in.
153
 
 
Residents‘ lived experiences drove the work of the refuge activists at WLHWH, just as the 
ideology of the women‘s liberation movement continued to shape their feminist approach. 
The beginnings of the refuge movement, and the development of WLHWH, inaugurated a 
significant period of feminist resistance and struggle in Victoria with the clear aim of 
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undermining the gendered social order and empowering women facing homelessness and 
violence.  
CO-AS-IT: Migrant Women and Feminism  
 
In 1975, the first migrant women‘s refuge was established under the auspices of Comitato 
Assistenza Italiana (Co-As-It)—translated as the Italian Association of Assistance. By 1978, 
Co-As-It was receiving national refuge program funding.
154
 The following account of the 
refuge‘s beginnings is largely based on the narrative of Vernon Hillman, the first worker at 
Co-As-It to run the women‘s refuge. Acknowledging this part of the refuge movement‘s 
history is imperative because, as Murdolo points out, neither the establishment of the migrant 
women‘s refuge in 1975, nor its three-year struggle to obtain government funding, has been 
noted in any other accounts of the women‘s refuge movement before her own.155  
 
Murdolo contends that Co-As-It refuge was established ‗in response to the perceived gaps in 
the provision of welfare service to women, on the initiative of immigrant feminists who were 
working as social workers‘.156 The account provided here broadens this analysis, and 
considers the influence of Hillman—a non-immigrant and non-feminist social worker—
alongside that of WLHWH as other catalysts for the beginning of Co-As-It‘s refuge. It 
documents how the refuge provided an important support service to Italian women in the 
community that was aligned in its philosophy and practice with existing traditional welfare 
organisations.  
 
Hillman was employed as a senior social worker with Co-As-It in the early 1970s. She recalls 
that the organisation had advertised for ‗a social worker‘ to provide generalist support ‗for 
Italian family welfare‘.157 Not being Italian, she quickly learned to speak the language by 
taking ‗Italian lessons and try[ing] to become fluent‘.158 Hillman subsequently worked for the 
organisation for over twenty years. As soon as it was operational, Co-As-It dealt with ‗every 
possible problem‘ facing Italian families, including the particular problems facing women, 
such as domestic violence, an issue they were ‗dealing with all the time‘.159 However, the 
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extent of the problem had not  previously been identified because their work had focused on 
individuals and the concept of a refuge was something that they ‗hadn‘t thought of before‘.160 
 
As a result of her work at Co-As-It, Hillman was inspired to attend the ‗Women and 
Madness‘ conference held at the University of Melbourne in August 1974 because it was 
concerned with the themes of ‗women having trouble with their husbands … or having no 
housing‘.161 She recalled being ‗enthralled‘ by the ‗fierce‘ nature of proceedings, and 
summoned the courage to approach the women speakers from WLHWH: 
I was absolutely enthralled by it … they stood up one after the other and they really 
went for it.  I was speechless and I didn‘t dare interrupt and it was such a shock to me, 
and I had never heard such … swearing and carrying on …  So I got my courage and 
went to the woman who was running it and I said, ―I am from Co-As-It‖, and they 
said, ―Co-As-It, what‘s the good of that place? ... We can‘t cope with all these Italians 
and their kids and we don‘t know anything about them, and we can‘t feed them … and 
we haven‘t got enough money to get special food and we haven‘t got enough staff‖. 
And then they said, ―If you call yourself a social worker, why don‘t you bloody well 
do something about the Italian community?‖ And so I said ―I will‖ … They just said, 
―We can‘t cope with the Australians, let alone all these,‖ and I had to stop them saying 
W-O-G-S.  But that was flashed about a bit.
162
   
 
Hillman was immediately ‗made to swing into action‘. She knew from her own work that 
Italian women were experiencing ‗domestic violence‘ and, following the conference, that their 
needs were not being met by the limited existing services. She was also now aware of the 
existing racist attitudes towards them.
163
 
 
At this point, and with the support of the Co-As-It board of management committee, Hillman 
began the process of establishing a refuge. The refuge was founded in 1975 and funded in the 
first instance by Co-As-It. The property was provided by an estate agent who sat on their 
committee. It took two years before the refuge received government funding in the refuge 
program.
164
 At its outset, Hillman was the sole worker, and recalls the anxiety it caused her 
when she accommodated the first three women in the Carlton refuge: ‗I was sick with worry 
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about them and thinking, ―Oh Lord, I hope the husband hasn‘t found them‖. It was a terrific 
responsibility and a terrific worry, but I had the committee very firmly behind me‘.165 
 
The work of Co-As-It women‘s refuge was based on the traditional welfare approach that 
shaped the broader organisation. It offered women professional welfare services that were 
informed by dominant notions of women‘s roles in society relating to motherhood and the 
family. It also operated on a hierarchical model with men on the committee, whose inclusion, 
they fought to maintain in opposition to feminist refuges that operated as women-only 
collectives.
166
 Their focus at the refuge was on reunification of women with their families and 
partners where possible. As Hillman recalls: 
Basically we thought why we were there was to help women to independence if they 
wanted it or help them to go back to their families, which was the thing that we hoped 
that we could do the most, because the children were involved and we offered 
guidance and things like that.  So our philosophy you would have to say was, if we 
thought there was any faint chance, get them together. And we had private places 
where they could be together, and talk to each other.
167
 
 
The Co-As-It refuge developed a close and supportive working relationship with the staff at 
Mary Anderson Lodge because the two refuges were based on reasonably similar 
philosophical positions and provided each other with support and camaraderie. Hillman 
recounts a meeting of the three initial refuges, illustrating the diversity of women in a visual 
context: 
I always sat next to the old girl that was the head of the Salvation Army … She was a 
very wonderful woman and she was rather staid … and one meeting she dug me in the 
ribs … and she said, looking down at all the women‘s lib who had no shoes and not 
very much at all underneath, and she said, ―Mrs Hillman, you and I are the only ones 
around this table wearing brassieres‖.168 
 
The lack of history telling in relation to migrant activism and the refuge movement is 
evidenced by the fact that very few interviewees from this period were able to recall that Co-
As-It was actually operating a refuge during the mid-1970s. Furthermore, it is evident from 
Hillman‘s account that migrant women were often excluded from access to refuges on the 
basis of their ethnicity. These policies of exclusion are often mis-remembered or not 
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remembered at all, particularly by non-migrant interviewees, many of whom insisted that 
refuges did not deliberately discriminate. This reflects the effects on interviewee‘s memories 
of their subjectivities, and is mirrored in dominant accounts of the movement, which have 
silenced these events. 
Maroondah Halfway House and Doncare Women’s Refuge, Feminism and 
Equality 
 
In contrast to WLHWH, other refuges established during the 1970s were characterised by 
more moderate feminist philosophies. One such refuge was Maroondah Halfway House 
(MHWH), which opened in September 1975, and Doncare Women‘s Refuge (later named 
Brenda), which opened in 1978. These refuges focused on the individual needs of women. 
They sought to promote equality by working with women on an individual level rather than 
stressing the structural issues relating to women‘s experiences of violence. This included 
supporting them to achieve economic independence and autonomous households; however, 
they were less concerned with changing the structures of society and prescribed roles for 
women. This facilitated learning on the run, as former MHWH worker Kate Coleman recalls, 
‗we all flew by the seat of our pants, there was no guidebook, there was no job description, 
and we were all learning‘.169 
 
MHWH was initiated by members of the Nunawading Legal Service, opened earlier that year 
as part of a Whitlam government initiative. A key role was played by Erskine Roden, a local 
solicitor who organised a public meeting to establish a women‘s refuge in the area.170 Roden 
generated awareness of the issues facing women who came to him for help in relation to their 
violent husbands.
171
 The legal centre then teamed with a range of women from the local 
community in the east, including members of the Women‘s Electoral Lobby, to form MHWH 
group.
172
 WEL‘s politics were focused on the achievement of equality for women and what is 
now often referred to as liberal feminism.
173
 Notably, Kate Coleman recounts, the group was 
also supported by men, one of whom ‗bought a house and said ―use it to run a refuge‖‘. The 
refuge subsequently ‗got some funding and opened early September 1975‘.174 The MHWH 
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group was motivated by the fact that WLHWH house ‗was up and running‘, combined with a 
climate of growing ‗concern about women in the community‘.175  
 
The refuge was also supported by a broad range of women in the community, including local 
councillors like Gracia Baylor
176
 and many other committed women volunteers.
177
 Through 
the Local Government Women‘s Association, over which Baylor presided for a number of 
years in the early 1970s, women councillors across Victoria ‗were drawn together‘ to respond 
to ‗discrimination issues against women‘.178 As a result of their public position, they were 
well aware of problems like domestic violence ‗that were not being addressed or being dealt 
with in any proper way‘.179 Baylor, however, acknowledged that she could not recall where 
the refuge movement originated: ‗to be honest, I can‘t remember who first thought of it, the 
idea of a refuge, and the concept of a house‘.180 Baylor‘s lack of recollection provides 
evidence of women‘s activism in history being rendered invisible. It also emphasises the 
importance of documenting events as significant as the formation of the refuge movement. 
The centrality to it of the women‘s liberation movement, which provided the impetus for other 
community groups such as the MHWH, might otherwise be forgotten. 
 
Liberal feminism shaped the work of MHWH. Domestic violence and women‘s homelessness 
were considered to be the result of women‘s inequality. Unlike the WLHWH, which aimed to 
work outside established structures, MHWH set about working within them. As Kate 
Coleman recounts, ‗the philosophy of Maroondah wasn‘t anywhere near as women‘s 
liberationist as the women‘s lib house was‘.181 It was on the fundamental issue relating to the 
desired place of women in Australian society, and the means of achieving that goal, that the 
work of the two refuges differed. The feminism of WEL, and by extension MHWH, was 
viewed by one WLHWH member as, ‗not ambitious enough, we actually didn‘t want what 
men had‘.182  
 
MHWH thus focused on working with individual women as opposed to political campaigns 
like squatting. Using feminist ideals, they sought to empower women and increase their 
autonomy so they might be equal with men. In doing, so the refuge workers were informed by 
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the belief that women were entitled to the same citizenship rights as men, and this included 
economic independence. In this area of their work, MHWH like WLHWH, was working in 
clear opposition to the charitable approach of the traditional welfare services. Indeed, the 
original aims of MHWH were for ‗a place where women can be free to help themselves, not a 
charitable institution which will keep women dependent and passive‘.183 In this sense, even 
though they made no claim to being politically radical, they participated in a process of 
politicising the nature of mainstream welfare services for women. It was this approach that the 
two refuges shared, and MHWH embraced this philosophy because it also fitted within their 
commitment to equality for women.  
 
For a number of years the refuge operated through a board of management that included men 
although women held key positions as co-administrators in relation to the day-to-day 
operations of the refuge.
184
 They did not embrace the model of collectivity employed by the 
WLHWH. Again, this choice derived from liberal feminism. MHWH was seeking equality, 
not revolution, and, despite the fact that they were not overtly political, the refuge maintained 
connections with the women‘s liberation movement and WLHWH.185 The influence of this 
relationship would manifest itself in later years when MHWH changed its constitution to 
become a women-only collective.
186
  
 
Doncare women‘s refuge was funded through a variety of local services, including Doncare 
Community Agency, the local council and churches. The service operated largely on a 
volunteer basis, with only a few women employed part time.
187
 Long-term refuge worker 
Wendy Austin recalled in relation to her experience working at Doncare in the late 1970s that 
the focus of their feminism was on ‗women helping women‘, and unlike, WLHWH, they were 
not ‗involved in the political side of it at all in that point of time‘.188 As Austin elaborates: 
[T]here was a lot of emphasis put on … conversation time, just being with the women. 
It was women helping women on a basis of equality, that was what the whole business 
was about … back in the 70s … it deliberately contradicted the social work client-type 
scenario … where women were basically being told what to do in a fairly strict social 
work framework as opposed to being given the options, being listened to at length for 
the first time and being encouraged to make decisions of their own that would actually 
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meet their need. It was very deliberately non-professional … It was quite openly said, 
―this is not a professional service, these are not professional women, we are women 
helping women, this is equal‖.189 
 
Austin surmised that the central difference between refuges like Doncare and other radical 
groups derived from their concern with ‗political change … [whereas] … for us it was more 
just taking women through a process and allowing them to control their lives rather than 
having their lives directed‘.190 This goal was consistent with their liberal stress on equality 
and creating the conditions for women to make independent decisions with the support of 
other women.  
Caroline Lodge and a Feminism of Protection 
 
In a somewhat different beginning, another refuge (later named Caroline Lodge) opened in 
the south of Melbourne in 1975. This refuge was auspiced by the Mentone City Council and 
accessed funding to support its establishment through the HPAP in 1975. The refuge was 
extremely conservative in its early years and operated for a decade via a committee of 
management that included members of the local council, and was chaired in its early years by 
a notoriously tyrannical mayor.
191
 Caroline Lodge received considerable support from ‗hordes 
of women and men‘, and, by the time the refuge opened, volunteers were ‗lined up to be 
roster women‘.192 Trades people and other local businesses donated various goods, including 
food and clothing, reflecting the extent of community support. 
 
The refuge was underpinned by a philosophy akin to that of mainstream traditional forms of 
‗charity‘ or ‗welfare‘, which were characterised by a feminism of protectionism. The role 
adopted by this refuge was to provide women with protection from their husbands as opposed 
to facilitating a new and different life and changing the structures of society. Dominant 
constructions of femininity, such as the view that ‗a good wife kept her family together‘ and 
was responsible for family harmony, informed their work, and volunteers actively encouraged 
the restoration of the family. A representative of the refuge stated they were ‗proud of our 
success in helping these women return to their husbands and restore their marriages‘.193 
Whilst they did not object to women‘s economic independence—indeed, one of their stated 
goals was ‗assisting women to become self-determining, self-reliant and able to utilise 
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facilities available in the community‘194—Caroline Lodge largely aimed to reinforce existing 
constructions of women as wives and mothers. Con Smith worked at the refuge from its 
inception for over thirty years, and recalled the mainly conservative women volunteers it 
attracted: 
They were really fine women … when they were on roster duty they always turned up 
looking spic and span ... [they] were very lovely women, but … they were very 
conservative, and could be quite judgmental, and I was probably a bit the same. And I 
just felt awful when this lovely dressed up roster woman would arrive with her 
casserole in her hand and say, ―Well what will we do today?‖ … It wasn‘t a good idea 
to come all dressed-up like you were going out to a Sunday lunch.
195
 
 
At first glance, Smith‘s memory of the ‗roster women‘ appears contradictory; they were at 
once ‗fine‘ and ‗lovely‘, and also ‗judgemental‘ and ‗conservative‘. This contradiction can be 
explained by examining the way that Smith‘s ‗past and current political ideology shape[s] the 
construction of [her] memory‘.196 First, because the ‗roster women‘ were Smith‘s colleagues 
and contemporaries in the past, it is probable that she shared ideas in common with them, and 
is therefore likely to recall their virtues. However, Smith was also critical of the pervasive 
class-based judgments adopted by the roster women, and whilst, acknowledging that she too 
had this tendency, Smith maintained she was not ‗as bad‘ as some whose behaviour and dress 
unnerved her. However, it is also likely that this awareness, and by extension her memories, 
have been constructed over time in light of her developing feminist political ideology. Giving 
further weight to this argument, Smith acknowledges that ‗the years that I was a worker in a 
women‘s refuge … was a really wonderful education for me‘.197 In particular, she recalls how 
her appreciation for feminism, and the methods of radical feminists, was a gradual process: 
I was a bit on the conservative side and originally I wouldn‘t even think of becoming 
involved in a sit-in and I found myself in the tent over at St Paul‘s Cathedral, and 
going on the night walk … I surprised myself with the fact that I could do it. I didn‘t 
think that I had it in me to go. I think it was because of the influence of those women 
who I thought had brilliant ideas and were very brave and very radical.
198
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Regardless of their class position, women like Smith‘s response in support of refuges is 
evidence that the issue of violence in the home was already well known amongst those who 
began volunteering their support. Smith noted her own motivations: 
I learned that from a very early age that it was an accepted thing for men to rule the 
family with violence. My own grandmother was a victim of domestic violence in the 
late 1800s in England … so when I heard about the feminist movement in the late 
1960s, and the fine work they were doing to fight for the rights of women and children 
escaping domestic violence … I decided to join them.199 
 
Though Smith recalled it was the work of the ‗feminist movement‘ that inspired her to join 
the refuge movement, she also admitted to being somewhat conservative, recalling that her 
appreciation for feminism grew gradually. On this subject, Smith‘s long-time colleague and 
friend, refuge movement activist Billi Clarke recounts: ‗I know Con in the old days would 
have said, ―I‘m not a bloody feminist‖‘.200 These contradictions highlight the continuing 
construction of memory, and reveal how changing political consciousness has shaped Smith‘s 
memories over time. Regardless, the refuge movement provided a space for Smith to act in 
support of women like her grandmother.  
 
Caroline Lodge was intent on providing professional services and actively employed welfare 
experts such as marriage guidance counsellors and social workers from the local council and 
citizen‘s advice bureau.201 This is what primarily differentiated their work from other 
equality-focused refuges such as Doncare, which actively worked against the dominance of 
professional welfare services.  
 
These differences resulted in heated media exchanges between WLHWH and Caroline Lodge 
over the issue of funding.
202
 Prior to the introduction of national refuge funding by the 
Whitlam government in June 1975, MHWH and Caroline Lodge were granted financial 
support through their local councils via the federal government‘s HPAP. This appears to be 
inconsistent with the government‘s general reluctance to fund women‘s refuges at this time.203 
Indeed, during the development of the HPAP guidelines, Social Security Minister Bill Hayden 
had been reported as saying that he did ‗not want activity to be dominated by … extremist 
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women‘s groups‘.204 This explains in part why the WLHWH operated for a number of months 
without government funding from the HPAP, despite numerous submissions. The WLHWH 
voiced outrage at the nature of the funding process, as well as the conservative ideological 
position of Caroline Lodge. In a letter addressed to Hayden, they lamented: 
We cannot help but wonder whether the grant to the council was made as a result of 
favouritism towards organisations which were more aligned than we are with the 
conservative and male-dominated power structure … organisations which until our 
collective, and the Elsie women‘s refuge collective began taking action, had attenuated 
and tried to ignore the problems of women in this society, and which are now 
emerging to jump on the bandwagon of the increasingly ―trendy‖ women‘s refuge 
movement.
205
 
 
It is clear that the HPAP had been reluctant to fund radical feminist organisations. However, it 
is also likely that the ability of MHWH and Caroline Lodge to access HPAP funding rested on 
a number of other factors, not the least of which was the fact that they were registered as 
charitable organisations. This meant that, unlike the WLHWH, they met the eligibility criteria 
of the HPAP to receive capital grants.
206
 Furthermore, it appears that the guidelines of the 
program itself were open to wide interpretation, and difficulties within its administration 
meant that there was a degree of inconsistency and ambiguity in relation to all its funding 
decisions.
207
 Those with knowledge and contacts could exploit this confusion. MHWH, for 
example, was able to take advantage of key public servants like Sid Spindler, who facilitated 
access to the federal purse.
208
 It is undeniable, however, that the speed with which Caroline 
Lodge gained funding under the HPAP indicates that some members of the Commonwealth 
government were uncomfortable with funding feminist organisations. The development of 
refuge funding will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 
 
By early 1976, the media had begun to understand refuges as a response to violence against 
women by men and their role was described by a supportive journalist as ‗the only glimmer of 
hope for these prisoners in their own homes‘.209 As a result of the work of the refuges, and in 
particular the publicity generated by WLHWH, public attitudes were shifting and dominant 
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discourses relating to the sacredness of the home were being challenged. The conservative 
ideology of refuges such as Caroline Lodge would later shift in response to this growing 
awareness. Like MHWH, Caroline Lodge would later become a collective and exclude men 
from involvement in their operation.  
Mary Anderson Lodge, the Salvation Army and the Sacredness of the 
Family 
 
In Melbourne the Salvation Army‘s refuge for women, Mary Anderson Lodge (MAL), had 
played an important role historically in the provision of services to homeless women. During 
the 1970s, MAL was amongst the first refuges, following WLHWH, to receive 
Commonwealth funding under the Hospital and Health Services Commission and worked in 
collaboration with the handful of other women‘s refuges operating in Victoria. 
 
The Salvation Army, and MAL by extension, were shaped by patriarchal and Christian 
values. The philosophical underpinnings of the refuge were therefore very different from 
those of feminist refuges such as WLHWH. The Salvation Army‘s work with women, as Elli 
McGavin has noted, was conceived historically as ‗rescue work‘ with ‗women leaving prison, 
escaping prostitution or in crisis situations‘.210  This century-long tradition fundamentally 
shaped the work of MAL at this time. Unlike WLHWH, which had begun to frame problems 
facing women in refuge in the context of women‘s inequality, the Salvation Army, as 
McGavin points out, failed to understand the cause of domestic violence in this context.
211
 
Furthermore, the patriarchal nature of the organisation meant that MAL was ‗a highly 
structured hierarchical management model and traditionally appointed staff outside the client 
group to professional roles‘.212 Unlike feminist refuges, they did not seek to promote the 
empowerment of women by facilitating their involvement in the refuge or to promote 
collectivism in the running of the house by breaking down oppressive hierarchical structures. 
 
Central to the ideology of the Salvation Army was the sacredness of the family, and this 
certainly shaped the nature of the practical work with women at MAL. Women were 
invariably encouraged to return to their husbands, as long-term Salvation Army officer and 
MAL worker Major Elsie Roberts commented at the time: ‗our first aim is to restore the 
relationship if possible … we encourage the woman‘s husband or de facto to come here and 
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talk, but of course this is not always advisable‘.213 MAL worker Laurel Pearce confirmed 
Roberts‘ comments and noted that, ‗some people in the Army at this time would see that these 
women should be with their husbands. You don‘t break up a marriage‘.214 However, she 
qualified this statement by commenting that they were ‗very careful about that‘,215 which 
suggests that, whilst the belief that a woman‘s natural place was in the family home 
influenced work at the refuge, at some time in its development, the women working there 
began to subvert that ideology. Moreover, alongside a history of supporting the ‗sacredness of 
the family‘, a history of social justice traditions within the Salvation Army included 
supporting the individual rights of women. Whilst the sacredness of marriage and family 
remains central to the Salvation Army‘s work, historically ‗tensions have existed in the 
promotion and acceptance of the sacred nature of marriage and family and the rights of 
individual women‘.216 In the 1970s, domestic violence was not on the Salvation Army‘s social 
justice agenda, and feminism was not central to MAL‘s conceptualisation of the problem or to 
their practical work with women in the refuge. There is evidence to suggest, however, that 
though they did not operate in a feminist framework, over the course of the 1970s, ‗they had 
begun to develop an understanding that domestic violence required specialised responses‘.217  
 
The refuge movement at this time distinguished ‗refuges‘ from ‗accommodation services‘, on 
the basis that traditional welfare services were antithetical to their feminist philosophy. The 
receptiveness of some of the other refuges to MAL in the refuge program was thus far from 
welcoming, and Rosi Lever, co-ordinator of the refuge program at this time with Department 
of Community Welfare Services (DCWS) recalled, ‗Mary Anderson Lodge remained funded 
although … [some other refuges] ... would have liked not to … They were considered by 
some to look more like an emergency accommodation service‘.218 MAL‘s relationship with 
other refuges was turbulent and for periods it was not considered to be a part of the 
movement.
219
  
Aborigines Advancement League and Elizabeth Hoffman House (EHH) 
 
Not until 1979 was a refuge for Aboriginal women established in the northern suburbs of 
Melbourne. As was the case for other women‘s refuges, gaining funding proved difficult and 
it was not until an amount of $38,000 was bequeathed to the Aborigines Advancement 
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League that they were able to purchase a twelve-roomed house.
220
 A refuge committee soon 
formed that included Aboriginal activist Elizabeth Hoffman, after whom the refuge was to be 
named. According to then CEO, Joyce Johnson, attempts were made to establish a refuge for 
Aboriginal women from as early as 1971, but had been unsuccessful.
221
 Prior to the refuge‘s 
opening in 1979, however, a smaller refuge had been operating for a number of months 
sustained by the volunteer efforts of the Aboriginal community and the Aborigines 
Advancement League, but it was limited in its capacity and could house only four women at a 
time.  
 
Attempts by the group to access funding were denied on the basis that existing refuges should 
be able adequately to meet the needs of Aboriginal women.
222
 In this sense, the particular 
needs of Aboriginal women, like those of migrant women, were not commonly acknowledged 
or understood. Indeed, until very recently, policies of assimilation towards Aboriginal people 
were unquestioned and self-determination was a new concept. However, Aboriginal people 
had begun to make claims to indigenous rights (including those to land) and the US-derived 
ideals of ‗black power‘ came to dominate the political trajectory of pro-Aboriginal 
organisations and activists. Within this context, Aboriginal activist Molly Dyer argued the 
need for ‗special facilities for Aboriginal women‘.223 Funding was finally granted by the 
DCWS in 1979. 
 
The desire of Aboriginal women to establish their own refuge was supported by some 
members of Melbourne‘s women‘s liberation movement, who acknowledged that existing 
refuges were ‗alien to their cultural background, their life experiences‘ and that Aboriginal 
women often experienced ‗racism from the other white women residents‘.224 The experience 
of racism by Aboriginal and migrant women in Anglo refuges challenges the assumption that 
refuges were necessarily ‗safe homes‘ for all women.225 Although racism was undoubtedly a 
major issue facing Aboriginal women in refuges, Joyce Johnson emphasised it was not their 
sole motivation for establishing the refuge. Indeed, she noted that, while some Aboriginal 
women had been made to ‗feel very welcome‘ at women‘s refuges, they were determined to 
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‗care for their own people‘.226 In addition, other issues facing Aboriginal women necessitated 
a specialist response because they often endured longer waiting periods for housing and 
required longer stays.
227
  
 
The development of Elizabeth Hoffman House (EHH) was supported by the refuge 
movement, and the initial co-ordinators visited WLHWH on at least two occasions during its 
initiation.
228
 It was a requirement of funding at this time to engage with other refuges, so this 
probably had as much to do with these initial visits as any sense of affiliation with other 
refuges because it is clear that EHH operated quite separately. This reflected the fact that its 
objectives were not in accordance with the Anglo-dominated Victorian refuge movement. 
Lever recalls that the Aboriginal women who established EHH ‗stood their ground‘ and 
argued against embracing white feminism, claiming that ‗this is not part of our cultural 
heritage and ideology‘.229 Indeed, as Tikka Jan Wilson notes, ‗the relationship between 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women and the second-wave women‘s movement—the 
latter understood by both black and white to be a white women‘s movement—has been 
marked by intense conflict‘.230 Moreover, like the Co-As-It refuge, EHH was not prepared to 
operate separately from men in their community, or keep the address of the refuge a secret.
231
  
 
The separatist nature of EHH must be understood, as Wilson argues, in relation to the 
‗specific historical context of the Australian welfare state‘.232 Aboriginal people were 
systemically excluded from the entitlements granted to non-Indigenous people, and the 
impacts of dispossession, government-sponsored racist policies of segregation, forced 
sterilisation and child removal meant that the demands of the Anglo-feminist movement were 
often alien to Aboriginal women‘s experiences. It has consistently been argued that race is as 
central as gender to the identity of Aboriginal women.
233
 Aboriginal activist Ruby Hammond, 
for example, argued in this vein during International Women‘s Year in 1975, stating that it 
was, ‗too early for Aboriginal women to be concerned solely with the feminist cause‘.234 
Hammond emphasised that ‗Men, women and children suffered from discrimination‘ and had 
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been ‗fighting oppression all our lives‘.235 Similarly, Molly Dyer stressed the importance of 
unity for the Aboriginal community arguing that ‗before anything else, our communities must 
unite. We are too fragmented … The last twenty years has produced many shattered human 
beings‘.236 According to Hammond and Dyer, then, it was not only Aboriginal women, but 
their entire community that was oppressed and this meant that calls to ‗sisterhood‘ by an 
Anglo-dominated refuge movement—based as it was on the presumption of an ‗overriding 
commonality among women as women‘237—were often rejected by Aboriginal women as a 
consequence of their historical experience of racism and dispossession, which has also 
involved the ‗racial violence of white women towards Aboriginal women‘.238  
 
EHH intended to provide accommodation for all Aboriginal women who needed it. In 
particular, it sought to provide accommodation for Aboriginal women exiting prisons such as 
Melbourne‘s Fairlea correctional institution.239 While this goal had been adopted by the 
WLHWH in its origins, it was later abandoned as will be discussed in Chapter 2. This meant 
that central to the aims of EHH was the provision of safe accommodation for Aboriginal 
women, regardless of the circumstances. This related to Aboriginal women‘s experiences of 
racism and dispossession, the impact of which enhanced their exposure to violence in the 
public sphere. Aboriginal women‘s experiences of ‗violence‘ were not perceived as 
predominantly perpetrated within the private sphere of the marital home. Instead they were 
government sanctioned and entrenched within mainstream public institutions. In addition, 
houses for Aboriginal women were far less readily available than for non-Aboriginal women, 
which meant that the committee were reluctant to exclude women on the basis of 
homelessness. The aims of EHH were inextricably linked to Indigenous women‘s experiences 
and identity as Aboriginal Australians, as well as gender.  
Conclusion 
 
Broad changes in women‘s lives, combined with the courageous activism of women 
experiencing violence and the determinism of the women‘s liberation movement and Halfway 
House Group (HHG), underpinned the early development of the refuge movement in Victoria. 
The movement revealed that even where there is considerable power imbalance, capacity to 
challenge and resist dominant ideologies and structures is possible. The women‘s liberation 
movement played a central role in resisting and recasting dominant constructions of gender at 
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this time. They sought to help women find new ways of being, and in doing so they had to 
deal with the issue of violence. This was central to the aims of the HHG with its focus on the 
liberation of women at a personal and societal level. The pioneering role of HHG, with its 
emphasis on challenging patriarchy and women‘s oppression, emerged from the radical 
feminist agenda for social change and resulted in WLHWH, Victoria‘s first women‘s refuge. 
Their ideas gained significant publicity, which spurred on the development of new refuges so 
that, by the end of 1979, there were sixteen in existence across the state.  
 
Refuges emerged in a haphazard manner and were characterised by varied philosophies, 
organisational structures and funding arrangements. The philosophies ranged from those 
focused on difference, and women-centred rights, to a more conservative protectionist focus. 
These were often shaped by geography as well as the politics of specific refuge auspicing 
bodies, and no two were exactly alike. Inner-city refuges, like WLHWH and Western, which 
opened in 1976, were more likely to be radical and connected with the WLM. Outer suburban 
refuges were often closely aligned to their local councils and churches and informed by liberal 
or protectionist feminisms. However, despite these differences, the majority of refuges shared 
a commitment to challenging the judgmental and professional social work approach that 
characterised traditional charities and welfare services whose interventions into women‘s 
lives could often be disempowering and autocratic and predicated upon prescribed roles for 
women. 
 
In their beginnings, refuges received considerable support from their local communities, 
particularly amongst women but also amongst men. Volunteer support was offered in 
abundance by various groups of women, and they often had financial, physical and moral 
support from local councils, churches and businesses. In particular, a significant financial and 
administrative role was played by local councils in support of refuges. It is also worth noting 
that women who joined the movement had personal experience, either directly or indirectly, 
that spoke to them about the extent of women‘s vulnerability in society at large.  
 
Radical feminist ideas gave priority to minimising difference and promoting the unity of all 
women, which meant that the real differences between women in refuges, and their needs, 
were often disregarded. Women felt excluded on the basis of their difference, and this led to 
the development of new refuges to cater to the particular needs of Aboriginal and migrant 
women. For these women, race and ethnicity was as central as gender in shaping their 
experiences, activities and philosophy.  
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What began as a diverse group of refuges operating relatively independently from one another 
would soon develop into a powerful force that united, when they needed to, in opposition to 
perceived threats to the autonomy of women‘s refuges by the state in 1978. The refuge 
movement also now began to develop and clarify its understanding of ‗domestic violence‘ as 
a problem and its relationship to gender inequality. 
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Chapter 3: The Victorian Women’s Refuge Movement, 
1976–1980 
 
If you were being beaten by your husband what would you do and where would you 
go? You would go to segregated high-rise housing in Fitzroy, even if you lived in 
Mornington or Kensington … You would only get a single mother‘s pension … you 
would not be assured of getting half-share of property and access to the kids, the 
police would write it off as a domestic, it would be very difficult to get a restraining 
order through the courts. We used to tell women if you wanted a food voucher, hide 
your cigarettes, take out your earrings, don‘t smoke while you‘re down there, you‘d 
have to be ―deserving‖, it was all on men‘s terms … Divorce was available, but it was 
looked down on and expensive … Women‘s wages were not anywhere near parity, 
and women had very little role politically and economically … and domestic violence 
was seen by society as OK.
1
 
 
In Chapter 2, I detailed the emergence of the refuge movement in Victoria in the mid-1970s, 
and the beginnings of several refuges were examined to make evident their contrasting nature 
and the range of feminisms that informed their work. Here I extend my analysis of the 1970s 
to the end of the decade, and document the activities of the refuge movement as members 
began to work in collaboration with each other as well as with ‗the state‘. In accordance with 
the first two thesis themes, I explore the ideas and strategies of the Victorian Women‘s 
Refuges Group (VWRG), highlighting the influence of radical feminism on their work. After 
tracing the formation of the group in 1976 and the way that refuges began to work together 
under its umbrella, I then explore the  political campaigns VWRG undertook to counter the 
fact that life for women seeking refuge was largely, as former Peninsula women‘s refuge 
worker Maureen Donnelly recounts above, structured ‗on men‘s terms‘. The group 
campaigned for resources for women in refuge to promote their autonomy, economic 
independence and ability to live free from violence. In doing so, the VWRG applied a 
feminist lens to each problem it encountered, and politicised numerous issues facing women 
in refuge. They also worked to challenge dominant discourses regarding society‘s sanctioned 
roles for women, which worked to perpetuate their marginalised position and the need for 
refuge. Whilst the methods they used were varied, direct action was central to the spirit of 
activism at this time. The first half of this chapter, then, documents the political action 
VWRG undertook to change the lives of women and their engagement in a debate over the 
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politics of gendered representations of women. The process by which the VWRG helped to 
construct ‗domestic violence‘ as a feminist issue will also be considered, alongside the way 
that access to refuge was narrowed accordingly. 
 
The refuges also worked strategically together with the aim of presenting a publicly united 
front to the state government. I document the outcomes of this strategy in the second half of 
this chapter, as well as the attainment of government funding, together with the debates and 
controversy that surrounded it. I also examine the relationship that evolved between key 
bureaucrats within the Department of Community Welfare Services and members of the 
VWRG. The strategies adopted by the VWRG to ensure that their feminist ideas and ways of 
organising were not compromised by their engagement with the state are also analysed. In 
particular, a discussion of the successful campaign launched by the movement to maintain the 
secrecy of their addresses concludes this chapter. 
The Victorian Women’s Refuge Group 
They were very skilled women, who put their skills together … and coloured with 
their passion around feminism … they were trying to create something.2 
Working Together  
From the end of 1976, representatives from refuges had begun meeting together under the 
umbrella of the VWRG, which was initiated by WLHWH. As we have seen, refuges had been 
operating relatively independently of each other until this time. But established ones such as 
WLHWH and MHWH had been active in supporting the development of new refuges by 
providing them with information and policies, which made the process of formalising a co-
ordinating group smoother.
3
 However, as long-term refuge worker Wendy Austin reflects: 
It was amazing that we actually eventually came together under some sort of an 
umbrella … back then I was quite scared of some of the more political women who 
were very radical and out there.
4
  
 
The VWRG was a political strategy by radical feminists designed to influence the direction of 
the refuge movement. An early account of the movement noted that WLHWH formed the 
VWRG in order to ‗prevent the growth of refuges facilitating a trend towards welfare 
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provision‘, and to raise the ‗political awareness of other refuges‘.5 This suggests the VWRG 
arose partly in response to a perceived ‗counter movement‘ of non-feminist refuges occurring 
largely outside of the women‘s movement.6 Indeed, they were successful in subverting an 
attempt by the conservative Women‘s Action Alliance to assume control over the 
development of a proposed refuge in the La Trobe Valley in 1977.
7
 Radical feminist refuges 
were alarmed by these kinds of developments and were concerned that they would destabilise 
the political focus of their work. As former WLHWH refuge activist Marie Rowan recalls: 
‗[The] VWRG was a political strategy … to influence the policy development of all of those 
groups, to ensure they weren‘t going to undermine us knowingly‘.8 Feminist refuges thus 
undertook to influence the operation of all refuges through the forum of the VWRG to ensure 
they did not lose their ‗political goals and just end up running a service‘.9 They saw 
themselves as the only service providers with an ideology informing their practice, viewing 
other organisations providing refuge as problematic because they had: 
[F]ailed to recognise these women as victims of an oppressive system … The growth 
of refuges will only act to hide the real inequalities of women if there is no 
understanding of the social implications behind women‘s oppression.10 
 
The feminist-led VWRG developed a set of aims and objectives, cemented by the principles 
of sharing, collectivity, social change and social action.
11
 The VWRG had incorporated all the 
hallmarks of feminist organisations within their constitution, which was endorsed by the 
fourteen members including WLHWH, Western, Footscray, Matilda, Mountain, Co-As-It, 
MHWH, Caroline Lodge, Southern, Peninsula, La Trobe Valley, Warrnambool, Blackburn 
and Doncare.
12
 As will be discussed below, their concerns about engaging with the state were 
another key catalyst for this development. Notably, MAL had decided to formally leave the 
refuge group by this time.
13
 While it can be assumed that differences of philosophy created 
this fall-out, it is also likely that conflict between refuge workers, as discussed below, played 
a part in MAL‘s decision to leave. Furthermore, the Aboriginal women‘s refuge, EHH, did 
not become involved in the wider movement until much later. 
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Conservative refuges often joined the VWRG for pragmatic reasons, such as their dire need 
for funding. Whilst they were more often concerned with providing a good quality service to 
women and children than campaigning for political change, they also recognised that uniting 
with other refuges would give them a louder voice at the bargaining table with government. 
Despite the different perspectives in the group, lobbying for funding was an issue that they 
could agree on. Austin recalls: 
We needed money in order to be able to provide a decent service to women and kids. 
We couldn't continue to fight without money, we really needed to find a way to go to 
government together and be able to say this is what we need. [T]here was a lot of give 
and take, and over the years there was a lot of different groups and a lot of fighting 
against each other about what was actually important, but in the early days we very 
deliberately put aside some of that and came together to be able to go to government 
to try and get some funding.
14
  
 
The capacity of the refuges to ‗work well‘ together on behalf of women and achieve change is 
a matter of contention, and representations of refuges as constituting a ‗magical sisterhood‘ 
were challenged early on. ‗Kathy‘ from WLHWH, for example, argued in a letter to her 
collective that they need not fall into ‗a trap of idealising‘ their work.15 What is apparent, 
however, is that they did work together, even if it was at times amid conflict and with 
different objectives. Then director of regional services in the DCWS, David Green, observed 
that, despite the existence of ‗a lot of other perspectives‘ within the refuge movement, they 
‗held together‘.16 Moreover, at a national refuge conference in Melbourne in 1978, Victorian 
refuge workers informed other states and federal bureaucrats that, ‗despite widely divergent 
views, the refuges have worked well together‘.17 In accordance with this view, former 
WLHWH activist Jenny Macmillan recounts her memories of working in collaboration with 
‗conservative‘ refuges: 
Mostly we just got on with doing what we could with them in common … that‘s how I 
remember it ... They were pretty good those women that were working in those 
refuges it‘s just that they were very different from us … We could still get together to 
advocate for the women; it was just within an understanding of those differences. And 
we had some good times with them actually.
18
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However, in contrast to Macmillan‘s memories of ‗good times‘, conflict was recalled by 
others as more characteristic of the VWRG. Indeed, representatives from radical feminist 
refuges were forthright and hard-line in their approach, particularly when they did not see 
eye-to-eye with the positions of workers from more conservative refuges. Feminist activists 
had an agenda to push and were more than assertive in getting it accepted. Long-term refuge 
worker Con Smith recalls being on the receiving end of some tough-minded women: ‗We 
were hauled over the coals by one of the women‘s libbers you know the radical ones, about 
how we were not toeing the line … it was like preaching to the converted. We were there‘.19 
The fact that these less radical groups ‗were there‘ warranted a degree of respect that was not 
always given. This was particularly the case with the more conservative refuges such as 
MAL, as Green recalled: 
[T]he tough aggression of the feminist collectives was not their cup of tea, but they 
were there and they were party to it. I can remember thinking time after time, it‘s a 
great pity that woman from the Salvation Army would have left that meeting, with the 
sense that she had just been humiliated, or her view point … just brushed aside 
sometimes.
20
  
 
This made the experience of attending meetings a potentially intimidating one for some, and it 
is not too surprising that they were often ‗scared‘ to attend. The visual diversity and 
uncomfortable experience of attending the meetings is captured by Austin: 
[Y]ou can imagine the diversity and the disparity of the people that were actually 
working there, so you'd get these massive meetings, you'd go in twos because it was 
all a bit scary, and we had twin sets and pearls knitting up one end, and dogs and kids 
and torn overalls and goodness knows what else down the other end.21 
 
Smith argued that a ‗tough‘ approach was ‗not always right‘, and suggested that radical 
feminists needed the influence of conservative women who ‗didn‘t need to bash on doors, and 
disrupt people to get what you wanted done‘.22 Instead, she insisted, you could ‗do it in a 
much easier way and a more even way‘.23 However, despite her misgivings about their 
methods, Smith came to believe that, ‗they were a group of highly intelligent women, who 
had courage of their convictions‘.24 With hindsight, women from feminist refuges have also 
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reflected on what they might have learned from refuges more concerned with the personal 
than the political. In this vein, Macmillan remarked: ‗I think we could have done more to have 
built up some people‘s skills … we should have taken a bit of a message from what the Salvos 
were doing‘.25  
 
At the time there was a growing concern among radical feminist refuges that joining together 
with conservative groups had undermined their political agenda: ‗the emphasis of the VWRG 
is becoming more towards reforms of institutions within the system, rather than radical social 
change‘.26 While acknowledging that, ‗the VWRG is a strong group and we work well 
together‘, radical feminists were concerned to ask the question ‗are we compromising too 
much?‘27 This view was shared by members of the WLHWH, who argued that:  
[A]ttempts to keep the group united in its struggles with its funding bodies and the 
increase in conservative refuges has as much of a depoliticising effect as a politicising 
one. The feminist refuges compromised on direct political action and modified their 
public statements.28  
 
Radical refuges viewed compromise negatively, and, in this sense, they were in an ongoing 
bind. They needed to work with the other refuges to ensure that the refuge movement‘s aims 
and objectives were not compromised; but they were also concerned that collaboration had 
caused their goals to be diluted. Despite this difficulty, however, they also saw themselves as 
part of a national movement and remained committed to working with others and developing 
a group that was functional, if not seamlessly unified: 
It is important to realise that there is a women‘s refuge movement, however informal. 
We are more than just individual houses providing local services. We are the 
beginning of a social and political movement organised around the need for women to 
share their skills and resources in order to fight for change ... most refuges, and 
certainly the actively feminist ones, see that it is essential to work on this broader, 
political level. To do this, we have to unite with other groups.
29
 
 
Despite tensions and conflicts, a commitment to a united front was maintained by the majority 
of refuges in the VWRG. For some, however, a commitment to working together did not 
outweigh the challenges posed by the group. As mentioned, the Salvation Army withdrew 
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from the group, in part, as a result of conflict. Furthermore, EHH were never a part of the 
VWRG, being unwilling to have Aboriginality appropriated under the guise of sisterhood.  
 
The capacity of VWRG to unite and gain resources was evident in its success in gaining 
funding for a Women‘s Refuge Referral Service (WRRS) by the end of the decade.  The 
development of a central agency to make referrals to refuges was seen as necessary because of 
the un-coordinated nature of existing arrangements.
30
 It also enabled refuges to maintain 
anonymity of addresses and the safety of women in refuge.
31
 Whilst many refuges received 
direct referrals, radical feminist refuges received them through the Women‘s Liberation 
Centre, which had continued to operate as a central referral point in Victoria until late 1978 
when the centre closed. In response to the closure, five refuges pledged $5 a week to continue 
operating a service, the Women‘s Liberation Switchboard (WLS), and they set about collating 
all the information from each refuge into one central file.
32
  
 
The WLS grew out of a meeting in December 1978 between women who had been part of the 
roster group at the Women‘s Liberation Centre and members of the VWRG.33 The service 
began operating and accepting refuge referrals in early 1979, renting a room in the Women‘s 
Cultural Palace in Fitzroy—a new centre for the women‘s liberation movement—and 
advertising for volunteers to staff the roster.
34
 They intended to provide support to all women, 
but in particular women needing referral to refuge, by relating their ‗specific problems or 
queries to the wider context of women‘s oppression‘.35 By mid-1979, the WLS received 
approximately 50 per cent of the referrals for Victoria‘s refuges, and was staffed primarily by 
volunteers.
36
 The service began operating from 9.30am to 9.30pm weekdays, and, outside of 
these hours, refuge referrals were automatically transferred to the Young Women‘s Christian 
Association.
37
 
 
The VWRG sought government funding to shore up the operation of the WLS as early as 
September 1978, and members worked together to prepare a submission.
38
 This was 
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ultimately rejected because the word ‗liberation‘ in the name was considered too political.39 
Other members of the VWRG also opposed the title, which resulted in an agreement to adopt 
the title WRRS. By this stage, the government had agreed in principle to fund the service for 
the cost of one salary,
40
 and, in early 1980, the then Minister for DCWS, Walter Jona, 
announced a grant from the minister‘s fund of $20,000 towards its operating costs.41  
 
During the early 1980s, funding for the WRRS was not adequate or recurrent, and the service 
was threatened with closure, particularly when pressure was applied by government for it to 
operate 24 hours a day on an allocation of $30,000. Roster women worked for nothing to keep 
the service operational as the state government refused to provide recurrent funds, despite 
considerable lobbying.
42
 In response, refuges workers marched into the foyer of DCWS 
bearing a giant red papier-maché telephone with its cord cut, symbolising the unanswered 
refuge referrals. Continued lobbying eventually resulted in the minister making a 
recommendation to cabinet that the WRRS be included in the refuge program. This was 
eventually accepted, albeit following a number of closures and protests. The service continued 
to operate out of the women‘s building for some years, providing a central referral point for 
women and children seeking refuge as well as a central contact point for the refuges 
themselves.
43
 The capacity for members of the VWRG to work together and successfully gain 
funding for the establishment of the WRRS provides evidence of the refuge movement‘s 
increasing capacity to put aside issues of ideology for mutual benefit. 
Political Action and Advocacy 
[I]t was just astonishing what you could do by a bit of lobbying and stuff.  We were 
passionate, about everything that we were doing and we were determined ... we were 
running our refuges.
44
 
 
Central to the activities of the VWRG at this time was political campaigning, and radical 
feminist refuges drove this work with the clear agenda of politicising the problems facing 
women in refuge because they were committed to the idea that ‗society needs to be changed 
so that refuges are unnecessary‘.45 Like WLHWH, the VWRG clearly linked the problems 
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facing women in refuge with women‘s inequality and was concerned that if it got to ‗the stage 
that we think refuges are necessary to solve a problem, we will have become 
institutionalised‘.46 To avoid ‗propping up a rotten system‘ feminist refuges involved 
themselves in broad campaigns, not just those focussing on a ‗narrowly defined problem of 
domestic violence‘.47 Macmillan explains: 
If you were looking at women in the context of women‘s refuges, you had to also be 
looking at women in terms of independent finance … security of housing … childcare. 
Then there were the issues around the personal is the political … And the refuge kind 
of personified that in a way… this is the situation that women can get into when they 
don‘t have all that.48 
 
In the early years of the movement, the issue of domestic violence, commonly referred to as 
‗intolerable circumstances‘, was one of a number identified by the movement.  The advocacy 
work of the feminist-led VWRG extended equally to many other areas affecting the lives of 
women and children in refuge. Relevant historiography has understated the broader goals of 
radical feminist refuges, which sought to overcome not only violence against women but also 
the inequality of all women in society and, in particular, their lack of access to autonomous 
households. These goals were also characteristic of feminist refuges in other states including 
WA and NSW.
49
 Political activity often took the form of direct action, including street 
marching, squatting and street theatre. The VWRG became increasingly organised, adopting 
tactical approaches that drew on the ideas of Saul Alinksy‘s book ‗Rules for Radicals‘ to 
enhance their power.
50
 They organised conferences to discuss and debate the relationship 
between feminism and refuges,
51
 and systematically targeted the media to publicise the issues. 
As former WLHWH activist Vig Geddes recounts:  
We set up a media group for the Victorian Women‘s Refuge Group, but it was actually 
made up of all the feminist refuges… we‘d write these media releases … [and] … at 
night after work … we‘d jump in the car … and deliver them all by hand. [T]here was 
no email then and we raced around the city, we had this little route and dropped them 
all off at the various radio stations.
52
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The VWRG also networked locally and shared information with other non-government 
organisations, including the Victorian Council of Social Services (VCOSS), Council for the 
Single Mother and her Child, the Brotherhood of St Laurence and Shelter Victoria. Direct 
action tactics were also embraced by some less radical members of the VWRG. Ex-
Maroondah Halfway House (MHWH) refuge worker Judy Johnson recalled lobbying Minister 
Jona, en masse: 
All of us went into the department … I mean you wouldn‘t have a hope in the world of 
doing that these days, and there must have been about 60 or 70 women and we just sat 
cross legged on the floor outside his office.
53
  
 
The VWRG systematically sought to make contact with state and federal bureaucrats and 
politicians in order to educate them about refuges.
54
 Refuge workers attended demonstrations, 
and travelled to Canberra, where they performed street theatre on the steps of Parliament 
House and lobbied politicians in relation to violence, housing, childcare, income, the law and 
the lack of recurrent funding for refuges.
55
 The remainder of this section will consider the 
movement‘s involvement in each of these areas. 
 
The issue of housing for women and children assumed a central focus of political activity for 
the Victorian refuge movement and a feminist analysis of the problem drove their agenda. As 
former WLHWH activist Ulla Svensson, told a state refuge conference in 1979: 
We need social change, which gives women access to society‘s resources without first 
processing them through the welfare system. We need housing – not more social 
workers and family support services.
56
  
 
It was the refuge movement‘s feminism that ‗radicalised the Melbourne housing action 
scene‘.57 WLHWH undertook political action with the aim of highlighting the dearth of 
affordable and accessible housing for women and children.
58
 The group continued to lobby 
the state Housing Commission to increase accommodation for women and children escaping 
violence and faced with poverty. As former WLHWH activist Kaye Hargreaves wrote:  
[D]iscrimination and inequalities in the rental market and the inadequacy of the 
Housing Commission of Victoria have been amongst the most obvious and immediate 
manifestations of the oppression of women. The prospect of living in poverty in a 
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substandard house, having borrowed the bond, lied about being on a pension and 
having children, and not being sure whether you can pay the next week‘s rent does not 
help a woman who already is struggling to establish some degree of independence 
from a destructive domestic.
59
 
 
Not only was the grossly inadequate provision of housing for single women highlighted in the 
VWRG‘s work, so were the processes that worked to perpetuate these circumstances, 
including dominant discourses about women‘s relationships with men. Activists repeatedly 
stressed the way that gender constructs social relationships and is central to the constitution of 
power relations. As former WLHWH activist Chris Sitka wrote at the time, women who did 
not fulfil society‘s prescribed roles for women as wives and mothers were labelled as deviant 
and housed alongside marginalised others according to the established gender-based social 
hierarchy:  
Single mothers and deserted wives are sent by the housing commission to the outer 
suburbs, to the country or into ghetto flats in the inner city along with other social 
misfits … because the norm is for women to be attached to a man, a woman who is 
not, is seen to be inadequate and often meets contempt, and disapproval from the 
people and the institutions, to whom she turns for help.
60
  
 
Outer area refuges such as Maroondah Halfway House were also active in lobbying for the 
housing needs of women. The MHWH pioneered the first bond and relocation scheme in 
Australia. Its function was to support women to access the private rental market by providing 
loans for the bond and rent in advance.
61
 MHWH also auspiced the Outer Eastern Regional 
Housing Council, the first of its kind in Australia. The council performed a research and 
advocacy role, and worked in collaboration with the VWRG. Together they achieved success 
in lobbying local councils to provide emergency housing for homeless women.
62
 And, by 
1978, the Outer Eastern Regional Housing Council had successfully negotiated with then state 
Minister for Housing Brian Dixon to fund a pilot program to spot purchase public housing.
63
 
Former MHWH worker Kate Coleman contends that ‗housing awareness grew in the outer 
east specifically from the refuge movement‘.64  
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The advocacy work of the refuge movement, together with groups like Shelter Victoria (many 
of whose founding members were refuge workers) and the Housing Commission Tenants 
Union,
65
 eventually led to the growth of various other non-government bodies advocating for 
the needs of the marginally housed and homeless. As Coleman recounts: 
From Shelter Victoria, all of those other peak bodies grew. Youth Accommodation 
Coalition, Public Tenants Union, Squatters Union, Rental Co-ops, Common Equity 
Co-op; Shelter Vic auspiced all of those groups. And then that pushed it into the state 
and national level of Shelter.
66
 
 
As a result of this groundswell movement, the VWRG gained representation on a Community 
Tenancy Law Reform Committee convened by the state government,
67
 which reviewed the 
Landlord–Tenant Agreement and made state-wide recommendations about the bond insurance 
scheme. Thereafter, the VWRG published a book detailing ‗the problems faced by residents at 
women‘s refuges (with) recommendations on how the housing market could become more 
responsive to their needs‘.68 This was widely distributed to relevant politicians and 
government ministers. 
 
At the same time, refuge movement activists quickly recruited the support of feminist lawyers 
whose experiences of supporting women in court, and the overt discrimination and sexism 
they encountered, propelled them into action. Rowan recalled an experience of attending court 
with a resident whose police-officer husband was awarded full custody of their three children. 
Rowan then ‗spent a lot of time getting [together] a collection of feminist lawyers‘, the result 
of which was that they ‗got a hell of a lot of their business from us‘.69 Rowan‘s shock at what 
she witnessed ensured that she ‗never lost another case‘, and instead, ‗briefed every lawyer‘, 
so that whenever they ‗represented one of our women … [she] met her lawyer [who] listened 
to her story‘.70 In this way, activists acted to empower refuge women in the courts and, at the 
same time, began the process of educating and politicising women lawyers.71  
 
Other areas of advocacy for the VWRG included family law. The guiding principles of the 
family law court at this time were based on ‗the need to give the widest possible protection 
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and assistance to the family as the natural and fundamental group unit of society‘.72 A detailed 
submission was made by the VWRG in 1979 to the Joint Select Committee on the Family 
Law Act. The group challenged a number of the court‘s requirements for women relating to 
divorce, which were based on what they regarded as patriarchal assumptions about women, 
family and marriage.
73
 In particular, the VWRG argued against the requirement that a 
woman‘s partner should assume financial responsibility for her children, thus ensuring their 
continued financial dependence on men. In doing so, they politicised gendered representations 
of men as the natural heads of the family unit, and women as natural dependants.  
 
Members of the VWRG also campaigned on the issue of income support for single mothers. 
They collaborated with the Council for the Single Mother and her Child and a Pension Action 
Group (PAG), was formed in 1978 that worked with a range of other community-based 
organisations and individuals.
74
 The group pushed for women to receive access to the 
pension, based on their economic situation, not their marital status or sexual relationships: 
‗when a mother does not live with the father of her children, the government should guarantee 
her income security‘.75 They also lobbied the Department of Social Security at a ministerial 
level
76
 and undertook direct action by occupying ‗social security offices because women 
couldn‘t get their pensions‘.77 The PAG thus politicised the assumptions about women‘s roles 
embedded in public policy discourse relating to income support, and sought to transform the 
policies of the Department of Social Security practices.  
 
Although the devastating impacts of domestic violence on children are now widely 
recognised, at this time, this was not well understood or acknowledged in the 1970s. As 
former WLHWH activist Di Otto explains, the issue of children in refuges had generally taken 
second place: 
[A] real blind spot that we had was about the children, because we very much 
identified the children‘s interests as being the same as the mother‘s interests and didn‘t 
face those hard questions about children‘s rights really … we also were kind of blind 
to abuse of children by some of the women who were residents. We had a playgroup, 
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and we provided childcare. But really our political and philosophical commitment was 
to the women and to the children because they were connected to the women.78 
 
Work in relation to supporting children focused primarily on ensuring adequate childcare in 
refuges. Childcare was the subject of campaigns by the VWRG and the Childcare Group 
formed by representatives from feminist refuges WLHWH, Southern and Footscray refuges. 
All refuges agreed on the need for  action and it drew them together in support of funding.
79
 
 
The issue of childcare was considered political because it related to women‘s oppression in 
the family. This analysis was based on a socialist–feminist critique of capitalism, which 
identified children as commodities and levers to manoeuvre women in or out of the 
workforce.
80
 The Childcare Group engaged in political action in order to gain resources for 
women, whilst politicising the issue of women‘s designated roles as mothers and housewives. 
Their purpose was to ensure that women in refuges were not ‗daunted by the motherhood 
myth, which says such relationships are sacred and unquestionable and to intervene is 
tampering with nature‘.81  
 
They initiated campaigns that included a state-wide conference on the issue of children in 
refuges in 1978. This prompted them to lobby the then federal Minister for Social Security, 
Senator Margaret Guilfoyle, which resulted in funding to improve childcare facilities in 
refuges. An advocate for refuges, Guilfoyle provided each with $10,000 through the Office of 
Childcare in 1979 for the purchase of play equipment.
82
 Though a few refuges had already 
been funded for a childcare worker, the new funding meant that access to care became more 
widely available.
83
  
 
The response of the police at this time to domestic violence and women‘s refuges was 
inadequate and difficult, to say the least. Domestic violence was considered to be private, 
‗never taken seriously,‘84 and not within the context of criminality, unless, as Hargreaves 
recalls, the woman was killed:  
We‘d get women ringing up saying ―look, I‘m in danger of domestic violence, my 
husband is threatening me‖ and the response would be ―well, there‘s nothing that we 
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can do about it‖. It was only … when he had taken a gun and shot her that it became a 
homicide and therefore it was a police matter.
85
  
 
In response to an ineffective police force, the VWRG took action by attending training 
sessions and participating in conferences with police instructors, all with the aim of 
influencing their policies and practice.
86
 Members of the VWRG systemically organised and 
utilised residents‘ experiences to inform their advocacy campaigns and gathered stories of 
women‘s experiences to submit to police corruption inquiries.87 Over time, the VWRG was 
invited to provide input into police training manuals, and in the early 1980s, members of the 
group gained influence within the Women‘s Advisory Council (WAC) to the premier. In this 
capacity, they argued in a submission to a major committee of inquiry that the Victorian 
police force needed to take into account the ‗needs of women, most particularly in situations 
of domestic violence‘.88 The amount and quality of training provided to police officers needed 
to be increased so that they would ‗provide assistance to women clients without being 
patronising‘.89 The refuge movement‘s condemnation of ‗patronising‘ attitudes of the police 
towards women, and their attempts to challenge this via formal processes, is further evidence 
of activists‘ concern to change both the cultural and the material contexts of women‘s lives. 
Historicising Domestic Violence  
The language of domestic violence didn‘t exist, because the phenomenon itself was 
totally hidden.
90
 
 
In this section, I turn to how the refuge movement was centrally involved in transforming 
dominant discourses regarding the problem of interpersonal violence in heterosexual 
relationships. Specifically, I trace the VWRG‘s engagement in a process of defining the 
problem of domestic violence as a feminist issue, and make evident the impact of the 
discourse of radical feminism in fashioning members‘ ideas. These discursive processes have 
received scant attention, most accounts having located the movement‘s beginnings in 
activists‘ response to the pre-existing problem of domestic violence.91 This section then, 
examines the use made of the new definition to determine the criteria for access to women‘s 
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refuges. In the process, Victorian refuges narrowed qualification for entry from ‗any women 
who needs it‘, to women experiencing ‗domestic violence‘.  
 
When refuges began in the 1970s, they were responding to an ‗almost invisible issue‘.92 
Domestic violence did not exist as a named social problem, let-alone as part of government 
public policy agenda. The invisibility of the issue also meant that its extent and severity were 
unknown. In her study of policy activism and domestic violence in NSW, Janet Ramsay has 
revealed that the first formal use of the term ‗domestic violence‘ in a national context was in a 
submission to the 1975 International Women‘s Year United Nations world conference, and it 
incorporated a socially based analysis.
93
 According to Howe, the formal adoption of the term 
domestic violence above other terms such as ‗criminal assault in the home‘ or ‗wife bashing‘ 
represented a concession by policy advisers to ensure that the ‗relatively benign term … 
succeeded as a discourse‘.94 It is certainly the case that in Victoria by the late 1970s domestic 
violence was the common term within the refuge movement as well as in public policy 
discourse more broadly.
95
 
 
Ramsay contends that this early framing by Australian feminists of domestic violence as a 
social issue meant they had ‗stolen a march‘ on the established professions and their 
‗pathological representation‘ of the problem.96 By contrast, feminists in Canada, the USA and 
the UK were forced to negotiate their understandings of domestic violence with established 
professions whose ‗controlling role in the policy processes … limited feminist influence on 
the eventual policy framing of domestic violence‘. 97 However, the relatively uncontested 
adoption of the radical feminist analysis of domestic violence in Australia meant that: 
[W]hen broader ranging analytical discussions about domestic violence and 
appropriate policy responses … began, feminist refuges had already been funded and 
feminist identification and ownership of the issue of domestic violence had an 
established presence in the policy arena.
98
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In Victoria, as we have seen, the level of ‗ownership‘ of the issue was evident in the refuge 
movement‘s activism within and across a range of institutions and organisations.99 Radical 
feminist refuges were thus ready and determined to defend their analysis in opposition to 
other professions as well as those within their own movement. As Green recalls: 
I have a very strong memory of that absolute determination to broaden the analysis 
out, and part of the antagonism within the groups was around the weakening of that by 
the women who really wanted to rescue other women … who did not see this in a 
political and gender context, who saw it as being about bad men.
100
 
 
However, as we have seen,  during the mid-1970s, the key issue was still homelessness. 
Refuges had played a critical role redefining and gendering it, maintaining that women‘s 
homelessness resulting from ‗intolerable circumstances‘ was distinct and a result of women‘s 
inequality in society. As Hargreaves recalls: 
One of the things that Halfway House and other refuges have done is expand the view 
of homelessness. That it isn‘t just literally the derro on the park bench that is homeless 
but there is a whole spectrum of homelessness … women were very hidden in all of 
that.
101
 
 
It is also evident that the refuge movement‘s emphasis on women‘s homelessness as a policy 
problem related to their desire to achieve government funding. Hargreaves recounts: 
And it just so happened that a homeless persons program popped up and we then said 
―well these women are homeless, therefore we should get funding‖. I think it was a 
funding-driven sort of thing that made us put that label on the problem.
102
 
 
Over the next several years, the refuge movement began to concentrate on domestic violence 
above and beyond other issues facing women in refuge such as their homelessness. At the 
same time, access to refuge was narrowed so that, by 1978, the group was arguing that refuges 
should not be a response to ‗homeless women without children‘.103 Furthermore, ‗the needs of 
women in particular crises, such as drug dependence and discharge from psychiatric 
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institutions or prisons, should be provided for under a different program than the women‘s 
refuges program‘.104 
 
This marked a turning point for the refuge movement, whose original aims and objectives 
were shaped by a commitment to offer support to all women. Sitka was one who was 
disappointed with this redirected focus: 
 [P]eople … couldn‘t really understand what we were on about because it was so 
radical … they didn‘t believe in women‘s liberation, they didn‘t believe that society 
needed to change … but they could grab onto this concept ―yes it‘s bad to see these 
women and children physically abused, and it is good to do something about that‖. So 
we would push that in order to get sympathy, support to build our movement. But I 
think that what was lost was the broader thing about the need for social change...
105
 
 
According to former WLHWH volunteer Merriene Shortridge, the new focus on domestic 
violence occurred because of ‗the absolute immediate and real physical harm‘106 that residents 
faced. By contrast, Taylor believes that changes in eligibility derived from a lack of resources: 
[O]nce we started doing the definition, that became much more of a hard line, because 
there were psychiatric problems, there were women who were homeless for a lot of 
reasons, and we decided in the refuges that we could only afford to take women who 
had to leave home because of domestic violence. [S]o we had to take a bit of a hard 
line about that ... [A]t one stage, even women without children were being looked at 
twice because they had more options.
107
 
 
Hargreaves also sees the decision to focus on women experiencing domestic violence as 
arising from their limited skills and resources. It was a decision that members of the NSW 
refuge movement opposed: 
We made a hard nosed decision on the basis that we didn‘t think we could handle it; 
we had enough on our plate. We got into real trouble with the Elsie women, who took 
a different line because they thought that psychiatric problems just came with the 
territory, and that we were being discriminating for no reason, or for arbitrary 
reasons.
108
 
 
                                               
104
 VWRG, ‗Concept‘. 
105
 Sitka interview. 
106
 Shortridge interview. 
107
 Taylor interview. 
108
 Hargreaves interview. 
  106 
Undoubtedly, it was a combination of all these issues that influenced the VWRG‘s decision to 
narrow the eligibility criteria for refuges. These refuges now begun to differentiate between 
women who were homeless and women experiencing what was now commonly referred to as 
domestic violence, despite the fact that they had earlier reformulated, the problem of women 
living in ‗intolerable circumstances‘ as one of homelessness. Over time it became their 
official policy to exclude women experiencing homelessness, language difficulties, 
disabilities, psychiatric, drug and alcohol issues. However, refuges did in reality support such 
women to some extent. Elizabeth Hoffman House (EHH) and Co-As-It, were also exceptions 
in that they prioritised Aboriginal, migrant and refugee women.  
 
Alongside Elsie, Marrickville refuge in Sydney continued accepting single homeless women, 
and this informed their understanding of the oppression that many women who became 
homeless shared. Refuge activist Vivien Johnson surmised all of them faced society‘s failure 
to respond adequately.                                                                         
We began to realise that for the woman who leaves home, our reformulation of the 
domestic violence issue as a question of homelessness was no expedient piece of 
bureaucratic jargon, but an appalling and stubborn reality—indeed, that ultimately 
there might be no difference between women displaced by society‘s failure to make 
adequate provision for the dependents of broken marriages and the original chronically 
homeless, except the length of time since their lives had been overtaken by such 
events.
109
 
 
Narrowing the criteria for refuge occurred in tandem with a process of conceptualising 
domestic violence within a framework of understanding that normalised experiences of 
Anglo, married, middle-class women above and beyond other issues relating to women‘s 
inequality. This meant that experiences of inequality and injustice, including violence and 
homelessness, that diverged from this model were not paid the same attention.
110
 The 
centrality of class and subjective experience in shaping the movement‘s focus on domestic 
violence above homelessness is revealed by Rowan, who recounts how at a personal level she 
did not recall:  
[S]eeing women‘s homelessness as a political issue. I mean obviously it is … but 
enough of us had been in oppressive marriages to know what that was like. Maybe 
that‘s a reflection of who I was really, that I wasn‘t able to connect to the underclass 
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of women, whereas I could connect to women experiencing violence and bad 
marriages‘.111 
 
By the late 1970s the VWRG was active at a national level in constructing feminist 
understandings of domestic violence, which thus came to be defined by the refuge movement 
within the parameters of gender inequality and the patriarchal home. Radical feminism 
provided the theoretical basis for such accounts, and while they did include challenging the 
assumption that it only occurred in a particular class or group, they nevertheless still framed it 
within a critique of women‘s inequality within marriage:  
Wife bashing is not confined to any particular groups of men in society. It occurs 
irrespective of class or income, and is built into the structure of society, where women 
have less status and less power than men. In the past women were regarded as the 
possessions of their husbands and were at their mercy, and this is still the case with 
many women today.
112
 
 
Domestic violence was in this view inextricably linked to the ‗role of women‘ or, in other 
words, their gender, and that it was both perpetuated and condoned by a range of institutions 
and structures. In a context of national activism, the Victorian refuge movement ‗[M]ade 
public the issue of domestic violence… [and] …. were influential in putting it in a context … 
about power‘.113 Given the focus of the women‘s liberation movement on challenging the 
institution of marriage, it is not surprising then that domestic violence came to be defined 
within this specific power context. Even more specifically, it was located within the sphere of 
marriage inside the private home: 
Domestic violence is violence which occurs in the home. By no co-incidence it is also 
understood to mean violence against women by the men they are living with and 
married to. It occurs behind the protective veil of privacy accorded to the family in our 
society.
114
 
 
And it was quintessentially about the power differential within marriage. As former WLHWH 
activist Irena Davis recalls: 
[P]art of seeing it in a feminist framework was to say it is not the woman‘s fault, it 
was about the relationships between men and women, it was a fundamental power 
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thing. Not that she‘d burnt the chops or didn‘t put his plate on the table the right way 
or whatever pathetic excuses they‘d give for belting the shit out of their partners.115 
                 
This framing of domestic violence reflected the subjectivities of the refuge activists involved. 
In particular, as Otto reflected, the focus on domestic violence above other inequalities faced 
by women was ‗in retrospect, I think … a reflection of the priorities of radical feminism‘,116 
which gave primacy to challenging the institution of marriage. As Svensson wrote at the time:  
We intended to use our experiences in operating a refuge to publicise the inequities 
women suffer in our society, and to take direct political action to gain rights for 
women … above all, the right to leave a marital relationship.117                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
This definition was shared by other state refuge movements, including NSW, where activists 
argued that domestic violence must be recognised ‗as a social responsibility‘118 that was 
‗inherent in the institution of marriage‘.119 This understanding of domestic violence was 
constructed as a counter-discourse to challenge the dominant view of the problem as caused 
by ‗vicious bullying husbands‘,120 or the ‗aberrant conduct of individual men‘.121 As former 
state member of parliament Gracia Baylor recalls, women experiencing domestic violence 
were considered to be, ‗Somehow failing, it was a women‘s role to create a happy home and 
all that ... [T]here was a lack of sympathy, among certain people, for the women caught in 
these situations‘.122 Hargreaves recalls that a significant consequence of attributing the 
problem of domestic violence to individual men was that women‘s experiences were often 
pathologised by medical professionals, including psychiatrists: 
 [T]here was a very strong sense of blaming the woman for not being the good wife, or 
a sense from the psychiatrists that the woman was neurotic and should be given 
valium, and sent back to the situation, rather than empowered to leave it.
123
   
 
The feminist-led VWRG was unrelenting in its attempts to educate and politicise state 
bureaucrats about the severity and causes of domestic violence. Rosi Lever worked as the co-
ordinator of the refuge program in its infancy. She recalled the intensity and forthrightness of 
the ‗radical feminists‘ she encountered:  
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my clearest memory is of them saying that men would or could kill women and … 
they were so persuasive and compelling … they certainly radicalised my way of 
thinking and they turned me into, I think, a more courageous bureaucrat.124 
 
On reflection, Green considered that a ‗feminist‘ interpretation of the problem was crucial in 
order to transform dominant constructions of domestic violence: 
I think a change of consciousness is generally going to be led by some sharp new 
interpretation.  And I think the feminist women had it right. They had to be sharp, they 
had to change the paradigm and the way of thinking about it. They had to break it 
open. I probably don‘t represent the typical view.125 
 
No doubt Lever and Green did not represent the ‗typical view‘ of government bureaucrats. 
However, their progressive views and location in key jobs was enough to ensure that the 
refuge movement in Victoria developed within a context of openness to change and new ways 
of thinking about welfare provision.  
 
Convincing representatives from the DCWS was certainly a serious challenge for members of 
the VWRG. Lever herself acknowledged that she initially considered ‗ridiculous‘ the claim 
that women were being murdered.
126
 However, the bureaucracy became increasingly 
receptive bureaucracy as Green‘s statement below reveals: 
I thought the whole process of the politicisation of the women‘s refuge was a really 
important process.  And that, in a sense, the differences of view were secondary, that 
what was happening here was that in fact a long standing social problem; one of the 
most significant kind of residual problems in Australian gender relationships, violence 
to women … was being unlocked, and if it was being unlocked in conflict, it was 
better than having it locked.
127
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‘Drawing a Line’:
128
 The Refuge Movement and the State 
 
If you're looking for change that actually gets into a variety of areas of power … then I 
think you've got to engage with the state.
129
 
Funding 
Federal funding for a national women‘s refuge program was introduced by the Whitlam–led 
Labor government in June 1975, $59,000 was allocated across nineteen refuges.
130
 Feminists 
within the Whitlam government had influenced the development of public policy so that 
‗refuge funding could be forced onto the political agenda‘.131 However, access was haphazard 
and inadequate and the majority of refuges continued to operate primarily on the volunteer 
efforts of women, particularly in relation to staffing and day-to-day running of the refuges. 
Funding for food and other costs was sought from a range of sources, including local 
councils, churches, private charities and philanthropists, non-government community 
organisations and various women‘s groups such WEL. In its first year of operation, for 
example, WEL set up a trust fund to pay the rates, electricity and phone for WLHWH, which 
also received philanthropic support from the Myer Foundation.
132
 Refuges sought general 
donations and undertook a range of fundraising activities.
133
 Available funds were divided 
according to need, as Austin explains: ‗in those days we just said ―we've got X number of 
workers, X number of hours … we want to cover the service from nine to nine, this is what 
we can afford to pay‖‘.134 
 
Generally speaking, in Australia, the refuge movement has, alongside the broader women‘s 
movement, believed that the state has a responsibility to provide for women and children and 
they have continually lobbied state and Commonwealth governments to provide financial 
support for refuges and related services. But there was also resistance to government 
involvement, despite a widespread conviction about the need to ‗force the government into 
recognition of its responsibility to meet the specific needs of homeless women‘.135 
Considerable debate took place when WLHWH first received funding; there was ‗probably … 
more disagreement within our collective over our approach to government funding … than 
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almost anything else‘.136 One of the central concerns for feminist refuges within the Victorian 
refuge movement was the fear that it would depoliticise their work: 
We thought it was quite a dangerous option, even though we also thought we deserved 
funding, or the women who were coming to the refuge deserved resources. But we 
didn‘t want to go down that track of becoming a depoliticised charity.137 
 
At the federal level, Malcolm Fraser headed a new conservative Liberal–National Party 
Coalition government following the dismissal of the Whitlam government in November 1975. 
This change of government signalled a shift to a residual approach to welfare. Whitlam‘s 
social welfare initiatives were wound back, resulting in ‗substantial changes being made to 
refuge funding as a consequence of the federal devolution of the Community Health Program‘ 
from which refuges had been funded.
138
 This included administration of refuges being handed 
over to the states and funding earmarked in federal block grants.
139
 Sociologist Roselyn 
Melville has argued that federalism was ‗used as a guise to institute large funding cutbacks by 
devolving federal government functions and responsibilities to state governments‘.140 
Alongside this, the 1976 federal budget expenditure for refuges was reduced to 90 per cent of 
operating costs and 75 per cent of capital costs.
141
 This trend continued, and the following 
year it declined further to 75 per cent operating and 50 per cent capital.
142
  
 
State governments were expected to make up funding shortfalls and the Hamer government 
continued to do so in Victoria. Indeed, Victoria was unusual in that refuges continued to 
expand during this period despite a conservative state government—unlike Queensland and 
Western Australia‘s governments, which refused to meet the funding gaps. Somewhat 
surprisingly, however, and despite the welfare cuts of the Fraser government, the 1977–78 
federal budget saw a considerable increase in funds for refuges from the Community Health 
Program to $1.4 million. This was the outcome of work by femocrats within the 
Commonwealth Office of Women‘s Affairs, public pressure and media exposure.143 
 
The responsibility for administering refuge funding in Victoria was held by the State Health 
Department until December 1977, when it was transferred to the DCWS. It is unclear why this 
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administrative shift occurred at this time. However, it is likely that the department‘s 
tumultuous history of relations with refuges was a motivating factor. It can also be assumed 
that the government considered the refuge program would fit better within a welfare portfolio 
than with health, particularly as refuges focused attention on domestic violence as a cause of 
women‘s homelessness, and some had already received funding under the Commonwealth 
Homeless Persons Assistance Program.  
 
In mid-1978 in response to the Commonwealth‘s provision of additional funds for refuges, the 
DCWS placed a submission to the Federal Health Department to continue funding the nine 
existing refuges, and a further five from which they had received submissions.
144
 These 
included young women‘s refuge collective and Co-As-It. 145  The receipt of funding for Co-
As-It followed two years of sustained efforts to prove the need for a migrant women‘s 
refuge.
146
 Soon after, a number of refuges were established across Melbourne as well as in 
regional areas, including Frankston, Warrnambool, Geelong and the La Trobe Valley.
147
   
 
Whilst funding levels for refuges increased from to $1.4 million in 1977–1978 to $3 million 
in the 1978–1979 Commonwealth budget, individual refuges were forced to operate on less 
money because of the increase in their overall numbers. Furthermore, there were considerable 
inconsistencies in funding between refuges. Co-As-It, for example, was funded at a lower rate 
than other refuges for a number of years. Murdolo has argued this arose from the assumption 
that ‗migrant women‘s needs were thought to be easily and readily met, despite quite some 
evidence to the contrary‘.148 Moreover, the oldest refuges were often in a better position to 
access funds simply because they were more experienced and knew what to apply for.
149
  
 
Following a national refuge conference convened in Melbourne during March 1978, refuges 
were informed by the Commonwealth that funding guidelines established in 1975 under the 
Whitlam government were no longer applicable.
150
 The guidelines had been prepared by 
women bureaucrats in the Commonwealth Health Department who had ‗stayed loyal to the 
original feminist image‘ and drew on the ‗models developed by Elsie and the WLHWH‘.151 
The change meant that funding guidelines became ambiguous and state governments assumed 
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a greater position of power over the governance of refuges. Victorian refuges also feared the 
Commonwealth‘s perceived indifference to their insistence that refuges must be more than an 
accommodation service,
152
 and moved to ensure that any new state government funding 
guidelines reflected their aims with regard to the role of refuges. They did so because they felt 
that it was not:  
enough to be a hostel for women in order to qualify for women‘s refuges money. The 
government seems very unclear as to where they should draw the line so it is probably 
a good idea if we worked out where we would like it drawn.
153
  
Definition of a Refuge 
 
The formation of the VWRG enabled refuges to work strategically together when engaging 
with the state. As former refuge activist Jean Taylor recalls: ‗Before going into the meetings, 
we would sit around in the Classic Café, and say ―when they say that, we will say this‖, we 
had it all planned out‘.154 By mid-1978, the VWRG felt impelled to express its concern to the 
state government about the increase in the number of refuges that were charitable in nature 
and run by non-political organisations. As well as fearing their aims and objectives were 
under threat, feminist refuges were also alarmed about the possibility of a ‗split within the 
refuges group‘.155 Their solution was to ensure greater clarity surrounding the functions of 
refuges, and, with this aim, a working party commenced the task of establishing a definition. 
Initiated by a group of inner city refuges, it met each Friday for five weeks from August 
1978.
156
 The group aimed to secure representation from all refuges, and maintain unity: ‗It is 
politically important for all refuges to be involved with social welfare—if we are not united 
then social welfare will split us‘.157  
 
The definition developed was based primarily upon a paper written by WLHWH collective 
member and sociology academic, Ulla Svensson.
158
 It sought to establish, ‗what sort of 
organisation constitutes a refuge?‘159 They were concerned that they would receive funding in 
accordance with organisations ‗providing emergency accommodation, and other more 
conservative women‘s refuges‘.160 So the definition was ‗constructed in such a way as to 
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provide a basis for establishing appropriate funding guidelines‘,161 and shaped by the 
following feminist principles:  
A women‘s refuge is run by women for women and their children; a women‘s refuge 
is committed to social change; a women‘s refuge seeks to directly affect the conditions 
of our lives in this society; a women‘s refuge provides temporary accommodation in a 
supportive environment; a women‘s refuge is based on the premise of reciprocal 
support; a women‘s refuge is a non-professional social setting; a women‘s refuge is 
accessible to ex-residents.
162
 
 
The VWRG‘s role in the development of a definition exemplifies the ability of refuge 
activists to work together to ensure their objectives relating to social change were taken into 
account when it came to funding so that they could operate as an ‗alternative to 
institutionalised welfare‘.163 They thus insisted upon ‗political activities being part of the 
funding‘.164 They were aware that, in Queensland, the refuge program now limited ‗refuges to 
emergency accommodation‘, and were concerned to ‗prevent that from happening in 
Victoria‘.165 Their definition insisted that the feminist principles of the VWRG be 
incorporated into state funding guidelines so that that any organisation running a refuge was 
required to incorporate these into their work. In particular, the criterion that refuges operate as 
women-only collective organisations was enshrined in the guidelines.  
 
Members of the VWRG were also invited, at their request, to participate in a DCWS working 
party reviewing applications from refuges for new funding. Their definition was utilised as a 
tool to assist assessment,
166
 and representatives ranked submissions in accordance with the 
new understanding, which included ensuring that refuges were ‗involved in changing social 
structures and institutions which disadvantage or affect the status of women and children in 
society‘.167 The VWRG also tried to ensure that funding went only to organisations they 
considered ideologically ‗appropriate to run a women‘s refuge‘.168 Conservative 
organisations, such as the ‗Women‘s Action Alliance, St Vincent de Paul … were not 
considered ideologically suitable‘.169 Moreover, in order to qualify for funding, refuges were 
expected to align themselves with the VWRG. Whilst it is not clear whether this was a 
                                               
161
 VWRG minutes, 18 August, 1978.  
162
 ‗Definition of a Refuge‘, June 1978, KHA. 
163
 VWRG, ‗A Paper‘. 
164
 Hargreaves interview. 
165
 Ulla Svensson to VWRG, 25 May 1978, Svensson papers. 
166
 ‗Drum‘, 1 August 1978.  
167
 DCWS, ‗Community Health Program: Women‘s Refuges – New Submissions 1978/79 Assessment Process‘, 
July 1978, Burrows papers. 
168
 ‗Drum‘, 18 July 1978.  
169
 ‗Drum‘, 18 July 1978.  
  115 
specific requirement, the authority experienced by the VWRG suggests that, without their 
support, access to funding was unlikely. This position was remembered with great delight, as 
Taylor recalls: ‗It was very much the decision of the refuges who were on the interview panel, 
which refuges got funded‘.170 Caroline Lodge, for example, sought funding at this time—as 
they had previously been funded under the HPAP—and, in response, the VWRG argued: 
[W]e feel that the stated aims and structures of the organisation differ from the 
concept of a refuge which we have developed. The Mordialloc refuge departs from 
this concept on two grounds: males are eligible to join the working group; the 
management structure is hierarchical.
171
  
 
As we have seen, conservative organisations did nevertheless receive funding from the 
DCWS and Mary Anderson Lodge is one example. However, the strategic capacity of the 
feminist-led VWRG to develop a definition of a refuge, combined with its influence on 
funding guidelines as well as the allocation of funds, enabled feminist principles to become 
enshrined in the state government‘s refuge program and policy development. Moreover, these 
processes worked to ensure that newly funded refuges were brought ‗under the wing‘ of the 
VWRG so as to ensure they adopted feminist philosophy and practice. In effect, this meant 
that all organisations involved in providing refuge to women were bound by these principles 
and guidelines.  
The Bureaucracy 
 
In a way they needed us as much as they needed each other. They needed open, 
flexible bureaucrats.
172
  
 
The refuge movement drove a process of responding to domestic violence in a new way and it 
was their feminist framing of the problem that came to be accepted by state bureaucrats. 
Whilst fraught with conflict, this relationship was also characterised by reciprocity and 
negotiation. Claire Reinelt contends in relation to the US in the 1970s, that the ‗challenge for 
state-level feminist activists was to negotiate a path that provides support services to battered 
women and at the same time promotes a feminist program for change‘.173 Feminists who led 
the Victorian women‘s refuge movement‘s engagement with the state walked this line with 
considerable care, determination and fortitude, the outcome being the support of the Victorian 
government for their leadership of the direction of the refuge program. The role of women, 
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and men, within government was also important in enabling the refuge program to develop 
unhindered, as well as ensuring that conservative forces did not undermine the feminist 
agenda for political action and social change. Indeed, in this context, the state actually assisted 
in bringing about one of the most sustained challenges to the gender order, namely, that 
domestic violence should be seen as the result of unequal power relations between men and 
women. 
 
At first, the VWRG was highly suspicious of the state government, and members were 
concerned that their engagement with bureaucrats would depoliticise the work of refuges. As 
the state sought to increase its intervention in the running of refuges, so too did refuges seek 
to maintain their autonomy. Similarly, activists in the US and Canada sought to ensure that 
shelters maintained autonomy whilst receiving money from the state.
174
 To this end, feminist 
refuges in Victoria initiated meetings with bureaucrats with the objective of ‗tak[ing] control 
by setting the demands to protect Halfway House‘s aims through educating and influencing 
the department‘.175 But they also feared this would result in ‗giving the department more 
knowledge and material with which to manipulate and undermine refuges‘.176 To circumvent 
this, at every step of the refuge program‘s development, the VWRG made sure that members 
were involved in all decision making. The appointment of a co-ordinator, for example, was 
not made without the refuge group‘s control over the job description.177 They also insisted on 
autonomy in relation to other funding requirements, including self-evaluation, research and 
input into policy.
178
 The issue of government control over feminist organisations more 
broadly was a publicly debated and contentious one at this time: 
The question of whether government funding of community projects necessarily 
involves government control of these projects has been a matter of grave concern to 
many community-based groups. However the VWRG as a consolidated united group 
will maintain its right to autonomy.
179
 
 
The VWRG‘s response to the implications for autonomy of accepting government funding 
was particularly shaped by radical feminist philosophy, which favoured autonomous 
institutions outside of the mainstream. But the desperate need for money meant that 
negotiations with the state were inevitable and, by the late 1970s, the divide between those 
who argued for and against state involvement in feminist projects was less apparent.  
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The challenges the VWRG faced in maintaining a unified group, combined with the struggle 
to retain autonomy, as well as put feminist philosophy into practice, were well recognised by 
the bureaucracy. The state acted in support of the group, however, and never, according to 
Green, deliberately undermined its integrity despite members‘ fears. As Green reflects: 
 [A]s a conscious position, [we] never, ever, in any way, attempted to use those 
differences or exploit them.  We could have, and occasionally people would say to us 
―I don't want to be party to this‖. And when the meetings were at their most insulting, 
either directed towards me or towards the state … no-one ever took it as totally 
personal … none of the dissenting groups felt strong enough … to break away, so 
there was sufficient coherence in it and I felt that was really important. If there was 
this process divided, that would have actually not served anybody's purpose very well. 
I thought it was really important that we tried to find solutions, which were respectful, 
not only of the state's interest, but alongside the refuges, the collectives‘ interests.180 
 
The respect for the VWRG‘s work by staff within DCWS meant that they considered 
themselves to have:  
[P]layed a small role in holding that together, so that it didn't fracture into groups … a 
lot of people thought it was important to hold this together and saw the diversity of the 
groups and the diversity of motivations and compassion and commitment that were 
there.
181
  
 
At the same time, the political work of Victorian refuges came under scrutiny from others, ,  
including conservative Senator Brian Harradine, who directed criticism at a Melbourne refuge 
that had advertised for a worker to undertake political work. Harradine applied pressure to the 
Federal Health Department, which in turn pressured the DCWS to ensure that political 
activity would not be undertaken in refuges during work hours.
182
 In response, the DCWS 
supported the advocacy and social action role of refuges.
183
 Because this was a period when 
the nature of welfare provision was being challenged in a broader context, supporting the 
refuge program to operate in new and different ways, was part and parcel of the department‘s 
work. As Lever comments, ‗it was about acknowledging that there is a whole group of people 
in the population who are not well served by counselling and often mainstream middle-class 
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service options of the time‘.184 The refuge program acted as a forerunner to this process and 
provided, as Green recalls, ‗a testing ground for all of us … it was actually leading a different 
way of relating to a sector if you like, which worried some people though, especially the 
Commonwealth‘.185  
 
The refuge movement‘s engagement with the state and its capacity to advocate for the 
autonomy of refuges gained the support and ‗enormous respect‘ of government bureaucrats, 
resulting in the preparedness of the DCWS to respond to refuge administration with 
flexibility. In a national context, DCWS bureaucrats argued this position, contending that 
refuges and other ‗new programs‘ should not be run according to blanket rules of operation: 
Licensing, contracting out or registration may be appropriate for, say, children‘s 
homes or family group homes where the state has a traditional regulatory role … but 
will not be appropriate for new programs such as youth refuges, emergency 
accommodation for families, financial counselling, women‘s refuges etc … too little is 
known about the most effective ways of providing services in these areas to prescribe 
rigid standards, uncertainty should be seen as a constructive part of program 
development.
 186
  
 
The personal impact on bureaucrats involved with the refuge movement was significant 
because the consistent pressure applied by the VWRG meant, as Green recalls, that, ‗there 
wouldn‘t be a meeting without fail that we weren‘t actually challenged on four or five 
different issues‘.187 While these were not ‗easy for me personally‘,188 they were nevertheless 
‗extremely invigorating … and largely quite enjoyable. It was exciting and they were doing 
some really innovative things‘.189   
 
Lever found group meetings difficult in facing the wrath of a group of ‗radical‘ and 
‗intellectual‘ women,190 and then condemnation of all things related to the patriarchal state. 
As Hargreaves recalls, ‗I think we‘ve had a very kind of unfair attitude that we labelled 
everyone as bureaucrats and put them in the camp of the enemy‘.191 At the time, there was 
very little appreciation of the work done by feminists in government. However, Lever juggled 
the competing demands of the refuge program‘s radical agenda and the constraints of 
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bureaucracy. As she recounts: ‗I still remember Walter [Jona] looking at me and saying … 
―Don‘t you put me in an invidious position‖‘.192  
 
A further example of state institutions supporting the work of the refuge movement is the role 
of women‘s departments and advisers. Whilst the role of adviser under the Hamer government 
was short-lived, it led to the establishment of a Women‘s Advisory Bureau—later re-named 
Office of Women‘s Affairs (OWA)—whose members sought contact with women‘s refuges 
and offered support in the form of administrative resources and strategic advice in relation to 
‗contacts in the state government that are sympathetic‘.193 The relationship was not 
particularly close, however, because bureaucrats (women included) continued to be viewed 
with suspicion by members of the VWRG.
194
  
 
Yolanda Klempfner was appointed to the OWA during the late 1970s, and sought to promote 
the issue of domestic violence onto the policy platform of the Hamer government. Refuge 
workers were considered experts on the issue of domestic violence, and Klempfner sought 
information and co-operation from them.
195
 The OWA also produced a pamphlet in 
partnership with the VWRG outlining the role and function of a women‘s refuge.196 Liz Orr 
has noted that Klempfner was particularly skilful at ‗utilising the support and knowledge of 
sympathetic men, in particular the Premier‘.197 This was evident in her capacity to lobby 
Treasury directly for funds to initiate research into domestic violence,
198
 and to ensure the 
government maintained its commitment to match the federal funding short-fall for refuges.
199
 
The role of women like Klempfner in Liberal governments confirms Melville‘s argument that 
funding support for refuges was dependent on factors other than the election of Labor 
governments.
200
 
 
The state‘s support for the refuge movement‘s feminism, autonomy and unity was hard won 
but it meant that the VWRG exercised considerable power. Members were able to influence 
the further development of the refuge program to ensure that feminist principles were 
embedded within government policy and adopted by newly funded refuges. A major 
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demonstration of this power was the campaign mounted to maintain secrecy of refuge 
addresses.  
The Secrecy of Address Campaign 
The bureaucrats wanted to just walk into the refuges, they wanted to come and visit, 
they wanted to pop in as they did with any other institution … We absolutely flatly 
refused to have that happen.201  
 
In October 1979, Minister for Community Welfare Services Walter Jona formally requested 
the addresses of and visitation rights to the sixteen women‘s refuges.202 Refuges were 
informed that, unless their addresses were provided to the DCWS, they would have their 
funding cut.
203
 They refused this request and launched a campaign to secure public support for 
their right to maintain secrecy. The success of the campaign became highly symbolic for the 
Victorian refuge movement because those involved were united, organised and ultimately 
successful in their battle against the state. For these reasons, it has become a highpoint in 
movement activists‘ in accounts of their history.204 Reflecting the subjective nature of 
memory, the address campaign has been represented as primarily concerned with the security 
of women‘s refuges, such commitment being claimed as characteristic of Victorian refuges 
from their beginnings.
205
 Only over time has the campaign come to symbolise ‗the ability of 
refuges to maintain some autonomy from the government‘.206 Here I reconsider these 
assumptions, and argue that the feminist-inspired campaign was equally determined from its 
the start to maintain the autonomy of refuges from the state government in order to avoid 
being forced to operate along the lines of traditional charitable welfare organisations. Whilst a 
commitment to confidentiality of address was characteristic of the Victorian refuge movement 
from the outset, the actual resolve to maintain secrecy developed over time. Inititally, 
confidentiality was a practical response to immediate security concerns, but the resolve to 
defend it on principle strengthened as the Commonwealth and state governments increased 
the intensity of their demands. Finally, the campaign is often remembered as achieving 
success solely as a result of the determination of the refuge movement.
207
 Whilst undoubtedly 
a useful strategy to muster group identity and solidarity, this narrative pays inadequate 
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attention to the significance of the political and institutional context—much of which has 
already been canvassed here—in addition to the influence of other actors operating in the state 
bureaucracy who enabled its success. This particular confluence of factors and people, I 
argue, allowed Victorian women‘s refuges to operate as government-funded community 
organisations with extraordinarily irregular accountability requirements that included being 
funded at unknown locations until the late 1980s. 
 
The addresses of Victorian refuges were unknown to the state government when the DCWS 
assumed administration of the program in late 1977.
208
 Prior to this, when the program was 
administered by the State Health Department, the address of at least one refuge was known to 
department representatives.
209
 It appears that there had thus been no formal decision by 
Victorian refuges to keep their addresses a secret when they were initially established.
210
 
Indeed, the issue was debated internally, and some members of the WLHWH questioned the 
necessity for secrecy.
211
 Extreme caution was taken with this information, however, which 
was in stark contrast to refuges in other states like Elsie in Sydney, which began in a very 
public fashion.
212
 By 1977, and in response to growing concerns about security, refuges 
became more focused on ensuring their addresses remained secret.
213
 At the same time, they 
adopted policies of moving the location of refuges in response to alleged security breeches. 
The cautious approach adopted by Victorian refuges was in part shaped by the experiences of 
the women who started the movement. WLHWH co-founder Sharon Laura recounts earlier 
experiences that shaped her behaviour: 
[W]e were being careful how we did things in order to protect the actual organisation.  
I know that my experience in the anti-war movement, my experience in the trade 
union movement, my experience with the cops, had very much informed how I 
operated within the group and the collective. 214 
 
Pressure on the state government to find a solution that both preserved the secrecy of refuges‘ 
addresses and delivered assurance that they were in fact operating grew following a request 
from Prime Minister‘s wife, Tammy Fraser, to visit a Victorian refuge. As then director of 
regional services David Green recalls:  
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I was called one day by the Commonwealth to say that the Prime Minister‘s wife 
wanted to visit a refuge. I said ―yeah that would be good but we'll have to contact the 
refuge, we don‘t know where they are‖. And there was this huge furore about the 
Prime Minister‘s wife being held up in her wishes to just drop in on a refuge … 
because the state didn't know where they were located.215 
 
Under pressure from the Commonwealth, the Victorian state government increasingly sought 
access to the addresses of refuges.
216
 In response, refuges became more organised in their 
resistance and debated the question of how far they should co-operate to provide this 
information.
217
 Notably, radical feminist activists from WLHWH, including Kaye Hargreaves, 
were influential in arguing against ‗allowing entry to the refuge‘, as well as ‗persuad[ing] 
other refuges‘ to follow suit.218 Not all refuges, however, were prepared to toe the line. 
Aboriginal activists, for example, challenged secret addresses as potentially divisive in the 
Aboriginal community. Lever recalls that Aboriginal women ‗stood their ground‘ in relation 
to the issue, and argued against embracing white feminism, claiming that ‗this is not part of 
our cultural heritage and ideology‘.219 Rural refuges also approached the issue of security 
differently because they ‗had to assume that everybody in town knew where the refuge 
was‘.220 They often worked in close collaboration with their local communities, and some did 
not adopt secrecy-of-address policies.
221
  
 
Whilst safety for women was a motivator in their campaign, radical feminist refuges were 
also, as former state government bureaucrat Susan Feldman argued, ‗ideologically driven, I 
believe, because it‘s a very strong feminist stance. And we‘re talking about some very radical 
women‘.222 The Victorian refuge movement continued to oppose the intrusion of the state into 
their affairs, which, they argued, represented a threat to their autonomy. This was a central 
focus of the address campaign. Feminist leaders continued to argue that, unlike other forms of 
welfare provision, refuges were not ‗an accommodation service … [and] … the concept that 
how residents live is susceptible to monitoring and evaluation … is directly in conflict with 
… this way of operating‘.223 At their state conference in 1979, refuges argued that providing 
addresses would result in ‗undermining their integrity and autonomy‘, and they ‗regarded the 
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demand for addresses and visits as a directive for refuges to operate purely as a welfare 
service‘.224 Avowedly feminist refuges were particularly concerned about what it would mean 
for refuges as sites of political action: 
The government‘s demands must be seen as a move towards increased government 
surveillance and control over refuges. Possession of refuge‘s addresses and the right to 
visit gives the government … the formal procedures for restricting the political 
function of refuges.225 
 
Refuge activists were certainly also concerned about the threat to their security. As Macmillan 
recounts, it was not unusual ‗if [men] found out the address of the refuge‘ for them to ‗arrive 
occasionally armed, demanding that we give them their wives back‘.226 The VWRG reached 
consensus on this issue and agreed that ‗no bureaucracy can guarantee to safeguard the 
addresses‘.227 It was further argued that ‗women come to the refuge to escape physical and 
mental violence. For this reason tight security is essential for the safety and protection of the 
residents of the refuge. Addresses of refuges are only known to those people living and 
working in each particular house‘. 228 They agreed that the address issue would be publicly 
explained in terms of the threat to the security of refuges, and the conviction that wider access 
to addresses would compromise their ‗ability to truly offer women sanctuary from male 
violence‘.229 This explains in part why the address issue is often remembered primarily in 
terms of safety. As refuge worker Janine Mahoney recounts: 
The whole concept of safety has [had] a massive influence on the development of the 
services … The whole security of address issue developed because we were looking to 
maintain safety for the clients that we provided services for.230 
 
However, as I have indicated,  the address issue represented something considerably more 
compelling and complex to refuge activists than the physical security of women; they did not 
consider that they should be held accountable to government. Hargreaves now reflects: 
 I think the security issue was not just in relation to the security of women residents, 
the danger of their husbands or their boyfriends coming around. I mean, we had 
reasons to be worried about that … we had incidents … but I think it was also the idea 
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that we didn‘t want to be under scrutiny from the government. There was an issue of 
autonomy versus accountability. We didn‘t actually think that we … should be 
accountable, because we were the women who had the problem, and we were acting 
on our own behalf. Yes, so what right did they have to ask us to be accountable? We 
were the ones with the entitlement.
231
 
 
Similarly, as Wendy Austin reveals, although the protection of women was a fundamental 
motivator in their campaign, it was also important that the community was not holding men to 
account, and so refuges likewise resisted being held accountable: 
Women need to be protected, the workers need to be protected, these are violent nasty 
men who the community's not paying any attention to, and is not holding to account in 
anyway, so … we're basically not going to tell you where we are.232  
 
This stance puzzled bureaucrats who did not consider themselves ‗to be careless or 
dishonourable, or people who … when a furious husband or de-facto rings up and demands 
the address of his wife … just fall over and provide it‘.233 They were stunned by the 
insinuation that they were not ‗responsible enough, or respectful enough, of the security 
issues involved to treat these matters with a reasonable degree of control and security and 
privacy‘.234 By contrast, refuge activists argued that ‗having never been through this kind of 
experience, government employees do not understand the necessity of secrecy‘.235 This 
necessity had been experienced first hand by former Victorian Labor Party Minister for 
Community Services Kay Setches, when, as a volunteer at a refuge in the late 1970s, she was 
phoned by a leading Victorian Australian Labor Party politician demanding the refuge‘s 
address because his colleague‘s wife was known to be residing there. Despite Setches‘ 
staunch refusal to provide the information, the woman‘s husband managed to locate the 
refuge within the week. This event gave Setches a renewed appreciation of the need for 
protection and security: 
Now, if that hadn‘t happened to me, being the person who was in charge, who 
understood the way that political patronage and information can be found among men 
… [a]nd they had no care that she was bashed. No care. And so, whenever I used to 
hear people saying, ―they‘re paranoid‖ … they might be a bit, but I‘ve seen it work.236 
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The security of addresses campaign was largely successful, revealing the powerful position 
that refuges had attained. As former refuge and outreach worker Judy Johnson argued: ‗[Y]ou 
couldn‘t possibly have splashed right across the local paper that government had closed all the 
refuges. They would have gone to the wall on that … so we did have a huge amount of 
political power‘.237  
 
Alongside the relentless advocacy of a united refuge movement, the state itself played a 
critical role in support of the refuge movement‘s position both by listening and by continuing 
to support what they considered to be a ‗crucial service‘. State bureaucrats in the DCWS 
advocated for them in the face of the Commonwealth government‘s alarm at the autonomy of 
the Victorian refuge movement in relation to addresses. The Commonwealth Health 
Department attempted to force provision of addresses by incorporating it in the funding 
agreement with the state.
238
 Until this point, refuges had met accountability requirements by 
providing DCWS with a statutory declaration nominating the suburb where the refuge was 
located. However, issues of accountability combined with the ambiguous legal status of 
refuges as unincorporated associations had already begun to plague the DCWS to the point 
that it no longer considered it ‗satisfactory to direct substantial funds to postal addresses of a 
group of unknown people‘.239 But, whilst the state government was determined to improve the 
accountability mechanisms for refuges, the DCWS was also determined to continue 
‗attempting to administer an innovative program flexibly … in spite of the complexity of 
these issues‘.240  
 
Supporting refuges to maintain secrecy of addresses is evidence that state bureaucrats were 
working from an awareness of the serious effects of domestic violence and the consequent 
need to defend the autonomy of refuges. Lever recalls the public servants‘ motivations for 
supporting the refuges:  
This group were so strong and articulate, and had a strongly held … philosophy and 
ideology, and we listened. And beyond listening we actually translated their view into 
the development of a ground-breaking program. Who else would ever, as a bureaucrat, 
fund people where you actually didn‘t know where they were operating from?241 
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Green believes that this continued largely because no formal attempts were made to interfere 
with his autonomy as a bureaucrat, and the methods he adopted to navigate the process: 
[A]t no point did my director, the director general of social welfare, Albert Booth, ever 
tell me not to go down the track of trying to negotiate the way through. I was never 
subject to any coercive interference with respect to that process, either from the 
minister or from the director general … [The] prospect of that ever happening today, a 
similar situation in terms of the risks for the state involved in that, the risk everybody 
was running, in that process, is just inconceivable. There'd be eight levels of authority 
breathing down the neck of my equivalent. So the institutional context is significant.
242
 
 
As Green‘s comments suggest, the autonomy he was allowed would be impossible in the 
present climate where governments are primarily focused on increasing their ‗steering and 
regulatory functions to manage and direct policy responses to societal risks‘.243 
 
The address issue gained significant publicity
244
 and became a topic of debate in state 
parliament, where ALP members, including feminist Joan Coxsedge, questioned the minister 
over his intentions.
245
 Support was also present amongst Victorian Liberal Party women such 
as Gracia Baylor, who recalled the impact they made on the government‘s eventual decision 
to support the refuge movement‘s campaign. It was because ‗conservative women were 
openly being associated with it‘, she argued, that ‗it publicly hit home a bit with the state 
government‘.246 Their position of influence was enhanced because of their ‗networks and 
people would watch what we do and say‘.247 As a consequence, they were able to ‗influence 
the thinking of a number of … key people in government circles‘.248 Within DCWS itself, 
there was also considerable support for the position of women‘s refuges. Green recalls:  
[A]mongst my staff in regional services there was sympathy towards the position … 
many of the staff in the division…. were very supportive of the women's refuge 
movement and it was exciting, it was a real inroad on … a very weak response to … 
male violence. And the women's refuge collectives were very articulate about it. The 
power struggle as we saw it, was more the struggle between us and the 
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Commonwealth, rather than us and the refuges. That‘s not the way the refuges would 
see it.
249
 
 
In response to refuges‘ protests, and the ensuing publicity and community support, DCWS 
convened a meeting in mid-December 1979 with the aim of resolving the deadlock. Refuges 
were informed that the minister would make a number of concessions, in particular, the notion 
of an address holder.
250
 In practice, this meant that a nominee would be asked to hold the 
address of a refuge in confidence and make an annual visit to authenticate its operation. 
Address holders would be well-reputed women within the community and not necessarily 
employees of DCWS. The compromise position was accepted by the majority of refuges but 
rejected by feminist ones, including WLHWH and Western, which argued that members 
found it ‗no longer possible to operate a refuge consistent with our principles and to accept 
government funding‘.251 This decision was over-turned within a few months, and they 
reluctantly agreed to accept funding according to the new agreement.
252
 They were unhappy 
about being forced into this position, and protested in theatrical fashion by occupying David 
Green‘s office dressed as mourners and carrying a coffin to symbolise the ‗death of 
autonomous refuges‘.253 
 
A tussle continued between the state government and the Commonwealth into the early 
1980s, with the Commonwealth persisting in its demands for access to refuge addresses.
254
 
The VWRG also met with the then Commonwealth Minister for Health, Michael Mackellar, 
who insinuated that they would lose their funding if they were not prepared to negotiate.
255
 
Refuges held to their position, which was strengthened by the ongoing support of the national 
refuge movement and the stand assumed by the Minister Jona in favour of the address-holder 
position.
256
 It has been argued by McFerran that the Commonwealth‘s agenda ‗bore little 
connection to the issues of accountability‘, but was instead ‗a thinly veiled campaign against 
the best organised refuge movement‘257 in Australia. It seems likely, however, that the 
Commonwealth‘s agenda did concern accountability, in part because of growing backlash 
against the welfare state by the Murdoch press and the backbenchers in Fraser‘s Coalition 
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government.
258
  However, in the end, ‗the State told the Commonwealth that that was the way 
it was going to be, and the Commonwealth had to accept it‘.259  
 
The initial address-holder arrangement was maintained until 1987, when all refuges‘ 
addresses were required to be lodged with female staff in Community Services Victoria 
(CSV) (formally DCWS). At this time, CSV had come under direct criticism from the 
Victorian state auditor general, who had ‗publicly criticised CSV‘s handling of … the 
Women‘s Emergency Services Program (WESP) in particular‘.260 The new requirements 
imposed on refuges reflected, (as will be discussed in the following chapter), the 
Commonwealth government‘s growing commitment to accountable management, which was 
inflamed by alleged abuses of power committed by particular refuges, including closing 
without notifying the department and misuse of public funds. Despite some renewed protest, 
refuges‘ addresses were lodged with a number of female bureaucrats who undertook annual 
inspections and made statutory declarations to the state confirming that the refuge existed and 
was operating.
261
 Susan Feldman recalled, ‗I was an address holder, so my refuge was in 
Mildura. I used to keep the addresses under a mat on my desk, unbeknownst to my 
colleagues‘.262 Today the confidentiality of addresses of Victorian refuges is still maintained. 
However, they are held together in the Office of Housing and Community Building division 
of the Victorian Department of Human Services (DHS), where access is restricted to female 
bureaucrats.
263
 
 
The secrecy of refuges‘ addresses proved to be one of the most controversial issues facing the 
Victorian refuge movement. During the time under discussion here, the campaign served to 
publicise the issue of domestic violence, stimulating considerable support for refuges amongst 
bureaucrats, politicians and the public alike. VWRG‘s advocacy persuaded the state 
government to support the refuge program to operate in unique and radical ways, thus giving 
recognition to gender as a critical factor in determining the provision of welfare. In addition to 
promoting the rights of residents to live without fear and with security, the address campaign 
symbolised the refuge movement‘s resolve to maintain its autonomy from the state so that 
refuges might continue to politicise the issues, avoid operating as traditional welfare 
institutions by empowering their residents, and circumvent, as social work academics Wendy 
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Weeks and Kate Gilmore have argued, ‗approaches to policy making which ignore structural 
inequality, and which favour responding to violence as a clinical problem, to be addressed at 
the level of individuals or families‘.264 
Conclusion  
Despite differences, conflicts and struggles, a commitment to gaining funding and providing 
support for women in refuge was shared by all involved in the movement and, by 1976, many 
had begun to work together under the umbrella of the VWRG. The VWRG illustrated the 
capacity of feminists within the refuge movement to work strategically to generate a united 
front and counter the development of non-feminist refuges. The group was heavily influenced 
by Anglo activists from radical feminist refuges who undertook to politicise issues facing 
women in refuge as the product of unequal gender relations. The advocacy work of the 
feminist-led refuge movement from its beginnings in the mid-1970s to the end of the decade, 
was directed to a broad range of issues affecting the lives of women in refuge, including 
resources for women to access autonomous households and eliminate the need for refuge. 
   
At the same time, activists drew on radical and socialist feminist ideas to engage in a process 
of politicising dominant constructions of gender. The origins of the domestic violence 
services movement thus illuminates the subjective nature of gender and discourse as women 
sought to reconstruct their identities and challenge society‘s structures in new and 
empowering ways, in processes connecting ‗discursive process to social experience‘.265 
Refuge activists made these connections by publicly demonstrating the way that dominant 
discourses relating to gender manifested themselves within the policy and practice of male-
dominated institutions and structures that operated to perpetuate women‘s inequality and 
oppression. In seeking to recast ‗relations of power‘266 in a society that worked to perpetuate 
violence against women, the Victorian women‘s refuge movement demonstrated the centrality 
of gender—as both socially constructed in discourse and lived experience for women—to the 
problems facing women in refuge. 
 
Towards the end of the decade, the refuge movement‘s analysis became much more refined as 
the focus narrowed to domestic violence. At the same time, for the purposes of limiting access 
to refuge, the movement had begun to differentiate between women who were homeless and 
women experiencing domestic violence. The corresponding focus on liberating women from 
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marriage and the private home as the primary site of women‘s oppression reflected a refuge 
movement dominated by Anglo, middle-class women. This had exclusionary implications for 
women who fell outside these boundaries. It can be argued, therefore, that whilst compromise, 
negotiation, creativity and struggle characterised the work of the VWRG in its early years, the 
group‘s actions were also marred by conflict and exclusion, where whiteness was naturalised, 
the unity of ‗women‘ as a social category idealised, and the differences produced by the 
intersections of class, race, ethnicity and sexuality were underplayed. However, the refuge 
movement did emphasise that domestic violence was a result of women‘s inequality in 
society, and in particular, men‘s power over women, a re-framing that challenged dominant 
constructions that considered it a problem of individual men and women. 
 
It is clear that the refuge movement‘s engagement with the state resulted in a range of 
considerable benefits for refuges as well as for women escaping violence. The advent of 
government funding, however inadequate, meant that the refuges were able to support women 
and focus their energy on political activity, whilst expanding the accommodation available. 
Moreover, the state‘s support for the VWRG‘s feminism, autonomy and unity meant the 
VWRG occupied a position of considerable power over the development of the refuge 
program to ensure feminist principles were embedded within government policy and adopted 
by new refuges. This included a determination that refuges would be organisationally distinct 
from traditional welfare services. It can be further argued that engagement with the state 
served to strengthen the unity of the movement, despite concerns about the potential for a split 
in the group and the capacity of the state to undermine them. 
 
The assumption that refuges‘ engagement with the state always results in a loss to the 
integrity of the refuge movement and is anti-feminist has, as its premise, the assumption of a 
monolithic state. This approach does not take into consideration the complexities of the 
‗dynamics of power‘,267 such as the capacity of bureaucrats within government to support the 
refuge movement‘s agenda for social change, or the power struggles that were, and are, 
characteristic of bureaucracies. Power at this time was more commonly interpreted as ‗the 
ability of the state, institutions, and those who held positions of authority to impose their will 
on others‘.268  This notion has simultaneously assumed ‗a shared view of coherent interests, 
which exist outside the state that can either influence the state or are represented by or 
embodied in it‘.269 As we have seen, however, at no point was the Victorian refuge 
                                               
267
 Reinelt, p. 99. 
268
 Reinelt, p. 99. 
269
 Pringle and Watson, p. 229. 
  131 
movement, prior to its engagement with the state, characterised by a seamless unity and 
shared vision that was subsequently lost as a consequence. As well, it is clear that the refuge 
movement was made up of divergent interests, and the exercise of power in its complex and 
subtle forms, such as the capacity of an Anglo refuge movement to marginalise the needs of 
migrant or Aboriginal women, for example, was rarely acknowledged or understood.  
 
This is not to dismiss the risks that are involved in engaging with the state, the most 
significant of which, according to Reinelt, is the threat to a movement‘s solidarity.270 The 
fears of feminist refuges that engagement with the state would lead to a ‗watering down‘ of 
their feminist agenda for social change was not unjustified in terms of their revolutionary 
perspective. Radical feminist organisations, including women‘s refuges, held unyielding ideas 
about what feminism and social change meant. They sought revolution, and all hierarchical 
and patriarchal institutions, including the state, were categorised as the enemy and marked in 
opposition to their movement. This framework is problematic, because it allows ‗no way of 
conceptualising the politics of a movement that may include both collective and hierarchical 
structures, participatory and bureaucratic elements, outside and inside political strategies, 
grassroots mobilisation and organising within institutions‘.271 However, there were some who 
appreciated the potential for engaging with and negotiating new terrain with the state. As 
Kaye Hargreaves recalls, ‗I think revolutionaries always underestimate how flexible the 
system is, and how it can accommodate change. But, I mean, the thing was, we had a radical-
cum-revolutionary spirit which was really good fun‘.272 The Victorian refuge movement‘s 
engagement with the state certainly ensured that the latter ‗accommodated change‘.  
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Chapter 4: The Domestic Violence Services Movement, 
1980–1989 
 
The groups that we spoke to in the early 80s would have said domestic violence is 
what? The groups that we spoke to in the end of the 80s knew about it.  The 
community in general had a much better idea.
1
 
 
By the late 1980s, the refuge movement‘s framing of domestic violence was virtually 
uncontested by government officials, professionals and the wider public and was eventually 
adopted at both state and national policy levels. This chapter begins by examining the refuge 
movement‘s engagement with state institutions, policy makers and bureaucrats in the 1980s. It 
analyses the movement‘s influence on the policy processes that led to increased funding for 
domestic violence services and to Victoria‘s first broad-sweeping policy initiatives. These are 
investigated to show the influence of feminism on the development of programs dealing with 
domestic violence. This chapter also examines the funding and programmatic arrangements 
affecting domestic violence services in order to highlight the changing political and 
institutional context under which they operated as well as their impact on shifting the 
movement‘s aims and objectives. The collaboration between movement activists and 
feminists in government to achieve co-ordinated policy and funding responses is also 
explored. 
 
In examining the ongoing influence of feminism on the refuge movement‘s aims and 
strategies in this period, the VWRG‘s ideological diversity assumes greater significance. The 
influence of liberal feminism on the movement‘s aims and activities became more evident, as 
less radical groups made tentative steps towards asserting their influence on the movement‘s 
internal operations, and external relationships. Conservative refuges, for example, now 
worked in close partnership with the state government, reflecting the way domestic violence 
had become a legitimate part of the mainstream policy platform of government. By contrast, 
radical refuges continued to resist close engagement and sought to ensure their methods of 
organising and goals of social change were not compromised as a result. This chapter 
documents how the VWRG organised internally in the context of declining group solidarity 
during this period.  
 
Domestic violence services grew exponentially during the 1980s, and the influence of 
feminism on their methods of operations and organisation was sustained despite internal 
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tensions. The services engaged with a range of external institutions such as the courts, police, 
and other non-government organisations, whilst continuing to agitate for social and cultural 
change by undertaking direct action to prevent the heinous impact of domestic violence on the 
lives of women and children.  
Engagement with the Bureaucracy
 
Funding and Political Action 
 
During the early 1980s, refuges faced federal Liberal government funding cuts (in real terms) 
and the transfer of responsibility for the administration of refuges to the states. 
Commonwealth funding allocated to women‘s refuges in the 1980–81 budget was $3.82 
million, and Victoria received $890,000 to be divided between its sixteen funded refuges.
2
 
They were already struggling to survive and the budget did not include provisions for new 
ones or extensions to existing services.
3
 The Fraser government subsequently relinquished 
financial responsibility for refuges by submerging funding in general revenue grants to the 
states in the 1981-82 budget.
4
 Block grants to each state were to cover public hospitals, school 
dental schemes and the Community Health Program—from which refuges were funded.5 The 
sums allocated were equal to those in the previous year‘s budget with an additional 10 per 
cent to cover CPI increases,
6
 and states could spend the appropriation however they chose.  
 
The Victorian refuge movement was concerned that ‗state governments could opt to drop the 
refuge program entirely‘.7 Whilst the government continued to make good on its contributions 
in Victoria, funding again decreased in real terms owing to inflation, and refuges were forced 
to cover the funding for the Women‘s Refuge Referral Service out of existing funds.8  
 
Refuges condemned their lack of funding and drew public attention to the issues facing them. 
In 1980, protests were held on the steps of Parliament House
9
 and, in the following year, at 
their national refuge conference in Melbourne, refuge workers relayed stories of housing 
shortages, increasing demand on refuges and overcrowding‘.10 In response to the federal 
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government‘s transfer of funding to the states, Victorian refuges joined a national women‘s 
services campaign headed by feminist refuges from NSW.
11
 The campaign called for a 
national stream of funding under a special purpose grant for women‘s services.12 A series of 
protests were held from May to early June, including a week long vigil on the lawns of 
Parliament House in Canberra, and a sit-in at Kings Hall, which turned violent after police 
were called to remove protestors.
13
 While the protests may have ‗angered sections of the 
(NSW) refuge movement wanting to distance themselves form the more radical feminists‘,14 
they also served the purpose of generating ‗solidarity and strength‘ amongst the women in 
attendance.
15
 In Victoria, the protests were endorsed by the VWRG, which had continued to 
remain relatively cohesive in its operations until this point.
16
 The protest was unsuccessful in 
achieving a women‘s services funding stream, but it foregrounded the issue of women‘s 
refuges and domestic violence amongst the public, Commonwealth femocrats and women 
politicians. Opposition ALP senators Pat Giles and Susan Ryan, for example, supported the 
provision of a women‘s services program, and Ryan presented a petition signed by over a 
thousand members of the public in opposition to the federal government‘s withdrawal.17  
 
During this period, Co-As-It refuge continued to advocate on behalf of migrant women, and 
organised a national conference in August 1981 where members demanded specific funding 
for ethnic refuge workers.
18
 Migrant activists were now demanding that Anglo refuge workers 
‗adapt and overcome language and cultural barriers to offer support to these women‘.19 The 
Co-As-It national conference made in-roads among femocrats in the Commonwealth, who 
publicised the conference findings noting that ‗migrant women will often experience severe 
guilt, and may return to the home rather than face total isolation from her community‘.20 
 
Despite the election in March 1982 of the Cain Labor government, which had campaigned on 
a platform promoting social justice, the Victorian budget for refuges in 1982 resulted in only a 
nominal increase in funding, much of which was absorbed by increases in CPI and other non-
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recurrent costs.
21
 At their national refuge conference in Melbourne in November 1982, 
refuges protested to Commonwealth and state government representatives about these 
problems. They highlighted insufficient funds for operating costs, overcrowding, lack of 
award wages, inequitable distribution of funding between refuges and the high rate of turn-
away. They also pointed to the desperate need for specialised services to respond to women 
with complex needs and migrant women and to the lack of housing for women leaving 
refuge.
22
 The Women‘s Refuge Referral Service (WRRS) backed up these claims with data 
revealing that 78 per cent of women callers in Victoria were denied a service.
23
 Yet Victorian 
refuges fared better than WA and Queensland, where allocations were significantly less as a 
result of years of conservative governments and insufficient funding.
24
 Victoria‘s refuges 
lobbied the new Labor Minister for Community Services, Pauline Toner, and set up camp 
outside St Paul‘s Cathedral before Christmas, maintaining a vigil there for a week.25 
However, they were again faced with significant funding cuts for the 1983-84 financial year, 
this time as a result of the state government‘s across-the-board 2 per cent cut in community 
services spending.
26
 In response, refuges took to the streets in protest, gaining significant 
media coverage and again drawing public attention to domestic violence.
27
  
 
It was not until after the Hawke-led Labor government‘s election in March 1983 that an 
additional $4 million in funding was made available under the Women‘s Emergency Services 
Program (WESP).28 Prior to its election, the Labor Party leader had been lobbied by members 
of the feminist bureaucracy and the refuge movement for a resumption of federal funding of 
refuges, rape crisis and incest centres and, in November 1982, the party committed to the 
establishment of a women‘s services program.29 This supported the feminist position that 
‗violence against women was not simply a matter of homelessness and that the solution … 
involved more than just the provision of emergency accommodation‘.30 WESP funding aimed 
to ‗ensure refuge workers in all states receive appropriate wages‘ and ‗new services in areas 
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of high need‘.31 It included $200,000 earmarked for ‗ethnic workers‘, an area of need gaining 
greater coverage in the media.
32
 With the support of Minister Toner, Victoria was approved 
$820,000 under WESP, taking its total budget to $1.7 million.
 33
 This enabled the expansion 
of the program in Victoria to include a new refuge in Geelong, 4.5 positions for ethnic 
workers, 11.5 positions to bring all refuges to a staff level of 3.5, expansion of the WRRS, 
improved wages and conditions, increased funds for operating and funds for research and 
evaluation.
34
  
 
At this time, demands from the government for data, which might not seem unreasonable in 
the context of accountability for public funds, were growing,. However, the majority of 
refuges were strongly opposed to providing it, arguing that they ‗should not be regarded or 
coerced into becoming welfare institution[s]‘.35 Furthermore, with their campaign to 
safeguard refuges‘ addresses, they were determined to protect the security of residents. They 
therefore resisted the Hawke government‘s focus on the accountability of homelessness 
programs. As long-term refuge worker Wendy Austin explains: 
[W]hen data came in we fought it like you wouldn‘t believe … we were saying this is 
not about bums on beds, we're not counting women, this is not about what you can get 
from your money.
36
 
Femocrats at Work in Victoria, ‘Punching above our weight’37 
 
During the 1980s, the economic and social status of women was rapidly changing and 
women‘s participation in education and the labour force increased markedly.38 In Victoria, 
this was further encouraged by the election of a progressive Labor government committed ‗to 
ensure the equal status and participation of women in our society‘.39 Key policy developments 
included equal opportunity of access to the public service, which enabled many women with 
‗a background of activity in the new wave of feminism‘40 to move into various arms of 
government. In turn this supported the rapid expansion of women‘s services and 
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organisations,
41
 and general issues of concern to women assumed a central place on the 
government‘s political agenda.42 The Women‘s Information Referral Exchange played an 
important role in connecting and enabling women‘s organisations to develop at this time,43  
and was the result of a working party comprising government representatives from the OWA, 
and DCWS and women‘s organisations such as the Women‘s Electoral Lobby and Women‘s 
Liberation Switchboard.
44
  
 
Kay Setches, a later Minister for Community Services, had been centrally involved in writing 
Labor Party welfare and health policy during the lead-up to the 1982 state election. The 
influence of Labor women was critical in the party‘s decision to incorporate into their 
platform a commitment to ‗funding for women‘s refuges and … support for children‘.45 Prior 
to this time, as Setches recalls, ‗ALP policy was uncontaminated by any discussion about 
women at all‘.46 In addition to Setches, ‗there was a very active lobby group amongst the 
women backbenchers in the Labor Party … who wanted to make sure that women‘s issues 
were addressed‘.47  
 
The first policy initiatives in relation to domestic violence in Victoria emerged under the 
Liberal Hamer government following the establishment of a Domestic Violence Committee 
(DVC) within the OWA in 1980.
48
 Alongside the advocacy of the refuge movement, the 
groundwork laid by small ‗l‘ Liberal women such as Yolanda Klempfner was instrumental in 
enabling its formation as well as in ensuring that the VWRG was one of the few community 
organisations represented.  
 
The DVC was initially mandated to make recommendations to the premier on a number of 
issues relating to domestic violence. In particular, it was charged with the task of investigating 
‗the degree of domestic violence in the community‘, as well as ‗the needs of victims‘ and ‗the 
means of preventing or reducing the problem‘.49 In addition to the VWRG, Maroondah 
Halfway House was also represented on the committee.
50 
Other community women‘s groups 
invited included the Women‘s Lawyers‘ Association of Victoria. The committee also included 
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representatives of the Victoria police, Springvale Legal Service, Equal Opportunity Board, 
Ministry of Housing and the psychiatric superintendent of Bouverie Clinic.
51
 At the same 
time, a Legal Subcommittee was formed to consider issues at law surrounding domestic 
violence, including the adequacy of police powers.
52
 Early in 1982, the newly formed 
Women‘s Coalition for Family Law Action also joined the sub-committee. This group had 
emerged from the VWRG, but quickly drew in a number of women in the legal field, 
including Yolanda Klempfner.
53
 
 
The DVC undertook a phone-in from women experiencing domestic violence in July 1982, 
which formed a central component of a campaign against domestic violence launched in the 
same week by Premier Cain. Former MHWH worker Judy Johnson recalled that the phone-in 
came about because they were ‗trying to work out the extent of domestic violence in 
Victoria‘.54 MHWH was central in charting the direction of the DVC campaign, which 
labelled the problem a ‗hidden crime surrounded by shame, fear and secrecy‘.55 Volunteer 
refuge workers were arranged to receive phone-calls and administer questionnaires, which 
were adapted from a similar survey undertaken in South Australia in 1981. The phone-in 
proved distressing and frustrating for refuge workers talking with women who were unable or 
unwilling to leave violent husbands.
56
 
 
A number of important findings from the phone-in included that women of all classes 
experienced domestic violence. Moreover, a large proportion did not leave violent 
relationships because they lacked, as the report noted, ‗access to the resources which would 
enable them to live free of violence‘.57 The phone-in made it clear that gender inequality was 
a central factor inhibiting the capacity of women to leave violent relationships. In addition, it 
identified a significant need for professional education, many women reporting that doctors 
and police were particularly unhelpful.
58 
The phone-in both complemented and built on the 
evidence that refuges had already produced.
59
 
 
In addition to the phone-in, a two-day conference was held at La Trobe University in July 
1982 as part of the domestic violence week campaign. Refuge workers were on the planning 
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committee for the conference, which drew together a range of professionals including doctors, 
social workers, counsellors and teachers, with the aim of educating them about issues relating 
to domestic violence, such as that it ‗cut across all classes‘, whilst attempting to drive home 
the ‗political perspective of it‘.60 Among the recommendations that arose from the conference, 
a number related to the structural factors that would enhance women‘s capacity to live 
independently and free of violence. These included: funding for a 24-hour service; improved 
income support for lone parents; increased government funding for public housing and 
training for women into employment; a new domestic violence Act; incorporation of 
intervention orders in legislation; additional resources and training for police involved in 
domestic violence access; and the need to canvass the needs of immigrants and ethnic 
communities.
61
  
 
Refuges like MHWH that were more aligned with liberal feminist values, sought to influence 
public policy relating to domestic violence. As former WLHWH activist Marie Rowan 
recounts: ‗liberal feminists would argue that the public policy outcome is the desired goal, and 
radical feminists would say it‘s about power‘.62 In this instance, these more moderate 
feminists utilised the results of the phone-in to support the expansion of the WRRS.
63
 
Differences over such matters fuelled an on-going debate within the VWRG between 
conservative and radical feminist refuges and their approaches to redressing the problem of 
domestic violence. This I explore in more detail below.  
 
In November 1983, a report produced by the legal subcommittee of the DVC was released to 
the public by Premier Cain. Building on the work undertaken by other states including 
NSW,
64
 it recommended amongst a number of proposals, that police ‗intervene to protect 
victims of domestic violence … [and] … commence proceedings for an intervention order … 
[and] … charge persons with criminal offences arising out of an incident of domestic 
violence‘.65 The report was particularly significant because it marked a paradigmatic shift 
towards understanding domestic violence as a crime. The VWRG was centrally involved in 
producing this report via its involvement in the Women‘s Coalition for Family Law Action. 
Maureen Teehan of the Springvale Legal Service was also a member of the subcommittee and 
had previously worked in collaboration with the VWRG for the Women‘s Advisory Council 
to premier. Together they had produced a submission to the committee of inquiry into the 
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Victorian police force in which they argued that ‗police be required to intervene to protect 
victims of domestic violence‘.66  
 
The influence of the refuge movement in making domestic violence a central policy concern 
for both the Hamer Liberal and Cain Labor governments is unequivocal. The movement 
played a central role in the development of the DVC and the reports it subsequently produced. 
The outcome was a new body of evidence that could be utilised to press for social and legal 
responses to the problem of domestic violence. Furthermore, the refuge movement continued 
a process begun during the previous decade of providing leadership on the issue in the public 
domain and ensuring that other professionals were educated in accordance with a feminist 
structural and political analysis of the problem. 
 
Social policy development in relation to women was expedited when Mary Draper was 
appointed head of Women‘s Affairs in the Cain government in 1983. She swiftly got 
agreement to rename it the Women‘s Policy Co-ordination Unit (WPCU).67 Although Draper 
recalled she was ‗the first person in that role with … a background in the women‘s 
movement‘,68 she also pointed out that her predecessor, Yolanda Klempfner, had ‗initiated 
whole areas of work that we continued to work on‘.69 While knowing that the newly elected 
Premier viewed feminists ‗with some suspicion‘,70 Draper ‗fought very hard‘ to ensure that he 
‗remained the person responsible for women‘s policy … because of the strategic importance 
of that location‘.71 The impact of the refuge and broader women‘s movement‘s lobbying was 
significant in providing an impetus for Draper and others to initiate substantial policy 
development in the realms of employment, childcare, women‘s health, and domestic 
violence.
72
 Indeed, Draper acknowledged that her: 
[R]oom to move … was often created by what feminists did on the ground ... [W]hen 
the women‘s refuges demonstrated every Christmas eve … there had to be a response 
and they had to be dealt with … they created some of the room that I had … to get 
policy, and decisions, and resources.
73
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Draper‘s comments affirm the importance of the strategic work of feminists within and 
outside the government to ensure the Cain administration‘s commitment to issues facing 
women.  
 
In 1985 the Victorian government released its discussion paper on domestic violence:  
Criminal Assault in the Home: Social and Legal Responses to Domestic Violence.
74
 The 
report derived in part from the ‗politicisation of what happened in the women‘s refuges … 
[who] … cut the path … around these kinds of questions‘.75 It was also the culmination of 
their collaboration with feminists in government who initiated work on this report at the 
WPCU in October 1984.
76
 The report made a number of wide-ranging expansionary policy 
recommendations relating to the legal, economic and social support needs of women and 
children experiencing domestic violence.
77
  
 
The report was informed by a feminist analysis of domestic violence, emphasising its 
gendered nature and the importance of affording women ‗the economic, social and material 
resources to live free from physical harm‘.78 Its title was reportedly a ‗deliberate decision‘ 
directly influenced by feminist lawyer and advocate Jocelynne Scutt, who had strongly urged 
the WPCU to ‗underline that [domestic violence] was criminal‘.79 The report emphasised the 
responsibility of perpetrators for their behaviour, and amongst a range of recommendations 
was the adoption of intervention orders to afford women ‗protection from violence‘80 in place 
of the largely ineffective system of family law orders. It also proposed a multi-pronged 
approach to domestic violence, acknowledging the social change agenda of refuges, and 
recommending their numbers be increased.
81
 The report proposed funding new initiatives, 
including specialist services for women with specific needs and an outreach service.
82
 It made 
recommendations relating to women and housing and, in particular, priority access to public 
housing for women escaping domestic violence.
83
 However, as Draper recounts, despite the 
fact that ‗the agenda that went up‘ was an across-government response‘, the Ministry of 
Housing, in particular, was seen to be ‗dragging their feet‘.84 Notwithstanding the wide-
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ranging recommendations included within the report, the adoption of intervention orders was 
its major achievement. 
 
The report and subsequent legislation followed similar developments interstate, including 
those in New South Wales and South Australia in 1981 and the Northern Territory in 1983. 
Western Australia launched its domestic violence task force in 1985.
85
 By 1985, South 
Australia, Western Australia, Queensland and New South Wales had all introduced similar 
systems of intervention orders.
86
 Other laws now came under review in Victoria in relation to 
violence against women; one recommendation from the Victorian Law Reform Commission‘s 
(VLRC) was that the defence of provocation be overturned
87—a change only achieved in 
2009.  
 
The report provided the groundwork for Crimes (Family Violence) Act in 1987. Women in 
government like Setches, who chaired the ALP‘s Community Services Committee from 1982 
to 1988, were critical in getting it passed.
88
 Setches also generated influence within the party 
through the development a Women‘s Caucus Committee, which consisted of ‗[t]he most 
influential women in that government‘.89 Via this forum, ‗we could punch above our weight 
… and … get some attention to things. And it was a strong feminist group in that government. 
Absolutely amazing‘.90 
 
The emphasis on civil law as the key means to respond to domestic violence was strongly 
opposed by feminists, including Jocelynne Scutt, who reportedly argued that it would 
‗decriminalise domestic violence‘.91 Despite calls, for ‗something far more radical than was 
adopted by the Victorian government‘, Setches surmised that, at the time, ‗society, 
community, the Labor Party, the government, the police, nobody was ready to face the full 
thing of men having to be put into jail, and removed from the home‘.92 Despite the adoption 
of new legislation relating to domestic violence, the judicial system and society at large 
continued to assess the problem as one that should be dealt with outside the realm of 
criminality. Feminists like Setches and Scutt persisted but were left ‗exhausted all the time 
from trying to make people understand [including] those that were making laws‘.93 However, 
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they did finally convince the then Attorney General, Jim Kennan, of the importance of 
passing a new Act with a title that did justice to the issue. This process was, as Setches 
recalls: 
A knock-down, drag-out, behind-the-scenes struggle of immense proportions … They 
would say ―we just need to have … a Domestic Violence Amendment Act‖ … to get it 
there was very hard.  But it was done.
94
  
 
Despite the challenges involved, Setches considered they had ‗come a long way [between] 
1980 to 1985 … [and] … thought [they] were riding a pretty good feminist boom‘.95 
However, both she and Draper would acknowledge that it was the refuge movement‘s 
politicisation of domestic violence in the first instance that enabled them and others in 
government to harness the apparatus of the state and shift some power into the hands of 
women. As Hargreaves argues: 
It wasn‘t until the women‘s movement had reframed the issue as being political rather 
than personal, and that had got through to a number of people in policy positions who 
could see that the law could be used on the side of the women.
96
 
 
The publication of Criminal Assault in the Home (1985), and the subsequent passing of the 
Crimes (Family Violence) Act 1987, marked the beginning of a co-ordinated policy response 
to domestic violence in Victoria. Soon after, in August 1987, a Family Violence Prevention 
Committee was initiated within the Attorney General‘s department with the aim of co-
ordinating ‗interdepartmental initiatives on family violence‘.97 The committee included 
representatives from a range of government departments as well as community organisations 
including women‘s refuges, and the Federation of Community Legal Centres. Former refuge 
worker Robyn Kennedy recounts her experience on the committee as an important time that 
saw women‘s organisations engage with the Attorney General‘s department and Victoria 
police to improve implementation of the Act.
98
 Of central concern for refuges was to ensure 
that the court process was ‗humanising … for women‘.99 The committee also conducted state-
wide training for clerks of court and collected statistics on intervention orders.
100
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At the same time, and as part of an overall reform package, the state government introduced a 
series of measures in community services, community education, housing and the education 
and training of police and other professionals. This was supported by federal grants made 
available as part of the Hawke government‘s national education campaign on domestic 
violence. In Victoria, task forces were set up to plan and provide community and professional 
education and housing as part of the government‘s family violence prevention program. The 
Community Education Task Force was convened by the Health Department to facilitate 
networking amongst those providing services to women experiencing domestic violence and 
to distribute information to those services and the wider community. They published a booklet 
that argued domestic violence resulted from the way ‗gender and power operated against 
women having economic freedom‘.101 They also produced resource material for service 
providers and supported the development of family violence networks.  
 
Funded by the Ministry of Education and Training, a Family Violence Professional Education 
Taskforce convened in 1988, its members representing a range of government and community 
organisations, including the Domestic Violence Incest Resource Centre (DVIRC), Centres 
Against Sexual Assault (CASA) and the Victorian Legal Aid Commission. It was provided 
with ongoing support by the new Education Minister, Barry Pullen, and funds to publish a 
book on domestic violence that was designed as curriculum for universities.
102
 The book 
identified gendered power structures as central to the cause of domestic violence.
103
 Premier 
Joan Kirner commented on its publication as an ‗important step towards placing family 
violence firmly on the agenda for social change in Victoria‘.104 However, funding was 
unfortunately not renewed for these groups, as it was ‗assumed that this work was 
finished‘.105 
 
Despite the recommendations within Criminal Assault regarding structural issues such as 
housing, the policy direction adopted by the state at this time focused on ‗thinking about how 
you enforce legislation [and] getting police to respond‘.106 This reflected a growing trend 
‗toward criminalising violence against women through major law reform‘.107 At the same 
time, community violence had been identified as a social issue following the Queen and 
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Hoddle streets murders in Melbourne. These events provided the impetus for a parliamentary 
inquiry by the Social Development Committee into public violence during 1987 and 1988. 
The committee recommended the establishment of the Victorian Community Council Against 
Violence (VCCAV) to ‗monitor the co-ordination of services which deal with family violence 
matters, identify inadequacies, and make recommendations‘108 to the Minister for Police and 
Emergency Services. 
 
During this time, the women‘s health movement was also gaining ground, following the 
establishment of the first state-funded sexual assault clinic at the Queen Victoria Hospital in 
1978.
109
 By the end of 1985 there were six CASA centres operating or due to commence.
110
 
The development and funding of the majority of Victoria‘s women‘s health and CASA 
services occurred during the late 1980s. Funding was significantly increased in 1987 
following the community consultation ‗Why Women‘s Health?‘—which had been instigated 
by Setches, who recalled that the challenge of establishing women‘s services ‗with a feminist 
base … was a fight of immense proportions‘.111 However, funding was made available from 
the Health Department, within which a Women‘s Health Unit was established to administer 
the programs. At the same time, CASA House opened at the Royal Women‘s Hospital, 
replacing the Queen Victoria Hospital as the central metropolitan CASA service in 
Melbourne. Furthermore, during this time, a range of organisations and activists external to 
the government were active in supporting the funding of women‘s health services.112 As 
Feldman recalls: ‗[W]omen‘s community health funding came out of, again, the drive from 
the community. It was quite an extraordinary thing that happened; there was a lot of lobbying 
from all sides‘.113 The work was supported by feminists in government including Draper who 
developed a women‘s policy plan in which women‘s health services would operate according 
to a ‗dual strategy‘.114 Draper recounts:  
[Y]ou aimed to set up services by women for women … [and] … influence 
mainstream services ... women‘s services would model, innovate, advocate … that 
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was the model that the CASA at the Women‘s was set up on … a service with a 
feminist philosophy‘.115  
 
In particular, the aim of feminist health services was to transform hospitals and the police 
response to women who had been raped.
116
 As a result, despite operating within a medical 
paradigm, CASA services developed with ‗a clear philosophy and model of service delivery 
which articulated its intention to advocate for victims‘ rights at both an individual and a 
public policy level‘.117  
 
The development of women‘s health and sexual assault services during the 1980s was distinct 
from the growth of women‘s refuges because of the leading role played by feminists in 
government in their establishment, as well as their collaboration within and co-location in 
existing mainstream health services. In contrast to the refuge movement, throughout the 
1980s, feminist sexual assault services readily moved to a more central place within the 
apparatus of the state, whereas radical feminist refuges continued to resist government 
intervention and working alongside mainstream services. Moreover, whilst refuges operated 
as collectives, sexual assault services adopted hierarchical organisational structures. Orr 
comments that: 
Funding for additional women‘s health services and the new sexual assault services 
was primarily achieved because women activists were willing to negotiate about the 
management and accountability structures of these services. Compromises about older 
ways of operating were made.
118
 
 
Despite their different beginnings, and the impact this has had on their development, refuges 
and sexual assault services in the 1980s shared an underpinning commitment to feminism, 
both as a way of conceptualising men‘s violence towards women, and as a basis for 
structuring their service responses. It is this commonality, Walker predicts, that will ensure 
their increasing convergence in the future, because ‗women working in the sector largely 
agree that sexual assault [and] domestic violence … run in the same family‘.119 
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Support Accommodation Assistance Program  
 
In 1985 the Hawke Labor government introduced the Supported Accommodation Assistance 
Program (SAAP). SAAP I (1985–88) was underpinned by the Supported Accommodation 
Assistance Act, and would continue as Australia‘s major policy and program response to 
homelessness until changes made by the Rudd Labor government in 2009. SAAP reflected the 
Hawke government‘s commitment to expand the provision of welfare,120 and, under a series 
of five-year agreements, it aligned existing services and provided for the establishment of new 
ones, using a cost-sharing arrangement between Commonwealth and state governments. 
Services were divided into the three program areas: general (single men and women), youth, 
and women‘s emergency services (including domestic violence). 
 
Nationally, women‘s refuges largely rejected SAAP because of its focus on homelessness and 
emergency accommodation. Victorian refuges were vehemently opposed to being 
pigeonholed as accommodation providers and argued that ‗the operating budget proposed by 
SAAP is far from adequate for a women‘s refuge, which sees itself as being more than simply 
an emergency accommodation service‘.121 However, despite their protests, all services 
provided under WESP were incorporated into SAAP in 1985. Refuge workers staged a silent 
protest during a consultation on the issue with the DCWS. As Johnson recalls: 
All the refuges were present … [and] … a decision had been taken … they would not 
speak at all at this meeting and they‘d just hold up signs. So 60 women … and not a 
single woman said anything, and every now and then they‘d hold up signs like ―SAAP 
sucks‖ or something.122 
 
Refuges continued to argue that housing and homelessness were peripheral to their core 
business, which they identified as addressing the ‗causes of violence against women‘. As we 
have seen, Victorian refuges had drawn this distinction from the late 1970s onwards as they 
focused their work in refuge on the needs of women and children experiencing domestic 
violence. In response to the SAAP funding proposal, Victorian refuges argued that: 
An accommodation program is totally inappropriate to the needs of refuges, and their 
classification under SAAP completely misrepresents their primary objective … [to] … 
address the causes of violence against women in our society by initiating educational, 
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public awareness and other social programs, therefore bringing them more 
appropriately under a preventative services classification rather than a band-aid type 
program … Whilst refuges do provide a whole range of services to meet the needs of 
women and children escaping domestic violence, the provision of housing and 
temporary accommodation is nevertheless peripheral to their major aims and 
objectives. Homelessness and domestic violence are two very different issues. Women 
who use refuges are not homeless. They have been forced to abandon their homes 
because of violence and abuse ... However women‘s refuges are NOT 
emergency/crisis accommodation services and we re-iterate that their inclusion in the 
SAAP program would be inappropriate and would underscore a gross 
misunderstanding of their definition and objectives.
123
 
 
The above passage reveals the refuge movement‘s approach to redressing the causes of 
domestic violence, which derived from their radical feminist commitment to social change. 
Thus, they emphasised the differences between homelessness and domestic violence, with the 
aim of ensuring that the gendered nature of domestic violence was not lost in the potentially 
homogenising discourse of homelessness and that their work would remain distinct. An 
emphasis on these differences was in contrast to the beginnings of the refuge movement, 
when similarities between all women‘s experiences of oppression were emphasised. One 
consequence, according to state government bureaucrat Tony Newman, was the de-
politicisation of women‘s homelessness: 
I think there were a group of people that missed out in that. In social security, 
probably the most disturbing group of people I dealt with were single woman who 
were probably over 35. And who just moved through very violent relationships … 
cohabitating for shelter until it got so bad. They moved in completely different circles 
as far as I could see from the family violence movement.
124
 
 
A further consequence was that services in Victoria for women experiencing homelessness 
were ‗few in number‘.125 In contrast, other states such as NSW, had more services for 
homeless women.
126
 The main focus of WESP nationally, however, remained on the support 
needs of ‗women and children escaping domestic violence‘.127  
 
                                               
123
 ‗The Victorian Women‘s Refuges Position on SAAP Funding Proposals‘, in ‗Drum‘, 23 July 1984. 
124
 Tony Newman, interviewed by Jacqui Theobald, 9 February 2009.  
125
 Chesterman, p. 57. 
126
 Chesterman, p. 57. 
127
 WESNET, Raising the Roof on Women's Homelessness: A Framework for Policy Development, WESNET, 
Canberra 1996, p. 73. 
  149 
During this time, refuges were successful in demanding that their position be considered 
distinct, and they were able ‗to … retain a corral around themselves in SAAP‘.128 Under 
SAAP I, the WESP program was reportedly able to retain ‗to varying degrees, program 
development within the feminist framework and the continued funding of all existing non-
accommodation services‘.129 This was underpinned by the SAAP Act introduced in 1985, 
which acknowledged the special characteristics of refuges including their preventative 
work.
130
  
 
According to Ludo McFerran, the further immersion of refuges into SAAP was inevitable 
since they were ‗disadvantaged from the beginning because of their lack of national 
organisation‘.131 On a practical level, however, SAAP brought recurrent dollars, which were 
not forthcoming under the disparate funding arrangements that refuges had faced under the 
Fraser government. As Tony Newman recounts:  
The challenge that family violence experienced, was a common challenge, there was 
no growth funding, no commitment to expand services. And that‘s the thing; SAAP 
did bring the opportunities along.
132
  
 
Alongside the rest of the social and community services labour force around the country, 
refuges remained outside the award system and industrially unregulated until the 1990s.
133
 
While Victoria did have a Social and Community Services (SACS) award, it was reserved for 
a minority of professionally qualified social workers.
134
 As Kate Coleman notes; ‗There 
wasn‘t a union who would take refuge, and housing workers … nobody would touch us 
because we weren‘t social workers. And so we were nowhere, no award wages, no work 
cover, there was nothing‘.135  
 
However, SAAP funding meant that Community Services Victoria (CSV) began to pay a 
salary subsidy to refuge workers that was loosely based on the welfare worker class of the 
Victorian SACS award. Until this time, workers‘ salaries were simply pooled and divided 
according to need. As employers, refuges were expected to meet these wage levels, even 
though the subsidy awarded by CSV did not always cover this cost. This meant that funding 
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had to be diverted to meet award conditions, which led to a reduction of hours, and workers 
forfeited some entitlements.
136
 Recurrent funding did not fix the problem that refuge funding 
in Victoria had historically been cobbled together from various government funding streams, 
and was never appropriately costed or funded to any particular base or model. Although, 
refuges were now provided with funds for five full-time staff, there was no additional funding 
for management because of their collective model. Notably, the lack of management funding 
remains today, despite demands from government throughout the 1990s that they adopt 
hierarchical management structures.
 137
  
 
At the same time, the growing pressure to become unionised presented a conflict for refuges, 
which were concerned to ensure women‘s work was not exploited but rejected the growing 
chorus of calls for the ‗professionalisation‘ of refuge work. Some were also concerned about 
how unions could work with refuges, particularly in relation to collectively run work places. 
They were therefore ‗extremely cautious about fixing their work … within the categories that 
are recognised and described by unions‘.138 Moreover, they were alarmed at being placed 
under an award that emphasised the welfare nature of their work and argued instead for 
recognition of their attempts to eliminate domestic violence.
139
 The dilemma facing the refuge 
movement is reflected in the following excerpt: 
Union award coverage must also be based on feminist principles of an autonomous, 
collectively run work place. Women‘s services have always relied upon volunteer 
labour by women committed to women‘s needs … Feminists in the women‘s services 
area and the Australian Social Welfare Union are no longer prepared to let that 
continue. However workers in this area argue against professionalism. They foresee 
such demands for ―professional‖ workers occurring.140 
 
By the end of the 1980s, ‗official intrusion into the daily affairs of feminist collectives [was] 
commonplace‘.141 On reflection, former WLHWH activist Jenny Macmillan posited that this 
was a result of the movement having been ‗undermined from within‘, which meant they had 
become ‗institutionalised‘.142 By contrast, former WLHWH activist Hannah Kaiser reflected 
on the benefits of unionism, commenting how the ‗earlier approach meant that people allowed 
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themselves to be exploited at times‘.143 Others reflected that the institutionalisation and 
professionalisation that developed in refuge work were essential, particularly in relation to 
managing a complex environment.
144
 This kind of knowledge was often undeveloped with 
refuge workers pioneering processes and policies to manage complex events and 
workplaces.
145
 However, the challenges of working in such a stressful environment certainly 
took their toll on the health of workers for whom professionalism enabled a more sustainable 
approach to working in refuge. As former refuge worker Hanna Kaiser recounts:  
While a ‗professional‘ approach can have problems I came to be very quickly of the 
view that what was going on was ridiculous … and the lack of understanding of the 
work and the unprofessional culture was very problematic. In the early days of 
working for Halfway House there were occasions when I‘d felt unable to breathe after 
collective meetings. I came to realise, it is just a job. It‘s great to be really committed 
and all the rest of it, but it‘s a job.146 
 
Under SAAP I, refuges were centrally involved in policy and program development, and 
participated in monthly steering committee meetings that made recommendations to the 
minister based on majority and preferential voting.
147
 The steering committee comprised 
representatives from women‘s refuges with staff from the DCWS and Commonwealth 
government. Long-time refuge worker Janine Mahoney recalled the challenges of negotiating 
those meetings in her position as a Commonwealth bureaucrat: ‗[T]he whole sector would 
come, and a rep from the state government and myself would go to the WESP meetings, and 
basically it was just a full-on attack every time you walked in a room‘.148 Similarly, within 
Community Services Victoria, which administered the refuge program, former bureaucrat 
Marg D‘Arcy, recalled that, despite a receptive bureaucracy, refuge representatives were often 
a hostile group:  
The people in the department … were actually quite committed to maintaining the 
refuge program and to being able to fund it properly. It wasn‘t a hostile bureaucracy, 
so it‘s interesting that despite that, the lines that were drawn were so strong, and there 
was so little allowance, and so little recognition of people wanting to work alongside 
you.
149
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This resistance, as we have seen, reflected the priorities of radical refuges that were reluctant 
to engage with the state lest their goals of social change be thwarted. 
 
Methods of collective decision making were also challenging for bureaucrats who ‗might 
have had one hour or two to get things decided, and then the collective wouldn‘t sit‘.150 
Conversely, as former bureaucrat Susan Feldman articulates, it also had its benefits for her as 
a feminist because: 
I kept my values alive around feminism … I knew that out there in the field there are 
women still not compromising and not rolling over without a battle, that the things we 
wanted to do or had to do, they would not just take on face value because of the 
money.
151
   
 
It also had the effect of ensuring that state and Commonwealth bureaucrats ‗needed to be 
respectful and understanding, and have some level of commitment, or they would have found 
it very difficult working with the sector‘.152 While ongoing funding was assured under the 
SAAP agreements, this did not inhibit direct action tactics by refuge activists to ensure the 
government made good on its commitments. As Feldman noted: 
Women used to come to the Department of Human Services on a Friday, waiting for 
their cheque … They would come into the building and protest in our office and sit 
there all day until they got a cheque written, because there was no security on the 
buildings. You try to do that these days.
153
 
 
From the other side, former WLHWH refuge activist Karen Bird recalled that in 1987 she and 
a colleague sat in the refuge co-ordinator‘s office demanding a cheque that had been promised 
to them for the purchase of a van for their child support worker: 
so we drove into CSV… and said ―look you promised us this van all year…we want 
the cheque today‖… And the two of us … said ―we‘re not moving, we‘re not leaving, 
we‘re not going until we get the cheque‖. Anyhow, we got the cheque for the van 
before five o‘clock.154 
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Newman recalled that as bureaucrats during the 1980s, ‗we‘d jump in the lift and whip up to 
brief the Minister verbally‘.155 These narratives highlight the different way that business was 
done during this period, and the fact that refuge workers were physically able to access 
government offices enabled them to continue to take this form of direct action. However, it 
must also be recognised that refuge activists throughout the 1970s pioneered new ground in 
their relationship with the state, forcing bureaucrats to be accessible instead of ‗oppressive, 
unaccountable, unapproachable, obstructionist‘.156 Furthermore, as we have seen, by the early 
1980s a large number of women had entered the bureaucracy, some of whom had spent time 
‗breaking themselves in as feminists through the women‘s refuges‘.157 This meant for the 
refuge movement that, ‗there was a lot of good will from the quite new senior female 
bureaucrats‘.158 SAAP bureaucrats of the 1980s were seasoned in community consultation and 
often understood the issues from first-hand experience. Moreover, they were operating in an 
institutional context where the government retained a commitment to the direct provision of 
social programs and these factors together meant that a particular ‗culture‘ had developed 
within SAAP administration in Victoria by the 1980s. As Newman recalls: 
SAAP was always viewed as these left wingers on level seven, and not to be trusted, 
and a few of them were ex-sector and a few of them were ex-Commonwealth 
bureaucrats … So while externally we were probably viewed as very conservative, 
internally we were viewed as representing a culture if you like.
159
 
 
This is not to suggest that refuges faced no new pressures under SAAP, which reflected the 
Hawke government reforms of the public service based on a ‗managerialist‘ philosophy.160  
Along with other Western governments during this period, the Hawke government aimed to 
‗improve performance by gaining greater control over public administration‘.161 SAAP was 
concerned with ‗increasing the efficiency and accountability‘ of community organisations like 
women‘s refuges, which subsequently faced ‗a drive to squeeze more from existing 
resources‘, as governments exerted ‗tighter controls‘.162 As Kaiser puts it: ‗the problem was 
then that the government just got more and more power and ended up dictating our work to a 
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much greater extent‘.163 However, despite these increasing pressures, Marg D‘Arcy argues 
that there was still capacity for autonomy within SAAP:  
There was increased funding, there was more accountability, there was more 
guidelines, there was more people looking at what they were doing, but you could 
actually still work around the edges, you could actually still get away with a whole lot 
of stuff if you wanted to.
164
 
 
The work of refuges was supported in a national review of SAAP undertaken in 1988, which 
argued that ‗the current refuge/shelter model has been successful … [and] … the vast majority 
of residents and ex-residents of women‘s refuges/shelters have a very high regard for the 
support they have received‘.165 Along with a greater diversity of services, the review 
recommended that the number of refuges be increased, noting they ‗had been very successful 
in raising public awareness‘ despite not having ‗had the authority or the resources to tackle all 
aspects of family violence‘.166 Conversely, McFerran has argued that by the end of SAAP I, 
refuges had become invisible in the public domain because their lobbying now took place 
‗closeted in the back rooms and committees‘.167 To this extent, ‗the edge … [was taken] … 
off a debate, which was forced to be feminist, and has turned refuges into part of the welfare 
furniture‘.168 However, during the second half of the 1980s, the refuge movement in Victoria 
was far from ‗welfare furniture‘ and continued to force governments to recognise their needs. 
As Newman explains: 
[T]hey had the benefits of being in a program where they got at least a third of the 
growth throughout the 80s and where new service models were encouraged, and where 
they were basically treated as a program within a program in many ways.
169
 
 
Refuges succeeded in avoiding becoming ‗welfare furniture‘, not only because of their 
feminist analysis and public advocacy, but also because the institutional context meant where 
bureaucrats were less restricted by regulatory issues relating to risk and uniform governance 
than in later years. A key example is, as we have seen, the arrangements that maintained the 
secrecy of addresses of Victorian refuges.  
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In the following decades, however, the capacity of refuges to operate outside conventional 
accountability and organisational boundaries was further restricted. Reflecting the 
Commonwealth and state governments‘ commitment to ‗corporate models of governance, 
management and risk practices … Victoria led Australia … from the early 1990s‘,170 on this 
trajectory. An increasing formalisation of processes correspondingly depersonalised the 
relationship between bureaucrats and the refuge movement. The next chapter further analyses 
this process. 
 ‘Committed to the Women’
171
 
 
Throughout the 1980s, differences in ideologies and strategies persisted continued between 
conservative and ‗radical elements of the Victorian Women‘s Refuge Group. Nevertheless, 
group members organised themselves strategically when necessary to ensure unanimity. This 
capacity was not unique to Victoria, as Murray has shown in a national context: ‗the ability of 
these diverse groups to cooperate and form strategic coalitions to successfully influence 
public policy‘, constituted ‗a significant achievement of the women‘s refuge movement‘.172  
Working Together 
 
With hindsight, the 1980s has been described as ‗a time when agreement was difficult, and 
peak body solidarity a bit shaky‘.173 In particular, internal conflict combined with external 
pressures relating to state intervention soon led to a split within the Victorian Women‘s 
Refuge Group.
174
 We have seen, for example, that refuges were reluctant to work in 
partnership with the state on the domestic violence phone-in, criticising it because it did not 
constitute ‗political action‘.175 Reflecting radical feminism‘s critique of the patriarchal home, 
they argued for changes that would, ‗give women a better bargaining position in marriage‘,176 
and contended that the main objective for the refuge movement should involve redressing the 
lack of resources available to women leaving refuge: ‗If we do not feel responsible for what 
happens to women after they leave refuges, then women‘s refuges are indeed no solution at 
all‘.177  
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Liberal feminists at MHWH expressed their frustration with the VWRG, accusing it of overly 
lengthy decision-making processes, which, they claimed made the group ineffective for 
lobbying government.
178
 They further believed the focus of their work should relate to 
‗improving funding and services … with decisions made on a majority vote‘.179 The 
WLHWH argued, however, that this would undermine their principles of collectivism. 
Discord about such issues led the WLHWH to withdraw from the VWRG in 1982, which they 
now perceived to be operating from a ‗welfare state mentality‘.180  
 
A number of radical feminist refuges, including the WLHWH, continued to meet as a 
‗feminist caucus‘, where they focused their energies on issues relating to ‗sexism, gender and 
power‘ with the aim of achieving ‗equal opportunity, affirmative action, [and] self 
determination … so that domestic violence would become really minimal‘.181 By 1985, a 
number of conservative refuges had also left the VWRG and formed a Coalition, whose stated 
aims were to ‗improve communication between refuges … and to work together on a united 
front‘.182 The Coalition was not an overtly political group and saw engagement with the state 
as an integral part of its work. It also sought to encourage ‗respect of others in the refuge 
movement … freedom of expression‘.183  
 
Significantly, the influence of radical feminist refuges meant that women who ‗started off 
with a community-based welfare aspect to what we were doing‘, had become ‗more involved 
in the political aspects of it‘.184 Austin argues that over time there developed a ‗recognition 
and understanding that both types of focus were important‘.185 However, by the late 1980s, 
the relations between so-called ‗feminist‘ and ‗non-feminist‘ refuges were hostile to the point 
of being destructive: 
  There was hostility between those(?) who were perceived to be the feminists. It took a 
look time for the chasm to be bridged. I came to think it was a very destructive divide 
because essentially it was one group of woman deciding that they knew what was 
feminism, and treating the others with contempt. Ironically it was very hostile to 
women that whole environment.
186
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Migrant women, as discussed in greater detail below, were often perceived in this context, as 
‗inherently non-feminist‘.187 Former DVIRC worker Maria Dimopoulos has argued that this 
was in part a result of failure by Anglo refuge activists ‗to recognise an intersectional analysis 
for immigrant and refugee women‘ that might make evident the ‗relationship between racism 
and sexism‘,188 and, by extension, the challenges faced by these women in addition to their 
gender. Instead, she argues, ‗radical feminism only ever saw it in terms of men and 
women‘.189  
 
Despite the differences in ideology symbolised by the Caucus and the Coalition, refuges 
adopted an across-the-board commitment to organise according to feminist principles. As 
outlined in Chapter 2, it was the strategic capacity of the feminist-led VWRG to develop a 
definition of a refuge that in part enabled feminist principles to become enshrined in state 
government program and policy development. However, radical feminist refuges continued to 
be concerned that refuges of the future would be ‗staffed by social workers under hierarchical 
authority of boards of management‘.190 These fears influenced the direction of the movement, 
and, over the course of the decade, refuges adopted collective structures in response. This 
included Coalition refuges such as Maroondah and Mordialloc, which became convinced a 
hierarchical ‗power structure was completely and utterly wrong‘.191 These kinds of changes 
meant that refuges ‗considered conservative in the Victorian context, seem quite militant 
when viewed in the national context‘.192  
 
Collectivism became part of what it meant to be a women‘s refuge, and those that continued 
to operate with hierarchical models were considered to be outside of the women‘s refuge 
movement. Former co-ordinator of Georgina women‘s refuge during the 1980s, Robyn 
Gregory, recalled how it was ‗interesting that it wasn‘t the nature of your client group, but the 
structure of your organisation that determined whether you were a women‘s refuge‘.193 
Collective structures, however, did not always equate to collective principles, as Gregory 
comments, ‗We didn‘t have the structure, but we were really committed to a collective 
process. Some refuges had a collective structure but not necessarily collective processes‘.194 
These kinds of developments meant that refuges and other WESP services had developed 
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their own identity as feminist service providers, and, by the end of the decade nationally, 
‗many WESP services would still resist identification with SAAP‘.195 As former refuge 
worker Sandra Morris notes, WESP services were characterised by: 
A commitment to women and children. Tertiary qualifications do not a WESP worker 
make. There is a commitment to empowering residents and this is often evidenced by 
the number of ex-residents working in services or participating in the collective.
196
 
 
Whilst the VWRG was no longer a united organisation, like other women‘s organisations in 
the past, they embraced ‗diversification not dichotomisation‘.197 Refuges such as WLHWH 
had learned that separatism made them insular and, rather than allowing the movement to 
fracture permanently, the split was harnessed as a strategy to achieve a middle ground.
 198
 The 
structures of the ‗Caucus‘ and ‗Coalition‘ allowed for the two groups to develop their 
different positions, which they then brought back to a larger group where they were better 
able to achieve ‗compromise rather than having massive ideas coming from all over the place 
and people not listening to each other‘.199 The combined group was thus able to generate 
compromise on pertinent issues and present a unified position in negotiating with state 
bureaucrats. As D‘Arcy recalls: 
 Despite the different positions of people, once they actually got to a point where they 
were talking to the department, they were actually really good at being united. They 
would put up a very strong front.
200
 
 
As Austin reflects, working together and sharing information also enhanced their capacity for 
advocacy: 
 Bit by bit the work that was being done by both of them came together in quite a good 
way because you'd go off to government and they‘d say ―well show me … is this true? 
Give me the story‖, and we could.201  
 
Though the existence of dissent is indisputable, the way the Caucus and Coalition co-operated 
is evidence of the refuge movement‘s capacity to work strategically when a united front was 
required. This resolve was held, as former WLHWH activist Vig Geddes argues, because 
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‗everyone was just really committed to the women, to keeping women safe. I think that was 
really strong‘.202 The capacity of the refuge movement to organise in response to both internal 
and external conflict supports Carol Mueller‘s argument in relation to women‘s organisations 
in the US that ‗the presence of a strong but not overpowering opposition—whether from a 
counter movement or the state—seems to overcome competing identities and create a sense of 
unity‘.203 
 
The capacity of refuges to work together was further evidenced and enabled during the mid-
1980s when funds of approximately $50,000 were made available through WESP for an 
evaluation of women‘s refuges. Three workers were employed on a six-month project 
managed by a collective of all women‘s refuges. Owing to the ambitious nature of the project, 
the evaluation was never completed but it was considered to have facilitated ‗a valuable 
learning experience for refuges … that laid the foundations of mutual respect … and the 
mature recognition that although we operate differently there is a common focus‘.204 Further 
funds were made available for a project worker within CSV to produce a report based on the 
evaluation findings, which was later published.
205
  
A Growing Service System 
 
By the end of the decade, a number of new programs had sprung out of the refuge movement 
and, in recognition of the growing diversity of organisations responding to domestic violence, 
the VWRG became known as the Victorian Women‘s Refuge Services. In addition to the 
approximately twenty women‘s refuges across the state, there were at least two new refuges 
for young women and an interim refuge opened in 1984. Federal funds were made available 
under the WESP program for establishing the Refuge Ethnic Workers Program (REWP) in 
the same year. By the end of the decade, a number of new organisations focused on 
community education, advocacy, outreach and research. These included DVIRC in 1986, 
Women in Supportive Housing (WISH) in 1987, and an outreach program in 1989.
206
 To a 
greater or lesser extent, refuges already undertook all of these roles, and some feminist 
refuges were reluctant to expand services, arguing that ‗empire building‘, was antithetical to 
their goals of empowering women. However, many also saw the development of new services 
for women and children as crucial and were supported by femocrats in government, who 
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played a vital role in enabling funding. Like women‘s refuges, these organisations 
incorporated feminism in their modus-operandi and structured their organisations accordingly. 
 
A young women‘s refuge collective had formed as early as 1979 but was unsuccessful in its 
first submission for funds despite aligning itself with the VWRG.
207
 Following this, the 
Young Women‘s Housing Collective was formed and funded in the early 1980s to provide 
‗information and supported housing for young women‘.208 At the same time, a Young 
Women‘s Refuge Collective was again established. Former WLHWH activist Di Otto was 
centrally involved in these developments in her position as co-ordinator of the Victorian 
Youth Accommodation Coalition: 
I was really quite keen on the idea of pursuing the establishment of a Young Women‘s 
Refuge … I was approached by a group of women who had started talking about that 
quite separately from me, and a collective was again established to lobby for this … 
There was some resistance from the field to this idea of a women only space, but 
eventually the young women‘s refuge did get funding.209 
 
The young women‘s refuge was called, ‗At Last‘, and, like other women‘s refuges, its 
members opted for a secret address.
210
 Their success in gaining funding was undoubtedly 
related to the leadership of Otto and other refuge activists including Billi Clarke, who were ‗in 
the state bureaucrats offices every second day‘.211 They were assisted by feminists working in 
CSV, who worked to influence the allocation of funding because of their own commitment to 
women‘s services.212  
 
Despite the similar nature of issues facing women in the three SAAP programs (women, 
youth and general), Otto recalls that service providers ‗hardly ever spoke to each other‘.213 As 
a result, in addition to supporting the establishment of a young-women‘s-only refuge, Otto 
attempted to overcome what she perceived as the ‗separatist‘ nature of the ‗feminist approach‘ 
to service delivery and began to ‗advocate for young women‘s housing rights in all youth 
services‘.214 In particular, Otto sought to encourage these services ‗towards an awareness of 
class, race and gender issues in designing, delivering and developing their services‘.215 By 
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1986, another feminist collective, ‗Zelda‘s Place‘, was established in Melbourne to provide 
support and accommodation to young women who were victims of incest. They considered 
incest to be ‗a political issue‘, and were supported in their work by the Women Against Incest 
collective established by Dympna House refuge in NSW.
216
 
 
The development of young women‘s services was particularly important because, as former 
Young Women‘s Refuge Collective member Jacqui Round recalled, ‗the youth sector wasn‘t 
handling young women‘s issues very well at all … [and] … DV refuges often wouldn‘t take 
them‘.217 Round argued that this was because young women‘s experiences ‗didn‘t come from 
that really narrow perception of what domestic violence was back then‘; young women were 
often ‗left out in the cold‘.218  
 
Otto‘s work in raising awareness of gender, race and class in the youth sector was later 
reflected in the refuge movement, which was increasingly pressured by migrant activists to 
adopt an intersectional analysis of women‘s experiences of violence that included ethnicity 
alongside gender. These changes also reflected broader trends in feminist scholarship that 
challenged the notion that all women shared the same experience of gender, and to suggested 
that ‗even if women are oppressed by sexism we cannot automatically conclude that the 
sexism all women experience is the same‘.219 
 
Adele Murdolo has noted that by the early 1980s, ‗the migrant women‘s refuge was unable to 
accommodate all who needed emergency accommodation, and the other fifteen women‘s 
refuges continued to be inaccessible and inappropriate to many immigrant and refugee 
women‘.220 Co-As-It worked to redress this lack of attention to the needs of migrant women 
from as early as 1980 by promoting discussion with other refuges regarding the ‗specific 
issues surrounding migrant women, and the steps to take for extending community facilities 
and services for migrants‘.221 At the same time, they joined with community organisations, to 
initiate a migrant women‘s group at Collingwood Health Centre.222 Under the leadership of 
migrant activists such as Anna Moo, Co-As-It adopted a ‗feminist model which recognised 
the underlying causes of domestic violence, and sought to bring about real change‘.223 This 
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marked a shift from the beginnings of the Co-As-It refuge, as outlined in Chapter 1, when it 
promoted family reconciliation. 
 
The national conference Co-As-It refuge hosted in August 1981 discussed effective 
accommodation strategies for migrant women escaping domestic violence.
224
 Following this, 
a submission was first made to the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs for Grant-
in-Aid funding, which was rejected. However, the program was further discussed at a second 
national refuge conference held in Melbourne in 1982, where soon-to-be-appointed co-
ordinator of the REWP, Anna Moo, addressed the conference, arguing that: 
Ethnic workers must be employed to work with migrant women in refuges during and 
following refuge accommodation. Migrant women, more than their Anglosaxon 
counterparts need a great deal of support to overcome isolation and the fragmentation of 
their support systems … we further believe that all refuges should adopt a policy of 
employing some workers of ethnic extraction whenever possible … All refuges have to 
realise that they have to fulfil their responsibility in relation to migrant women.
225
 
    
Co-As-It finally received $121,919 via the WESP program for the REWP‘s establishment in 
1984.
226
 REWP employed six workers who were based in different refuges. By December 
1985, they employed a liaison worker and nine workers fluent in a range of languages.
227
 The 
main objective of the program was to: 
Focus on the special needs of migrant women and their children in refuges … [and] … 
to provide safe and secure shelter for women who want to leave intolerable domestic 
situations such as physical, emotional and psychological abuse from their spouse.
228
 
 
Notably, the program aimed to enable migrant women to ‗become independent and self -
confident‘229 and identified ‗inequality between men and women, as the root cause of 
domestic violence‘.230 While REWP workers claimed to operate ‗as a collective‘, as Murdolo 
observes, ‗debate raged for over a period of ten years as to the appropriate structure of the 
organisation‘.231 The REWP provided a much-needed link between the refuge movement, the 
Department of Community Welfare Services (DCWS) and other ethno-specific agencies 
                                               
224
 Co.As.It , p. ix; ‗Migrant Women‘s Refuges‘. 
225
 Anna Moo, ‗The Needs of Migrant Women in Refuges‘, National Women‘s Refuge Conference, 19 
November 1982, KHA. 
226
 Consultative Group of the Refuge Ethnic Workers Program (REWP) meeting minutes, 17 April 1984, KHA. 
227
 REWP, Refuges Multicultural Newsletter, no. 1, December 1985, p. 2, WLHWH papers.  
228
 REWP, Newsletter, p. 2. 
229
 REWP, Newsletter, p. 2. 
230
 Co.As.It., p. vi. 
231
 Murdolo, p. 308. 
  163 
which formed a consultative committee and met on a bi-monthly basis to discuss issues facing 
the program.
232
  
 
Many Victorian refuges continued to implement policies that discriminated against migrant 
women unless they ‗could speak English‘.233 This was justified by one rural refuge on the 
basis that they would otherwise be ‗isolated from their culture‘.234 Other refuges also argued 
that, for these sorts of reasons, ‗the needs of non-English speaking women could not be met‘ 
by their service, but they were willing to ‗see both the problems and the possibilities‘235 
associated with migrant women in refuges. This supports Murdolo‘s argument that migrant 
women were primarily constructed as a ‗problem‘ for refuges, with little regard for their rights 
‗and the way in which to address their specific needs‘.236 This approach was evident in the 
REWP program itself, which was considered to be, as Dimopoulos has argued, an appendage 
to the refuge program: 
The Refuge Ethnic Workers Program felt very much on the margins of the Refuge 
Program … They were regarded, and I think this would be fair to say at the time … as 
there to service or support the refuge program, and that somehow the REWP was not a 
legitimate body in its own right.
237
 
 
Similarly, Murdolo has argued that the ‗location of migrant women‘ outside of the history of 
Australian feminism was mirrored in the similarly marginalised and subordinate location of 
migrant women‘s services in relation to other mainstream women‘s services.238 
 
REWP workers were quick to highlight these and other issues facing migrant women in 
refuge. They also communicated the problems facing migrant women to the Anglo feminist 
movement whilst challenging ‗false assumptions‘ such as that ‗domestic violence is 
particularly prevalent, and of worse degree, amongst the ethnic communities‘.239 The work of 
the REWP was also critical in ‗breaking down mistrust and fear  … in the migrant community 
about refuges‘.240 They began immediately, and one of their first tasks was to reproduce the 
women‘s refuge pamphlet in partnership with the WPCU in the eight languages they 
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represented.
241
 Despite a number of challenges, the program was, as Murdolo argues, 
successful in a number of ways, contributing to ‗the comparatively longer stays of non-
English speaking women‘, as well as increasing ‗community awareness of domestic violence 
and the situation of migrant women in refuges‘ and developing ‗protocols which enhanced 
communication between refuges and the REWP‘.242 
 
The challenges facing migrant women were raised again in national refuge conferences in 
1986 and 1988,where discussion focused on racism.
243
 It was after forums such as these that 
refuges began to improve the accessibility of refuges for migrant women. By the late 1980s, 
the political activism of migrant women in the refuge program had begun to make inroads into 
the work of refuges such as WLHWH and Sheila West. In Kaiser‘s words: 
 Halfway House made a critical decision in 1989 … when some of the woman went to 
a national conference, which was looking at the issues around non-English speaking 
background women not being supported adequately in the refuge program. That was 
when Halfway House said ―okay we mostly take non-English speaking women, so 
let‘s take this by the horns and we‘ll make this a NESB-focused refuge‖.244 
 
The Aboriginal women‘s refuge, Elizabeth Hoffman House, faced similar issues relating to 
racism, which led to an alliance with the REWP as ‗marginalised groups‘.245 Aboriginal 
activists within the refuge movement made it clear the range of issues facing women in their 
community, both inside and outside of the home, meant their refuge would provide 
‗assistance to any Aboriginal woman who needs shelter/help‘.246 Even at this early stage they 
challenged the mainstream refuge movement‘s conceptualisation of domestic violence by 
arguing that the ‗majority of women who use our refuge are subject to domestic violence, 
whether it be from the husband or family members, i.e. sons, brothers, sisters and in-laws‘.247 
In part for this reason, they began to use ‗family violence‘ interchangeably with ‗domestic 
violence‘. In dealing with this, Aboriginal women‘s services‘ goals were different from those 
of their Anglo counterparts. For them, ‗the breaking up of the family would be the last resort‘ 
in responding to family violence.
 248
 The refuge movement came to acknowledge that the 
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‗Aboriginal women‘s major struggle‘, was ‗with the general Australian community as a 
whole‘ as much as men‘s violence.249  
 
The different methods of operating at EHH extended to the way its workers engaged with 
government bureaucrats. As former Maroondah refuge worker Anne Mynot recounts: 
The Elizabeth Hoffman women would come in, they would stand, they never sat, they 
would make their presentation, and they would leave … [I]t was really powerful. And 
the department was absolutely in awe of those women ...
250
 
 
EHH were also concerned to work in partnership with other refuges because many Aboriginal 
women accessed them. This meant that they would travel to different refuges to provide 
‗support and links to the Aboriginal community‘.251 EHH sought to ensure that other refuges 
maintained contact with them and were proactive in promoting ‗cultural events‘ and 
‗Aboriginal women‘s news‘.252 They also attempted workshops to educate improve the 
support response of other refuges but without adequate financial support. As a result, they 
lobbied for a funded program similar to the REWP for Aboriginal women but were 
unsuccessful.
253
  
 
Predominantly, Aboriginal communities continued to work independently, arguing that they 
were ‗much better at dealing with their own problems‘.254 State-based community 
representatives were moving towards a nationally co-ordinated policy approach to Indigenous 
family violence. In Victoria, a domestic violence taskforce was set up in August 1987 by the 
secretariat of the Aboriginal Childcare Association to co-ordinate their campaign against 
family violence. 
 
For other marginalised women experiencing homelessness and violence, including those with 
disabilities, psychiatric illnesses, and drug and alcohol problems, refuges were often 
inaccessible. Refuge activists argued that these women needed 24-hour specialised support, 
which they were unable to provide.
255
 However, refuges did work alongside other women‘s 
groups to advocate for these women. In 1982, for example, the Women‘s Council on 
Homelessness and Addiction collective was formed in response to the ‗lack of appropriate 
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services catering to the needs of addicted women in Melbourne‘.256 At the 1982 national 
refuge conference in Melbourne, refuges reported that they were receiving an ‗increasing 
number of requests from young and old homeless single women, women with drug, alcohol 
and psychiatric problems‘.257 Like migrant women, they were seen as ‗problems for the 
refuges‘, with their narrowed focus on ‗women and their children who were the victims of 
domestic violence‘.258 This limited definition of ‗domestic violence‘, thus worked to 
downplay other women‘s public and/or institutionalised experiences of violence, which were 
seen as somehow less deserving of attention. The conference did, however, recommend that 
‗there is a need for new refuges for other special groups of women‘.259 A refuge was 
established in the mid-1980s to specifically support drug-and-alcohol affected women, but 
this was short lived and the question of ‗what do we do with women who have these 
problems‘ continued to be raised by WESP-funded services.260  
 
The refuge movement was nevertheless acutely aware of the relationship between domestic 
violence and women experiencing psychiatric illness, and, alongside the women‘s health 
collective, radical refuges worked to politicise the psychiatric professions‘ response to such 
women, including the use and abuse of tranquillisers.
261
 Refuges did also support women with 
these kinds of problems to some extent, despite their official policy. Because they were ill-
equipped to do so, they took a considerable risk, as long-term refuge worker Angela Palmer 
recounts: 
I remember having really complex clients. I think we walked a dangerous line with 
them. I remember sitting up in the night with women with mental health issues … and 
with women that were psychotic … [W]e didn‘t have the training, and in all the 
mayhem we all decided that the psychiatric system was appallingly patriarchal, so we 
never sent them to hospital which was very dangerous. I think we were really lucky 
that more women didn‘t suicide.262 
 
Criticism on all these issues was growing from both within and outside the refuge movement 
but particularly in relation to the exclusion of women with disabilities.
263
 In the mid-1980s 
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refuges began to meet with disability advocacy groups, including the Disabled Persons 
Information Bureau, the Disabled Women‘s Resource Network, the Disability Resource 
Centre, and the Spastic Society. These groups conducted workshops with refuges to educate 
them about the difficulties facing women with disabilities.
264
  
 
Refuges also worked to improve the after-hours response to women and children, and placed a 
submission with DCWS for a feminist-staffed interim refuge in 1984 (later named Trish‘s 
Place).
265
 After some negotiation, very limited funding was provided and the refuge began 
operating by the end of the year. It was combined with the phone service (Women‘s Refuge 
Referral Service) and moved out of the women‘s building into a suburban house where it 
operated 24 hours, seven days a week.
266
   
 
At this time, after-hours calls to the WRRS were answered by volunteers at the Young 
Women‘s Christian Association (YWCA), where many of these women were also 
accommodated. This assistance had been appreciated but was sometimes problematic because 
YWCA did not always have the resources to ‗cope with the women and children seeking their 
assistance‘.267 The WRRS continually lobbied the government about their grossly inadequate 
funding. From the establishment of the service till 1988, there had been an 81 per cent 
increase in requests for refuge which left them little time to undertake community 
education.
268
 They requested funding for a toll-free number and larger premises with office 
space for workers.
269
 The effects of this under-funding were reported in a review of Victorian 
refuges, which noted that workers were often ‗overnight alone‘ and faced an ever growing 
‗volume of calls‘.270 The lack of a rational funding model was also highlighted in a later 
review of the service.
271
 Inadequate funding continued to plague refuges generally; their 
workers faced growing demands to undertake after-hours on-call duties and carry beepers but 
no extra funding was provided.
272
 Former WRRS worker Liz Short describes the long hours 
of work juggling complex tasks and needs: 
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We used to run the emergency interim refuge and the phone service … we‘d be up all 
night on the phone, and also supporting women and children at the emergency refuge, 
and then also driving out to the local hospital to pick someone else up, maybe at 2am 
… There was scant occupational health and safety … and such low money at that 
point, because the award was low, and women did it, partly because … in our 
collective, it was an activist job … [B]ut they were twelve-hour shifts, running two 
crisis services …. driving round at night, usually alone, and occasionally getting lost, 
and  picking up and supporting someone up who was in absolute crisis, with her kids, 
then back to do both jobs.
273
 
 
This demonstrates that the problem of inadequate outreach services was reported as early as 
1982 at the national refuge conference in Melbourne.
274
 Refuges first began to apply for 
funding for outreach workers in the mid-1980s. In 1987, five pilot outreach services were 
funded through SAAP and attached to separate refuges.
275
 These workers came mainly from 
refuges and worked in relative isolation with minimal funding that was often shared between 
services.
276
 In 1989, the Inner Eastern Women‘s Outreach service was funded after a 
submission by Brenda House.
277
 Another such service was  ‗Safe Place for Women‘ 
established in 1989 by Billi Clarke to respond the particular needs of women with mental 
health issues combined with an experience of domestic violence.
278
 
 
Refuges in rural areas faced unique problems issues because of their geographical location. 
They were, for example, often unable to access the WRRS and the interim refuge, and had to 
take referrals themselves from a range of other services including the police, hospitals and 
doctors. Issues of security were different because, as in the case of Emma House, they ‗found 
it difficult to keep their address confidential‘.279 This meant that they were forced to develop 
good relationships with the police, who they noted were ‗always co-operative‘.280 Some rural 
refuges like Coroonya found ways to operate with flexibility and ingenuity, which included 
taking referrals out as well as developing their own security measure such as two-way radios 
to keep themselves safe.
281
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Further, issues such as incest and child sexual abuse were evident from the beginnings of the 
women‘s refuge movement. In Kaye Hargreaves‘ recollection of those years, ‗The notion of 
incest was almost unheard of, and was beginning to be raised in the context of the sexual 
politics of the family‘.282 The refuge movement played an important role in publicising and 
politicising incest, instigating a phone-in as early as May 1983. They also discovered through 
their own research that up to 90 per cent of women and children in some refuges reported 
being victims of incest.
283
 In August 1984, VWRG held a two-day workshop to draw attention 
to the problem and, in the same year, results of international research began to become 
available.
284
 Reflecting these developments, the Criminal Assault report recommended 
funding for a domestic violence and incest advocacy centre
285
 and, in 1986, the first 
discussion paper released by the state government on child sexual assault identified it as a 
‗major social problem‘,.286 
 
Refuge workers drafted the submission for the advocacy centre,
287
 which was named the 
Domestic Violence and Incest Resource Centre (DVIRC). Approval was given for its 
establishment when one-off funds became available in late 1985.
288
 Matilda and Southern 
refuges received $50,000 to establish the centre. Despite some initial opposition,
 289
  DVIRC 
eventually won overwhelming support on the grounds that it was ‗important to have a centre 
that wasn‘t providing … accommodation services for women, because that freed people up to 
keep their eye on the campaigning and lobbying and the political issues‘.290  
 
The centre‘s philosophy and actions were informed by a feminist perspective that ‗child 
sexual assault and domestic violence‘ were ‗crimes arising from the structural gendered 
power imbalance within patriarchal societies‘.291 Founding worker Lynne Burgoyne recalled 
that its focus was on ‗changing attitudes and structures in our society, and on supporting and 
empowering children and women‘.292 The service was first housed at the Women‘s 
Information Referral Exchange, with access to a desk in a corner. Its work focused on treating 
support groups, collecting and sharing information, developing a referral database and a 
library, acting as a resource for survivors and workers, and undertaking community education. 
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By the late 1980s, support groups for domestic violence and incest had spread throughout 
metropolitan Melbourne and had begun to publicise their members‘ experiences.293 DVIRC 
also provided ‗seminars and public speaking to schools, TAFEs, community agencies, Fairlea 
women‘s prison, refuge workers, ministry of housing tenants associations, and school 
nurses‘.294 In addition, centre workers joined with other community organisations including 
CASA to form the Standing Strong Collective, which worked to develop a sexual abuse 
prevention kit aimed at adolescents for use in schools and by community education 
workers.
295
  
 
In 1989, an ethnic community education worker was appointed and this led to the 
establishment of a multilingual telephone service by 1991. Alongside workers from REWP 
and Co-As-It, the ethnic education officer at DVIRC challenged stereotypes relating to 
ethnicity and domestic violence and, in particular, the notion that migrant women were 
somehow more oppressed than their Anglo counterparts because of their culture.
296
 Within a 
short space of time, DVIRC had become the ‗group to go to if you wanted to talk about 
legislation or if you wanted to talk about policy‘.297  
 
At the same time, funding was made available for the development of family violence 
networkers in each region of Melbourne. Like DVIRC, the networkers were intended to play a 
critical role in policy and program development but at a regional rather than state level, thus 
augmenting the state-wide work of DVIRC.
298
 Hannah Kaiser argues that, as a result of the 
role undertaken by these new domestic violence services, refuges had somewhat ‗less of an 
engagement on that policy type … political level‘, which was ‗a pity because this possibly put 
us in a weaker position and diminished … our voice‘.299 The feeling that, as a movement, 
refuges had suffered a ‗loss‘ of power and voice over time was common amongst 
interviewees. This in part reflects a movement that had ‗become more weighed down by 
service provision‘, which meant that ‗it was difficult to balance the political agenda with 
meeting, or being responsive to, the everyday needs of the women and children who came to 
the refuge‘.300 Despite these changes, however, domestic violence services continued to drive 
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policy change, just as they continued to bear witness to abused women‘s experiences of 
injustice.  
Taking Action and Publicising Domestic Violence 
 
Despite the growing demands on domestic violence services workers in their day-to-day 
operations, they worked in growing collaboration with state institutions such as the courts, 
police, and other non-government organisations, whilst continuing to agitate for social and 
cultural change to prevent domestic violence. An early history of the refuge movement 
claimed that 
stress caused by the nature of the refuge work and ongoing funding shortages, women 
in refuges managed to direct much of their energy into campaigns, which brought to 
public notice the injustices of women and children‘s position in society. Workers and 
residents lobbied for better pensions for women, for better public housing, and they 
spent many unpaid hours publicising the issue of domestic violence.
301
 
 
The work of Women‘s Housing Action Group, for example, led to the establishment of a 
Housing Task Force chaired by the Ministry of Housing.
302
 One outcome was that women and 
children who were victims of domestic violence would be automatically eligible for priority 
housing.
303
 Whilst this response made real differences to the lives of women escaping violent 
partners, it was not an ideal outcome since they felt ‗forced into a position of … competing 
against other needy groups‘.304 Major structural change in society would ideally lead to 
‗provision of housing so there was no longer a waiting list, so that you would no longer need 
priority battles‘.305 New organisations began to pick up this work, and, in 1988, Women in 
Supportive Housing undertook a major study to examine the relationship between domestic 
violence and poor access to housing after refuge.
306
 
 
DVIRC in particular began to take a lead in forming partnerships with external organisations 
as well as generating community awareness of the issues relating to domestic violence. They 
received ongoing funding from the Attorney General‘s department to conduct community 
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education about the Crimes (Family Violence) Act.
307
 This enabled them to appoint additional 
staff, including legal worker Ariel Couchman, who undertook ‗educating and campaigning … 
all over the state‘, which involved, ‗country trips, and extensive workshops in inner 
Melbourne [that] provided immense feedback from participants, including the names of 
sympathetic lawyers/doctors/social workers and others, who then became part of our referral 
network‘.308 Work began in partnership with other community organisations concerned to 
raise awareness of the issues facing women experiencing domestic violence. In 1987, for 
example, DVIRC formed the Women‘s Coalition against Family Violence (WCAFV), 
comprising a number of non-government organisations that included domestic violence 
services, legal centres, community health services, sexual assault services and community 
houses.
309
 Part of the focus of the WCAFV was ‗monitoring the effectiveness of the Crimes 
(Family Violence) Act, its utilisation and to educate the community and advocate for 
change‘.310 In this context, the group promoted the use of intervention orders, whilst also 
arguing that they ‗should not be seen as a substitute for laying criminal charges‘.311 
Employing a feminist analysis of domestic violence, WCAFV argued that ‗violence in the 
home is about the abuse of power, particularly the power of men over women‘.312  
 
WCAFV also undertook public campaigns to highlight the number of killings of women and 
children resulting from domestic violence, and, most significantly, they organised a domestic 
murders commemoration in May 1989 to raise the community‘s understanding of domestic 
violence and domestic murder.
313
 At the same time, graffiti campaigns were undertaken as a 
‗creative way‘ to publicise the issue.314 Palmer reminds us however, that advocacy undertaken 
by refuge workers was unpaid and additional to the work with women in refuge:  
We did a lot of political activity after hours … we turned up to rallies, and go to 
Canberra for things, graffiti art … and we were always involved in reclaim the night. 
We used part of our funding to set up Women Against Rape, and we went to the 
Anzac day marches as a protest group.
315
  
 
Work by refuges in collaboration with the Victorian police at this time was also extensive. In 
the early 1980s, members of the VWRG had gained influence within the Women‘s Advisory 
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Council to the premier. In this capacity, they argued in a submission to an inquiry into the 
Victorian police force that the ‗needs of women, most particularly in situations of domestic 
violence‘ must be given greater priority.316 They argued for an increase in the ‗amount and 
quality of training provided to police officers‘ so that they would ‗provide assistance to 
women clients without being patronising‘.317  
 
In the mid-1980s, criticism of police inaction in relation to domestic violence was mounted in 
the media.
318
 At this time, domestic violence services joined forces with community legal 
services to request that the Equal Opportunity Commission (EOC) undertake to respond to the 
lack of police action in relation to domestic assaults.
319
 By 1986, a police and domestic 
violence working party had been established in response to these complaints, and the EOC 
initiated a domestic violence monitoring group representing WRRS, refuges, the St Kilda 
legal service and the WPCU.
320
 In this forum, domestic violence services worked with the 
community policing squad and were invited to provide input into a police training manual. 
During 1987 refuges worked together with WRRS and DVIRC to develop a police training 
package.
321
 This group brought a feminist perspective to the materials and the package 
included information on the philosophy and function of refuges, including that ‗the most 
significant factor in domestic violence is the relative powerlessness of women in social, 
economic and physical terms‘.322 The group adopted police training as a strategy to engage 
the support of police as allies without antagonising them, further evidence of the new resolve 
of the domestic violence services movement to work in partnership with state institutions.
323
 
 
A Family Violence Strategy Group was established within the Victorian police in September 
1988. Marg D‘Arcy took on the role of deputy chairperson after establishing the Family 
Violence Project Office within the Community Policing Co-ordination Office. She organised 
‗training around the Crimes (Family Violence) Act, developing the policy and setting up the 
family violence incident database‘.324 In 1989, a formal policy statement on family violence 
was released recognising the rights of victims to police protection.
325
 Whilst a struggle ensued 
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to ensure that the police implemented the legislation, this marked a considerable improvement 
in the police response to domestic violence, now understood (in policy terms at least) as a 
crime. Domestic violence workers also pressed for family law reform, including the provision 
of child access centres,
326
 and development of a new child support system.
327
 They focused 
particularly on ensuring legal process met the needs of women and children and that they 
were fully informed of their entitlements.
328
 
 
By the late 1980s in Australia, domestic violence was commonly being named and responded 
to by both national and state governments. Significant shifts were also beginning to take place 
in public awareness of domestic violence. At a national level, the Commonwealth–State 
Coordinating Task Force on domestic violence was formed and April 1989 was named 
National Domestic Violence Awareness Month by the Hawke government. Country-wide 
publicity about the issue ensued and formed a part of the federal government‘s three-year 
National Domestic Violence Campaign, managed under the slogan Break the Silence. This 
was preceded by the first Australian survey on community-wide attitudes towards domestic 
violence and was undertaken by the Commonwealth Office of the Status of Women.
329
 
Conclusion 
 
During the 1980s, the domestic violence service‘s movement‘s engagement with the state had 
made significant gains. These included recurrent funding, the expansion and diversification of 
services, and new legal and policing responses. These changes occurred in a social and 
political context of action by both state and Commonwealth governments to improve the 
status of women. Moreover, the Commonwealth expanded its welfare commitment through 
the introduction of the Women‘s Emergency Services Program (WESP), and later SAAP, 
following the election of the Hawke-led Labor government in 1983. The advocacy of the 
refuge movement, combined with the work of femocrats in government, saw domestic 
violence adopted as a policy issue, which in turn enabled funding and legislative changes that 
had been inconceivable a decade earlier. This relationship was critical to ensuring that policy 
framings and recommendations on domestic violence reflected a feminist analysis of the 
problem.  
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Over this period it is clear that the domestic violence services movement had made some 
concessions towards working for reform within the system, in contrast to the refuge 
movement‘s earlier radical feminist agenda demanding fundamental social and personal 
transformation as part of a revolutionary critique of society. This shift is illustrative of the 
ascendancy that liberal feminism had come to assume both within the domestic violence 
services movement and the women‘s movement more broadly. But the changes in the 
movement‘s aims and activities were also being shaped through engagement with the state. 
Specifically, domestic violence services had been forced to operate as part of a service 
system, and the government began to exert greater control over their work. Despite this 
growing trend, however, the Victorian movement resisted state control and had some success 
in maintaining a degree of autonomy in their operations and feminist approaches to service 
delivery. In this, paradoxically, they were assisted by feminists in government and other 
bureaucrats, who were both accommodating and supportive of the movement‘s agenda. 
 
This chapter has also traced the origins of a continuing and often counterproductive tension in 
the movement between homelessness and domestic violence as issues of concern. As a 
consequence of their forced inclusion into an emergency accommodation program, refuges 
sought to differentiate their organisations from homelessness service providers so they might 
pursue their feminist goals of social change. However, in doing so, they polarised the 
problems of women‘s homelessness and domestic violence by insisting that their work was 
not concerned with the former because it derived from the latter, which was their key priority. 
Whilst this distinction has proved useful—in as much as it has highlighted violence as a 
contributing factor to women‘s homelessness—it has also proved problematic because it 
obfuscates our understanding of the relationship between the two issues, which would be 
enhanced by a consideration of how they relate to women‘s economic inequality, poverty and 
other experiences of violence.
330
 I have also noted that, whilst women‘s access to affordable 
housing continued to form part of the advocacy work of the VWRG until the late 1980s, it 
was increasingly relegated to the periphery of the movement‘s agenda. Moreover, the 
dichotomisation of these issues remains embedded within Victoria‘s domestic violence and 
homelessness service system, and governments respond to them as if they are independent 
problems. This has important implications for women‘s access to, and experience of, the 
domestic violence and homelessness service systems, for their experiences cannot be neatly 
categorised within such artificial programmatic boundaries. The following chapter explores 
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how activists within the movement began to challenge these kinds of rigidities, with some 
limited success.   
 
This chapter has examined hostilities between conservative and radical groups within the 
movement, reflecting their different feminisms and conflicting ideas about the aims of the 
movement and appropriate methods to achieve them. The outcome saw the majority of 
services embrace radical feminist ideas of organising and working with women. Despite their 
differences, refuge activists were adept at uniting in the face of external forces such as their 
state funding bodies. But political ideology was not the only factor that generated difficulties 
and drove change within the movement. I have also highlighted the role that activists from 
within and outside the movement played in filling the gaps in a service system established 
according to the universalisation of white middle-class women‘s assumptions. These activists 
demanded consideration of the needs of women who were migrant, young, Aboriginal, 
disabled, homeless and with mental health and substance-use issues. As a result, new services 
emerged to cater for these groups, and the policies and practices of existing organisations 
were challenged to include differing requirements and subjectivities. 
 
In the 1980s, that domestic violence services continued to engage with and respond to, the 
burgeoning policy responses to domestic violence by the state government. Despite the fact 
that they were now an integral part of a state-sponsored service system, they also continued to 
pursue goals of radical social change through direct action designed to publicise and politicise 
the issue of domestic violence. At the same time, they formed relationships with a range of 
state institutions and other non-government organisations that were developing programmatic 
and policy responses to domestic violence. The domestic violence services movement 
remained at the forefront of the policy process, ensuring its program implementation met the 
needs of women and that feminism continued as the dominant discourse by which domestic 
violence was understood. While many of these patterns continued into the 1990s, the decade 
would witness a flourishing of partnerships between domestic violence services and other 
external organisations. 
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Chapter 5: The Domestic Violence Services System, 1990–
1999 
 
In this competition period, the only way to survive was to pull our heads in and be as 
innovative as possible without making too much noise and then basically stamping our 
feet to say this works for women … we actually achieved quite a bit service by 
service.
1
 
 
This chapter analyses the rapidly changing political, institutional and policy context that 
domestic violence organisations confronted during the 1990s. Whilst the policy problem of 
domestic violence occupied a central place on both Commonwealth and state government 
agendas, other discursive and institutional shifts, including the onset of economic rationalism 
and changing conceptualisations of citizenship and welfare, dramatically changed the nature 
of the services‘ relationship with government. In addition to being administered within the 
SAAP program, which was inadequately funded, Victorian services also faced what was 
arguably the most rigorous application of economic rationalist principles to public policy in 
the country under the Kennett-led Liberal government. I analyse how this confluence of 
factors generated a particularly inhospitable environment for domestic violence services, 
which sheds light on how a movement for social change transformed into one focused on 
service delivery. Specifically, I investigate the challenges the services faced, including the 
imposition of competitive tendering, techniques to enforce ‗accountable management‘ 
structures, under-funding, the promotion of individualised service responses, and case 
management. Drawing partly on the narratives from domestic violence activists regarding the 
impact of these changes, I highlight the difficulty they faced in maintaining a radical 
structural and social change agenda in relation to their work. 
 
This chapter also considers the resistance that organisations displayed in the face of adversity. 
I examine their responses to economic rationalism and, in particular, to the intermittent and 
real threat that they would face de-funding. The argument proposed challenges the view that, 
during this period, services simply rolled over or gave up on feminist principles or resisting 
the government‘s agenda. It demonstrates that services opposed when they could, challenged 
where possible, and, over time, began to work in greater cooperation not only with each other 
but with external organisations. This section will also continue to examine the relationship 
between feminism and domestic violence services and, in particular, the impact of the 
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growing ascendancy of liberal feminism on their aims and activities. From the early 1990s 
onwards, domestic violence services were also increasingly challenged from within to 
incorporate the differing requirements and subjectivities of marginalised women into their 
services. The chapter documents the sustained efforts and advocacy of the women who 
undertook to respond to these needs, and demanded that mainstream organisations do the 
same.   
Domestic Violence Services and the State  
If you had the nineties as they should have been, we‘d be ten years ahead of where we 
are now.
2
 
The Policy Context 
 
In March 1990, the Hawke Labor government committed $1.35 million over three years to 
establish the Commonwealth–State National Committee on Violence Against Women.3 The 
committee aimed to deal with all forms of violence against women through the development 
of policy, research and community education. It replaced the existing State–Commonwealth 
Coordinating Task Force and built on the work already undertaken by the previous three-year 
National Domestic Violence Campaign. The committee‘s National Strategy on Violence 
Against Women was informed by radical feminism
4
 and framed the problem as ‗male 
violence‘ against women resulting from ‗male attitudes, beliefs and behaviours in relation to 
women, and from the abuse of power‘.5 In addition, it argued that ‗violence against women 
has its origins in the social system which assigns subordinate status to women‘.6 It 
recommended that ‗policy and practice need to be linked by a commitment to empower 
women, which results in women gaining a sense of entitlement; enjoying equal status; 
experiencing freedom, [and] achieving economic independence‘.7 As historian Suellen 
Murray has noted, the solution had therefore to involve ‗improvements in the status of 
women, including those concerned with women‘s access to economic independence, health 
and education‘.8 Years of advocacy by activists in women‘s refuges, combined with the work 
of feminists in government, had ultimately resulted in the problem of domestic violence 
becoming a key Commonwealth government priority. As feminist activist Maria Dimopoulos 
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comments: ‗It was the first time that we have ever seen it feature in such a pronounced way 
on the government agenda … and I think we had used every strategy possible‘.9  
 
At the same time, however, and in a somewhat contradictory manner, other shifts in the 
administration and conceptualisation of social welfare were occurring. These posed 
considerable challenges to domestic violence services. Jane Bullen has argued that 
‗governments employed technologies of performance management including techniques such 
as accountable management, derived from business, as a means to regulate the activities of 
non-government organisations‘.10 Conceptualisations of welfare and citizenship were also 
shifting, welfare recipients being expected to take action to overcome their circumstances in 
return for government support.
11
 These changes had become dominant under the Hawke and 
Keating Labor governments, which also ‗granted priority to the economic imperative of the 
free market over social objectives‘ with an emphasis on tackling ‗poverty rather than 
inequality‘.12 In part, these shifts meant, as Bullen contends, that ‗during the 1990s, 
homelessness came to be viewed more as an issue of individual welfare or individual 
problems‘.13 
 
At a state level, Joan Kirner had become premier in 1990, following the sudden resignation of 
John Cain, and also took on the portfolio of Women‘s Affairs. Despite the growing pressures 
facing the Kirner government—including an economic recession combined with mounting 
attacks from the Murdoch press—Kirner‘s leadership signalled improvements in the status of 
Victorian women. Her government confirmed its commitment to ‗tackle family violence and 
its effects‘ through the continuation of an ‗integrated approach to this issue across government 
agencies through education, prevention, enforcement, information and support services‘.14 In 
its fourth report (1992) examining accommodation issues in the context of family violence, 
the Victorian Community Council Against Violence (VCCAV) made a series of 
recommendations relating to the housing and legal needs of women and children escaping 
domestic violence and argued for changes to be implemented across a number of ministerial 
portfolios. Like the National Strategy, the report was informed by radical feminism and 
argued that domestic violence was a result of ‗the position of women in our society … a great 
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many of whom suffer various forms of gender-based social disadvantage‘.15 Part of the 
solution thus involved the improvement of women‘s economic position, and in particular, 
their access to affordable housing. First and foremost, the report recommended increases in 
the supply and type of public housing stock.
16
 In relation to domestic violence services 
specifically, it recommended an expansion of refuge places, that WRRS be adequately 
resourced, and that the Victorian Women‘s Refuges Service be funded to operate as a peak 
body.
17
 The report and recommendations were released shortly before the election of the 
Kennett Liberal government in October 1992.  
 
For all the Kirner government‘s rhetoric, however, and perhaps as a consequence of its short 
term in office and a recession, there were no significant policy developments specifically in 
relation to domestic violence, apart from a new focus on funding men‘s behaviour-change 
programs, discussed in more detail below. Though little was actually achieved, the Kirner 
government undertook social policy development in a manner characterised by a commitment 
to social justice and feminism, including fostering community partnership and engagement. 
During the tenure of Kay Setches as Minister for Community Services, for example, the 
department commissioned feminist academic Wendy Weeks to undertake a review of 
women‘s services in Victoria, which highlighted the strong support in national and 
international research for service provision for women by women.
18
 This approach was 
reflected in the Ministerial Advisory Committee for Women and Housing, which funded 
Women in Supportive Housing (WISH) to undertake a state-wide consultation ‗asking 
Victorian women what concerns them about housing‘.19 Women were entering the Victorian 
parliament in record numbers at this time, though the trend was reversed with Kennett‘s 
election in 1992. As Setches observes:  
When we were in parliament, there were ten of us, we thought more and more women 
would come in, we‘d broken the glass ceiling, we‘ve done it. And then we lost in 
1992, and there were four women left in the lower house, four altogether, or some 
bloody thing.
20
 
  
In response, Setches later worked alongside Australian Labor Party (ALP) colleagues Joan 
Kirner, Julia Gillard and Jenny Macklin to develop and implement an affirmative action 
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strategy for the pre-selection of women in winnable seats within Victoria. Getting such a 
policy adopted, as Setches recalled, involved a series of ‗drag-down fist fights with men in 
power‘.21 Within two years, however, it had become policy in Victoria, then later federally.  
 
The end of Kirner‘s short run as premier meant that the future for feminist women‘s services 
in Victoria looked doubtful. The new Kennett government defunded non-government services 
at an alarming rate. Somewhat remarkably, however, as will become apparent, domestic 
violence services were not amongst them, though they were not immune from the economic 
rationalist reforms that followed. What may have been achieved under a long-term Kirner 
government is impossible to say. The challenges of shifting entrenched male power structures 
within the Victorian state government were huge. In addition, governments at all levels 
became party to the global contraction of welfare states consequent upon the ascendancy of 
neo-liberal doctrines on the role of the state.
22
   
 
The welfare sector in Victoria was dealt a considerable blow following the election of a 
conservative government in 1992. Kennett immediately began a process of ‗promoting a 
contract culture‘, consistent with ‗economic rationalist ideology‘.23 This included reducing the 
public sector and focusing its activities on purchasing services, rather than providing them. In 
keeping with this approach, the new government imposed funding cuts and gradually 
introduced market-type funding mechanisms, including competitive tendering, which replaced 
traditional input-based funding arrangements. Whilst domestic violence services survived this 
period, many others did not. This apparent anomaly can be attributed to a commitment in the 
Liberal Party‘s platform to reduce domestic violence, which was described as a ‗common 
form of assault‘, where ‗women are overwhelmingly the victims‘.24 Whilst the party‘s policy 
certainly did not include a radical feminist analysis of the problem, the fact that domestic 
violence was a key part of Kennett‘s election platform is evidence that violence against 
women and the need for refuges had become ‗institutionalised in the social landscape‘.25  
 
The VCCAV continued to act as the key policy adviser to the government on violence against 
women and formed the Violence Against Women Task-Force in 1993. The taskforce 
undertook a wide-ranging consultation in 1995, resulting in the development of a state-wide 
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strategy and an integrated policy approach.
26
 The taskforce also promoted a gendered 
understanding of the problem and focused attention on violence as a continuum. It argued that 
violence against women should be understood as a ‗consequence of inequalities based on 
gender, culture, religion, race, age, sexual preference and class, and it acts to reinforce the 
power disparity existing between men and women‘.27 The report noted that ‗in Victoria there 
is currently no cross departmental approach to domestic violence or sexual assault‘.28 In line 
with domestic violence policy in NSW, its recommendations included an integrated and co-
ordinated response between police, courts, corrections, women‘s services and men‘s groups.29  
 
The Kennett government did not, however, formulate any semblance of a co-ordinated state 
government policy, or, indeed, a policy statement in relation to domestic violence, such as had 
been issued by the Cain government. Vig Geddes says of the 1990s, ‗students would ring up 
… and be doing something on family violence …[and say]… ―I‘m just wondering what bits 
of government policy I should be looking at ?‖ I‘d say ―oh there isn‘t any … not in Victoria 
… there are no documents‖‘.30 The Coalition did, however, ‗continue to provide funding for 
women‘s refuges … and … support to enable women to leave violent relationships‘.31 It also 
continued to promote and fund initiatives directed towards improving police responses to 
domestic violence, combined with community education campaigns and, as we shall see, 
programs for violent men.  
 
‗Service delivery‘ constituted the key element in the Kennett government‘s overall response 
to domestic violence throughout the 1990s. But the model of service delivery underwent 
redevelopment which included regionalised administration for refuges, combined with a new 
focus on the provision of outreach services and regional service networks. However, funding 
and a practical framework for the much-touted redevelopment were lacking. The projected 
changes reflected the state government‘s intention to withdraw from a direct role in the 
provision of community services, as well as the impact of the SAAP agenda, which had 
become focused on individual experiences of homelessness and domestic violence as opposed 
to the necessity of crisis accommodation based on a structural analysis of the problem of 
homelessness.  
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During the 1990s, the Kennett government expedited the closing down of state government 
institutions, which had previously provided congregate care for people with mental health 
problems and disabilities and for children and young people unable to live at home. Whilst 
‗deinstitutionalisation‘ signalled a growing international recognition of human rights for such 
people, it simultaneously reflected the government‘s determination to withdraw from 
providing human services and to reduce welfare spending. Indeed, the enormous funds saved 
as a result of deinstitutionalisation have never been fully redirected into community care. As a 
result, many people who would otherwise have been institutionalised failed to receive 
comparable support in the community, which meant that those without family support 
suffered homelessness and poverty. This served further to increase pressure on SAAP services 
and expanded the population of homeless people. SAAP became ‗the safety net that sat 
beneath other poorly resourced community functions and the complexity of client support 
required rose excessively‘.32 
 
Across the country, other states were continuing to respond to domestic violence by 
developing co-ordinated strategies and establishing domestic violence committees and/or 
advisory councils. In NSW, for example, a domestic violence strategic plan was developed in 
1991, incorporating recommendations to all departments. And, in WA, the Liberal state 
government implemented their ‗abuse in families‘ campaign, reflecting the government‘s 
conservative political orientation.
33
 In 1994, the NT government launched its five-year 
domestic violence strategy. However, it was criticised for failing to provide resources.
34
 
Whilst, nationally, domestic violence services were celebrating the fact that ‗domestic 
violence as an issue has finally made it onto the agenda of state and federal governments‘, 
they were simultaneously reeling from the impact of economic rationalist policies, which left 
services ‗scrambling to compete against business plans and cost effective standardised 
bureaucratic agencies‘.35  Nevertheless, strategies were devised to survive these challenges, 
including attempts to sell ‗expertise and knowledge in a competitive arena‘.36 In Victoria, for 
example, domestic violence services worked together to position themselves strategically as 
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viable and efficient service providers, whilst trying to maintain their commitment to feminist 
ways of working.
37
  
Funding, SAAP and Economic Rationalism 
 
We did all this ongoing work together and basically grew the program from bottom 
up. Through the 80s … bit by bit Department of Human Services actually took it over, 
and ran with it and owned it, without costing it mind you … and then they took it, 
called it DHS programs, and off they went with it into the 90s.
38
  
 
Throughout the 1990s, domestic violence services faced a number of challenges in their 
relationship with their state funding bodies. Whilst they managed to survive, they faced a 
barrage of changes as the state transformed its methods of administration and governance. In 
particular, the application of free market principles to the delivery of human services meant 
that services had to adopt different methods of operating. During the decade, SAAP continued 
to fund women‘s refuges nationally, despite an attempt by the Hawke government to hand 
them back to the states in 1991 with untied federal grants rather than specific purpose 
payments.
39
 This was averted when Hawke was ousted as Prime Minister by Paul Keating, 
who opposed transferring Commonwealth financial powers to the states. However, there had 
been no real increases in SAAP funding from the early 1990s, which led state government 
bureaucrat Tony Newman to conclude ‗in ‘91 SAAP died, and it took ten years in Victoria to 
revive it‘.40  
 
In her position as Minister for Community Services in the Kirner government, Kay Setches 
was responsible for domestic violence services; she recalls that the onset of recession in 1991 
made it difficult to expand their funding. Instead, as a committed feminist, she worked to 
protect services from funding cuts she had to make. As she recalls: 
I just said ―I can‘t help you with an expansion of this program. You see, I‘ve got to 
make $23 million savings without touching your sector. I‘m not telling anyone I‘m not 
touching your sector, but I‘m not going to‖.41 
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But these years did see funding of perpetrator programs assume a new importance in Victoria 
as well as other states, including WA.
42
 A forum had been arranged in Melbourne by the 
VCCAV in November 1990 and attended by Kirner, who endorsed the employment of 
‗diverse strategies‘.43 Setches chose to fund some perpetrator programs because she 
considered that women‘s refuges by themselves were not preventative.44 The issue was 
controversial because it was considered by some groups to divert resources away from 
women‘s services. It was also condemned for seeming to ‗individualise, medicalise and 
psychologise‘ the problem of violence, which ‗diverts attention away from the structural or 
social causes of this widespread behaviour towards band-aid solutions‘.45 In this instance, 
Setches averted the first of these criticisms by negotiating with the Police Minister, Mal 
Sandon, for corrections money to be allocated to perpetrators.
46
 Nevertheless, at least one 
activist at DVIRC argued against funding programs considered to be ‗therapeutic‘ in nature 
and challenged the Kirner government‘s ‗inconsistency‘.47 In keeping with a radical feminist 
analysis of domestic violence, DVIRC further argued that funding perpetrator programs as 
therapy groups ‗reinforces the myth‘ that ‗violence is a marital problem‘.48 Members further 
demanded ‗a clear policy statement in relation to domestic violence … [that] … would 
provide a direction against which new projects and initiatives could be prioritised‘,49 and 
would ‗focus on the criminality of assault in the home and the protection of victims‘.50 
 
Controversially, in the mid-1990s, the Department of Human Services funded a peak body, 
the Victorian Network for the Prevention of Male Family Violence, to co-ordinate behaviour-
change programs for men, as well as the Men‘s Referral Service, comprising a state-wide 
telephone counselling, information and referral facility for men. Donna Zander assumed the 
position off co-ordinator and developed a standards manual for men‘s behaviour-change 
programs. Zander‘s background was in women‘s and youth services and she felt that the 
feminist movement saw her ‗as a bit of a traitor for going to work in men‘s services‘.51 
However, she considered this work of critical importance:  ‗I knew that if the women‘s 
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movement [was] going to go forward, we have to join with these services, and we have to 
start to shape these services and … hold them accountable.‘52 But she agreed that: 
 many men … will never change … I think the solution to all of this is long-term 
prevention by education and cultural and structural change, and that is not going to 
happen by having a support group and behaviour change program, it is one part of a 
fleet of services that we need.
53
 
 
In 1998, the network became No to Violence and, by 2000, there were 25 men‘s behaviour 
change programs operating in Victoria. However, only eighteen received government funding 
and were subject to the minimum standards.
54
 Whilst many domestic violence workers 
supported the decision to work with men in principle, the decision to fund men‘s services 
angered some who saw it as money diverted from women‘s services. Feminist activist and 
long-term domestic violence services worker Billi Clarke remarks:  
The government fucking loved it. They threw money at them … The peak body of a 
men‘s service got funded … before the women‘s sector that had been going for 25 
years got a cent … You could see there was a real trend [of] taking resources off the 
women‘s movement and transferring them over to men.55 
 
A greater threat of funding cuts seemed to follow the election of the Kennett government in 
October 1992, but, as we have seen, domestic violence services were somewhat protected. 
The Kennett government‘s election pledge to continue funding women‘s refuges had in part 
come about, Geddes argues, because: ‗[T]he feminist and all the women‘s DV services 
lobbied, and lobbied, and lobbied, and lobbied, and made a noise and were really effective by 
it‘.56 So effective were they, in Geddes view: 
That one senior bureaucrat told me once, a few years ago … that … DV services 
didn‘t get cut … because there was still fear amongst the Liberal backbenchers about 
the power of the women‘s liberation movement.57  
 
Domestic violence services survived this period by lobbying Liberal Party MPs, and it was 
Liberal Party women from whom they received support.
58
  In particular, they were supported 
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by Jan Wade as Attorney General and Minister for Women‘s Affairs, who was seen to be 
‗quite committed‘ to tackling the problem.59 
 
Funding cuts in other areas nevertheless severely affected domestic violence services. As 
former Women‘s Liberation Halfway House activist Hanna Kaiser pointed out, the resources 
that had been available for women on leaving refuge had disconcertingly gone: 
[A]fter Kennett came in … so many people had lost their jobs and so many 
organisations lost their funding.  That meant that for us working at Halfway House all 
the resources that we had used to tap women into and so on, were no longer there. 
That made a huge difference in terms of how we were able to support woman.
60
 
 
At the federal level, in contrast to SAAP I (1985–89), SAAP II (1989–94) ‗marked a new 
emphasis on the ‗transition to ―independent living‖ as the purpose of ―support‖‘.61 It 
identified five target groups that included young people; women and women and children who 
are homeless and/or in crisis as a result of domestic violence; families including single-parent 
families; single men; and single women. SAAP III (1994–99), introduced ‗case management 
as the means to assist people to redress their circumstances‘.62 Bullen judges that ‗these and 
other changes such as the encouragement of more diverse service models including outreach 
indicate the shift to a more individualised approach, and less emphasis on providing crisis 
accommodation‘.63  
 
In addition to funding cuts, compulsory competitive tendering was introduced for local 
government activity, including human services, and consultation with domestic violence 
services as a group ceased.
64
 Competitive tendering was not, however, technically imposed on 
SAAP-funded services in Victoria. These were instead faced with a ‗planning model‘. Instead 
of ‗responding to submissions‘, ‗government would determine in advance where services 
were needed and invite non-government organisations to provide‘ them.65 Reflecting this 
shift, bureaucrat‘s administering SAAP in the Health and Community Services (HACS) 
(formerly Community Services Victoria) division of the Department of Human Services 
increasingly spent their time ‗dealing with changes in funding models, and moving to a costed 
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funding model where you had targets‘.66 In this sense, SAAP changed from being ‗a service 
program‘ to ‗a funding program‘, which meant: 
you stay in the office and you work the money … There‘s a real difference … you stay 
indoors, you don‘t go out into the community. We [had been] constantly with the 
community, helping them. We knew what was going on everywhere. It was a very 
different model‘.67  
 
These kinds of changes reflected the ‗contract culture‘ imposed by the Kennett government 
and the ‗priorities of SAAP became more consistent with those changes taking place in social 
policy and administration more broadly‘.68 The resulting ‗corporate‘ changes were 
implemented under John Patterson, the new director of DHS. As former state bureaucrat and 
feminist Susan Feldman recalls: 
John Patterson brought that model into DHS. They corporatised. It was very clear 
when that happened, you could actually see it.  So that means that the government 
takes a much more hands-off role in the management of the program … But you also 
lose the connections with the field.
69
  
 
Unlike the 1980s, when women had often been recruited into government to administer 
domestic violence programs because of their knowledge from working in the field and/or 
commitment to feminism, bureaucrats were now more often employed because of their 
management knowledge. Consequently, bureaucrats: 
[H]ad no idea about domestic violence … You‘d have people in a senior position who 
were responsible for a service agreement … and they really weren‘t familiar with the 
domestic violence field … it makes it very difficult when people you‘re accountable to 
… don‘t really understand what you do. Or, they might understand what you do, but 
they don‘t have the same political view of it.70  
 
Some feminists in government were reluctant to work under the new culture, and decided to 
move out. As Feldman says, ‗I realised that I didn‘t want to be there anymore. Because you 
were not really supposed to engage with the community, the thing I enjoyed most‘.71 Long-
time DVIRC worker Margot Scott concurs, ‗it was very difficult for left-leaning bureaucrats 
                                               
66
 Sandra Morris, interviewed by Jacqui Theobald, 31 March 2009. 
67
 Feldman interview. 
68
 Bullen, p. 67 
69
 Feldman interview. 
70
 Margot Scott, interviewed by Jacqui Theobald, 28 April 2009. 
71
 Feldman interview. 
  189 
in those days. It was all about economic rationalism and money, money, money‘.72 Covert 
measures were adopted by domestic violence services that included meeting bureaucrats 
outside of the department because they were ‗quite frightened to talk. We used to have to go 
out to coffee to talk with some of the women in there that we were on side with‘.73 
 
In the context of this new ‗hands-off‘ management of SAAP, Victorian domestic violence 
services ‗participate[d] in service reviews, service reconstructions, new accountability 
systems … signed service agreements … counted support periods, challenged data collection 
… [and] … learned to become accountants‘.74 Service agreements became compulsory, 
providing a mechanism for the state to enforce regulation.
75
 In Austin‘s words, because 
organisations ‗were being constrained by funding agreements, we were being directed to do 
particular things‘.76 Bullen describes the process in Foucauldian terms as ‗interlinking set of 
techniques that affected and regulated the activities of services‘.77  
 
In a further attempt to improve accountability, the Victorian SAAP policy on collective 
management of domestic violence services was revised in 1993 by HACS, to draw a clear 
distinction between ‗the collective‘, and the ‗management collective‘, the latter being 
responsible for ‗staff selection and management, policy development, finances, accountability 
to government and service direction‘.78 In addition, a SAAP service system review 
recommended that management collectives ‗should no longer be worker dominated‘.79 As a 
result, HACS decreed that ‗service workers‘ positions on management collectives should 
constitute 25 per cent or less‘.80 As long-time refuge worker, Julie Oberin, comments:  
They had a real issue about paid workers making decisions … So you had to have 
clear structures in place which showed that the workers weren‘t making any decisions 
about their pay and conditions, whether clients got service or not, or the policy 
directions of the organisation.
81
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It also became mandatory that management collective members have particular skills and 
experience, including ‗basic management and financial management principles and 
procedures‘.82 These changes enforced a degree of hierarchical management structures and 
formally reduced the decision-making power of workers and residents in services. As we have 
seen, collective organisational structures, including majority decision-making, had been 
central to the ideology of radical feminism, which saw hierarchical methods as oppressive. At 
first, refuges continued to resist hierarchical structures, as Oberin indicates: 
We didn‘t want to be a committee of management.  We became a management 
collective and said, ―okay we‘ll do what government wants us to do, but we‘re also 
going to keep our consensus decision making, and we‘re not going to have these 
power structures, we‘re going to do it the women‘s way of doing it‖.83  
 
Yet, towards the end of the 1990s, many refuges adopted management committees. This 
decision was often pragmatic, rather than ideological, because, as Oberin relates, those who 
resisted experienced funding discrimination. As Oberin recounts: 
 We stayed a management collective for quite a few years until we realised we‘d put in 
a few submissions for funding and didn‘t even get a look in. And we just felt that there 
was no respect or understanding of what a management collective was, and … we 
weren‘t going to get any growth funding unless we became a little bit more 
standardised. So we made a political decision to turn into a committee of management 
… So we were able to grow a bit after that, we were actually able to start to gain some 
extra funding grants.
84
 
 
A new generation of domestic violence services‘ workers had also become critical of 
collective decision-making processes. As former worker and present-day bureaucrat Alison 
Fraser recounts: 
 If you try and focus a collective meeting around examining a recent example of 
practice and seeing how we might improve … and examine it in a meeting, there‘d be 
emotional sabotage and no notion of process and the whole thing would just end in 
shambles and tears, and the clients would be no better off. And that‘s what used to shit 
me, because we didn‘t have the process to examine practice. And that was a crime.85 
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At the same time, the industrial organisation of refuge work over the 1990s inevitably meant 
that control was removed from domestic violence services in relation to ‗establish[ing] their 
own working conditions, and added pressure to abandon the collective form of governance‘.86 
However, refuges aimed to ensure that pay parity continued, and they lobbied to be 
recognised as community development workers under the state Social and Community 
Services (SACS) award so they could continue to ‗bring family violence to the attention of 
the community and fight for change‘.87  
 
From their beginnings, refuges had been ideologically opposed to union membership because 
unions represented hierarchical organisational structures and wage disparity. In any case, no 
union would take refuge workers until such as time as peak organisations like Shelter 
Victoria, working with the Regional Housing Councils (both of which were partially de-
funded under Kennett), negotiated membership of the then Australian Social Welfare Union.
88
 
But feminist refuge workers continued to see their organisations as political, not institutional. 
As Geddes points out: ‗Unions see [refuges] as a workplace … [and]… they wanted to put 
different workers on different awards … We weren‘t interested in differential pay, it wasn‘t 
about the work, it was a political thing‘.89 
 
Following the introduction of SAAP II in 1991, SAAP services nationally were brought 
within state award structures and wages increased considerably, although they never became 
comparable with salaries for similar roles in government.
90
 Service agreements now assumed 
compliance with industrial awards.
91
 In Victoria, the SACS award was abolished in 1993 as 
part of the Kennett government‘s general elimination of awards but was later reintroduced.92 
Services were encouraged to seek coverage under the federal Crisis Assistance Supported 
Housing (CASH) award; however, this did not include salary conditions, and Victorian 
refuges continued to pay wages in accordance with the SACS award, pending further 
development to the CASH award.
93
 Regardless, the wage subsidy provided by HACS Victoria 
remained inadequate with no provision to pay workers over-time, penalty rates, on-call or 
long-service leave.
94
 Finance workers in refuges lobbied the government incessantly for 
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meagre increases so services could meet their obligations to workers with regard to 
superannuation and safety net award increases. Often the delays in funding meant services 
would have to ‗budget from other salary funds‘.95 Workers also undertook an inordinate 
amount of unpaid over-time because, for the majority, it was always more than a job.
96
  
 
These kinds of industrial changes were often looked upon critically by an earlier generation of 
refuge activists who saw their adoption as signalling an end to the role of refuges as agents for 
social change and the whole-sale capitulation to ‗institutionalised welfare‘. In WLHWH 
activist Jenny Macmillan‘s words: 
People started being paid large amounts of money, and became obsessed by work 
conditions, and … that wasn‘t what we were about … these were very different sorts 
of jobs. And it was all very well to be reasonably paid, and we probably should have 
had more time off than we did but … it certainly wasn‘t about staying there and 
getting your long service leave and concentrating on your next increment … It had 
become an absolute institutionalised welfare service.
97
 
 
In fact, refuge workers were never paid ‗large amounts of money‘, and workers across the 
social and community services ‗have long experienced some of the worst working conditions 
in Australia‘.98 Domestic violence workers often received under-award pay, suggesting that 
they are likely to be amongst the most financially disadvantaged members of the SACS 
workforce. In addition, implementation of competitive tendering processes inevitably led to 
funding being won by large organisations that could afford to put in the lowest bids.
99
 This 
meant that many SAAP workers were offered less pay and poor conditions.
100
  
 
SAAP III (1994–99) was introduced nationally in December 1994, with the inclusion of case 
management, combined with the imposition of a uniform national data collection system. At 
this time, domestic violence services in Victoria received $8.25 million in recurrent annual 
funding.
101
 The 24 refuges in operation got the majority of this funding ($6.3 million), whilst 
the seventeen domestic violence outreach services received a total of $955,000.
102
 Other 
services, including WRRS, DVIRC, Women in Supported Housing (WISH) and the Refuge 
Ethnic Workers Program (REWP), received a total of $1.25 million annually. This funding, 
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particularly for refuges, continued to be inadequate and, in Kaiser‘s words, it significantly 
inhibited their capacity to undertake the kind of ‗world-best‘ practice they may have aspired 
to: 
 [A]t one point after Kennett came in at the peak of economic rationalism, there was 
suddenly all this discussion of world-best practice. And I remember a campaign, 
where a leading feminist academic who had a lot of influence in the sector spoke about 
how feminist services provide world-best practice. I was content with her efforts to 
recognise the really good work that was being done by feminist services but it was 
wrong in my view, to ignore the fact that this was in a context of being greatly under-
resourced.
103
 
 
During this period, domestic violence services faced both an external state-wide SAAP 
service systems review
104
 and the now infamous ‗SAAP triennial review‘, undertaken 
internally by HACS.
105
 The latter is remembered as a ‗witch hunt from government‘.106  This 
recollection is not surprising, given its stated aims to examine ‗service management, financial 
management practices and accountability, service performance, SAAP standards and data‘.107 
Interviewees speculated that part of the impetus derived from the ‗perception that we were 
unaccountable, and that we all just had our snouts in the trough … a few bad decisions with 
public funds have made it bad for everybody else‘.108 However, that these kinds of changes 
were enacted across a range of human services organisations and were generally characteristic 
of the Kennett government‘s new ‗contract state‘. 
 
Of particular note was the criticism in the Brenda House review of the refuge‘s expressed 
commitment to non-professionalism in its constitution.
109
 The reviewer considered this to be 
inconsistent with the newly developed SAAP standards, which espoused ‗maintaining 
professional relationships between workers and service users‘.110 As we have seen, the 
majority of women‘s refuges had always worked against the dominance of professional 
welfare services in women‘s lives and instead aimed to break down hierarchical barriers 
between women. Brenda House collective responded to the query by explaining that the 
inclusion of ‗non-professionals‘ was based on the history of refuges as ‗women supporting 
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women‘. Non-professionalism was important, they argued, ‗because it provided an equality 
between worker and service user‘, and they pressed for the continuation of their ‗non-
professional focus without being unprofessional in our dealing with our funds and our service 
users‘.111 However, the government‘s conceptualisation of professionalism was clearly 
focused on the specific relationship between ‗workers‘ and ‗service users‘, which they sought 
to control through policy decreeing that workers must be ‗detached from their situation and 
offer objective opinions and advice‘.112  
 
The issue of underfunding was also raised in the review process and was recognised by senior 
state bureaucrats in HACS, who generated a working party to undertake a funding model 
review. The group aimed to examine the costs of running a refuge, as refuge representative 
Wendy Austin explains, ‗The intent was to find a costing base and use it to apply to treasury 
for more funds, or adjust targets to a more realistic base with the same funds‘.113 This report 
was never completed, however, because, as Austin explains, it became ‗very obvious that 
[domestic violence] services would never catch up‘.114 Whilst acknowledging the extent of 
‗need in the wider community‘ for domestic violence services and that ‗women in refuges are 
merely the tip of the iceberg‘,115 the authors of the SAAP review emphasised the need to 
restructure the service system away from refuges to increase its ‗flexibility‘ and ‗diversity‘. A 
revised model of organisation for domestic violence services would give new priority to the 
funding of outreach services, facilitated by the transfer of funding from refuges.
116
 In 
addition, the review recommended regional management of services and increased focus on 
the development of regional family violence networks.
117
 Refuges were judged to have 
‗insufficient connections with domestic violence outreach and wider SAAP networks‘.118 
Greater resourcing for the WRRS, REWP and DVIRC was recommended, as well as 
additional forms of supported accommodation for refuges to house and support additional 
women.
119
 But funding for the research and advocacy organisation, WISH, was not supported, 
which meant the organisation would be forced to close.
120
 The report also defined the problem 
of ‗service clogging‘ as resulting from inefficient service practice rather than the lack of 
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affordable housing.
121
 The reviewers particularly criticised refuge practices that allowed 
women to remain for long periods of time to save money so they might obtain independent 
housing. This, they argued, was the reason the system became ‗clogged‘.122  
 
The then Minister for Community Services, Michael John, announced the formation of a 
ministerial taskforce to advise him on the report‘s recommendations. Representatives were 
appointed from domestic violence services, as well as the SAAP Ministerial Advisory 
Committee, only after advocacy from the non-government sector.
123
 Following a brief period 
of consultation with the services and other interested parties, the taskforce released its report 
to the minister. Referred to as the ‗Asher report‘,124 it essentially endorsed the premise of the 
consultant‘s recommendations, which included regionalised service networks and 
departmental administration for domestic violence services. It also supported an enhanced 
outreach capacity for the sector but did not approve funding it by ‗diverting funds from 
refuges‘.125 Rather, the taskforce proposed additional funding to resource outreach services 
and other developments, a recommendation influenced by considerable lobbying on behalf of 
the domestic violence services movement.
126
 The report also recommended that the 
government tackle the housing and legal issues facing women and children experiencing 
domestic violence. In particular, it argued that the ‗acquisition of more housing stock‘ should 
be prioritised and recommended that the minister work in partnership with the Housing 
Minister to generate ‗longer term affordable housing options for women and children‘.127 As 
well, the taskforce recommended funding for a peak body and the development of a state-
wide ‗NESB strategy‘.128  
 
Despite the advantages promised by these recommendations, domestic violence services 
questioned the Asher report‘s focus on service provision ‗with no recognition of the band-aid 
effect of such provision without ongoing community development/education and societal 
change‘.129 Whilst the general directions of the report were agreed to by the minister, it 
appears that funding and leadership from HACS to support the bulk of the recommendations 
were not forthcoming.
130
 Instead, HACS took a piecemeal approach to reform, which included 
a focus on the service delivery aspects of the report‘s recommendations, recurrent funding 
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being made available for the continuation and expansion of outreach services, which had 
previously only received one-off funds during the 1993–94 financial year.131 In addition, 
funding was made available for the development of family violence networks throughout the 
state.
132
 Moreover, regional family violence networkers were subject to considerable pressure 
to spend time on ‗direct service‘ as opposed to community education.133 By October 1996, 
WISH had lost its core funding after the government decided that it would no longer fund 
‗non-direct service delivery services, or research agencies‘.134 The priority now given to 
funding outreach services and the focus on service delivery were in keeping with the shift in 
SAAP, which increasingly focused on the individual as opposed to the structural causes of 
homelessness. 
 
A model of domestic violence service delivery dominated by outreach was also attractive to 
the bureaucracy, according to Newman, because it was seen as an opportunity to ‗crack the 
refuge model‘.135 Refuges were perceived as unaccountable and certain incidents, including 
the ‗famous refuge in Victoria that didn‘t exist‘,136 inflamed this perception. It is also arguable 
that the refuge model made members of the Kennett government nervous, because it ‗took a 
woman from the home‘.137 In addition, refuges had been criticised for producing an 
inadequate number of ‗outputs‘,138 a judgment that took no account of the quality of service 
delivery. Moreover, with the shift of SAAP‘s focus from the provision of crisis 
accommodation to the implementation of case management, governments were no longer in 
the business of affordable housing. Indeed, the provision of crisis accommodation through 
women‘s refuges was described by at least one senior bureaucrat at the time as the ‗Rolls 
Royce‘ option of service delivery.139 Further weight was also given to the implementation of 
domestic violence outreach services because high-security refuges were simply not the 
solution for every woman. As Clarke acknowledges:  
The model of high security refuge did not suit a lot of women … [for example] … 
women who had older boy children, women who didn‘t want to move from their 
region, women who couldn‘t or wouldn‘t live communally, women who had 
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mental/physical health issues, women who didn‘t want to sever contact with their 
partner—good, bad or ugly—that is a choice thing. 140  
 
Taken together, these factors meant that, ‗people were very attracted to the newer Domestic 
Violence Outreach Services‘, which were considered to be ‗flexible … much cheaper … [and] 
… you could therefore get a lot more coverage on the ground. You could set higher targets. 
Hopefully they were about more flexibility in service delivery‘.141 While bureaucrat Tony 
Newman acknowledged there were ‗some individuals who were very strong around the value 
of the [outreach] model‘, he was led to question whether ‗the sector grew that model as much 
as the bureaucrats‘.142 This might perhaps explain the degree of animosity that developed 
between refuges and outreach services in Victoria, exemplified by the development of a 
separate peak body to represent outreach services.
143
 As former long-term refuge worker Con 
Smith notes: ‗[R]efuge workers saw outreach services as a bit of a threat to their service. They 
felt that they would take over and refuges would lose their funding‘.144  
 
In line with the recommendations of the Asher report, regionalisation became a core 
component of the state government‘s domestic violence services redevelopment plan and its 
implementation was incorporated into domestic violence services 1995–1996 service 
agreements.
145
 Regionalisation was also in keeping with the newly developing SAAP regional 
service networks that arose out of the 1993 National Evaluation of SAAP.
146
 Networks were 
proposed to ‗strengthen the non-government involvement in program planning, coordination 
and service development‘147 as part of the growing trend towards the outsourcing of service 
provision. As a consequence, ‗regional offices became more responsible for funding and 
service agreements, and there was a whole devolution of a whole lot of things … and the 
refuges were one of the last things that were centrally held, and the refuges fought it‘.148 In 
addition, and as a part of this process, services were encouraged to amalgamate for the sake of 
efficiency.
149
 Domestic violence services opposed regionalisation, particularly because it 
inhibited their capacity to work together with the same level of unity that had characterised 
past negotiations and they were concerned that it would mean a ‗watering down‘ of their 
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‗basic philosophies‘.150 In response, DVIRC applied to the department for funds to evaluate 
the impact of regionalisation on domestic violence services.
151
 The application was refused, 
further signalling the government‘s intent to control the direction and operations of the 
domestic violence service system. 
 
At the same time, service agreements became annual and were standardised across all SAAP 
services, which were now required through case management to ‗meet particular targets 
within specified hours of service provision‘.152 As already noted, by 1996, Victoria had 
moved to prioritise funding service provision over community development and the latter was 
removed from agreements with most services, which were informed the government no longer 
wanted to ‗purchase community education‘.153 Bullen has argued that the implementation of 
case management worked to ‗individualise and to make specific the form of support that was 
offered‘, which meant that, the focus of services activity was less on structural explanations of 
homelessness, than on ‗individual factors and on techniques of service delivery‘.154 Case 
management was also deemed to be consistent with reformers‘ aims of ‗activating homeless 
people‘ to maximise their ‗self-reliance‘.155 At this time, domestic violence workers were 
generally opposed to these techniques and noted that, in the past, workers would not: 
[D]are suggest to somebody that ―I need to do a case management plan‖, because we 
saw ourselves as being equal to them and everybody else. So you would sit round a 
table like this, and talk about what was the best was to solve your problems … It was a 
much more participatory thing than it is now.
156
          
 
In addition, services were particularly concerned about the ‗prescriptive nature‘ of the service 
agreements, which gave little ‗attention and allowance for the real demands on services as 
employers and the ever-changing needs of the women and children we support‘.157 Services 
criticised the ‗arbitrary targets‘ they faced, arguing that ‗meeting targets really says nothing 
about the quality of service provision‘.158 Domestic violence services were fundamentally 
opposed to output-based funding and targets, insisting they ‗encourage[d] services to move 
women and children through‘ rather than focus on ‗developing and improving service 
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provision‘.159 This view is supported by management academic Dierdre O‘Neil, who has 
argued that output-based funding increases the ‗risk that what will be judged in the funded 
program will be its efficiency, rather than its effectiveness in terms of quality outcomes for 
clients‘.160 As well as the ever-increasing accountability expectations, services were expected 
to ‗develop and expand‘ service delivery with what appears to have been, in effect, a decrease 
in real funding. Funding for the 1995–96 year did not allow for CPI rises, national safety net 
increases, superannuation increase, increments, or work-care levy subsidy.
161
 Indeed, in 
Victoria, there had been no indexation of SAAP funds for domestic violence services since 
1987. Where monies had been available, they were instead used for the funding of one-off 
projects.
162
 Women‘s refuges continued to receive funding for five full-time workers, but for 
case management of women only, not for their work with children. Moreover, funding did not 
take into account capital/asset replacement requirements of services, though some of these 
were met through one-off grants until 1999, at which time such grants were discontinued. 
 
The pressure for services to expand meant that some, including Brenda House, were running 
numerous programs on an inadequate budget designed for one refuge.
163
 Consequently, they 
made the controversial decision to begin charging service users. However, other refuges, 
including WLHWH, would not consider this as an option.
164
 Services received insufficient 
funding ‗to attract qualified and experienced staff‘, and also argued that, ‗in order to comply 
with the service agreement specification on hours, workers would need to take a large drop in 
pay‘.165 In response to these concerns, a number of services refused to sign their 1995–96 
annual service agreements. In doing so, Brenda House was concerned to emphasise it was an 
‗accountable and responsible service‘, but that its representatives could not ‗sign a document 
which does not recognise the real obligations of the service as employers and provides no 
response to the request for some flexibility in the hours of service provision‘.166  
 
In an attempt at unity, domestic violence services examined the inconsistencies in their 
services agreements
167
 and approached the Commonwealth SAAP department, arguing that 
whilst they as ‗services [were] expected to operate with accountability to their funding body, 
service users, employment responsibilities, etc‘, this was not being reciprocated, and their 
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funding bodies had begun to fund refuges on a month-to-month basis, leaving them without 
the interest on funds they had previously been accruing when they were paid in six-monthly 
allotments. They should receive compensation, they argued, adding politely that it would be 
‗appreciated if the change in conditions of SAAP III could be negotiated to meet the needs of 
all parties‘.168  
 
Services also felt that bureaucrats were imposing unrealistic expectations on them, whilst 
criticising their work, without acknowledging the financially depleted context in which they 
were operating. As Hanna Kaiser comments: 
They would criticise you for what you weren‘t doing when they weren‘t funding you 
properly … a simple concept but that was always there. [They would] come and tell us 
of their perception of what we were doing wrong, with very little understanding of 
what work was actually being done and very little knowledge of domestic violence … 
and it‘s like ―but hang on a sec, this is in a context, and the context is that you‘re not 
enabling us to do this as well as we might‖.169 
 
Increasing the accountability of services has been perceived with hindsight by workers in 
domestic violence services as a necessary development. Oberin recalls, for example, that, ‗it 
did clean us and our processes up … which wasn‘t a bad thing‘.170 By the end of the 1990s, 
domestic violence services were perceived by some as being ‗much more professionalised … 
[and] … more bureaucratic … which wasn't always a bad thing‘.171 Others, however, saw the 
negative consequences of their enhanced professionalism. As former refuge worker Kate 
Coleman observes: 
[P]eople who worked in the refuge thought being professional was having your hair 
done once  a week, wearing nice clothes and keep a safe distance from the resides … 
so sometimes it was a negative sort of growth rather than a positive.
172
 
 
While most workers saw benefits in improving the accountability of services, many felt the 
‗overly prescriptive‘ approach of government stifled services‘ ability to be innovative and 
creative in their work. Kaiser recalled that: 
We were always trying to match the service to what they were saying was the 
direction we had to go … I could see why the government wanted to direct the work of 
refuges [and] I certainly don‘t think they were evil in their intent. They were trying to 
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deliver more and more bang for their buck … Ironically, the more requirements that 
they imposed upon our work the more that what we were doing became limited, and 
we were so busy trying to satisfy them that it just made it really hard to do the work as 
well as we had. Our capacity to be innovative was impeded.
173
 
 
According to Clarke, the effects of having a domestic violence service system tightly 
controlled from the ‗top-down‘ meant that ‗a woman had to fit the model rather than the 
model fitting the woman‘.174 And, by implication, ‗it stopped that grassroots evolving … and 
this is where things, I think, went horribly wrong‘.175 Whilst it is clear that the original refuge 
model could not meet the needs of all women, it was certainly driven by them.  
 
Government policy in response to domestic violence continued to be fragmented during this 
period. It appears, for example, that funding for perpetrator programs was made available 
through one government department, but bureaucrats in HACS were ignorant of this until 
informed by domestic violence services.
176
 This may in part explain the development of a 
family violence reference group and the appointment of a dedicated worker within the newly 
formed Homelessness and Family Violence Services Division (formerly SAAP) of DHS. 
There was also a lack of clarity regarding the commitment of $3 million tagged for domestic 
violence by the Kennett government during the 1996 re-election campaign.
177
 However, at the 
initiative of DHS, a new high-security refuge was funded in the Grampians region at this 
time.
178
 And, shortly thereafter, funding was also made available for each region to provide an 
after-hours response to women and children, although the proposed budget was grossly 
inadequate at $20,000 per annum.
179
  
 
Overall, from the middle of the decade onwards, domestic violence services policy was 
fundamentally altered. No longer were services being driven by the perspective and needs of 
women accessing and running them, but increasingly by the agendas of government, and 
services were forced to compete with each other to survive. One consequence of this was that 
‗people got stuck in service delivery‘ and, despite the fact that many were ‗incredibly 
personally motivated‘, it was not ‗an easy world to be operating in‘.180 
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Competitive tendering principles also served the government‘s agenda to amalgamate and 
mainstream specialist women‘s services. As Scott recounts, these processes meant that ‗the 
domestic violence field radically changed … [and] … very small services just went under … 
So, it was a rationalisation of the field in a way‘.181 In addition, as Kaiser explains, these 
kinds of policies meant that it became harder for services to work together:  
So there became a bit of competition. And eventually over time, the government and 
the bureaucrats more and more controlled the agenda. Then people played into the 
hands of the government … and competed against each other, ultimately to our 
detriment, rather than working together.
182
 
 
From a bureaucrat‘s perspective, Newman noted the particular combination of policies such 
as ‗regionalisation, lack of money, and the doubt about the future of the program‘ meant 
‗people were incredibly frustrated with the SAAP administration‘.183 These factors, he argues, 
‗fundamentally changed the nature of the relationship [during] that period‘.184 For Newman 
personally, ‗working on the inside‘, whilst ‗thinking your program might be pulled apart and 
knowing how important it is‘, was a ‗really hard‘ balancing act.185 Lack of funding and 
uncertainty about the future had always plagued the national refuge movement, but it had 
never retreated from challenging state government policies that were perceived to undermine 
its core aims and objectives. Scott suggests that the imposition of competitive tendering and 
like policies did, however, inhibit the capacity of community sector organisations to be 
openly critical of government, and thwarted their capacity to undertake political protest: ‗if 
your funding relied, to some extent, on competitive tendering, then you weren‘t going to 
make a big enormous noise about being critical to government‘.186  
 
In 1997, the Kennett government took a further step in an attempt to restrict the capacity of 
SAAP services to speak publicly about their work by incorporating a ‗confidentiality clause‘ 
into their service agreements.
187
 Legal advice to refuges was that the clause was an 
‗extraordinarily onerous restriction‘ that would confine ‗open and informed debate by 
agencies‘ as well as ‗making it difficult for the agency to promote its value to the 
community‘.188 In response, the finance workers group of the Victorian Women‘s Refuges 
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and Associated Domestic Violence Services (VWRADVS, the renamed and reformed peak 
body, to be discussed further shortly) recommended that member services refuse to sign their 
1997–98 agreements and, with the change of government in 1999, the issue was sidelined. It 
seems undeniable then, as Clarke argues, that ‗some of the political agitation stopped because 
there was a bit of a threat you might lose your funding if you were seen to be criticising‘.189 
Relentless and dogmatic implementation of economic rationalist policies to the public 
management of domestic violence services did therefore radically change their relationship 
with government. As Kaiser concludes, the balance of power had dramatically shifted:  
The big achievement of the feminist movement was that it took this government 
money and put it in the hands of a community … And what happened when Kennett 
came in [was] they took it back and put the control in the government.
190
  
 
As the decade progressed, the Kennett government‘s application of free-market principles to 
the delivery of government-funded human services in Victoria was furthered by other major 
reforms. These included a Community Housing restructure. Redevelopment of Youth and 
Family Services (YAFS) was also proposed but not implemented before the Kennett 
government left office in 1999. Only the former will be discussed here.
191
  
 
The Community Housing restructure was initiated within the Office of Housing (OoH) in 
DHS. A key element was the implementation of the Transitional Housing Management 
(THM) program to restructure the provision of accommodation through many SAAP services 
by separating the housing (tenancy administration) and support provision roles. This was 
achieved by selecting new THMs via competitive tender to provide the housing component.
192
 
The restructure represented a ‗rationalisation of both programs and providers‘, and it resulted 
in ‗fewer and larger not-for-profit organisations‘.193 A key aim of the THM program was to 
create new governance structures for organisations providing transitional accommodation, 
which were required to become companies so as to improve financial management skills and 
accountability. A further aim was the establishment of large geographical catchments aimed at 
economies of scale across the program.
194
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Commencing in July 1997, sixteen organisations were contracted to provide THM services. 
Prior to this, more than 350 agencies delivered tenancy management and support services 
across the state, and, as a consequence, many of these were de-funded with the aim of 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness in planning, funding and program management.
195
 
By contrast with SAAP-funded domestic violence services, organisations auspiced under the 
THM program were appropriately costed and funded from the outset.
196 By the end of the 
decade, the difference between services like refuges funded in the 1980s, and others funded in 
the 1990s, including domestic violence outreach services was estimated to be in the vicinity of 
$10 million per annum.
197
 
 
This restructure of housing provision represented a further ‗change in the way of thinking 
about the role of government and the nature of state intervention‘.198 In keeping with the 
Kennett government‘s economic rationalist principles, it reflected a shift in ‗responsibility … 
from the government to the non-government sector‘.199 The changes were not implemented 
without considerable opposition and discord. Indeed, some argued that they there resulted in a 
less flexible and accessible response than before the THM restructure.
200
 Regional housing 
councils spoke out against the new contracts, arguing that they made it increasingly ‗difficult 
for [service providers] to criticise government policies and programs‘, and led to the ‗the de-
funding of services that provided advocacy to people in housing need‘.201 They also passed 
costs on to service users that had previously been covered in SAAP.
202
 Moreover, because 
organisations were encouraged to act in an entrepreneurial capacity, they developed uneven 
responses to working with SAAP agencies. In particular, domestic violence services found 
gaining access to the properties managed in their regions very difficult.
203
  
 
The separation of ‗housing‘ and ‗support‘ functions in the provision of accommodation to 
homeless people in Victoria, combined with the SAAP III agenda of focusing on case 
management, created an environment where Victorian SAAP agencies had no choice but to 
focus on therapeutic and individualised responses to the problems of homelessness and 
domestic violence. This was counteracted to some degree at the end of the decade when 
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additional funding for the THM program saw increased provision of accommodation. This 
was largely attributable to the Victorian Homelessness Strategy introduced by the new 
Bracks-led Labor government.  
 
Around the same time, the OoH developed a new method of prioritising public housing for 
people experiencing homelessness. As we have seen, domestic violence had been judged a 
worthy reason for priority public housing in the late 1980s. But by 1998, for unknown 
reasons, the OoH planned to remove it as a category under the new model, which included the 
introduction of a three-tiered segmented waiting list.
204
 In response, VWRADVS protested in 
writing to the new director of OoH, Howard Robinson, as well to the Attorney General, Jan 
Wade.
205
 At the same time, a direct action approach was adopted by one member of the 
segmented waiting list steering committee, representing by Westernport Accommodation and 
Youth Support Services (WAYSS),
206
 who refused to leave the OoH building until domestic 
violence was included.
207
 As a result, it was reinstated and included within the new system. 
This suggests, as Newman argues, that whilst you should ‗work on the inside … you always 
need a few wild cards out there on the outside‘.208 
 
These kinds of policies changed the way people viewed government. Needless to say, this 
became increasingly negative, as relationships between bureaucrats and workers in 
community organisations came under strain. Victorian state bureaucrat Di Godfrey describes 
how this eroded trust that had taken a long time to develop: 
Everything that we did was through a competitive tendering process. So it was all 
value for money, not best practice … especially in the Kennett era. So it was a 
difficult time and it damaged a lot of the relationships that people had built up over 
many years ... There will still be people around who lived through that, and remember 
that governments can change at whim and they never can be trusted.
209
 
 
Social work academic Lee FitzRoy has contended that, by the end of the 1990s, dominant 
gender power relations in Australia had ‗remained largely unchallenged with the main policy 
response being an array of reactive policies and services to apply after the fact of violence‘.210 
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In Victoria, the confluence of factors I have outlined, generated a particularly inhospitable 
environment in the 1990s for the domestic violence services movement to tackle structural 
issues relating to women‘s inequality and men‘s violence. This provides a large part of the 
answer to the question posed by former WLHWH activist Jenny Macmillan: ‗Why weren‘t 
refuges shouting out during the Kennett era about some of the stuff Kennett was doing?‘211 
Working Together: ‘Desperate for Survival’
212
 
 
The economic rationalist environment of the 1990s, in Victoria as well as nationally, already 
created immense difficulties for feminist women‘s services in general. In a study of feminist 
services in Melbourne, social work academics Lesley Hoatson and Ronnie Egan argued that it 
required organisations ‗to totally rethink practice‘, with services turning inwards to survive: 
‗relationships with sister services have frayed and a sense of increasing siege is evident‘.213 
Victoria‘s domestic violence services were not immune from these effects, but, over the 
course of the decade, they undertook a range of strategies to counteract them, and some 
worked strategically together in the face of adversity.  
A Struggle for Unity: Victorian Women’s Refuges and Associated Domestic 
Violence Services (VWRADVS) 
 
In September 1992, the Victorian Women‘s Refuges Services adopted a title—Victorian 
Women‘s Refuges and Associated Domestic Violence Services—reflecting the growing role 
and acceptance of outreach services. VWRADVS was incorporated as the new peak body 
representing women‘s refuges, outreach services, REWP, and other related services including 
the Women‘s Refuge Referral Service, DVIRC and WISH. This signalled a turning point in 
the direction of the movement, which resolved to ‗develop a more united front‘ and gain 
‗ideological clarity about what the movement in Victoria looks like‘.214 The VWRADVS 
constitution signalled a clear intention by the group to ‗formalise a peak group that wasn‘t 
divided along ideological grounds‘.215 The constitution stipulated ‗co-operation and support 
between member services‘216 and attempted to discourage a tendency, as Maria Dimopoulos 
puts it, to ‗finger point around‘ to determine whether ‗you are a decent feminist or not‘.217 It 
aimed to forge unity because activists believed that ‗the only way we were going to survive 
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was if we all banded together‘.218 It was also designed to bridge the divide that had long 
existed between refuges and outreach services.
219
 The Statewide Outreach Combined Services 
of Victoria (SOCS) had been incorporated as a peak body in 1991.
220
 At this time, Clarke 
recalls, ‗outreach services … used to meet separately‘, before they ‗got permission from the 
refuges to finally attend peak body meetings‘.221 Following its incorporation the following 
year, VWRADVS immediately placed a funding submission with the government to support 
their work, and lobbied the then Community Services Minister, Kay Setches.
222
 Funding was 
not forthcoming, however, until 2004, when Domestic Violence Victoria was financed as the 
new peak body for all domestic violence services.  
 
The move to unite refuges had been furthered in 1993 when Victorian Women‘s Refuges Inc. 
(VWRI) was initiated by, and later replaced, the Coalition. VWRI represented refuges in the 
wider VWRADVS forum. Not surprisingly, VWRI was dominated by refuges informed by 
liberal feminism, which reflected the more conservative focus of the Coalition group.
223
 Over 
time, the VWRI effectively replaced both the Coalition and the Caucus groups, and it was 
argued by the former that, since its establishment, members of the two groups ‗now co-
ordinate and consult with each other with far better understanding‘.224 Throughout the course 
of the decade, this coming together proved necessary because services were ‗inundated with 
Government demands‘, which meant that ‗the split between the ―right on‖ feminists and the 
so-called conservatives died, and people got on together and worked together‘.225  This was 
corroborated by Billi Clarke, who recounts that, whilst it was always a challenge for her to 
work with conservative women, over time, as a result of both government pressure and a 
growing level of maturity, it became necessary to bridge the gap: 
there was a real dilemma of supporting women who identified with conservative 
politics … it was always a struggle. But … what initially started out as … an angry 
way of responding … started to evolve into a healthy respect and a way of doing 
business … [W]omen like myself grew up a bit, in terms of how we needed to actually 
help each other, rather than be divisive. And ... there was a lot of government pressure 
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… for us to become a bit more professional, to be more accountable. And we actually 
realised that we had to help each other do this …226 
 
Eventually, SOCS and VWRI provided a mechanism for outreach services and refuges to be 
formally represented at the wider VWRADVS forum. This strategy was not unlike the earlier 
Caucus and Coalition division, which had allowed different views to be represented within the 
Victorian Women‘s Refuge Group.  
 
Nevertheless, refuges continued to see outreach ‗as a real threat‘ and ‗a watered down 
response to domestic violence‘.227 This position can in part be explained by the concerns of 
refuges about the government‘s agenda to undermine the aims and objectives of their work. 
Refuges were running a model that enabled women to leave men and advocated a policy 
response to the problems of homelessness and domestic violence based on the increased 
economic independence of women through the provision of housing. Whilst a refuge was 
clearly not what every woman needed, and outreach services offered an important new 
service, the refuge movement was probably right in believing government support for 
outreach symbolised a preference for tackling domestic violence and homelessness at the 
level of individuals.  
 
The hostile political environment of the 1990s goes some way to explaining why it was that 
refuges were perceived as, and sometimes were, reluctant to engage with outreach services, 
and confirms Egan and Hoatson‘s view that ‗economic rationalist policies … exacerbate 
existing conflicts and create new ones by … playing off agencies including sister services in a 
tendering environment‘.228 Refuges were perceived to have ‗marginalised themselves‘ whilst 
‗everyone was getting on with it and working around domestic violence‘, leaving refuges 
largely ‗out of the picture‘.229 However, despite the apparent inward-looking focus of refuges 
and the fraying of relationships between members of the movement more broadly, the process 
of coming together to form a new peak body and constitution marked a continued 
commitment to putting the needs of women first. It represented a ‗beginning … of the 
willingness to talk about different models … and not all had to be high security, [because] it 
didn‘t seem to suit every woman to be whisked away‘.230 Despite the debate over appropriate 
models of service provision and continuing of differing ideological differences, the domestic 
violence services movement celebrated the fact that, by the late 1990s, ‗gaps in philosophy 
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[had] been narrowed to the point where services [could] openly consult, swap ideas and work 
together‘.231  
 
In 1994 VWRADVS restructured itself to include a coordinating collective ‗to bring all the 
state-wide issues together‘, and this operated until 1998, ensuring a strong unified voice.232 
Through the development of various subgroup representatives, the restructure also facilitated 
access to the ‗direct experiences‘ of women using the services.233 Despite the emphasis on 
‗greater efficiency‘,234 the coordinating collective did not perceive itself to be operating from 
‗a traditional hierarchical model‘ because its processes were ‗consultative and 
collaborative‘.235 However, some members were concerned about the stricter decision-making 
processes,
236
 and there was ‗a reluctance to pass over to a representative body the negotiation 
and decision making role‘.237 There was also concern about how the ‗the proposed new peak 
body would represent different, and at times conflicting, views of VWRADVS members‘.238 
The organisational change, as well as the debate that it generated, mirrored the differing 
positions of individual services and was mainly driven by ‗an increasingly competitive and 
rationalised environment‘.239 The ‗streamlin[ed] processes and structures‘ were considered to 
have gained VWRADVS ‗credibility with the SAAP unit and other outsiders‘, as well as 
greater legitimacy with the government.
240
 The coordinating collective represented and 
advocated for VWRADVS members in response to policy changes. In doing so it, continually 
sought government funding for their work as a peak body.
241
 When the government failed to 
act on the proposed redevelopment of domestic violence services, for example, they submitted 
a funding proposal to undertake the work themselves.
242
 VWRADVS also proposed where 
government funds should be allocated
243
 now that activities concerned with community 
development and social change had been deleted from their service agreements. 
 
Towards the end of the decade, and in response to the immediate threat of competitive 
tendering, domestic violence and women‘s health services in the eastern region of Melbourne 
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formed a strategic alliance and established the Eastern Services Group (ESG). ESG met 
throughout 1998 to discuss how they might work collaboratively to survive with their services 
intact. They hired consultants to help them develop formal business plans and enhance their 
understanding of purchaser–provider relationships and tendering.244 ESG nevertheless wanted 
their work to continue to be informed by a feminist philosophy, and sought to combine ‗the 
strengths of collectivism‘ with the ‗strengths of a governance structure‘.245 Rather than 
withholding information from other services out of concern that ‗it may give the organisation 
the successful edge on a tender‘,246 they adopted a policy of unity in adversity.  
 
Within VWRADVS itself, and in response to the perceived threat to all women‘s services, the 
initiative was taken to form a coalition to promote the achievements of feminist women‘s 
services generally.
247
 This was supported by research undertaken into the impacts of these 
services, headed by passionate feminist campaigner and academic, Wendy Weeks, who 
argued that: 
[W]omen working for other women in services such as refuges are making history. 
They are taking steps to ensure our daughters and granddaughters will grow up in a 
safer, more respectful and just Australia for women.
248
 
 
In response to these initiatives, meetings took place between VWRADVS and Centres 
Against Sexual Assault (CASA), with the ‗aim of forming a lobby group of the women‘s 
sector‘.249 Arguments were also made for VWRADVS to widen its membership and to work 
in greater partnership with the Women‘s Emergency Services Network (WESNET), which 
had operated since 1992 as the Australia-wide women‘s peak advocacy body for women and 
children experiencing domestic violence.
250
 There had been little communication before this 
time between domestic violence services and other women‘s services.251 This was also the 
beginning of cross-government discussions between the Department of Justice and the Office 
of Women‘s Affairs regarding ‗general directions in the field of violence against women‘, 
which resulted in the development of an interdepartmental government Committee on 
Violence Against Women in mid-1998.
252
 It coincided with the beginnings of research aimed 
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at documenting the experience of sexual assault by women in domestic violence services,
253
 
though this project was not pursued, partly because of the movement‘s preoccupation with 
issues of service delivery above political action.  
Recognising Difference, and Responding to Diversity 
 
Women aren‘t just victims of domestic violence; there are a range of other things 
going on in their lives‘.254   
 
From the early 1990s onwards, domestic violence services were increasingly challenged to 
incorporate the differing requirements and subjectivities of women into their services. This 
presented new opportunities for the movement, in which conceptualisations of feminism and 
domestic violence had tended to universalise the experiences of Anglo, able-bodied and 
heterosexual women. At the same time, a long tradition in Victorian women‘s refuges 
emphasising the safety and security needs of women above other kinds of needs was also 
being challenged. Critics argued, for example, that policies aimed at protecting residents had 
the unintended consequence of disempowering women. 
 
As we have seen, Victorian refuges were particularly safety-focused from their beginnings, an 
emphasis exemplified by their powerful campaign to maintain the secrecy of their addresses 
during the 1970s. Former refuge co-ordinator Judy Line has argued that a consequence of this 
emphasis was the adoption of some ‗draconian rules and regulations‘,255 which served to 
undermine refuges‘ goal of empowering women. As Billi Clarke puts it, ‗feminism was 
replaced by security procedures‘.256 This meant that, at times, as Line admits, refuge workers 
made decisions for women, or put down bottom lines where women didn‘t really have 
much room to think about things. It was either black or it was white, and there was no 
grey in between, and it was quite harsh when I think about it.
257
 
 
One problem with this kind of approach, according to political scientist Carol Bacchi, is that it 
runs the risk of ‗framing the problem [of domestic violence] as a matter of violent men who 
need disciplining, and passive women who need protecting‘, which potentially ‗transforms an 
understanding of the problem as a critique of patriarchal power, to demands for protection 
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from male power‘.258 With hindsight, Line believes how this representation of the problem 
failed to recognise that:  
The women that came through the women‘s refuges, they were strong intelligent 
women, that survived some of the worst experiences under the sun.  Don‘t tell me that 
they‘re not resilient and not brave women.259 
 
Rural refuges were often forced to approach the issue of security differently because they ‗had 
to assume that everybody in town knew where the refuge was‘.260 As a result, they often 
worked in close collaboration with their local communities, and some did not adopt secrecy of 
address policies, which also meant that they adopted more flexible rules and regulations 
within their refuges.
261
 For example, programs developed in the Bendigo region were less 
concerned with security than with the human rights of women accessing their services.
262
 In a 
similar vein, a Ballarat service during the mid-1990s worked from an understanding that 
‗women have come from a situation where they‘ve had rules [and] they‘ve had to answer to 
somebody else‘, and consequently should not be subject to regulation or ‗answerable … to 
our service. So we threw all of that out‘.263  
 
The growing pressure on refuges to respond to the diverse needs of women resulted in the 
movement‘s 1991 state conference making a commitment to enhance access to refuge for 
special groups and to increase the availability of refuges in ‗ethnic communities‘.264 This 
coincided with greater attention being given to the rights of service users as part of the SAAP 
II (1989–94) agenda, which had included the introduction of grievance procedures and user 
rights strategies into services policies and procedures.
265
 During 1994, VWRADVS also 
developed a document detailing minimum inter-refuge standards, signalling their intent to 
provide a consistent approach to supporting women within refuges.
266
 At the same time, and 
in response to the growing range of organisations responding to domestic violence, a 
standards of practice project was auspiced through the Women‘s Domestic Violence Crisis 
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Service (WDVCS) (formerly WRRS) with the aim of improving the ‗consistency of service 
provision‘, and ensuring ‗an appropriate, skilled and ethical response to service users‘.267  
 
In this context then, domestic violence services began to question the efficacy of their rules, 
regulations and service model and recognised their service response ‗required 
diversification‘.268 In particular, with the growing acknowledgment that ‗not everybody needs 
high security or wants high security‘, they were forced to undertake a process of ‗tailor[ing] 
our responses‘.269 However, there were rarely any available to support services to do this, and 
they often had to ‗generate this stuff ourselves‘.270 VWRADVS list of minimum standards, for 
example, was developed without financial support but the principles were incorporated into 
government standards.
271
  
 
Growing criticism of refuges‘ lack of accessibility for particular women continued. Activists 
like Clarke, for example, asked publicly whether refuges ‗want women to fit the model of 
service that we operate, or should we be changing the model to actually fit the women that we 
are supposed to be servicing?‘272 In particular, Clarke criticised the current refuge model for 
not being open to the needs of ‗women who work, to NESB women, or to women whom we 
may describe as having difficult behaviours‘.273 These criticisms were supported by advocates 
for Koori and migrant women.
274
 Domestic violence workers were thus forced to reflect on 
the aims and objectives of their work, which meant that some adapted their ways of operating 
to become responsive to the different needs and subjectivities of women and the range of 
issues with which they presented. As mentioned previously, in 1989 Clarke respond to the 
particular needs of women with mental health issues by establishing ‗Safe Place for Women‘, 
which was a specialised for such women when they were also experiencing domestic 
violence, ‗because those women were not being catered for anywhere and unfortunately 
probably still are not‘.275 Other services also began to become more responsive, including 
Brenda House, which undertook to implement a dispersed model of accommodation, enabling 
workers to support women with mental health and substance abuse issues outside a communal 
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setting.
276
 It is important to note that refuges were never allocated additional funding to 
support these innovations and that many provided additional services by ‗operating on the 
smell of an oily rag‘.277 
 
As we have seen, from the early 1980s the issue of discrimination against women with 
disabilities in women‘s refuges was being raised from within and outside of the refuge 
movement. By the mid-1990s, violence against women with disabilities had been adopted as a 
key advocacy issue by Women With Disabilities Australia (WWDA). Advocacy was also 
being undertaken by the Victorian Women‘s Disability Collective (VWDC), later the 
Victorian Women‘s Disability Network (VWDN), which argued the need to ‗make refuges 
more accessible‘.278  
 
Feminist and disability advocate Natalie Tomas recalls how her work with domestic violence 
services during the 1990s had made her ‗quite concerned about their attitude to women with 
disabilities‘.279 In particular, Tomas argues that ‘white dominant class able-bodied‘ women in 
the refuge movement often constructed women with disabilities as ‗other‘.280 And, whilst 
‗race, sex and class was something everybody would talk about‘,281 women with disabilities 
were not included in these discussions. This relates in part, as women with disabilities have 
long argued, to the fact that they were not perceived as ‗women first‘, and have had to ‗to 
fight to have recognition of [their] gender.
282
 This has occurred not only within the feminist 
movement, but also, as CEO of VWDN Keran Howe points out, ‗the issue of gender has 
never and continues to not be recognised within the disability movement‘.283 
 
Women with disabilities found that some refuges were ‗very dogmatic about things like ―we 
don‘t care if there‘s a Disability Discrimination Act that says we can‘t discriminate because 
we can‘t put people at risk and we don‘t have the skills‖‘.284 Indeed, some refuges even 
considered seeking exemption from anti-discrimination legislation.
285
 Women with 
psychiatric disabilities were also excluded. As Tomas recounts: 
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The refuges had this rule if you were a woman taking psychiatric medication, then 
they weren‘t wanting you in the refuge because they didn‘t want to be responsible. But 
they were often the women who needed it most because mental illness is often brought 
on by domestic violence trauma.
286
 
 
Some refuges did make attempts to support women with disabilities. This required 
modifications to their premises, but they often had no access to funds to carry out the work 
needed. In 1995, for example, Brenda House applied for funds to transform one of its 
transitional housing properties into three units built to disability standards. The idea was well 
received but there was no money at this time and this project was not finally completed until 
late 2010. 
 
The exclusion of women with disabilities from women‘s refuges, Tomas has argued, was 
further aggravated by radical feminism‘s emphasis on challenging women‘s traditional roles 
as nurturers and carers. This combined with a focus on supporting women to independence, 
worked against the needs of women with disabilities. As Tomas reflects:  
 There was a sense that I got, nobody would directly say it to me, but often the feminist 
argument that went around in the late 70s, 80s and probably continued a little bit into 
the 90s was that  … women with disabilities need care … therefore this is oppressing 
other women who have to do it … if they can‘t look after themselves they can‘t be 
here.
287
 
 
As Tomas indicates, these arguments soon came under serious challenge, particularly when 
women with disabilities began to voice their concerns about being denied access to services, 
thus providing the catalyst for the WWDA to form a Violence Against Women with 
Disabilities reference group.
288
 At the same time, the WWDA presented a paper at the 
national domestic violence forum in Canberra in 1996,
289
 which in part recommended that 
domestic violence services should co-operate with them to ‗get refuges to start realising that 
women in wheelchairs have a right to be in a refuge if they need it, and they need to be made 
accessible and inclusive‘.290 The reference group applied for funds from the Commonwealth 
Office of the Status of Women (OSW) to employ a project worker to develop an action plan 
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for refuges, and VWRADVS took on the project.
291
 It was led by consultant Fiona Strahan, 
and Woorarra was nominated as the participating refuge. As former Woorarra co-ordinator, 
Kathy Russell, remembers:  
Fiona Strahan … came to a VWRADVS meeting, and said what she wanted to do. 
And we all agreed it needed to happen. And [I] said, ―if you can make Woorarra 
accessible, you can do it anywhere‖. That‘s how it started … [and] … it was a good 
two years work [where] … we were able to learn about providing access to services 
for women with disabilities‘.292 
 
The WWDA continued its advocacy work into the late 1990s, arguing that the current SAAP 
arrangements were grossly inadequate to meet the needs of women with disabilities.
293
 On the 
matter of violence, members developed an information kit on women with disabilities and 
further funding was gained from the OSW to host a national workshop, which was ‗planned, 
organised, attended and run by, women with disabilities‘.294 The workshop produced a range 
of strategies designed to respond to the issue, involving education, services, information, 
research, direct action and networking.
295
  
 
During the 1990s, response by the refuge movement to the needs of migrant and Aboriginal 
women also came about primarily as a result of advocacy from these groups. Migrant workers 
at the Domestic Violence Incest Resource Centre (DVIRC), for example, aimed to improve 
the organisation‘s ‗NESB‘ focus, with the development of an Access and Equity Policy in 
1991, which included the implementation of a multi-lingual phone service.
296
 An Access and 
Equity Working Group was established as a sub-group of VWRADVS to work with 
refuges.
297
 The Immigrant Women‘s Domestic Violence Service (IWDVS) (formerly REWP) 
received funding to develop audio tapes and booklets in 1996 so that migrant women were 
informed about services in their first language.
298
 In addition, multi-lingual brochures were 
provided to women accessing Victorian CASA centres.
299
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The influence of post-structuralist feminist ideas regarding the recognition of differences 
between women, and the role of discourse in determining identity, are evident in the writings 
of migrant activists at this time, who began overtly to challenge institutions that constructed 
migrant women as ‗deviant‘.300 These activists were central in arguing for a government 
strategy to redress ‗the gaps in service provision to NESB women‘.301 Furthermore, in March 
1996, a working group comprising representatives from DVIRC, IWDVS, Women in Industry 
and Community Health, and the VCCAV put together a conference that developed a set of 
strategies to respond to migrant women experiencing domestic violence and/or sexual 
assault.
302
  
 
Around the same time, Aboriginal workers from Elizabeth Hoffman House, with support from 
the IWDVS, argued that the government and VWRADVS needed to develop a strategy for the 
specific needs of Koori women.
303
 Drawing on the IWDVS model as an example of culturally 
appropriate support, they developed a funding submission to employ additional Koori workers 
in domestic violence services to support Aboriginal women.
304
 Meanwhile, the Koori 
representative from VWRADVS resigned in protest at the organisation‘s inaction.305 This 
prompted the coordinating collective of VWRADVS to acknowledge that ‗no strategic 
response to Koori women had been effected within the VWRADVS‘,306 and to start 
developing a strategy to improve their services for Indigenous women. This strategy 
incorporated proposals for training, employment and policy and resource development.
307
 A 
Koori worker was later employed by Department of Human Services. However, in keeping 
with the government‘s preference for tackling domestic violence at the level of individuals, 
the department implemented a case management program specifically targeting Koori and 
NESB women.
308
  
 
At the same time, Aboriginal women across the country began to speak publicly about the 
impact of violence against women and children on themselves and their communities.
309
 This 
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process was in part facilitated in Victoria by DVIRC, which initiated the first forum for 
workers providing domestic violence and sexual assault services to Aboriginal women and 
children in 1997. Inter-state Aboriginal activists Pam Greer and Judy Atkinson attended the 
forum, sharing their experiences of tackling the problem in NSW and Queensland.
310
 
Victorian Aboriginal women also continued to suffer overt discrimination in terms of their 
access to housing, a problem compounded by the lack of available housing for Aboriginal 
women across the country.
311
 Feminist activist and long-term refuge worker Rose Solomon 
recalled that racism was central to the discrimination experienced by the Aboriginal women 
she engaged with in her work in a Gippsland refuge:  
I had to give the message to Indigenous women I came across that it is not acceptable 
for people to be racist. It is not acceptable for them to deny you a service based on 
your colour ... [A]nd we needed to empower those women to make a stand. And in 
those days we didn‘t have some of the systems and the support services and the cross-
cultural understanding that are existent today … so we took extreme measures.312 
 
Once such measure adopted by Solomon on several occasions, involved posing as clients 
seeking to obtain private rental housing, so they would avoid the blatant discrimination 
characteristic of real estate agents. In one particular instance, Solomon recalled initiating the 
process of renting a house immediately after it was refused for let to her client on the grounds 
it was unavailable. The property was approved for Solomon to rent, and she immediately 
confronted the estate agent about their discriminatory practices, who quickly overturned their 
decision.
313
 
 
Lesbians were also marginalised in terms of access to domestic violence services and activists 
in Melbourne began to tackle this problem from the early 1990s. Feminist activist and former 
DVIRC lesbian services worker Karen Bird initiated a Lesbian Violence Action Group 
(LVAG) in 1991. Prior to this time, Bird argues, lesbian domestic violence was an issue that 
feminists ‗want[ed] to ignore‘ because it was considered to ‗water down‘ their ‗argument … 
that it‘s because of patriarchy‘.314 The LVAG prepared a paper on the issue315 that was 
delivered to a Sydney conference and publicised in the lesbian and gay press.
316
 This led to an 
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increase in demand for support services by lesbians, which resulted in a support group at 
DVIRC. In partnership with this group, Bird produced the first pamphlet on lesbian domestic 
violence,
317
 which was later adapted across the country.
318
 DVIRC also implemented internal 
training on ‗lesophobia‘ as well as a telephone counselling and referral service.319 The issue of 
lesbian domestic violence was soon being debated nationally and, at a conference to discuss 
the issue held in Adelaide in 1997,
320
 a number of recommendations including that ‗all 
women‘s refuges become lesbian appropriate services‘321 were made. 
 
The issue of lesbian domestic violence facing women from migrant backgrounds had been 
raised at the 1996 migrant women‘s conference in Melbourne. In her capacity as a 
representative from Interlesbian, which formed in 1994 as a referral network for lesbians from 
minority racial and ethnic backgrounds in Melbourne, Audrey Yue argued that ‗mainstream 
heterosexual, NESB and lesbian services, more often than not, do not meet the needs of 
NESBians because our specificities—as simultaneously NESB, women and lesbian—are not 
recognised‘.322 Yue further contended that, because ‗of our lived experiences of racism and 
homophobia‘, there can ‗often be no clear demarcation as to the source of violence or upon 
which domestic sphere it is occurring and enacted‘.323 Advocates for young migrant women, 
argued along similar lines, noting they were unlikely to contact domestic violence services 
because they do not identify ‗what they are experiencing as domestic violence‘.324 This 
highlights again the exclusionary consequences of defining violence solely within the 
parameters of gender inequality and the patriarchal home. Yue thus argued that definitions 
and analyses of domestic needed to be expanded because current understanding ‗defined at 
the local level of the domestic home … do not take into account the disparate and diverse 
experiences of lesbians from non-English speaking backgrounds‘.325  
Relationship to Feminism 
 
A commitment to feminism was reflected in VWRADVS first constitution, which aimed ‗to 
promote social justice for all women and children‘ and work towards ‗changing community 
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attitudes towards the crimes and issues of domestic violence and incest‘.326 The influence of 
liberal feminist philosophy was particularly evident in its commitment to ‗lobby for legal 
reform‘. Likewise, the influence of marginalised groups was reflected in the commitment to 
‗promote equal opportunity and access for all women and children‘.327 The continued 
influence of the movement‘s radical feminist origins was also evident in VWRADV‘S 
concern for services to be ‗run by women, for women and children‘ according to ‗non-
hierarchical collective working structures‘.328 However, whilst the 1992 constitution 
expressed a commitment to ‗promote a feminist analysis of the crime of domestic 
violence‘,329 feminism as an ideological framework for understanding violence against 
women was not integrated into most of its provisions. As least one person involved at the time 
has argued that the constitution was more concerned with ‗the structural aspects of the 
program than the ideological framework of violence itself‘.330 In particular, the constitution 
was ‗less articulate about [a] causal analysis of violence, [and] more focused on 
interventions‘.331 This is in contrast to the refuge movement of the 1970s, whose main 
purpose was to undertake political action and engagement in a debate over the politics of 
gendered representations in relation to women and domestic violence. The vastly different 
institutional and political environment in which the movement operated in the 1990s meant 
that the services had become desperate just for survival.
332
 Domestic violence services were 
under ‗siege‘, and their mandate above all else to survive. As long-term refuge worker Kathy 
Russell recounts, within this context, what feminism meant to the movement was re-
evaluated: 
We were all under threat … [and] … that siege mentality brings you all in, and we 
started to talk on a different level. We were talking about survival. Survival of the DV 
sector. Did we still want it? Did we want the feminist philosophy to go away 
altogether? Did we want the collective principles?
333
 
 
Radical feminism in particular was interrogated by domestic violence activists, who, argued 
against its focus on:  
[G]ender as the primary tool of analysis … where …. issues of race, class, sexuality, 
have all too often been excluded from the core of those discussions, resulting in the 
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marginalisation and trivialisation of the needs of working class women, indigenous 
women, non English speaking women, and lesbians.
334
 
 
Solomon recalls that she was forced to re-evaluate what feminism meant in her work with 
Aboriginal women in refuge.
335
 Radical feminist responses to domestic violence, supporting 
women to live without violent men, were designed for Anglo women and merely signalled a 
continuation of past injustices into the present for many Aboriginal women: 
There was a time in the early-to-mid-90s, where Indigenous communities were saying, 
―We want the violence to stop but we don‘t want to lose our men‖ And that was a fair 
enough comment.
336
 
 
Domestic violence remained as understood within radical feminism, combined with a 
recognition of the ‗intersections of the oppressive societal structures which affect the lives of 
women‘.337 However, the outcome of this period of introspection eventually resulted in a 
renewed commitment to feminist principles that, for the most part, built on the tenets of 
liberal feminism. While the 1996 VWRADVS constitution, for example, reaffirmed the 
objectives of 1992, it omitted the previous commitment to collective working structures, and 
instead referred to ‗structures which give workers involvement in decision making‘.338 As 
discussed previously, this change also reflected the pressure from government funding bodies 
to conform to hierarchical methods of operating.  
 
VWRADVS members were particularly active in arguing for the continuation of specialist 
domestic violence services in the face of funding cuts.
339
  In doing so, they argued the need to 
make certain that their ‗basic philosophies [were] not compromised‘, which included ensuring 
that the ‗needs of the service users, in terms of self-esteem, and other personal issues, are not 
undermined in order to achieve perceived accountability requirements‘.340 Domestic violence 
services thus sought to prioritise the needs of the women in their services above those of their 
funding bodies and in a manner congruent with their feminist philosophy. Moreover, despite 
the shifting ideological ground, feminist activists continued to assert the need to ‗spend some 
time making sure our processes are consistent with the kind of world we are trying to 
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create‘.341 Similarly, Russell recalls that the maintenance of collective process was an 
important part of her work at this time: 
[E]ven though a lot of us were starting to work then with managers and co-ordinators, 
we still argued you could do that, and uphold collective principles. For me, personally, 
I worked really hard to do that.  For a long, long time.
342
 
 
In keeping with this approach, and in the face of the government‘s refusal to fund the 
community development component of their work, services argued that it was ‗imperative that 
… the focus on community education remain‘.343 This was the reason they resisted signing 
their service agreements over a number of years as an attempt to ‗stand united in our 
decisions‘.344 In this sense, services stood up against attempts to change the nature of their 
work from that dealing with both the individual and structural factors underpinning domestic 
violence to an approach one that increasingly focused just on the individual. Services argued 
that the government should recognise ‗those involved in community based service provision 
are expert in that field‘. Furthermore, and in keeping with the now dominant liberal feminist 
approach, they implored the government to work in partnership, arguing that ‗outcomes that 
are best for service users can only be reached if each listens to the other with a decent 
measure of trust‘.345 
 
Arguably, as a consequence of the ascendancy of liberal feminism within VWRADVS, the 
movement was now considered ‗less political‘ in the sense that the focus of the group was 
domestic violence rather than the wider agenda of the earlier women‘s liberation movement.  
There was not the same concern ‗about the power imbalance in society‘.346 The liberal 
feminist tradition of reform within the system was also evident in the fact that in ‗many 
instances political action had become community education‘.347 As we have seen, however, 
this change in emphasis was also a result of government regulations prohibiting public 
criticism of funding bodies, which refused to fund social change activities. Some have argued 
that ‗within feminist services there had been an ideological swing to the right, and a watering 
down of feminist philosophy‘.348 Russell, for example, remembers the mid-1990s as a turning 
point, and asks why it was that the work they had accomplished thus far was suddenly 
‗watered down‘: 
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[W]hat they started back in the ‗70s was built on through the ‗80s and the ‗90s.  Well 
up until probably the mid-90s.  And I think that‘s when the watering-down processes 
began.  And I don‘t know whether the governments out there did it to us, or whether 
we did it to us? Trying to be seen to be more professional … and to be more 
acceptable.
349
 
 
Taken together, these factors help to explain why the 1996 VWRADVS constitution placed 
more attention on the nature of service provision. It incorporated statements endorsing priority 
for developing ‗funding submissions to government to ensure the growth and development of 
VWRADVS services‘.350 The 1996 constitution thus elevated the running of services above 
personal politics and political action and put greater emphasis on ‗the role of a refuge program 
as a viable response to crisis for women‘.351 In 1992, for example, the constitution included 
women‘s ‗equal opportunity and access‘, which by 1996 was made specific to their access to 
‗DV services, for women and children where the primary issue is DV‘.352 Dimopolous 
considers this was ‗an attempt … to respond to a recognition that funding was changing, 
[with] tendering and contract management stuff, [that was] very different to what the sector 
had been used to‘.353  
 
As Chapters 2 and 3 have demonstrated, the refuge movement had prioritised the problem of 
domestic violence above other issues relating to women‘s inequality since the late 1970s. 
However, in the 1990s, the locus of attention shifted from politicising the problem of 
domestic violence to providing domestic violence services. In Bird‘s summation: ‗by 1992, 
which is when I left DVIRC, I think it was much more about how can we provide a better 
service, rather than how can we influence society to provide equal opportunities for men and 
women‘.354  
 
By the mid-1990s, the domestic violence services movement‘s ‗basic philosophy‘ was 
summarised as ‗women supporting women escaping domestic violence in a manner, which 
promotes equality and responsibilities‘.355 The particular stress on equality and responsibility 
reflected the dominance of liberal feminism within VWRADVS combined with a new focus 
on accountable management. The latter had been imposed on, and then adopted by, the 
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movement and some celebrated their achievement as ‗effectively running small businesses‘.356 
This supports Egan and Hoatson‘s view that, ‗in order to survive [feminist services] have 
been forced to adopt [a market] philosophy themselves‘.357 In light of these changes, they thus 
implored the services to: 
 fight to retain core feminist principles, which include having women as the service 
focus and a gender analysis as the critique, creating change at the individual and 
structural level, using a diversity of strategies and rebuilding trust and collaboration 
within feminist service networks.
358
 
Looking to the Outside 
 
The ‗legal developments‘ that occurred in relation to domestic violence throughout the late 
1980s and into the 1990s, were also significant in terms of the direction of the domestic 
violence services movement. This reflected in part the new emphasis on responding to 
domestic violence via reform within the system. Whilst the implementation of the Crimes 
(Family Violence) Act 1987 was heralded as a key achievement for the movement, domestic 
violence services still faced a range of challenges that included a lack of police response to 
breaches of intervention orders,
359
 and a family court system that continued to overlook the 
safety needs of women and children in access and custody arrangements.
360
 Throughout the 
1990s, domestic violence services workers spoke out about these issues, and began to argue 
for a greater level of cooperation and co-ordination amongst service providers to redress these 
inadequate responses.
361
 Dimopoulos, for example, describes how legal challenges led better 
‗relationships with feminist lawyers‘, as well as a renewed engagement with ‗community 
legal centres‘.362 These kinds of developments had not been ‗happening in the mid-to-late 
1980s‘.363   
 
The refuge program in particular had been criticised for adopting an insular approach to their 
work, reflecting an apparent unwillingness to concede that ‗their view of the world isn‘t 
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[always] quite right‘.364 However, over the course of the 1990s, the movement was 
increasingly perceived as becoming ‗more inclusive‘ and ‗willing to learn‘.365 As Kaiser 
comments, ‗it wasn‘t just the conservative and so-called radical refuges working together, the 
group were working with a lot of community groups again‘.366 A growing willingness to work 
in partnership with outside organisations came to characterise a sector that had begun to 
realise there were ‗benefits to building a coalition … of activists that weren‘t just refuge 
focused‘.367 Dimopoulos notes: 
[M]ulti sector partnerships in the late 90s were really starting to build in a way that 
was reducing the silos of the refuge program … key individuals, personality driven … 
were outreaching and saying that we need to talk.
368
 
 
The work undertaken by both the DVIRC and the Women‘s Coalition Against Family 
Violence (WCAFV) at this time was significant in generating awareness of domestic violence 
and incest in the community. Of particular importance was the publication of a book that told 
the stories of murdered women and children.
369
 This work was also effective in educating 
other professionals, like magistrate Sally Brown, who from the mid-1990s undertook a 
leadership role in promoting the issue amongst her colleagues and ensured it was addressed at 
their annual conferences.
370
 At these gatherings, Brown challenged them to ‗accept our share 
of accountability for stopping family violence‘.371 It was also the role of key individuals like 
Brown that enabled important links to be forged between the judiciary and the domestic 
violence services movement: 
Sally Brown … was the Chief Magistrate at the time, now a Family Court Judge, [and] 
she was coming out to the sector and saying, ―How can the courts be working together 
with you?‖ And that was unknown, unheard of. My goodness, a judge … one of those 
bad guys … doing this. So … relationships then started to develop with the courts, and 
with … individual magistrates and judges.372 
 
The role of feminist lawyers, who over time rose in the ranks of the legal profession, 
combined with the advocacy of refuge workers who had ‗fought for ages‘,373 influenced the 
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family court to take into account the needs of women and children experiencing domestic 
violence. In 1993, the then Chief Justice of the Family Court, Alistair Nicholson, for example, 
developed a statement of principles to guide conduct in matters relating to domestic 
violence.
374
 In 1996, Nicholson also established a Gender Awareness Committee to 
implement training programs for court personnel.
375
 Around the same time, the Act was 
amended to ensure that the court took into account the impact on children of witnessing 
family violence.
376
 DVIRC also continued to be involved in the changes occurring within the 
family law arena and hosted forums in partnership with the Federation of Community Legal 
Centres, at one of which Nicholson provided the opening address.
377
 As a consequence of the 
development of these relationships, ‗joint initiatives with the judiciary became frequent‘.378  
 
A Family Violence Law Committee was established, for example, between DVIRC and the 
legal community to standardise practices for intervention orders. DVIRC drove this 
relationship and facilitated the inclusion of the VWRADVS Legal Subgroup as a 
participant.
379
 Sally Brown began chairing a courts and family violence protocols committee, 
which included representatives from DVIRC, the VWRADVS Legal Subgroup, police, 
magistrates, courts management, and the Attorney General‘s Department.380 In addition, the 
Women‘s Legal Resource Group presented a series of educational sessions on the legal 
system and domestic violence.  
 
The VWRADS Legal Subgroup also began to develop external relationships that were 
expanded under the leadership of key individuals such as Billi Clarke. They engaged the legal 
community in forums that encouraged debate about legal justice for women and children, 
particularly in relation to Legal Aid funding,
381
 which had been slashed following the 1996 
election of the Howard Commonwealth Liberal government.
382
 In doing so, they continued to 
involve key Melbourne magistrates such as Brown, and later Anne Goldsbrough and Sue 
Blashki, to stress that courts must take into account the safety needs of women and children 
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experiencing violence during legal proceedings.
383
 They were supported in their work by the 
then state Attorney General, Jan Wade, who met with VWRADVS on numerous occasions 
during which representatives raised their concerns, particularly about the impact of Legal Aid 
funding cuts on women and children experiencing domestic violence.
384
 Wade was an 
advocate for the domestic violence services movement, fending off attacks in parliament on 
the use of intervention orders and arguing for attention to be focused instead on the ‗greater 
issue of domestic violence‘.385 
 
Around the same time, the relationship between domestic violence and the legal system was 
undergoing interrogation, particularly in terms of the appalling experiences of many women 
within the system
386
 that were exposed in a published report, Trial by Legal Aid,
387
 by then 
domestic violence outreach worker Billi Clarke. The report followed Jan Wade‘s appointment 
of Clarke to the community member position on the Legal Aid Consultative Committee, 
which enhanced Clarke‘s awareness of the ‗blatant discrimination‘ in the allocation of Legal 
Aid funding to women experiencing domestic violence. Clarke argued that funding decisions 
were made arbitrarily and on the basis of whether the committee liked or disliked a woman.
388
 
She had obtained funding from the Women‘s Trust to write the report, which included a 
number of case studies of women whose Legal Aid funding had ceased once their allocation 
was exhausted. This often saw them losing legal representation, which at times resulted in 
them being cross-examined by the men who had committed crimes against them. As Clarke 
recounts: 
I did the case studies, and then [a lawyer] was able to write up the legal disadvantages 
that particular woman faced by not having representation. And some of the women 
had disabilities, no English, so there‘s obvious already disadvantages without having a 
lawyer representing you. Fortunately I was working for the Salvos and we were able to 
have a huge launch, attract media attention and get a meeting with the Federal 
Attorney General.
389
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Continuing a long tradition by feminists of challenging the provision of welfare to women 
within a deserving and non-deserving paradigm, Clarke‘s report ensured change ‗within the 
practice of the grants division‘, which was ‗made much more accountable for decisions of not 
granting aid rather than just, ―we‘re not doing it‖‘.390 
 
The report also occurred in the broader context of growing frustration within the sector 
concerning the gross lack of resources available for women facing the legal system. This issue 
was particularly significant for migrant and refugee women whose advocates in domestic 
violence services and other community groups engaged in research and lobbying to highlight 
the deleterious impacts of the legal system on a particularly marginalised group.
391
 This 
problem was also under scrutiny in a national context, as demonstrated in a book published by 
law academic Patricia Easteal in 1996 detailing the impact of violence against overseas-born 
women in Australia.
392
  
Conclusion 
 
Throughout the 1990s in Victoria, the relentless implementation of economic rationalist 
policies to human service delivery operated to radically change the relationship between 
domestic violence services and the state. I have argued that the imposition of competitive 
tendering and like policies inhibited the capacity of community sector organisations to be 
openly critical of government and thwarted their ability to operate autonomously or undertake 
political protest. Domestic violence services were also forced to respond to innumerable 
administrative and organisational demands from government from the 1990s onwards, 
including expanding their service delivery—all without additional financial support. 
 
In the face of these challenges, this chapter has also shown that the refuge movement did not, 
as some would suggest, simply give up confronting the government and politicising the issues 
facing women in their services. Despite the threatening and competitive environment, services 
opposed when they could, challenged where possible, particularly in relation to funding 
threats, and, over time, began to work in greater cooperation with each other to survive. I have 
suggested that the influence of liberal feminists was critical to this strategy and, more broadly, 
that liberal feminism assumed a significant role in directing the movement‘s engagement with 
the state at this time. This was reflected in the movement‘s growing focus on achieving 
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reform within the system, which was evident in their participation in countless government 
committees and taskforces. 
 
I have also argued that the influence of liberal feminism on the movement‘s aims during the 
1990s can be seen in the greater focus on improving the efficiency of their organisations and 
the effectiveness of their service delivery above social change. However, the Kennett and 
Howard governments overwhelmingly led this charge, and domestic violence services were 
unable to halt or reverse the dominating emphasis on professionalism across all realms of 
their practice, or the gradual adoption of hierarchical organisational structures within 
domestic violence organisations. Some adopted market philosophies in order to survive.  
 
This chapter has further argued that the influence of liberal feminists in the movement 
enhanced the level of mutual respect and tolerance for the ideological diversity of women 
working in domestic violence services. Moreover, I have shown that in correlation with 
broader post-structuralist influences on feminist theory and activism, differences between 
women were now being articulated, recognised and responded to within a domestic violence 
services movement that had previously conceptualised feminism and domestic violence in  
terms of the experiences of Anglo, able-bodied and heterosexual women. At the same time, 
the external environment in Victoria was particularly hostile to feminist services by the mid-
1990s, and to feminism more broadly, which meant that a growing number of activists 
deliberately and strategically distanced themselves from identification with it, particularly 
when engaging with external organisations. 
 
Throughout the 1990s, members of the Victorian movement continued to organise 
strategically and work together because of a shared commitment to women and children 
experiencing domestic violence. The instigation of VWRADVS is an example of the capacity 
of the movement to work cooperatively with both internally and with external bodies. Under 
the growing leadership of liberal feminists within the movement, refuge activists‘ tactics 
became less public and confrontational, and its leaders sought both to work in partnership and 
to generate reform within mainstream organisations. This enabled the movement to position 
itself successfully to influence mainstream policy and programmatic development in relation 
to domestic violence across a range of non-government and government institutions, 
particularly within the judiciary. I have also documented how, within the movement, 
marginalised groups of women operated strategically to ensure their voices were heard, and 
successfully advocated for their needs to be met. 
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Chapter 6: Integrating the Service System, 2000–2005 
 
In Victoria during the early 2000s, a number of dramatic changes to policy responses to 
domestic violence occurred, culminating in part in the state government contributing 
approximately $30 million from the 2005 budget to tackle the problem. A particular 
confluence of factors—not the least of which included the appointment of a knowledgeable 
and sympathetic woman chief police commissioner—provided the catalyst for these 
developments. Other factors included the election in 1999 of a Victorian state Labor 
government, which implemented a whole-of-government policy framework designed to deal 
with violence against women. These achievements built on foundations established by the 
activism of the Victorian domestic violence services movement over a 30-year period. They 
represented, as state government bureaucrat Di Godfrey recounts, ‗a ground-swell movement‘ 
that ‗brought with it recognition that violence against women shouldn‘t be tolerated and that 
we needed to address it‘.1 
 
This chapter examines the lead-up to these major developments, with particular attention to 
the policy context of government initiatives and the ongoing relationship between domestic 
violence services and ‗the state‘. In particular, this period was characterised by an approach to 
public administration that reflected the new Victorian Labor government‘s commitment to 
‗partnering‘ non-government organisations, and in this regard, marked a significant point of 
departure from the divisive approach of the former Liberal government. Indeed, by the turn of 
the decade, domestic violence services believed they were ‗entering a phase of real 
consultation‘ and were relieved to hear that the era of competitive tendering was over.2 
However, during this period of transformation, the services were forced to respond to a range 
of policy initiatives, some of which sought to diversify and expand their models of service 
delivery without the provision of adequate funding. As well as and alongside many other 
human services organisations, they faced an onslaught of regulatory requirements as 
governments increased their control over community organisations. An historical legacy of 
insufficient funding, combined with the reduction in welfare state investment by the 
Commonwealth government, made these tasks particularly burdensome for stand-alone 
community organisations like women‘s refuges still heavily dependent on the unpaid work of 
committed women. 
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This chapter continues to explore the external strategies and actions of the domestic violence 
services movement, largely characterised by liberal feminist methods of working within 
mainstream systems. This approach was further bedded down by the new Labor government‘s 
‗partnership‘ approach. Domestic violence activists began working in closer collaboration 
with a wider range of government institutions in the context of an emerging integrated policy 
response. Whilst these relationships can be characterised as constructive and collaborative, 
they also raised serious concerns for domestic violence activists, as ‗the government takes 
[domestic violence] on as its own thing‘.3 Concerns about the growing extent of government 
control, particularly via the funding bodies in DHS, flared into internal divisions about how to 
respond. These grew more pronounced as the domestic violence services peak body 
formalised and transformed its organisational structure and methods of advocacy in line with 
government demands. Nevertheless, domestic violence services continued to work together 
for funding purposes and for the women accessing their services. Overall, they became less 
concerned to challenge the ongoing application of business principles to their governance, 
which had by now become institutionalised. But domestic violence services now also faced 
new expectations to work in collaboration with mainstream service providers, including those 
providing services to men. This has proved challenging because, as we have seen, domestic 
violence services had operated quite separately until the 1990s.  
 
This chapter also continues to trace the activism of marginalised groups of women determined 
to ensure their voices were heard and their needs met. In recent years, this has resulted in 
specialised funding and taskforces to tackle particular issues confronting migrant and 
Aboriginal women and women with disabilities. Perhaps in part as a result, domestic violence 
services have become less explicit about their relationship to, and identification with, 
feminism. I conclude this chapter by exploring this shift, noting that this transition occurred 
despite the fact that feminism had become implicit in government policy and sector guidelines 
for understanding the problem of domestic violence.  
The Policy Context 
 
At a national level, the Howard-led Coalition government continued its Partnerships Against 
Domestic Violence (PADV). Initially funded until 2001 (and extended until 2005), the 
government initially injected $25.3 million to implement policies under four key areas 
relating to working with children and young people at risk, perpetrators, Aboriginal 
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communities and community education.
4
 As we have seen, and as historian Suellen Murray 
has reminded us, ‗policy changes‘ in relation to domestic violence and homelessness have 
occurred ‗within a context of competing discourses‘.5 PADV, for example, reflected the 
Howard government‘s ideological orientation towards individualism and self-reliance, which 
also shaped its broader approach to welfare reform. Whilst PADV acknowledged gender as 
the principal cause of domestic violence—defined as ‗an abuse of power perpetrated mainly 
(but not only) by men against women both in relationship and after separation‘6—unlike the 
former Labor government‘s National Committee on Violence Against Women (NCVAW), it 
did not recognise that ‗domestic violence occurs within the wider context of social 
disadvantage and inequality experienced by women relative to men‘.7 Domestic violence, 
then, was articulated as an ‗individualised‘ problem, rather than one that was ‗gender-based‘.8 
Moreover, as Murray has pointed out, PADV formed ‗a major part of the Government‘s 
strategy for strengthening families‘.9 A harmful consequence of this ‗family harmony‘ 
discourse was that it placed the ‗responsibility for ―managing‖ violence upon women‘.10  
 
The Howard government‘s focus on self-reliance and strengthening families was further 
developed in the ‗Stronger Families and Communities‘ policy initiative in 2000. Minister for 
Family and Community Services Amanda Vanstone saw its purpose as enabling ‗families and 
communities‘ to ‗build strength and resilience‘, so they could ‗resolve their local issues‘. 11 
The government‘s minimalist role would be to deliver one-off funds to ‗―can do‖ 
communities‘ and ‗kick start local responses‘.12 Social policy academic Sheila Shaver has 
argued that this approach to social welfare reflected a continued emphasis on economic 
rationalist principles, combined with ‗a newly salient appeal to moral ideas about the 
responsibility of citizens to be self-sustaining‘.13   
 
The concept of ‗self-sustaining‘ citizens was also evident in the revised principles of the 
Supported Accommodation Assistance Program (SAAP) IV (2000–05), which continued to 
fund the majority of domestic violence services in Victoria. SAAP IV aimed to ‗improve 
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outcomes for homeless people and those affected by domestic violence‘, through ‗preventing 
dependency by supporting individuals and families to secure their own economic and social 
participation to the greatest degree possible‘.14 Jane Bullen has argued that homelessness ‗was 
now to be conceptualised more in terms of the characteristics of individual homeless people 
and individual self-management rather than provision by governments, markets and other 
entities and forces‘.15 Though responsibility for SAAP funding had always been shared by 
Commonwealth and state governments‘ the former‘s contribution decreased over the years to 
the point of being insufficient to cover increases in awards and inflation.
16
 Thus expansion in 
service delivery in Victoria under SAAP IV was solely funded by the state government.
17
 
 
In Victoria at this time a range of new public policy initiatives specifically designed to tackle 
inequality and promote the safety of Victorian women came into being. Following the 1999 
election, the Bracks-led Labor government unveiled its policy framework for improving the 
position of Victorian women in education, work, economic independence, health, wellbeing, 
justice and safety.
18
 Consistent with this, the government in July 2000 announced ‗a co-
ordinated approach to violence against women across the whole of government‘.19 To develop 
this objective, an across-government Women‘s Safety Committee was formed in October 
2000 and state government ministers convened in December for their first annual meeting to 
oversee a proposed Women‘s Safety Strategy (WSS).20 The resulting policy framework was 
launched in October 2002, its principal aim being to reduce the level of violence against 
women. A whole-of-government action plan outlined how various government departments 
would meet WSS objectives,
21
 which were grouped under the four key themes: protection and 
justice; options for women (including enabling women to stay at home); prevention and 
education; and community action and co-ordination.
22
 Domestic violence was defined in WSS 
as a form of violence against women in a wider context of inequality: 
An abuse of power that occurs in a particular social and cultural context. The power 
imbalance between men and women in society contributes to violence against women, 
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along with other factors such as racism, homophobia, other forms of prejudice and the 
dispossession of Aboriginal people from traditional lands.
23
  
 
This policy direction marked a turning point. The former state Liberal government had 
acknowledged domestic violence as a gendered issue but had not placed it within the broader 
context of gender inequality. It had also ‗individualised‘ the problem, responding to it at the 
level of service delivery and case management. Under the Labor government, individual case 
management continued to form the bulk of the work undertaken by SAAP-funded domestic 
violence services, but WSS expanded on this response, not only by re-framing the problem, 
but by pledging to reform government institutions and employing a whole-of-government 
response that focused on protection and prevention-based initiatives.
24
 This was reinforced by 
policy development in relation to other issues affecting women including housing, health, and 
homelessness.
25
 Unlike the policies of the federal Coalition and former state Liberal 
governments, Labor‘s reforms in relation to domestic violence were thus part of a broader 
agenda to improve the status and equality of Victorian women.  
 
These developments reveal the extent to which the aims and objectives of feminist domestic 
violence services had become ‗absorbed as part of government policy‘.26 It is perhaps, in part 
because of this achievement that broader goals concerning women‘s equality became less 
central to domestic violence services work. However, as we have seen, this change of 
emphasis also stemmed from shifting ideological persuasions within the services, alongside 
demands arising from the plethora of policy reforms and regulations imposed by government. 
As former refuge co-ordinator Robyn Gregory puts it, ‗If you‘ve got poor funding, high 
targets and masses of need, it is difficult to find time to maintain a strong political focus‘.27  
 
Another key policy initiative was Victoria‘s Family and Domestic Violence Crisis Protection 
Framework (FDVCPF),
28
 which was developed in partnership between the Office of Housing 
and the Community Care divisions of DHS and sought to guide future delivery of crisis 
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responses to women and children experiencing domestic violence. Domestic violence services 
were included in consultations from as early as 2000.
29
 The framework released in 2002 was 
underpinned by a commitment to the safety needs of women and children and to refocusing 
the work of services to better respond their ‗individual needs‘ and to the growing 
‗complexity‘ of the problems. The report argued that traditional accommodation and support 
models (that is, refuges) were ‗struggling to adequately respond to this complexity‘,30 and 
‗some refocussing of resources‘, was required to increase the ‗emphasis on support responses 
through family and domestic violence outreach‘.31 Services would also be expected to carry 
out more work in their local areas, including supporting women to remain at home, which 
marked a reversal of the state-wide removal response that had characterised their work from 
inception. In summary, services would be required to provide greater ‗flexibility, diversity 
and choice in access to, and delivery of, crisis protection responses‘.32 This approach 
implicitly acknowledged that Victorian women‘s refuges emphasis on security and protecting 
residents had had the unintended consequence of disempowering residents and that the variety 
of women‘s needs required a variety of responses. 
 
Whilst FDVCPF‘s recommendations on better responding to ‗individual‘ needs were 
laudable, they were not new. As Chapter 4 has demonstrated, responding to the diverse needs 
and subjectivities of women and children, including supporting them to remain at home and 
developing different models of accommodation, had been part of the service‘s work since the 
1990s. In the 2000s, refuges increasingly adopted dispersed models of accommodation
33
 and 
supported women who chose to remain in their homes.
34
 However, as we have seen, domestic 
violence services, and refuges in particular, were never offered additional funding to 
implement these reforms, which meant that responses occurred unevenly and the typical 
model of refuge remained communal high security.
35
 FDVCPF was no different in this respect 
from other reform proposals. That is, implementation of its proposals was not supported by 
funding. VWRADVS raised these concerns time and time again,
36
 arguing both for 
recognition of the innovative work already undertaken by the services and for financial 
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support to implement FDVCPF:  
It must be stated that the sector as a whole has expanded its breadth of service delivery 
to provide a flexible, innovative response to women and children across regions and 
across the state … thus having more than doubled capacity and expanded serviced 
provision options to an enormous degree from the original model, services are now 
seeking recognition of these initiatives in the form of DHS funding ... 
37
 
 
It is altogether unsurprising that domestic violence services, and refuges in particular, were 
‗struggling‘ to respond to the growing complexity of their clients‘ needs and demands. Their 
difficulties simply reflected the government‘s meagre resource allocation, combined with the 
flow-on effects of deinstitutionalisation. What is surprising, however, is the assumption that a 
transfer of resources to outreach services would solve these problems. This bears a striking 
resemblance to the proposed SAAP service system redevelopment of 1994, which, as we have 
seen, was rejected following recommendations from a Ministerial Taskforce. State 
government bureaucrat Tony Newman has argued that the growing focus on outreach services 
reflected a more general inadequacy in of government response: 
 The problem with government is that it‘s often simplistic. So refuges were good, are 
bad, domestic violence outreach now is good. The world doesn‘t operate like that … 
but that is the flavour of government.
38
 
 
Whilst Newman‘s comments are no doubt accurate, the government‘s ongoing support for 
outreach services through FDVCPF was also equally reflective of a policy context 
characterised by an aversion to redressing homelessness and domestic violence through 
investment in accommodation-based services, combined with a continuing preference for 
individual support. Whilst this focus on the needs of ‗individuals‘ was designed to enhance 
services‘ capacity to provide much-needed flexible and individually tailored support, it also 
reflected the prevailing emphasis of welfare provision on regulating individual behaviour to 
prevent dependency rather than increasing the availability of crisis accommodation.
39
 That 
being said, FDVCPF was also in principle concerned to diversify the accommodation 
responses of domestic violence services. Former refuge worker and bureaucrat Sandra Morris 
describes some of the options: 
We were considering models that meant women didn't have to live in close proximity 
in share housing with women who they didn't know, and came from a range of diverse 
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backgrounds. Whilst this model of communal living could provide support it was 
often challenging and difficult.
40
 
In addition, funding support was never forthcoming, despite the largely agreed-upon need for 
new models of crisis housing.  
 
FDVCPF also challenged the accessibility of refuges, which remained primarily the 
responsibility of WDVCS, thus enabling refuges to keep their addresses secret. Refuges had 
long followed a policy of not accepting women from their local area, a product of the need to 
move them away from the perpetrator. This was considered particularly necessary at a time 
when police intervention was unreliable, to say the least. However, over time, criticism of this 
approach grew, particularly in relation to the isolation and disruption it caused the women. 
State bureaucrat Alison Fraser, who was involved in developing FDVCPF, recalled that a key 
motivation was to minimise the displacement experienced by women and children escaping 
domestic violence: 
It brought into question the high security of the refuges, and whether the practice of 
relocating women and their kids a long way away for safety‘s sake was actually 
serving their best interests ... It was just such a massive amount of dislocation for the 
family and the resultant legwork for the woman and the workers then to either rebuild 
a new life or to repatriate her back safely to where she was. It was just unworkable.
41
 
 
Despite considerable work towards its implementation,
42
 FDVCPF ‗never got finalised‘.43 
While the reasons for the framework‘s abandonment remain unclear, the opening up 
discussion about ways to improve and diversify service responses to women and children 
were considered valuable and necessary. Former outreach and Domestic Violence Victoria 
(DV Vic) worker Bree Oliver has argued, for example, that these conversations were critical 
to ensuring services would be based on ‗what is in the best interests of the women … [and] … 
not what is in the best interest of the service system‘.44 If diversity is not encouraged, Oliver 
contends ‗then we are excluding a whole lot of women that need support‘.45 Similarly, 
feminist and former WRRS and CASA worker Lyn Walker raised concerns about the existing 
service system:  
 I completely and utterly respect the front line work that refuge workers do. I also think 
that the system is not designed to meet the needs of the full range of women it is 
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required to service and that‘s terrible because most vulnerable women actually fall 
through the cracks.
46
 
‘Partnering’ the State: Challenges and Achievements  
Funding and Regulation: Collaboration or Co-option? 
 
Despite the considerable mistrust that accumulated during the Kennett government‘s period in 
office, relationships between domestic violence services and bureaucrats in DHS improved 
considerably by the mid-2000s to the point where annual ‗address holder‘ visits to monitor the 
operation of refuge services were no longer considered necessary.
47
 The appointment of 
sympathetic bureaucrats with past histories of working in the sector (reminiscent of the 1980s 
and early 1990s) helped forge a new foundation for relations. In addition, those involved in 
domestic violence services adapted their methods of engagement, with some positive results. 
However, the ability to achieve true ‗partnership‘ in a context of unequal power relations has, 
not surprisingly, been questioned. In particular, activists have queried whether domestic 
violence services continue to reflect the ‗the voice of community‘,48 and in particular, of 
women experiencing violence.  
 
The Bracks Labor government‘s approach to the governance of community organisations 
continued to reflect global trends away from ‗macro-economic stabilisation and redistributive 
welfare policies towards the improvement of economic efficiency‘.49 Not surprisingly, then, 
domestic violence SAAP-funded services have continued to receive inadequate funding, 
combined with growing demands in relation to accountability, self-regulation and output-
based funding measures. VWRDAVS continued to speak out against these impositions, but 
with less emphasis on opposition to the nature of these reforms than to a lack of funding to 
implement them.  
 
Immediately after the Labor government‘s election, the administration of Victorian SAAP-
funded services, including women‘s refuges and outreach services, was transferred from 
Community Care to the Office of Housing division of DHS. Before this time, according to 
bureaucrat and former refuge worker Alison Fraser, there had been ‗a lot of internal toing-
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and-froing about who had policy responsibilities for domestic violence services‘.50 Non- 
SAAP-funded domestic violence related programs continued to be administered under 
Community Care within the Family Violence Prevention and Support Program (FVPSP), 
which included family violence networkers, children‘s counselling services, after-hours 
family violence support and men‘s behaviour-change programs. Following the shift, SAAP-
funded domestic violence services came under the responsibility of the new Minister for 
Housing and Aged Care, Bronwyn Pike, who promptly met with VWRADVS representatives 
committed herself to ‗better collaboration‘ by inviting their input into new policy 
developments.
51
 This administrative shift appears to have occurred without significant 
controversy, and support for Minister Pike was strengthened during 2000 after she took an 
active role in securing an additional $5 million in funding for Victorian SAAP-funded 
services.
52
 Of this amount, $2.1 million went to SAAP-funded domestic violence services,
53
 
which included 27 women‘s refuges, to outreach services that existed in every DHS region, 
and to WDVCS (and the interim refuge), IWDVS, and DVIRC.  
 
These funding increases allowed the salary subsidy benchmark for domestic violence services 
to be increased, which improved wage conditions.
54
 Domestic violence services could thus 
roll back cost-saving measures that had included reducing the number of hours dedicated to 
service delivery.
55
 However, many services remained inadequately funded for a range of 
employee-related costs, including long service leave, work cover, award and superannuation 
increases.
56
 Although domestic violence services raised these problems with their funding 
bodies, they were informed that no further funding would be made available from the state 
coffers at this time.
57
 Furthermore, because the government‘s funding injection only resulted 
in a 1.39 per cent increase for operating costs,
58
 much of it was absorbed into existing budget 
deficits, and the ‗gap between funding and real costs continue[d] to grow‘.59 Despite a 
nominal increase in recurrent SAAP funding from $8.25 million per annum in 1994 to $13.5 
million per annum in 2002,
60
 budget deficits existed in women‘s refuges because they had 
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received no real increase in operating funds since the late 1980s.
61
 They had therefore been 
forced to absorb the growing costs of running a service while expanding their service models 
as government demands increased. For example, growing demands for financial 
accountability increased three-fold between 1995 and 2000.
62
 
 
From 2002 onwards, funding concerns for SAAP-funded domestic violence services 
intensified under new financial pressures arising from OoH‘s cancellation of one-off annual 
SAAP-funded grants previously made available to cover costs in relation to vehicle 
replacement and long service leave. Thus, when the services heard rumours that new funding 
would be made available in the 2002 state budget, VWRADVS representatives forwarded a 
‗budget issues‘ paper to Minister Pike outlining the historical and current context for funding 
inadequacies. In particular, they pointed out that, in contrast to Transitional Housing 
Management organisations, domestic violence services were ‗operating with minimal funding 
for administration and with unfunded management‘, and had received ‗no operating funds‘ for 
the additional accommodation services that many refuges operated.
63
  
 
It is arguable that the shift in administration of domestic violence SAAP-funded services did 
not help domestic violence services. Refuge workers highlighted the disparity between 
salaries of SAAP-funded domestic violence services and government-run Family Support 
Services (FSS) administered within Community Care. This gap continued to grow to the 
detriment of the former,
64
 and it was estimated that, by 2002–2003, the difference in funding 
was approximately $20 million per annum.
65
 VWRADVS therefore argued for ‗salary 
increments‘, without which there would always be a lack of ‗value on the work of staff in our 
services‘.66 VWRADVS further argued that services were already faced with a ‗workload that 
is unsustainable‘, which had only been made possible because ‗there is far more commitment 
than career in this field‘.67 Furthermore, the shift to OoH, long-time refuge worker Julie 
Oberin has argued, was particularly disadvantageous for women‘s refuges because of OoH‘s 
allegiance to economic rationalist ideas, marked by a scrupulous focus on cost effectiveness 
and accountability,
68
 reflected in the requirement that services increase their ‗outputs‘ before 
gaining new funding.
69
 VWRADVS opposed these demands and continued to argue their 
                                               
61
 VWRADVS budget minutes, 22 May 2002, BHA. 
62
 VWRADVS Finance Subgroup, ‗Annual report‘, 2000, BHA. 
63
 VWRADVS to Minister for Housing, 6 June 2002, BHA. 
64
 VWRADVS, ‗Annual Report: 2003–2004‘, p. 13, BHA. 
65
 Austin correspondence. 
66
 VWRADVS to Minister for Housing, 6 June 2002. 
67
 VWRADVS to Minister for Housing, 6 June 2002. 
68
 Oberin interview. 
69
 VWRADVS budget minutes, 22 May 2002, 
  241 
services had been historically under-funded and that, since the early 1980s, increasing costs 
associated with property upkeep, combined with a changing client base, had gone ‗largely 
unrecognised‘. They requested that the minister undertake to determine ‗the real costs of 
running services‘ with ‗appropriate recurrent funding provided on this basis‘,70 and they to 
meet with them to respond to the issues raised in their paper. However, despite repeated calls, 
there was no response at this level. Domestic violence services were, however, granted an 
increase in salary as a result of an increase in the Social and Community Services (SACS) 
award, and a small increase in operating costs towards the end of 2002.
71
 Notably, domestic 
violence outreach services fared better than refuges from this funding, a pattern that would 
continue into 2005.
72
 As a further consequence of the administrative shift to the OoH, 
domestic violence services have been subject to a process of homogenisation amongst generic 
homelessness services and are often treated in terms of a causal relationship to homelessness, 
as opposed to gender inequality.
73
 This trend has meant that, throughout the 2000s, domestic 
violence services have been ‗constantly arguing for the visibility of family violence within the 
Office of Housing‘.74 Many have argued that the need for domestic violence funding should 
be administered instead by a ‗women‘s unit or … a family violence unit‘.75 
 
The Commonwealth government‘s inadequate funding for the SAAP program nationally was 
counteracted to some extent in Victoria by the state Labor government, which committed to 
modest increases between 2000 and 2003, thereby shifting the proportion of Commonwealth-
state SAAP funding over this time from 58:42 to 50:50.
76
 However, as we have seen, 
numerous attempts by bureaucrats to review the funding model for domestic violence services 
have resulted in only small increases and tinkering at the edges of the problem has proved 
ineffective in the face of an historical legacy of inadequate and disproportional funding for 
OoH-funded organisations.  
 
Bureaucrats within DHS openly acknowledged that domestic violence services were 
underfunded, but reiterated the mantra that no money was available, and therefore the option 
services should ‗reduce targets or reduce services over time‘ to achieve funding equity with 
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other DHS-funded services.
77
 Services were quick to highlight the immorality of this 
proposition, faced as they were with an already over-stretched service system, combined with 
an anticipated increase in demand resulting from the publicity generated by the Women‘s 
Safety Strategy (WSS) and forthcoming changes to police standing orders.
78
 The funding 
differential between SAAP-funded services and FSS was also of concern to bureaucrats 
within the Office of Women‘s Policy (OWP), who made the somewhat more astute 
suggestion that DHS increase its annual bid to the treasury‘s Economic Review Committee 
(ERC) in order to improve salaries for SAAP workers.
79
 This has not, however been realised 
to date.
80
 Therefore, whilst the perception exists today that women‘s refuges ‗no longer have 
to go cap in hand and prove their case all the time‘,81 the funding issues continue largely 
unredressed, as Women‘s Liberation Halfway House manager Kathy Russell explains:  
The THM system came into play, many years behind us, funded from the outset at a 
realistic level. You go to some of their office buildings now, and you think, ―this is not 
fair‖! Come to Halfway House, and see the conditions that we‘ve got. I‘m fighting to 
get air conditioning in for this summer. Basics.
82
  
 
Lack of funding was raised by many interviewees as a key challenge to the future of domestic 
violence services. This issue is particularly dire for small independent organisations like 
women‘s refuges that continue to face increasing numbers of compulsory government 
regulatory requirements without any funding to support their implementation. As long-term 
domestic violence services worker Vig Geddes puts it: 
Family violence services are under resourced. I worry that the specialist women‘s 
domestic violence services will be swallowed up by big organisations, that the family 
violence program in these organisations might then lose their gendered approach to 
violence.
83
 
 
Workforce sustainability is also increasingly uncertain without improved funding for salaries, 
as long-time refuge worker Janine Mahoney argues: 
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 There‘s been initiative after initiative dumped on the sector … they‘re underpaid, they 
have massive stress on them in their workplace, they have high-risk jobs, and there‘s 
no recognition of that given by government … So why would anybody want to work 
in our sector?  Unless they‘ve got a strong commitment, which is the only reason we 
have the staff we‘ve got now.84 
 
SAAP services continued to be underfunded despite the emergence of cross-government 
investment and collaboration in response to domestic violence at this time via policy 
initiatives arising from the Women‘s Safety Strategy, and the Victorian Homelessness 
Strategy (VHS). Funding associated with some of these initiatives was not in general provided 
for SAAP-funded services but instead directed towards prevention-focused initiatives such as 
the family violence networkers, whose program was expanded after receiving an additional 
$1.5 million in funding in 2002.
85
  
 
Another initiative included the allocation of $1.8 million in funding to support women 
experiencing domestic violence to access the private rental market.
86
 Consistent with its 
aversion to welfare, the Commonwealth government had, over the previous decade rigorously 
pursued policies geared towards enhancing people‘s access to the private rental market in 
favour of investment in public housing. Rent assistance, for example, trebled in real terms 
between 1990 and 2001,
87
 usurping funding for public housing, which declined by 31 per cent 
over the same period.
88
 Additional investment in social housing by the state Labor 
government between 2001 and 2003 had begun to peter out by 2004.
89
 Capital investment in 
the THM program, for example, came to a virtual standstill by 2004-05.
90
 The peak body for 
homelessness organisations, the Council to Homeless Persons, argued publicly that the state 
government‘s commitment to tackling affordable housing and homelessness had stalled,91 and 
that ‗the lack of affordable, sustainable and long-term housing is the major issue that needs to 
be addressed‘.92 
 
By the middle of the decade, diminished government funding for SAAP and social housing 
was paralleled by the ongoing transfer of responsibility for welfare service provision from the 
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government to the non-government sector, which was combined with an ever-growing 
emphasis on their regulation. Government continued to implement ‗accountability techniques 
to measure whether non-government organisations … were meeting government objectives‘.93 
As we have seen, this trajectory was firmly established in Victoria by the Kennett government 
in the 1990s when it implemented a purchaser–provider model, which radically shifted the 
locus of power from the community sector to the government. Whilst the Bracks-led Labor 
government opted for a model characterised by ‗partnership‘ above competition, which 
worked to soften the edges of the more extreme market-inspired measures imposed by the 
Kennett government, it continued to operate within the same paradigm as its predecessors. In 
practice, the Labor government continued to work within a purchaser–provider model, 
although it replaced techniques of competitive tendering with the somewhat less market-
driven ‗expressions of interest‘, as a method of purchasing services.94 The paradox that 
characterises this form of partnership was not lost on domestic violence services, and the 
tensions it generated will be considered in greater detail below. 
 
The trends outlined above continued into 2003, when DHS proposed three-year service 
agreements for all SAAP-funded services. Services were informed that the agreements would 
incorporate a greater emphasis on ‗output-based funding, increased standardisation, visibility 
and accountability‘.95 The finance group of VWRADVS was particularly concerned about the 
proposed inclusion of a common price index for all services, and undertook extraordinary 
efforts to analyse the proposed funding formula, which, they concluded, would lead to 
funding cuts since it was not tied to an award.
96
 VWRADVS also challenged the government 
resolution that ‗funds will be reduced if targets are not met but will not be increased if targets 
are exceeded‘.97 They were told that the key driving force behind the agreements derived from 
the fact that ‗the state does not have the capacity to continue to fill the [funding] gap left by 
the Commonwealth‘.98 However, a clause inserted into the agreements defining the agency as 
an ‗independent contractor for the purpose of this agreement‘, was both reminiscent of the 
‗contract culture‘ instigated by the Kennett government and suggestive of Labor‘s intention to 
extend the ongoing ‗devolution of responsibility from DHS to the services‘.99 The Victorian 
Council of Social Services led a campaign in opposition to the service agreements, including a 
sector-wide day of action. As in the 1990s, many domestic violence services refused to sign 
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their agreements until 2004, when they were forced to do so under threat of de-funding.
100
  
 
It seems somewhat paradoxical that within a state government policy context designed to 
promote the wellbeing and equality of women, inadequate funding for domestic violence 
services, combined with their increased regulation, has had the effect, in Julie Oberin‘s words, 
of ‗work[ing] people to the bone‘ and inhibiting the capacity of services to have ‗quality time 
with the women and children that they‘re supporting‘.101 However, despite the widespread 
consensus that services were, and are ‗constrained by service agreements and targets and 
numbers and occupational health and safety‘, the implementation of these controls was also 
considered by some as ‗really important‘.102 Indeed, VWRADVS made evident their in-
principle commitment to ‗embrace further outputs‘, combined with the ‗need to operate as 
professional small businesses‘.103 Correspondingly, case management was no longer 
challenged on the basis that it undermined the ability of workers to break down hierarchical 
power relations between themselves and their clients, or that it limited the capacity of services 
to undertake political work. On the contrary, as Kennedy says, it was now assumed ‗that 
everyone should work that way‘.104 Thus, unlike the 1990s, when domestic violence services 
voiced their principled opposition to economic rationalist proposals, by the 2000s their 
objections focused entirely on inadequate funding. This adoption of business techniques to the 
governance of individuals through case management had thus become normalised and 
institutionalised.  
 
Despite their now widespread acceptance, some activists have continued to raise concerns 
about the disproportionate attention such techniques have received in contrast to other 
objectives of domestic violence services, including the elimination of family violence. The 
achievement of this goal, Vig Geddes has argued, should encompass a continued dedication to 
reddress family violence at the ‗level of power and redistribution of power‘.105 Without this 
ongoing commitment, Geddes contended, an ‗increasing emphasis on accreditation, good 
governance, unit costing, and risk management will distract us‘.106 There is no doubt that this 
has indeed occurred to a large extent, and, despite the fact that activists continue to identify 
the need for equality and redistribution of power to reduce domestic violence, the onerous 
regulation from government has made it difficult to apply these goals in their work. As long-
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term refuge worker Judy Kneale explains: 
[W]hen you‘re embroiled in producing that fabulous service system … how do you 
have the time and energy to do that other stuff? … Our aim is not just to develop the 
best service system for women experiencing violence, it‘s to actually change society 
so that it doesn‘t happen, and when are we getting the chance to do that?107 
 
The new level of scrutiny applied to domestic violence services was reflected in the 
government‘s funding and regulation of community services generally, as well as the 
direction of the FDVCPF as outlined above. The requirement that VWRADVS become a 
more ‗formal‘ body and change its methods of operation and organisational structure was thus 
congruent with these wider shifts, and had been in progress since the 1990s when 
VWRADVS had moved away from collective structures in the name of efficiency and to 
legitimate its standing with the state. VWRADVS finally received funding for a project 
worker in late 2000
108
 and rewrote its constitution in 2001 to enable wider membership and 
remove any reference to collective forms of operating.
109
 Following the receipt of further 
funding in 2002, it ‗tightened processes for decision making‘,110 and represented itself as now 
playing a ‗far more pro-active, visible and accountable role‘.111  Two years later, VWRADVS 
restructured again, wider members no longer taking part in the peak body‘s decision making, 
which was instead undertaken at monthly coordinating collective meetings.  
 
The 2002 funding allocation for a VWRADVS policy co-ordinator was couched in terms of 
the government‘s ‗commitment to working collaboratively‘112 and ‗a result of the relationship 
VWRADVS members and DHS staff have fostered‘.113 It was the culmination of a long 
campaign, as bureaucrat Alison Fraser confirms, ‗the sector had lobbied for years to get a 
funded peak‘.114 However, funding came with conditions intended to alter VWRADVS 
methods of operating and to improve its capacity to negotiate ‗in a constructive way‘.115 DHS 
funded VWRADVS in order to foster broader critical ‗debate about practice‘ and 
‗examination of the way things were‘, and to generate ‗dialogue [and] some scrutiny, a level 
of empirical evidence, [and] a diversity of approaches‘.116  By extension, DHS saw reform of 
VWRADVS as a means to increase services‘ accountability, a goal most domestic violence 
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service providers now supported. They still, however, demanded that the government 
recognise its own lack of responsibility and accountability in failing to fund the services 
adequately.
117
 
 
The adoption of hierarchical decision-making processes was mirrored in an endeavour to 
bridge the ‗historical differences between refuge, outreach and state-wide services‘.118 With 
this aim, VWRADVS voted to adopt the title of Domestic Violence Victoria (DV Vic) at its 
annual general meeting in 2003. This change was also driven by the government‘s desire for 
just one ‗formal body to talk to‘.119  It was in part, therefore, an attempt to generate efficiency, 
as well as replace ‗informal relationships‘ with those that were ‗formal, concrete, open‘.120 
DV Vic‘s founding coordinator Janine Bush describes the merit in: ‗having a feminist 
organisational structure, that‘s got some hierarchy but that‘s ethical, transparent and with 
clear processes and acknowledging the power and where it lies and making that power 
accountable‘.121 Current CEO of DV Vic Fiona McCormack also perceived the change as 
positive: ‗I would much rather have a formal relationship with bureaucrats because it‘s 
acknowledging that we have very different roles … and that your responsibility is to keep 
government accountable and that it‘s not personal‘.122  
 
These transitions were not surprisingly contentious, member services being largely suspicious 
of DV Vic‘s engagement with the state, and less than willing to compromise on their tactics 
and principles. DV Vic also incurred criticism by some members for being unwilling to adopt 
militant protest tactics during their negotiations with government. Some perceived that their 
achievements and ‗power‘ as a group had been ‗weakened‘ as a result.123 This criticism from 
their membership led to concerns by some within DV Vic that a ‗legitimacy crisis‘ had 
developed.
124
 They were accused, McCormack recounts, of ‗being co-opted by the 
department‘, an ‗unhappy‘ constituency assuming that, when controversial decisions ‗have 
been made that people aren‘t happy with …  that we‘ve been party to those decisions.‘125 
However, it was not DV Vic‘s changing methods and tactics that reduced domestic violence 
services position of power in their negotiations with their funding bodies, but instead the 
growing capacity and desire of modern government to exert control over the planning and 
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operation of human service organisations. Ironically, this paralleled the government‘s 
determination to relocate responsibility away from the state to ‗reduce their exposure to 
risk‘.126 These changes were combined with a preference for funding prevention-based policy 
initiatives and reluctance to invest in bricks-and-mortar, including women‘s refuges and other 
forms of medium and long-term social housing. The emergence of this new administrative 
regime over the 1990s, and first half of the 2000s also worked to constrain domestic violence 
services‘ capacity to undertake political work. 
 
DV Vic‘s decision to adopt a partnership approach to working with the state was a pragmatic 
one as old ways of interacting with government were proving ineffective. Challenging 
government decisions via direct action tactics and public campaigns, for example, was not 
‗appropriate when you at least have some sort of accord with the government‘.127 McCormack 
contends that such strategies would have resulted in DV Vic being considered ‗a risk and they 
wouldn‘t give us any information and they would be really loathe to negotiate with us … we 
actually need more sophisticated strategies‘.128 Similarly, Bush argues that militant tactics ‗are 
no longer effective because they place you at risk of being frozen out and having the door 
slammed in your face‘.129 Adopting a partnership approach has meant, as long-term 
bureaucrat Peter Lake suggests, that DV Vic was perceived as ‗shift[ing] from being an 
organisation that made its own decisions, and was assertive, and demanded certain things … 
into something that we can partner‘.130 
 
Adopting conciliatory methods of negotiating with the state does not necessarily deny 
services the opportunity to politicise issues. As DV Vic policy worker Alison Macdonald has 
argued, ‗keeping up the political struggle‘ and ‗going along with change‘ are not necessarily 
‗mutually exclusive processes‘.131 Moreover, adopting a partnership approach does not 
necessarily make the job of the bureaucracy an effortless one. As Di Godfrey has argued in 
relation to working with representatives of domestic violence services: 
[T]hose women haven‘t changed, they‘re still strong, driven, and opinionated and 
determined. And if you are going to try and go in and have a discussion with them, 
where you want to influence their decision making, or implement anything, and you 
aren‘t really articulate about what you‘re saying … and you haven‘t got a good 
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rationale, you are going to be like pushing shit up hill.
132
 
 
Clearly, despite the perils inherent in partnering the state, there remains capacity for 
resistance, and positive outcomes have been achieved through the adoption of new techniques 
of engaging with the state. Whilst discussion of the late 2000s period is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, Macdonald contends that, in recent years, as DV Vic has developed a positive 
relationship with state bureaucrats, their work has continued to be ‗inherently political‘, thus 
challenging the view that ‗by going along with change you‘re therefore complicit, or you‘re 
watering down your radicalism‘.133  However, Dimopoulos has cautioned Australian domestic 
violence services against becoming ‗locked into government‘, and losing the drive to ensure 
‗the voice [we represent] is about the voice of community‘.134 She warns that in Australia the 
‗government has been very clever about co-opting us … we have become the government 
voice … I am not naive and I participate in it myself, but … I think we really need to watch 
how we have been co-opted into some of it‘.135 Similarly, disability activist Chris Jennings 
notes that governments in the past ‗funded the community sector to be a voice of the 
community‘, but that, in recent years, ‗the bureaucracy wants to control the voice of the 
community. They want to purchase community services to be a spokesperson for 
government‘.136 Dimopoulos explicitly asks whether that ‗compromises us in terms of toeing 
the government line or not being critical?‘137 
 
As we have seen, until the late 1990s, domestic violence services were determined to promote 
collectivism within their organisations, in order to encourage full participation in decision 
making. Whilst there had been a variety of problems associated with this method of 
organising, many of which have been canvassed in this thesis, there can be little doubt that 
collective processes enabled the voices of women in the community to be heard. Though a 
partnership approach to working with government may be perceived as ‗a really positive 
thing‘, it has also represented ‗a real change from groups of collective women coming 
together‘,138 as long-time DVIRC worker Margot Scott notes. Other long-time activists have 
also reflected on the impact that partnering the state has had, particularly in terms of the 
changes to the modus operandi of domestic violence services and what these have meant for 
women and children. Dimopoulos suggests, for example, that central to the refuge 
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movement‘s past success was that it represented ‗a remarkable opportunity to say that the 
wisdom that women have through their own experiences can shift thinking‘. Whilst 
acknowledging the importance of ‗boundaries‘ and ‗professionalism‘, she contends ‗there is 
also a loss that comes with that‘, which includes ‗less willingness to see women as wise about 
their own lives‘.139 It was collectivism, according to former refuge worker and bureaucrat 
Marg D‘Arcy, that enabled women experiencing domestic violence a voice that they no 
longer had. However, she acknowledges that the suppression of these women‘s voices today 
also derives from a concern to protect the sensibility of workers:  
[T]he women who were victims of domestic violence had the voice because of the 
way the service was operated, because they operated as a collective … and they don‘t 
have that any more ... we actually had a discussion about whether it was okay to have 
victims speaking at the conference, because one of the workers actually said ―well the 
problem is if you do that it could be too confronting for workers‖.140 
 
Donna Zander, sees this as indicative of basic values being jeopardised: ‗[I]f we can‘t hear 
survivors tell us about their lived experience … then we should pack up our bags and go 
home is my opinion‘.141 
 
Dimopoulos‘s views canvass the main areas of criticism of current practices from the 
perspective of the founder‘s values. Domestic violence services, she argues, are no longer 
concerned with ‗taking risks around community education, or promoting a more grass-roots 
or revolutionary idea‘.142 She points out that ‗we don‘t talk about the institutions or the 
systems reinforcing it … are we really agitating for social change? Maybe I am outdated, I 
don‘t know‘.143 These comments draw attention to the pattern of change in domestic violence 
services from a focus on politicising the problem of domestic violence itself, to concentrating 
on the problems facing provision of domestic violence services. This shift has also been 
paralleled by withdrawal from advocacy in relation to housing issues facing women, which 
had been central to the work of the movement from the early 1970s until the 1980s. As this 
thesis has shown, these changes occurred in part in response to a neo-liberal environment, 
which led ‗feminists [to] adapt their efforts‘.144 But we have seen that the change of focus was 
also a consequence of the early refuge movement‘s decision to champion the problem of 
domestic violence above other issues relating to gender inequality, reflecting the priorities of 
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radical feminists who sought to liberate women from violent marriages. Former WLHWH 
activist and academic Di Otto voices her frustration at the effects of this change: 
I feel frustrated now because there is so much focus on gendered violence and all these 
other things, like women‘s economic position, maybe even women‘s housing, get lost. 
This focus can also portray women as victims, as vulnerable and in need of 
protection—it produces a very stereotyped gender discourse about women needing 
state protection or the protection of men.
145
 
 
The policy context of the mid-2000s stands in contrast to that of twenty years earlier when 
policies designed to tackle domestic violence gave greater attention to supporting women to 
leave their homes via the direct provision and administration of social housing by the state.
146
 
Whilst this response was undertaken in a context where there were significantly fewer options 
available to women other than leaving their home, it was also occurring in a period when 
governments remained comparatively more committed to ‗ameliorating the economic and 
social consequences of free market policies—such as poverty‘.147  
 
Consideration of poverty and inequality, particularly in terms of the relationship between 
domestic violence and homelessness remains critical, particularly in light of the fact that two-
thirds of people in Victoria seeking homelessness support are women, principally because of 
domestic violence.
148
 Ludo McFerran has also recently reminded us, ‗poverty is as greater 
determinant of women‘s need for support, as domestic violence‘.149 This issue of women‘s 
poverty remains at the forefront of outreach worker Karen Bird‘s daily work with women and 
children experiencing domestic violence, and it significantly hinders their ability to leave: 
‗The feminisation of poverty is big … the clients I have today that are living in domestic 
violence, are hampered and hindered, and feel they can‘t change their situation because 
there‘s not enough money‘.150 By contrast, for many women who do leave their homes 
because of domestic violence, the ensuing problems of homelessness and poverty have 
enormous implications for their own wellbeing, as well as that of their children. As one rural 
outreach worker comments: 
There‘s this big push about the wellbeing of children, but at the same time we‘ve got a 
housing system that‘s not in the best interest of children, in that, you‘ve got to keep 
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moving ... and find some accommodation with friends and family. So it might be a 
few nights here, a few nights there, some of them are outstaying their welcome and 
that's just commonplace … Or there‘s five or six people in one bedroom because it‘s 
the only bedroom that‘s available … What happens to their schooling and stability and 
those sorts of things at a time when things are so disrupted for them and uncertain … 
[when] … you haven‘t got secure and affordable housing?151 
 
Similarly, as mentioned above, McFerran has also recently commented on the lack of 
attention to women‘s poverty, arguing that ‗it has been evident since the first evaluation of 
women‘s refuges that poverty is as great a determinant of women‘s need for support, as 
domestic violence‘.152 Indeed, a lack of attention to the broad range of issues relating to or 
resulting from gender inequality has therefore meant that there has been comparatively little 
inroad made into tackling women‘s housing, homelessness and poverty.153 
Policing and Legal Developments 
 
The doubts of some notwithstanding, the Labor government‘s ‗partnership‘ approach enabled 
domestic violence services to engage in the development and implementation of substantial 
cross-government policy and funding initiatives and it became standard practice for 
government working groups to invite VWRADVS to participate.
154
 Despite the contests 
around funding and regulation in their negotiations with DHS, working in partnership 
continued and was also characteristic of VWRDVS relationship with other arms of the state 
such as the police. The appointment of Christine Nixon as Chief Commissioner of Police in 
2001 proved a key catalyst for change in the state government‘s response to violence against 
women. Nixon accorded a new priority to domestic violence in the police force that 
encouraged an unprecedented number of government-led legislative and other initiatives 
designed to tackle domestic violence and improve service system responses to women and 
children, particularly in the legal system. As Tony Newman comments, ‗when Labor was 
elected in 1999, these … policy initiatives weren‘t even on the radar … the police almost 
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drove us up the road into this. So their role cannot be underestimated‘.155 The kinds of legal 
changes Nixon initiated, as Dimopoulos argues, ‗impacted profoundly on those relationships, 
because police were our enemy and now they are our friends‘.156  
 
As we have seen, since the early 1980s, feminists inside and outside of government had 
worked to challenge police attitudes and responses to domestic violence as well as other 
forms of violence against women including sexual assault. While their advocacy had resulted 
in many achievements along the way, a proactive response from the police was something 
new, as former Labor MP Kay Setches observes: 
You dreamt about, [that] there‘d be a police commissioner that would say, ―this is 
serious, and we‘re going to do something about it, and we‘re going to put resources 
into it, and I‘m going to measure it‖.157 
 
News of Nixon‘s appointment was welcomed by the domestic violence services, whose 
representatives swiftly undertook to meet with and impress upon her the extent of domestic 
violence and the inadequacy of existing police responses. Geddes recounts how immediately 
after she learned of Nixon‘s appointment, as DVIRC co-ordinator, she organised a letter to be 
sent from all the domestic violence services requesting a meeting, to which Nixon ‗responded 
pretty immediately, and there was a meeting, and it wasn‘t long after that she announced that 
she‘d make family violence a priority‘.158 Nixon‘s personal experience of witnessing violence 
against women as a young police officer generated her commitment to improving police 
reactions to these problems.
159
 Long-time domestic violence services advocate Billi Clarke 
explained how this initial meeting was utilised to provide Nixon with evidence that the police 
were failing to respond adequately: 
 The first meeting we had with Christine Nixon we were able to give her … the figures 
of the number of intervention orders that police took out on behalf of women … [and] 
… the number of figures where women have reported violence where there‘s been no 
follow up, no charges laid from breaches of intervention orders, and she was just 
horrified.
160
 
 
Soon after, in August 2001, Nixon appointed Police Commander Leigh Gassner to lead a 
review of police responses and policy with regard to violence against women. The review 
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engaged in extensive consultations, including with representatives from domestic violence 
services, who recommended change in relation to matters such as police not treating domestic 
violence as a criminal matter and putting the onus on the woman to press charges.
161
 
VWRADVS and family violence networker representatives continued to meet with Nixon and 
press their concerns, including the need for a ‗shared philosophy across sectors about the 
dynamics of domestic violence‘ and the importance of ensuring that separate consultations 
would be undertaken with Aboriginal women and those of non-English speaking 
background.
162
  
 
The review was published with a series of recommendations, many of which reflected 
concerns raised by the domestic violence service sector.
163
 In particular, the report‘s authors 
labelled the inadequacy of police responses to domestic violence as ‗disturbing‘, and argued 
for them to assume a ‗role which exhibits commitment, collaboration, influence and 
leadership, together with other similar service providers, domestic violence workers and 
agencies, both government and non-government‘.164 The report also recommended the 
establishment of a state-wide domestic violence steering committee sponsored by the chief 
commissioner and to include a range of key stakeholders. The aim of the committee would be 
‗to develop an integrated strategic direction to the operational response of agencies to 
domestic violence‘, and Victoria Police would be tasked with ‗a leading role in the 
establishment and commitment to this process‘.165 The review further proposed additional 
training and education for police, the development of a code of practice for police responses 
to domestic violence, an accountability framework to monitor police responses to family 
violence incidents, improved data collection and a review of the role of family violence 
liaison officers.
166
 It also made a range of recommendations on police responses to sexual 
assault and violence against women in the workplace, both of which also included the 
establishment of state-wide steering committees.  
 
The new Victoria Police Code of Practice for the Investigation of Family Violence was 
released in August 2004 and adopted standing orders that stressed the criminal nature of 
domestic violence and prioritised the safety of and sensitivity to victims.
167
 In particular, the 
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Code of Practice specified that police must make an application for an intervention order 
‗wherever the safety, welfare or property of a family member appears to be endangered by 
another‘.168 This policy resulted in a 72 per cent increase in the number of intervention orders 
sought by police between 2003–04 and 2004–05.169 The Code also adopted a pro-arrest 
policy, which resulted in a 73 per cent increase in the number of charges being laid by police 
in 2004–05.170 VWRADVS representatives were invited to attend consultation forums held in 
August 2003 and utilised the opportunity to stress the importance of providing ‗additional 
resources to increase the capacity of the women‘s domestic violence services system‘, which 
would be faced with ‗rising demand as police began to increase their reporting of 
incidents‘.171 The consultation also enabled improved communication between domestic 
violence services and police more broadly. As VWRADVS representative Rose Solomon 
recalls, there were ‗[O]pportunities … to actually have consultations at a local level with 
police officers. There was an opportunity for us to go and speak to the trainees out at Waverly 
who were training to be police officers around family violence. Lots of doors started 
opening‘.172 The historical significance of the changes adopted by Victoria Police has not 
gone unnoticed, as Oliver reflects: 
When you look back in fifty years time it will be the most significant thing that ever 
happened. It was just the turning point I think. If you have got Victoria Police making 
change, it makes everybody else sit up and take notice. You have Victoria Police 
holding the government accountable to what they are doing for their services, what 
they are doing to support the police to have a better response and it is a good change 
agent.
173
 
 
Domestic violence services also worked collaboratively with the courts and other legal 
professions, further cementing the productive working relationships they had established 
throughout the 1990s. They were consulted on a number of legislative reviews, including the 
Crimes (Family Violence) Act, which was referred for review by Attorney General Rob Hulls 
to the Victorian Law Reform Commission in November 2002.
174
 The Department of Justice 
(DoJ) consulted widely on the terms of reference for the review, sent to the Victorian Law 
Reform Commission in August 2003, and continued to engage with domestic violence 
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services during the review process.
175
 Whilst the Women‘s Safety Strategy provided impetus 
for the review of the Act, it came off the back of many years of advocacy by domestic 
violence services.
176
 At the forefront of the problems identified with the existing legislation 
was the inadequate and unaccountable legal requirements for ‗police response to family 
violence‘.177 As Geddes recounts: 
[W]e hammered for years and years and years for a review of the Crimes Family 
Violence Act  …  and in the end when they indicated that they might be willing to 
have a review … I remember racing upstairs getting a letter together and immediately 
sending it off to Rob Hulls. There had been lobbying for that for a long time … there‘s 
been a lot of noise for a long time about the police response and how it wasn‘t good 
enough.
178
 
 
The VLRC commenced its review in August 2003. It was delivered to government in March 
2006 with a range of recommendations in relation to family violence laws. The review found 
that ‗an alarming number of Victorians experience violence and abuse within their families 
[and] in many instances victims find the justice system fails to protect them‘.179 In response to 
the VLRC‘s recommendations, the DoJ commenced drafting a Family Violence bill and at the 
same time  a Victorian Family Violence Justice Reform campaign was coordinated by DV 
Vic and the Federation of Community Legal Services (Vic), which sought to ensure that the 
government responded to the VLRC‘s recommendations in a manner that was 
‗comprehensive, timely and accountable‘.180 The DoJ continued to work in a consultative 
manner that enabled the campaign group to make submissions on issues of concern, including 
protecting people with disabilities experiencing violence from their carers, as well as enabling 
women to make changes to their leases once an exclusion order was in place.
181
 These 
recommendations were incorporated in the bill, alongside promoting the accountability of 
perpetrators and the presumption that the respondent is to be excluded from the home. An 
expanded definition of family violence was adopted to include non-physical forms, and, in 
response to calls for greater protection for women with disabilities, ‗family member‘ was 
extended to ‗family like‘ relationships. Police were also empowered to apply for an order 
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regardless of the person‘s wishes.182 The new Family Violence Protection Act (2008) was 
finally adopted in December 2008. The significance of these developments cannot be 
underestimated, their achievement having been considered inconceivable only a few years 
earlier, as Oliver recounts:  
The fact that you have got legislative change, and therefore you might get some 
changes at the Magistrate‘s level is phenomenal, huge, and absolutely massive. I 
didn‘t think that it would ever happen. I thought we would have an almost integrated 
family violence response.
183
 
 
Other legal developments at this time concerned the Magistrates Court of Victoria, which now 
appointed a state supervisory magistrate for family violence matters. This position was 
assumed by Anne Goldsbrough in February 2002. Goldsbrough, as we have seen, had a long-
standing record of working in partnership with domestic violence services. She also held the 
position of Magistrates Court representative on the State-wide Steering Committee to Reduce 
Family Violence (SSCRFV) in relation to a range of issues, including the development of 
protocols for family violence and stalking
184
 and a roster system at the court to provide 
support for women and children experiencing domestic violence.
185
  
Through SSCRFV, Goldsbrough was instrumental in leading consultations on the 
establishment of family violence courts in 2004. In the campaign that saw the re-election of 
Labor in November 2002, the government had committed $2.7 million over four years to the 
development of these courts as a division of the Magistrates Court.
186
 Making good on this 
promise, the DoJ initiated consultations in 2003 to develop of a pilot domestic violence 
court.
187
 As with the review by Victoria Police into domestic violence, DoJ undertook to 
consult widely on the court‘s development and implementation and sought representatives 
from domestic violence services on its reference group to provide important information in 
relation to the support needs of women and children.
188
 The family violence courts 
commenced in 2005 at Ballarat and Heidelberg and, amongst their many aims, they aimed to:  
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Simplify access to the justice system for people involved in family violence; increase 
recognition of the rights of children as people affected by family violence … and … 
make accountable people who used family violence toward family members‘.189  
 
The family violence courts also included provision for court-appointed behaviour-change 
programs for men subject to intervention orders. This was a key initiative of WSS and a 
reference group that included VWRADVS representative Samiro Douglas was established by 
DoJ as part of SSCRFV to guide the program‘s development. The main task of the reference 
group was to provide feedback on a preferred model for the program. However, for ‗feminists 
and advocates on behalf of women and children‘,190 Douglas recounts, the task at hand was to 
maintain an emphasis on their particular needs. A best-practice framework for men‘s 
behaviour-change groups, which promoted the safety of women and children as the key 
goal,
191
 had previously been developed by OWP and the new model was guided by this 
framework.  
 
Feminist domestic violence services have raised concerns about behaviour-change programs 
for men since they began in the early 1990s.
192
  In particular, they have been alarmed by the 
lack of evidence to support the effectiveness of this form of intervention. More recently, 
concern has also been raised about the emphasis on men‘s behaviour-change programs within 
the state government‘s prevention-focused initiatives. As long-time domestic violence 
services worker Sandra Morris argues: 
 A lot of the prevention activities that [government] looked at or have funded have 
been geared towards men. It‘s all about changing men‘s behaviours but we actually 
don‘t know whether it really works or not … Do they just learn the language of family 
violence so they‘re better able to speak about it, and better able to hide it? … [and]… 
it doesn‘t deal with the structural inequities [facing women] that we still have. 193  
 
Despite these concerns and on-going debates, domestic violence service providers over time 
became involved in the running of men‘s programs because they wanted them, as men‘s 
group facilitator Judy Kneale recounts, ‗based on feminist principles‘.194 Similarly, as CEO of 
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DV Vic Fiona McCormack has argued, engaging with men‘s services is critical to ensuring 
their ability to ‗have any control or opportunities to influence their service provision … to 
make sure that it‘s working from a position that absolutely puts the responsibility on the 
perpetrator as opposed to seeing it as some sort of dysfunctional family dynamic‘.195  
 
With regard to the wider issue of engaging with men in the response to violence against 
women, Lyn Walker maintains ‗the view that it‘s inappropriate for men to provide direct 
support to women experiencing or escaping violence‘. However, she argues that, ‗in terms of 
prevention you‘ve got to work with [men], they‘ve got to be part of the equation … I reckon 
we‘ll see an escalation of men‘s participation and involvement in the prevention agenda‘.196 
On the wider prevention agenda, Dimopoulos raises the concern that if it ‗is solely about 
social context and not about dislodging institutionalised power‘, then we might fail in our 
attempts to eliminate domestic violence and continue to question ‗why are we still in the 
situation that we are in?‘ As she continues, there may ‗more murders than we have ever had 
before … more intervention orders than ever before … [and] … family violence at the same 
rate if not higher‘.197 
The State-Wide Steering Committee to Reduce Family Violence  
 
Following the release of Victoria Police‘s review into domestic violence, the establishment of 
SSCRFV was announced by Chief Commissioner Nixon. SSCRFV was to be co-chaired by 
Commander Leigh Gassner and director of OWP, reflecting the high priority it was accorded 
by Victoria Police. SSCRFV would include representatives from a range of government and 
non-government organisations, including the police, courts, health, welfare and specialist 
domestic violence services. Domestic violence services representatives included members 
from VWRADVS, the Domestic Violence Incest Resource Centre, the Immigrant Women‘s 
Domestic Violence Service and the Women‘s Domestic Violence Crisis Service. VWRADVS 
was successful in lobbying for further representation from the Federation of Community 
Legal Services.
198
 
 
The central focus of the committee‘s work leading up to 2005 included the development of a 
best practice framework for a whole-of-government integrated response to family violence, 
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which OWP took a lead role in developing.
199
 The proposed model was based on overseas 
experience and, in particular, a model of integration developed in Duluth, Minnesota, USA, 
known as the ‗Duluth Model‘.200 The committee argued for an integrated response combining 
a ‗strengthened justice system‘, and ‗integrated multi-agency‘ responses to ensure ‗that 
women receive an appropriate response, regardless of the pathway through which they choose 
to receive assistance‘.201 DVIRC took an active role in developing a discussion paper leading 
up to the committee‘s report and argued that, ‗within a climate of shrinking resources‘, 
women‘s and children‘s needs should not be overlooked. It called for the development of a 
‗unifying philosophy which established the need to ensure victims‘ safety as the basis for all 
interventions‘.202  Like WSS, the integrated framework prioritised the safety of women and 
children as a ‗paramount consideration in any response‘ but was equally concerned to 
emphasise that ‗responses to family violence must recognise and address the power imbalance 
and gender inequality between those using violence (predominantly men) and those 
experiencing violence (predominantly women and children)‘.203 As we have seen, since the 
1990s, feminism has been the dominant discourse by which domestic violence has been 
understood at federal and state government policy levels. Whilst reaching agreement on these 
kinds of issues within the context of SSCRFV involved, as long-term domestic violence 
services activist and committee representative Rose Solomon recounts, ‗robust discussions 
and debates … in the first couple of years‘,204 SSCRFV was nevertheless operating within a 
policy context framed by WSS that had articulated domestic violence as a form of violence 
against women, reflecting the gender-based nature of the problem.  
 
SSCRFV was also a point of consultation on other developments that were occurring as part 
of WSS, including the police code of conduct. WSS identified law reform as one it its key 
objectives and this gave rise to many Department of Justice (DoJ) initiatives that were 
developed in consultation with the committee. They included the development of the family 
violence courts, the review of the Crimes (Family Violence) Act, and an inquiry into the 
defences and partial excuses commonly presented for homicide. In order to advance their 
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recommendations to government on these kinds of policy developments, SSCRFV initiated a 
cross-departmental executive co-ordinating group.
205
  
 
Throughout 2004 and 2005, cross-government and community sector collaboration continued 
in accordance with the objectives of WSS and was facilitated by SSCRFV and its framework 
for an integrated services system, as outlined above. In 2004, this led to the development of a 
whole-of-government bid to Treasury‘s Economic Review Committee (ERC) to improve 
funding for existing domestic violence services and to access new funding for non-specialist 
domestic violence organisations to deliver domestic violence programs. Victoria Police 
played an important role in driving this work, as Newman explains: ‗I sat in meetings where 
police told us to lift our game, which was exciting, but the problem with being in DHS is that 
you‘re competing with health for dollars‘.206 The challenges of competing for funding 
amongst other divisions of government thus goes some way to explaining why this bid was 
unsuccessful in its first attempt and did not attract additional funding.
207
 However, despite this 
initial set-back, the committee continued to pursue its agenda, the outcome being that in 2005 
a second bid was successful, and $35.1 million was allocated over four years to support the 
reforms proposed by SSCRFV. Newman recounts how the bid succeeded by gaining higher 
profile across senior ranks of government:   
It really took two goes, because the first year we bid for the budget we didn‘t get it and 
a lot more work was done behind the scenes, and we got much more senior 
sponsorship. So I think that part of the problem in the bureaucracy, while there was a 
lot of goodwill, the bureaucrats driving it were generally people at my level trying to 
convince their bosses that the police are really serious about this and we‘ve got a state-
wide committee and we really need to be putting in … So it got a life of its own 
eventually, whereby bidding across whole of government and by the police really 
upped-the-ante.
208
 
 
Also significant in enabling this achievement, as former refuge worker and bureaucrat Marg 
D‘Arcy recounts, was that domestic violence services were organised at ‗getting together and 
actually lobbying the politicians for funding … They spent a day in parliament, they met with 
Ministers, they met with backbenchers‘.209 The bid was further enhanced by the release of a 
VicHealth report in 2004 assessing the health impact of intimate partner violence on 
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women.
210
 It concluded that this was the leading contributor to death, disability and illness in 
Victorian women aged 15–44 years.211 This project was co-ordinated by Lyn Walker, who 
recounted that the publicity it generated was well timed to stimulate further momentum: 
 We got front page in the Age, it was on every TV and radio station across the state and 
probably across the country and globally, and hit the papers at the same time as a bid 
was being prepared to support further integration of the service system. The acting 
premier and Christine Nixon launched the report and I‘m sure that the focus on the 
issue assisted a cabinet decision to allocate resources to improve the service 
response.
212
 
 
In relation to domestic violence service delivery, funding was earmarked for outreach 
services, after-hours support, intensive case management, counselling and support services, 
and regional private rental brokerage.
213
 Notably, funding for refuges or other forms of social 
housing was not incorporated in the funding package. So, while the success of the bid was 
cause for great optimism amongst domestic violence services, it soon became grounds for 
considerable distress when DHS distributed the funding through a form of competitive 
tendering and adopted ‗expressions of interest‘ as their preferred method of purchasing the 
domestic violence services. Bureaucrat Di Godfrey explains that this process was undertaken 
with the view that DHS ‗needed all of the services to sign onto the [policy] directions and … 
not just for the growth money‘.214 The tendering process caused ‗great grief‘ amongst 
domestic violence services because of the uncertainty and competition it generated.
215
 
However, despite these obstacles, there were examples of domestic violence services 
collaborating to strengthen the calibre of their tenders. In the eastern region, for example, 
domestic violence services worked together in order to prevent therapeutic-oriented 
organisations such as Relationships Australia gaining funding for domestic violence outreach 
services, reflecting, as long-term domestic violence services worker Wendy Austin recounts, 
that the ‗women working together thing is still very strong‘.216  
 
The DHS process reflected, in former bureaucrat David Green‘s words, ‗the ahistorical and 
short term-ist perspective‘ of ‗DHS handling‘: 
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If significant people in DHS had an appreciation, had a historical perspective of the 
policy area that they‘re working in, even if they‘re not feminist in orientation, or 
they're not particularly passionate about the issues, but at least if they had it, there 
would be some cause to say can ―we learn from history … we learn from the evolution 
of this process‖.217  
 
The assumption that domestic violence services were averse to taking part in an integrated 
reform agenda, and were therefore in need of coercion, is indeed ‗ahistorical‘ because 
members had argued for a greater level of cooperation and co-ordination amongst service 
providers for the better part of a decade. What would appear even more incongruous is that 
the bulk of criticism regarding domestic violence services‘ disinclination to engage with 
external organisations had been directed towards women‘s refuges, which were surprisingly 
left out of the funding and reform process altogether. This can in part be explained, as Austin 
has commented, by the fact that DHS was not capable of tendering women‘s refuges because 
they did not have access to their property titles, many of which had been purchased by 
services with DHS funds in the late 1980s, which made the process too difficult.
218
 Godfrey 
confirmed that refuges were excluded from the tendering and reform process because DHS 
hadn‘t ‗sorted out the ongoing issues around who owns them‘.219 This did not alter the fact 
that the government was determined to regulate community service organisations according to 
a model of business-style competition and to avoid investment in bricks-and-mortar. As 
Janine Mahoney recounts:  
The government has done a lot with domestic violence in recent years, but I don‘t 
think it listens to the sector as much as it should on what else is needed.  Yes, they‘ve 
brought in an integrated model, and yes they have provided additional funding for 
things such as counselling but the actual refuges, the crisis accommodation, got 
nothing, and they haven‘t actually had any increase in funding for probably seventeen 
or eighteen years.
220
 
 
Equally disappointing for domestic violence services at this time, as Oberin argues below, 
was the fact that the majority of the 2005 funding, which had been publicly announced as a 
new investment,
221
 was mostly recycled: 
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It was a smoke screen when they announced the $35 million. It was already existing 
money that they re-announced. So they actually put the domestic violence outreach 
services up for tender, which was a shocking thing to do, and they never should have 
done that, that was outrageous … most of that 35 million was repackaged outreach 
money.
222
 
 
The integrated focus of the new reforms meant organisations external to the domestic violence 
services movement would increasingly be engaged in the direct provision of services to 
women and children experiencing domestic violence. This process has been referred to as 
‗mainstreaming‘ and concern has been expressed that, as it occurs, ‗issues lose their power or 
get whittled down somehow‘.223 As Chapters 1 and 2 have documented, similar concerns 
were held by feminists who launched the refuge movement in Victoria. They had been 
reluctant to engage with conservative organisations because of concerns that their movement 
would become fragmented and depoliticised. However, despite the funding of a large number 
of diverse women‘s refuges during the 1970s, the movement retained a surprising degree of 
unity, and feminist principles were enshrined in their policies and practice.  
 
Despite misgivings by some about the effects of mainstream service delivery in response to 
domestic violence, others have espoused its benefits, perceiving it as ‗a good thing‘ because 
women experiencing domestic violence do not only present at specialist domestic violence 
organisations, and should still ‗receive a professional response informed by a gendered 
understanding of violence against women that prioritises their safety‘.224 Similarly, Walker 
has argued that ‗on the one hand you‘d never want to see the demise of specialist feminist 
women‘s services, but also you don‘t want to block progression of good mainstream service 
delivery. We need both‘.225 On this issue, former DVIRC worker Donna Zander raises the 
pertinent point that the incidence of women seeking support for domestic violence has never 
been limited to domestic violence services, and argues that, whilst she has often worked 
outside the ‗DV sector‘, she has always undertaken ‗DV work‘: 
[T]he domestic violence sector often sees itself as a sector … outside the mainstream, 
where domestic violence happens a lot of the time. So I find this notion of the DV 
sector quite an interesting one, because what is it? And when are you doing DV work? 
And when are you not? Because I don‘t think I‘ve ever stopped doing DV work.226 
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McCormack raises the significant point that a worker‘s gender does not automatically equate 
to a feminist perspective, arguing that ‗you can have women who are workers who don‘t 
necessarily believe or understand that violence is gendered‘.227 In a similar vein, Bush has 
argued that the seemingly arbitrary separation between women‘s services, including sexual 
assault and domestic violence services, has only served to weaken the focus on the needs of 
women, arguing that they should instead ‗all come together and create some kind of broader 
women‘s focus‘.228 During the 1990s, as we have seen, there were some attempts to forge 
greater unity between women‘s services but they were not pursued. However, in 2001, 
Australia‘s inaugural conference focusing on domestic violence and sexual assault was 
convened in Queensland and later, in 2004, a Victorian conference convened by DV Vic and 
the Centres Against Sexual Assault (CASA) was designed to highlight the commonalities 
between the two policy areas. Walker has predicted that this trend will continue into the 
future, resulting in the ongoing diminution of ‗the lines between DV and sexual assault‘.229 
Reflecting this trend, in 2009 the Victorian government released its plan to prevent violence 
against women.
230
 These developments also reflect contemporary feminist theorisations that 
have constructed violence against women as a continuum.
231 
Forging New Ground and Looking Ahead 
 
As we have seen, responding to the different requirements and subjectivities of women 
presented opportunities for the domestic violence services, whose conceptualisations of 
feminism and domestic violence had tended to universalise the experiences of Anglo, able-
bodied and heterosexual women. However, in the face of challenges by marginalised groups 
of women, domestic violence services acknowledged their shortcomings and, by the early 
2000s, were attempting to better respond to the needs of these women. This process was 
expedited by government bureaucracy. A long history of advocacy and action by migrant 
activists, for example, meant that by 2003 the IWDVS offered a range of services that 
included telephone information, case management, secondary consultation and community 
education. IWDVS also worked to ensure that mainstream domestic violence services offered 
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culturally appropriate support by providing them with audit checklists.
232
 Years of migrant 
women‘s activism had resulted in domestic violence services having achieved: 
terrific things to be inclusive of women of culturally and linguistically diverse 
backgrounds … they worked very hard to be inclusive and put practices in place … 
Now you wouldn‘t come close to that in general homelessness services.  I‘m proud of 
the movement for that.
233
 
 
Other marginalised groups, though they had not been able to achieve the same outcomes, 
continued to work towards their own objectives and, during the first half of the 2000s, a 
number of important developments occurred to assist women with disabilities and Aboriginal 
women. This section will pay particular attention to these developments, which also informed 
domestic violence services‘ ongoing relationship to feminism, a concluding point of 
discussion in this chapter.  
Aboriginal Taskforce  
 
From the mid-1990s onwards and in response to their experiences of marginalisation within 
domestic violence services, Aboriginal activists had, as we have seen, argued for a strategy to 
tackle domestic violence in their communities that would focus on their particular needs. The 
state government recognised the needs and began to develop an Indigenous Victorian Family 
Violence Strategy as a priority area for whole-of-government action under their Forward Plan 
for Women 2000–2003.234 This was followed by an Indigenous-led task force appointed in 
October 2001 with the dual aims of engaging Indigenous people throughout the state to 
develop ‗community-led‘ strategies for dealing with Indigenous family violence and 
providing a report to the Victorian government with recommendations for ‗a culturally 
appropriate state-wide strategy for addressing family violence issues in an integrated and 
holistic manner‘.235  
 
Joint responsibility for overseeing the strategy would be shared between Aboriginal Affairs 
Victoria (AAV) and DHS. In 2002–2003, the Victorian state budget allocated $7.6 million 
over four years to support its development. This was complemented by a range of initiatives, 
including regional action groups, support officers, a whole-of-government departmental 
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working group and a state-wide Indigenous family violence forum.
236
 Money was also 
allocated for an Indigenous family violence community initiatives fund, reflecting the 
taskforce‘s concern to ‗facilitate a process whereby communities begin to take ownership of 
the issue of family violence‘.237 In December 2003, the taskforce released a report identifying 
‗key points‘ that should underpin the development of a state-wide strategy.238 The report 
emphasised the importance of implementing measures, ‗which are owned and driven by 
communities and create an environment which empowers individuals, families and 
community groups to take control of their lives by dealing directly with the underlying 
issues‘.239 In their response to the report, the government acknowledged ‗that Indigenous 
people want not only to identify the priorities but also drive the process at the local 
community level‘.240 In 2005, an Indigenous partnership forum was established to develop 
and implement a ten-year plan to tackle the issue of Indigenous family violence. This 
‗community-driven‘ approach stands in contrast to mainstream responses to domestic 
violence, which, as we have seen, were taken on by government in a way that has been 
criticised for failing to reflect the voice of the community.  
 
A detailed history of Aboriginal people‘s activism in response to the problem of domestic 
violence remains to be written and is beyond the scope of this thesis for reasons already 
stated. However, I have sought to provide brief accounts of Aboriginal people‘s responses and 
protests, both to the problem of domestic violence and to Anglo domestic violence services. I 
have done this to stress the continuity of their efforts, the distinctiveness of their demands and 
the centrality of whiteness, not only to the domestic violence services movement but to 
feminism and the process of history writing itself, where ‗assumptions [can] disremember the 
structural advantage of being white, and [can] generalise specifically white cultural practices 
and ways of seeing and being in the world as normal‘.241 
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Women with Disabilities 
 
We have successfully locked out all sorts of women and we‘ve locked them out by 
reframing what it is that we‘re talking about.242 
 
As we have seen, throughout the 1990s, Women With Disabilities Australia (WWDA) and the 
Victorian Women‘s Disability Network (VWDN) publicised the issue of violence against 
women with disabilities and, as a direct result, an action plan for refuges was developed in 
Victoria in order to improve their responsiveness.
243
 During the first half of the 2000s, 
activists continued to publicise these women‘s needs, which meant that Victorian services 
moved from the point of not ‗want[ing] to deal with this issue‘ to ‗realis[ing] that [they are] 
one of their key target groups … that are primarily the most vulnerable‘.244 However, the 
struggle by women with disabilities for recognition and inclusion in domestic violence 
services has been particularly long and arduous, in part because of their particularly 
disadvantaged position in society and lack of representation as workers in services. This lack 
of representation reflects their double marginalisation, as executive director of Women With 
Disabilities Victoria (WWDV) (formerly VWDN) Keran Howe reminds us, ‗by virtue of 
having a disability and by virtue of being women‘.245  
 
In the follow-up to recommendations from a national work group run by and for women with 
disabilities in 1998, members of VWDN and DVIRC lobbied the Minister for Community 
Services and Disability, Christine Campbell, for funding to support a project to further 
‗develop relationships between the disability and domestic violence sector‘.246 Chris Jennings 
was appointed project director in 2002; she recalls the invisibility of women with disabilities 
in government policy at this time:  
 [A]lmost all Government policy documents [and] position statements around violence 
against women excluded any mention of women with disabilities. They all included 
mention of Indigenous women and women from non-English speaking backgrounds. 
Now I‘m not suggesting for one moment that those women are getting appropriate 
responses … I am saying that as recent as seven years ago, they were acknowledged as 
groups of women for whom gender violence had an impact on their lives. Women 
with disabilities were not.
247
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While Jennings‘ position was initially funded for only twelve months, she was able to 
continue until 2009 largely through the support of philanthropic organisations, including the 
Reichstein Foundation. Part of her role included publicising ‗the need for a funded focus on 
violence against women with disabilities‘.248 VWDN also continued to lobby for funding, 
which was eventually forthcoming in 2005 when they partnered with Women‘s Health 
Victoria and established the VWDN Advocacy Information Service (VWDN AIS). Keran 
Howe was appointed project manager to further develop the new service and was appointed 
the inaugural executive officer in 2007. The organisation became the ‗first port of call for 
advice by organisations and government with regard to issues concerning women with 
disabilities‘.249 At the same time, and also as a result of years of lobbying, VWDN won a 
place on the SSCRFV.
250
  
 
From that time, WWDV, as Howe recounts, ‗worked really closely with DV Vic‘, reflecting a 
conscious decision by the network to ‗work with our sisters‘.251 Disability advocates have 
been concerned to redress the past failings of the feminist movement, which did not 
‗recognise women with disabilities, just as black women were not recognised‘.252 Similarly, 
Jennings recalls her efforts to persuade those whose ‗core work is violence against women‘ to 
also accept that their ‗core work is supporting women with disabilities‘.253 Jennings asked 
domestic violence workers if they intended just to be ‗advocates for some women or does 
your feminist understanding include all women?‘254 Her challenge eventually elicited a 
positive response: 
When I first started here I would probably have been a very lone voice that would be 
at a meeting that would raise the issue of violence against women with disabilities. 
Seven years down the track that‘s not the case anymore, there‘s a number of people 
and services that take an interest and carriage of that.
255
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At the same time, advocates have pointed out the disability movement‘s failure to recognise 
gender issues, leading Howe to reflect—despite the inadequacy of feminism where women 
and disability are concerned—that there remains little doubt amongst disability advocates that 
‗we still need feminists‘.256 For example, feminists have been able to expose the fact that the 
oppression of women with disabilities is compounded by their gender because, as Jennings 
observes, they may not ‗really understand the impact of the violence in their lives‘, because 
‗they haven‘t had a lot of support … to engage with thinking about and understanding 
themselves as women first‘.257 
 
Concern has also been expressed by Jennings that the domestic violence sector was at risk of 
being ‗co-opted by the resource issue‘, that is, using the chronic underfunding of services to 
focus on  ‗how difficult it is to provide a service‘ to women with disabilities, a response that 
‗allows us … the space to shirk our responsibility‘.258 The impact of such action on women 
with disabilities would be unthinkable, Jennings points out, because ‗you are saying it‘s okay 
for these women to experience abuse‘.259 As we have seen, however, domestic violence 
workers have in fact adapted their ways of operating to become responsive to different needs 
and subjectivities and the range of issues with which women present. Despite these 
achievements, Jennings‘ concerns are shared by others, including Dimopoulos, who maintains 
that some services still fail to consider  ‗the diversity of women‘s experiences‘, which  
tells us … as a movement, [because] we are still fixated on the imaginary universal 
woman that doesn‘t exist. Women are complex and diverse and to that extent I think 
the refuge program has had to be really challenged, and some of them have really 
understood it, and really moved forward with it, and others haven‘t.260  
Feminism and Domestic Violence Services: ‘A Dirty Word?’261 
 
Identification with ‗feminism‘ or ‗feminist service provision‘ was explicit in the domestic 
violence services until the late 1990s. However, by 2005, this was no longer as apparent, 
despite feminism‘s long-lasting impact on conceptualisations of domestic violence articulated 
by DV Vic as ‗a gendered political issue‘ resulting from ‗patriarchal structures‘ that worked 
to ‗sanction violence against women and children‘.262 Moreover, the practice of Victorian 
domestic violence services has continued to be informed by a commitment to supporting 
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‗women in our services to understand that they are not responsible for the violence and to 
assist them to see the ways in which our society supports violence towards women and 
children‘.263 Feminism, then, has been well and truly institutionalised as the dominant 
discourse by which domestic violence is understood and its influence is evident ‗in the way 
that many state and territory policies situate domestic violence within a gendered analysis‘.264 
This section considers why it was then that, by the mid-2000s, the domestic violence services 
movement had become increasingly equivocal about its relationship to, and identification with 
feminism, prompting one long-term activist to conclude that ‗feminism is a dirty word‘.265 
 
One explanation, as this thesis has argued, can be seen in feminism‘s propensity to 
universalise the experiences of Anglo, able-bodied and heterosexual women, which left many 
women, including migrants, Aboriginal women and women with disabilities, experiencing 
‗frustration and anger about being left out of the feminist dialogue‘.266 In particular, radical 
feminism provided the theoretical basis for the refuge movement‘s construction of domestic 
violence, which came to be defined within the parameters not only of gender inequality but 
also of the patriarchal home, leaving many other women‘s experiences of violence silenced. 
This framework has been criticised by feminist scholar Anannya Bhattacharjee who has 
argued that, in the context of domestic violence, feminism‘s constructions of the private and 
public, based as they are upon the experiences of white middle-class women, have been 
largely imaginary.
267
  
 
Radical feminism‘s influence on the adoption of collective forms of organising in domestic 
violence services has been supplanted in recent years by government bureaucracy‘s insistence 
on hierarchical modes of administration. So too has the long-held feminist resolve to limit 
membership of domestic violence services to women, come under growing pressure to be 
inclusive of, and work alongside, external organisations that include men. These changes have 
resulted in a widening gap between the feminist base of domestic violence services and their 
increasingly non-feminist methods of organising. Growing disenchantment with feminism as 
a ‗politics of emancipation‘268 has added to this dilemma and has been paralleled in other 
spheres, as documented in the conceptual chapter of this thesis. 
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What has also been characteristic of domestic violence services in years gone by is the 
sometimes bitter internal conflict and ‗finger pointing‘ that has characterised its internal 
negotiations, particularly in relation to differences between feminists themselves and forms of 
service provision. This has resulted in considerable anguish for activists such as Rose 
Solomon, who comments, if ‗being feminist means impos[ing] my beliefs and my 
philosophies on other women, then I don‘t want to be a feminist‘.269 Although, in more recent 
years, these politics have settled to a considerable degree, resulting in greater unity and 
tolerance, it was only recently, that as ‗a young woman‘, Bree Oliver‘s experience was less 
than ‗warm and fuzzy‘.270 As Oliver explains, she made the decision to leave DV Vic because 
she became ‗sick of feeling so undeserving and alienated‘.271 This raises another issue that 
may help explain domestic violence services‘ current reluctance to promulgate feminism as its 
raison d‘être—that is, its lack of favour with a young generation of women who do not want 
‗to associate themselves with the concept or notion of feminism in any way‘.272 The services‘ 
relationship to feminism, Oliver contends, should be actively contested: 
[F]eminism should be an active discussion and ongoing debate and ongoing reflection 
about what it means to do what we do, and whether what we we‘re doing now is the 
most appropriate way to do it … I think it is always important that our history informs 
the present, I just don‘t know whether we need to bring every little bit of it with us 
because it prevents us from picking stuff up which might be useful.
273
 
 
From the 1990s onwards, many activists deliberately distanced themselves from identification 
with feminism because the political climate was so hostile to feminist women‘s services. 
Despite the improved context of the latter 2000s for domestic violence services, scepticism 
about feminism remained widespread. For example, in the context of giving training to 
domestic violence workers, Geddes warned providers ‗to be careful so that you don‘t come 
across as too ratbag feminist in what you do … you don‘t want to lose anybody because 
they‘re a bit nervous about feminism‘.274 
 
The human rights framework adopted at the Beijing world conference for women in 1995 
reflecting the fact that various forms of gendered violence was increasingly being understood 
as a human rights violation. From the 2000s onwards, a human rights framework became an 
important guiding element in policy, legislation and practice in relation to domestic violence 
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in Victoria and nationally.
275
 In Victoria, the introduction of the Victorian Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 has meant that public and statutory authorities, and state 
and local governments, are required to take human rights into consideration when providing 
services, making laws and setting policies. A human rights–based framework has significant 
implications for domestic violence services, because it provides greater impetus to recognition 
of the needs and rights of different groups of women as citizens. However, the concept of 
human rights in this context arguably also generates additional reluctance for domestic 
violence services to persist in seeing feminism as ‗a natural political destination for all 
women‘.276 As historian Marilyn Lake puts it, ‗feminism might not be the most appropriate or 
urgent politics for all women … For different oppressions are differences not necessarily of 
degree, but of kind‘.277 On the other hand, Bush believes that the domestic violence services 
sector should pursue its commitment to feminism but in a manner that enables others entry. 
She concedes that this poses a ‗major challenge for the sector in terms of how do we bring on 
board people and look at ourselves and diversify in ways that we can appeal to more people 
and in different ways?‘278 As a starting point, she suggests that the sector should adapt ‗older 
understandings of feminism to more contemporary … understandings of feminism, bringing 
younger feminists along the way‘.279  
Conclusion 
 
By 2005, as this chapter demonstrates, many of the aims and objectives of domestic violence 
services—including the promotion of gender equity and the development of an inclusive 
service system—had become absorbed in the Victorian state Labor government‘s policy 
framework for tackling violence against women. At the same time, a positive foundation for 
cooperative relations was re-established between bureaucrats and member activists. However, 
the ability to achieve true ‗partnership‘ with government in a context of unequal power 
relations—where the government has continued to make use of its capacity to exert rigid 
control over the planning and operation of human service organisations—has, unsurprisingly, 
been questioned. These questions have included concerns raised by activists as to whether 
domestic violence services have continued to reflect the needs of women in the community. 
Nevertheless, as I have outlined above, those involved in the domestic violence services have 
                                               
275
 Domestic Violence Victoria, Code of Practice for Specialist Family Violence Services for Women and 
Children, DV Vic, Melbourne 2006; OWP, A Right to Respect; National Council to Reduce Violence Against 
Women and Children, Time For Action. 
276
 Ang, p. 57. 
277
 Lake, Equal, p. 15. 
278
 Bush interview. 
279
 Bush interview. 
  274 
continued to adapt to their changing environment by altering their aims and methods with 
many positive results. Whilst concerns that the sector would become depoliticised have to 
some degree been realised, this was largely the result of economic rationalist and/or neo-
liberal agendas of government, rather than a consequence of mainstream service delivery or 
changing methods of engagement by the movement‘s peak body with the state. 
 
I have also documented how, within the movement, marginalised groups of women worked 
strategically to ensure their voices were heard, and continued to press for their needs to be 
met. In recent years, this has resulted in specialised funding and taskforces to tackle particular 
issues confronting migrant and Aboriginal women and women with disabilities. This 
represents a considerable modification of the original feminist framework. Even though 
foundational feminist principles are now implicit in government policy and sector guidelines 
for working with women in domestic violence services, ironically the movement itself has 
become less explicitly identified with the politics of feminism. I have argued that this can in 
part be explained by a backlash against exclusionary practices and dogmatic interpretations of 
feminism and/or feminist service provision. In addition, the external environment in Victoria 
was particularly hostile to feminist services from the mid-1990s, and to feminism more 
broadly, which caused a growing number of activists deliberately and strategically to distance 
themselves from identification with it, particularly when engaging with external 
organisations. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Only when [women] are seen as equal partners with men in the decisions that are 
made in the world will they then not be seen as a punching bag.
1
 
 
In the 1970s, feminists in Victoria and across Australia established women‘s refuges, and, 
amongst their many goals, they sought the elimination of what they soon named ‗domestic 
violence‘. They argued that the problem arose as a result of men‘s power over women, and 
their powerful re-framing of its causes contested dominant understandings that had previously 
constructed such violence as arising from the nature of individual men and women. This 
thesis has examined the development of this new understanding and its emergence as the 
dominant discourse underpinning policy during the past three decades. It is important because 
women‘s activism in history all too often becomes invisible. Whilst the achievement of 
Australian feminists in exposing and re-framing this long-term social problem has been well 
documented, the research findings presented here augment our knowledge—not only in 
relation to how this critical naming and framing process occurred in Victoria but also in 
explicating the ongoing and sustained commitment of movement activists to redress domestic 
violence over the subsequent thirty-year period. As this thesis has documented, there have 
been many hard-fought achievements throughout this time. Significantly, and as former 
Victorian Labor Party Minister, Kay Setches contends above, feminists in the 1970s argued 
that the eradication of domestic violence would necessitate a change in the role and status of 
women in society. Three decades later, such change has been uneven and is far from 
complete. 
 
In this thesis I have shown that feminism was fundamental to the work of domestic violence 
services across the time frame examined, though some types of feminisms were stronger than 
others at different times. The influence of radical feminism was significant for the direction of 
the movement in its early years, whereas, from the early 1990s onwards, liberal feminism 
assumed a dominant influence. This shift has been reflected in each of the three 
interdependent themes that emerged from the research, which I discuss below. I have further 
argued that the movement‘s endeavours were played out on a field marked by internal 
conflict, under-resourcing, ethnocentrism, and a shifting political and institutional context that 
included the particularly exigent onset of economic rationalism. Despite these challenges, and 
the ideological diversity that was characteristic of the Victorian movement, my research 
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shows that activists maintained a sustained and overwhelming commitment to supporting the 
needs of women and children in their services. The remainder of these concluding remarks is 
dedicated to summarising the key findings of the thesis in accordance with the three specified 
themes.  
 
The first of the three themes explored—the influence of feminism on the movement‘s ideas 
and aims—describes how feminists from Melbourne‘s women‘s liberation movement 
instigated the refuge movement in Victoria. Feminist discourses, and in particular radical 
feminism, informed their ideas and aims. Stressing the role of women‘s agency in historical 
transformations, I have documented how these feminists took action by establishing refuges 
with the aim of shifting the allocation of society‘s resources so that women could establish 
autonomous households financially independent of men, and thus eliminate the need for 
refuge. Simultaneously, radical feminists sought to politicise the issues facing women in 
refuge, claiming they resulted from unequal gender relations. Their advocacy work until the 
end of the decade was directed to a broad range of issues affecting the lives of these women, 
and the issue of homelessness and housing for women and children was central to their 
campaigns. As an extension of their radical feminist philosophy and aims to change the 
structures of society, refuge activists rejected traditional forms of charitable welfare provision, 
and also deliberately adopted methods of working with women that set them apart from the 
professional social worker. Although the movement was constituted by women of diverse 
feminisms and backgrounds, not all of whom identified with feminist ideas, they generally 
shared a commitment to challenging the judgemental approach that characterised traditional 
charities, and the assumption of superiority through professional expertise that was the 
hallmark of the modern social worker. 
 
The thesis further documents the process whereby, at the end of the 1970s, the refuge 
movement had successfully constructed the problem of domestic violence as a feminist issue. 
Specifically, domestic violence came to be defined by the refuge movement within the 
parameters of gender inequality and the patriarchal home. As a corollary, I have argued that 
refuges did not respond to the pre-existing problem of domestic violence, but instead engaged 
in the process of reframing it as a feminist issue over time according to radical feminist 
theorisations of gender and the family. In making these points, I have drawn on the work of 
post-structuralist feminists who highlight the way that social problems are contested and 
influenced by competing discourses and subjectivities.  
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Further, I have shown how, over the same time period, this definition of domestic violence 
underpinned the criteria for women entering refuge, as well as the emergence of a high-
security refuge model based on secret addresses that was unique to Victoria. With regard to 
the latter, the Victorian movement‘s insistence on secret addresses for women‘s refuges 
reflected their commitment to organisational autonomy and women‘s safety. Yet the thesis 
also shows that these developments reflected a refuge movement dominated by Anglo, able-
bodied, and middle-class women; this generated exclusionary practices towards those who fell 
outside its boundaries. Indeed, by the end of the 1970s, it was the official policy of the 
Victorian movement to exclude women from their services who were experiencing 
homelessness, English language difficulties, disabilities, and psychiatric, drug and alcohol 
issues; and it was their unofficial policy to target married, Anglo, able-bodied, and 
heterosexual women with children experiencing domestic violence.  
 
Oblivious to the contradictions involved in the exclusions that characterised the early refuge 
movement‘s practices, radical feminists claimed to promote the unity of all women in their 
modus operandi by removing oppressive hierarchical structures and adopting collective 
organisational structures and processes. These were gradually implemented by all women‘s 
refuges by the 1980s. I have argued that this process was at times empowering for the women 
involved, but it also meant that the differences between women in refuge, and their needs, 
were often overlooked or minimised, and collective methods did not always operate smoothly. 
As a result of the activism of marginalised groups of women, new refuges emerged to cater 
for their particular needs. And, from the 1980s onwards, these groups further demanded that 
mainstream services be more inclusive of their differing requirements, and subjectivities. By 
the 1990s, then, and in correlation with broader trends including the ‗cultural turn‘ and its 
influence on feminist theory and activism, differences between women were being articulated, 
recognised and responded to within domestic violence services.  
 
This growth in inclusiveness by the early 1990s was not the only change. The thesis also 
documents the rising influence of liberal feminism on the movement‘s aims in focusing 
greater attention on improving the efficiency of their organisations and the effectiveness of 
their service delivery, above social change and gender equity. Evidence adduced here 
demonstrates the influence of conservative groups in bringing about these shifts, alongside an 
enhanced level of mutual respect and tolerance for the ideological diversity of women 
working in domestic violence services. However, these changes were met with resistance by 
radical elements in the movement that feared their goals of achieving women‘s equality would 
be compromised. Despite the impetus by conservative groups to professionalise behaviour 
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and enhance efficiency in decision-making processes, by the 1990s Commonwealth and state 
governments were overwhelmingly leading the charge in these shifts, as they became 
increasingly determined to regulate community organisations at arms length according to the 
principles of managerialism and privatisation policy. Domestic violence services were unable 
to halt or reverse the overriding emphasis on professionalism across all realms of their 
practice, or the gradual adoption of hierarchical organisational structures within domestic 
violence organisations, and some adopted market philosophies in order to survive. However, 
until very recently, domestic violence services across all ideological persuasions continued to 
resist the outright adoption of hierarchical structures, and instead organised according to 
modified collective structures.  
 
Whilst feminist principles are now implicit in government policy and sector guidelines for 
working with women in domestic violence services, it is also evident that the movement itself 
has become less explicitly identified with the politics of feminism. I argue that this can in part 
be explained by a backlash against the exclusionary practices of some women‘s refuges, and 
dogmatic interpretations of feminism and/or feminist service provision. In addition, the 
external environment in Victoria was particularly hostile to feminist services by the mid-
1990s, and to feminism more broadly, which meant that a growing number of activists 
deliberately and strategically distanced themselves from identification with feminism, 
particularly when engaging with external organisations.  
 
The second thesis theme—the movement‘s internal and external strategies and actions—
describes in detail the changing tactics and methods adopted by the movement to achieve their 
goals. Direct action outside of mainstream institutions was central to the spirit of activism 
during the 1970s, and the first half of the 1980s. Activists in Victoria, and across Australia, 
protested by holding vigils, squatting, marching, and publicising the issues facing women in 
refuge during the 1970s, and continued to do so into the mid-1980s. The approach of radical 
feminists, in particular, was confrontational and forceful, and this extended to their 
interactions with other activists both inside and outside their movement. I have argued that, 
whilst this approach was challenging for many, including conservative members of the 
movement and government bureaucrats, it was also effective because the issues being 
articulated were of such gravity, and their analysis so powerful, groundbreaking and 
articulate, that many were forced to listen. From the early 1990s onwards, as I have 
demonstrated, under the growing leadership of liberal feminists within the movement, refuge 
activists‘ tactics became less public and confrontational, as these leaders sought to work in 
partnership with external organisations, and generate reform within mainstream organisations. 
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This enabled the movement to position itself successfully so as to influence mainstream 
policy and programmatic development in relation to domestic violence across a range of non-
government and government institutions, particularly within the judiciary. Notably, their 
capacity to do so had in part derived from the movement‘s history of radicalism, which forced 
government institutions in particular to become more open and responsive. 
 
For all the differences between the groups in the domestic violence services movement, the 
thesis demonstrates that participants in the Victorian movement were able to organise 
strategically and work together because of a shared commitment to women and children 
experiencing domestic violence. This commitment is evident over the three decades covered 
by this thesis. The instigation of the various unfunded peak bodies described here is an 
example of the capacity of the movement to work strategically both internally and with 
external bodies. I have also documented how, within the movement, marginalised groups of 
women operated strategically to ensure their voices were heard, and continued to press for 
their needs to be met. In recent years, this has resulted in specialised funding and taskforces to 
tackle particular issues confronting migrant and Aboriginal women, and women with 
disabilities. 
 
Examination of particular incidents and crises has shown that working together was not 
always harmonious, and the movement‘s history should not therefore be characterised as one 
of unmitigated feminist heroism and success, though certainly much was accomplished. 
Domestic violence activism was characterised by significant internal and external conflict 
until the 2000s, and there were clearly negative experiences for individual movement 
members as a result. Histories to date that have sought to minimise these tensions have been 
criticised for a propensity to generate seamless narratives of feminist achievement. This 
dissertation provides some counterbalance to those accounts of the women‘s refuge 
movement that have glossed over the unruly nature of women‘s political experiences. 
However, I also contend that the movement‘s monumental achievements should not be 
minimised, but instead acknowledged publicly and given the dignity of serious historical 
analysis. This thesis has endeavoured to provide such an analysis and appreciation. 
 
The final thesis theme—the relationship between the movement and external institutions such 
as ‗the state‘—focuses on the domestic violence services movement‘s engagement with state 
institutions, which resulted in considerable benefits for women and children escaping 
violence. These included the achievement of recurrent government funding, the expansion of 
services, the implementation of whole-of-government co-ordinated policy responses, 
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legislative and judicial reforms, and the ongoing adoption of a feminist framing of domestic 
violence in the construction of public policy. I have demonstrated how these changes have 
primarily come about because of the movement‘s tireless advocacy, which forced 
governments to tackle the issue.  
 
The thesis argues that the movement‘s engagement with government bureaucrats, particularly 
during the 1970s, served to strengthen activists‘ unity, despite initial fears among radical 
feminist refuge workers that the funding of refuges by the state would serve to undermine 
them. I have shown that, contrary to these feminists‘ fears, state bureaucrats and other 
members of government during the 1970s and 1980s were very often supportive of the 
movement‘s agenda. And women of all political persuasions played a critical role in 
supporting the movement to achieve co-ordinated policy development and funding for 
domestic violence services.  
 
As we have seen, the influence of liberal feminism from the 1990s onwards had a significant 
effect in directing the movement‘s engagement with the state. The movement became 
increasingly focused on achieving reform within the system, and lobbied for policy 
development, legislative change, and improved funding for services. Domestic violence 
services remained at the forefront of these processes, participating in countless committees 
and taskforces with the aim of ensuring that policy development and implementation met the 
practical needs of women, and that feminism continued to be the dominant discourse through 
which domestic violence was understood. However, the thesis makes it clear that this level of 
influence was only possible because radical feminists waged a long and hard-fought battle to 
force the issue onto the government‘s agenda, thus making it a ‗legitimate‘ policy problem, 
and therefore one of more central concern to liberal feminists. 
 
Throughout the dissertation, I have demonstrated how these shifts in feminist ideology were 
also influenced by broader institutional and political transformations such as governments‘ 
change of emphasis to economic efficiency rather than redistributive welfare in human 
services delivery. Reflecting this process, the relentless implementation in Victoria of 
economic rationalist policies in the 1990s radically changed the nature of the relationship 
between domestic violence services and the state. In particular, the imposition of competitive 
tendering inhibited open criticism of the government by community sector organisations, and 
thwarted their ability to operate autonomously or undertake political protest. However, I have 
shown here that the refuge movement did not, as some would suggest, simply give up on 
challenging government and politicising the issues facing women in their services. Despite 
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the threatening and competitive environment, domestic violence services opposed when they 
could, resisted where possible, and, over time, began to work in greater cooperation with each 
other to survive.  
 
Domestic violence services have continued to undertake political advocacy in addition to 
service provision, despite dramatic underfunding; this continues today and places an 
unsustainable burden on small independent community organisations. Continued advocacy 
has only been possible because of the unpaid work of women who remain committed to 
redressing domestic violence. Significantly, refuges have been the most under-funded of all 
domestic violence services, and they have often been unable to meet minimum requirements 
in relation to basic staff entitlements. I have argued that this has stemmed, in part, from a 
changing institutional culture in which the government moved to redress domestic violence at 
the level of individuals over and above structural factors. Domestic violence services were 
forced to respond to innumerable administrative and organisational demands from 
government from the 1990s onwards, including expanding their service delivery—and all 
without additional financial support. I argue that successive Liberal and Labor governments in 
Victoria did little to tackle underfunding and under-resourcing, despite unrelenting advocacy 
by the movement and recommendations from numerous government advisory committees. 
 
By 2005, as the last substantive chapter demonstrates, many of the aims and objectives of the 
domestic violence services movement—including the promotion of gender equity and the 
development of an inclusive service system—had been absorbed in the Victorian Labor 
government‘s policy framework for tackling violence against women. At the same time, a 
new cooperative relation was re-established between bureaucrats and movement activists. 
This relationship, however, bore little resemblance to the movement‘s engagement with the 
state during the 1970s and early 1980s; indeed, the locus of power had indelibly shifted. The 
ability to achieve true ‗partnership‘ with government in a context of unequal power 
relations—where the government has continued to make use of its capacity to exert rigid 
control over the planning and operation of human service organisations—has, not 
surprisingly, been questioned. Activists have, for example, queried whether the domestic 
violence services movement continues to reflect the needs of women in the community. 
Nevertheless, as I have made clear, those involved in the movement have adapted to their 
changing environment by altering their aims and methods, and with many positive results.  
 
The domestic violence services movement has had a powerful and transformative impact on 
the way that domestic violence is commonly understood and responded to in Victoria, and 
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more broadly, in Australia. The advocacy work of activists has resulted in the development of 
a plethora of services, programs, legislation, and government investment designed to tackle 
domestic violence, and this has real impacts on the daily lives of countless women and 
children. Yet the incidence of violence remains widespread, and the intractability of the 
problem is indicated by its responsibility for causing major health problems for women and 
substantial economic costs. Reflecting on the refuge movement‘s origins provides us with 
some opportunity to consider why this social problem persists.  
 
Activists in the 1970s sought the elimination of all the causes for women seeking refuge, 
including domestic violence, and, in order to achieve their goals, they set about attempting to 
redress issues of gender inequity. In particular, they tackled problems relating to women‘s 
poverty, including their need for access to safe and affordable housing and economic 
independence. These problems remain stubbornly apparent today, and should therefore 
remain at the forefront of any social policy response designed to eliminate domestic violence. 
But there are other unresolved problems that need attention too. It is now widely recognised 
that the problem of violence in the home is located on a continuum of mistreatment that stems 
from inequality between women and men. However, compartmentalisation at a programmatic 
level generates exclusionary consequences for particular women, including those whose 
experience of interpersonal violence occurs outside the home. The factors that connect 
women‘s different experiences of violence require specific attention and research, as well as 
policy and programmatic coordination and response. It is also critical that domestic violence 
services, and in particular women‘s refuges, receive improved funding so as to avoid 
disastrous impending workforce retention problems. It is at once a failure of successive 
governments, as well as a feat of committed activists, that many of the movement‘s 
achievements have come as a result of the unpaid work of women. This cannot continue 
indefinitely. 
 
Recent policy initiatives reflect the consensus that, in addition to the need for wide-ranging 
integrated responses to support the diverse needs of women and children, the support needs of 
violent men also require recognition and resourcing. It is critical, therefore, that the domestic 
violence services movement leads future policy directions designed to deal with domestic 
violence. This is to ensure that programs continue to be informed by an analysis of domestic 
violence in which gendered power structures are understood to be the central cause of this 
devastating problem—and so that men‘s violence can never again be framed simply as a 
problem arising from violent individuals, requiring policy responses targeted to the protection 
of passive women. 
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